University of Virginia Library



BOOK FOUR

Chapter XI

SOLITARY INDIGNATION[1]

Men well versed in the principles of tact[2] are always farseeing
and clearly observing. For, if not clearly observing,
they cannot discern selfishness. Men able to uphold the
law are always decisive and straightforward. For, if not
straightforward, they cannot correct crookedness.

Ministers who attend to their duties in conformity to
orders and fulfil their posts in accordance with laws, are
not called "heavy-handed men".[3] The heavy-handed men
would without any order act on their will, benefit themselves
by breaking the law, help their families by consuming state
resources, and have enough power to manipulate their
ruler. Such are the so-called[4] "heavy-handed men".

Men well versed in the principles of tact, being clearly
observing, if listened to and taken into service by the ruler,
will discern the secret motives of the heavy-handed men.


98

Men able to uphold the law, being straightforward, if listened
to and taken into service by the ruler, will correct the crooked
deeds of the heavy-handed men. In short, if these types of
men are taken into service, noble and powerful ministers
will infallibly fall off the inked string.[5] This is the reason
why they and the authorities in charge of the state affairs[6]
are bad enemies and unable to coexist.

If the authorities concerned take all matters of the state
into their own hands, then everybody, whether outside or
inside the court, will be bound to become their tool. Thus,
unless through their good offices, feudal lords from abroad
cannot accomplish any negotiation, wherefore even enemy
states praise[7] them; unless through their good offices, no
official in governmental service can advance his career,
wherefore the body of officials becomes their tool; unless
through their good offices, the courtiers cannot approach
the sovereign, wherefore the courtiers conceal their vices;
and, unless through their good offices, the allowances of
scholars will decrease and the treatment accorded them will
deteriorate, wherefore the learned men speak well of them.
These four assistances are means whereby wicked ministers
embellish themselves.

The heavy-handed men cannot be so loyal to the sovereign
as to recommend their enemies and the lord of men cannot
rise above their four assistances in such wise as to discern
the right types of ministers. Therefore, the more deluded[8]
the sovereign is, the more powerful the chief vassals become.


99

In general, the authorities concerned, in relation to the
lord of men, are rarely not trusted and beloved, and, moreover,
are his old acquaintances and long time intimates.
To please the sovereign's mind by sharing the same likes
and hates with him, is, of course, their beaten way of self-elevation.
Their posts and ranks are noble and powerful;
their friends and partisans are numerous; and the whole
country praises them with one accord. Contrary to these,
upholders of law and tact, when they want to approach the
Throne, have neither the relationship of the trusted and
beloved nor the favour of the long acquaintances and old
intimates, and, what is still worse, intend to reform the
biased mind of the lord of men with lectures on law and
tact; which altogether is opposed to the taste of the lord
of men. Naturally they have to acquiesce in a low and
humble status and, having no partisans, live in solitude and
singleness.

Indeed, the strange and distant, when contesting with the
near and dear, have no reason to win; newcomers and
travellers, when contesting with long acquaintances and old
intimates, have no reason to win; opponents of the
sovereign's opinion, when contesting with his supporters
of the same taste, have no reason to win; the humble and
powerless, when contesting with the noble and powerful,
have no reason to win; and a single mouth,[9] when contesting
with the whole country, has no reason to win. Confronted
with these five handicaps, upholders of law and tact, though
they wait for a number of years, are still[10] unable to see the


100

sovereign. On the contrary, the authorities concerned,
possessed of the advantages of five winnings, speak freely
to the Throne at any time. If so, how can upholders of law
and tact distinguish themselves and when can the lord of
men realize his own mistakes?

Being thus hopelessly handicapped in their equipment
and rendered incompatible with the authorities by force of
circumstances, how can upholders of law and tact avoid
dangers? Those who can be falsely accused of criminal
offences are censured with state laws; those who cannot
be indicted as criminals are ended by private swordsmen.
For this reason,[11] those who clarify the principles of law and
tact but act contrary to the sovereign's taste, if not executed
through official censure, are infallibly dispatched by private
swordsmen.

However, friends and partisans who form juntas on
purpose to delude the sovereign and twist their words so as
to benefit themselves, always win the confidence of the
heavy-handed men. Accordingly, those who can be accorded
the pretext of meritorious services are ennobled with official
rank; those who cannot[12] be accorded any good reputation
are empowered through foreign influences. For this reason,
men who delude the sovereign and frequent the gates of
private mansions, if not celebrated for official rank, are
always empowered through foreign influence.

In these days, the lord of men, without investigating


101

evidence and witness, inflicts censure and punishment upon
upholders of law and tact, and, without waiting for
meritorious services to appear, confers rank and bounties
upon friends and partisans of the authorities. If so, how
can the upholders of law and tact risk their lives in presenting
their ideas to the Throne, and how would the wicked
ministers discard their private advantages and withdraw
themselves from office? Therefore, the more humbled the
sovereign is, the more ennobled are the private clans.

Indeed, the Yüeh State was rich and her army was strong.
Yet the sovereign of every Central State, knowing that she
was useless to him, would say: "She is not within the reach
of my control." Take for example a state at present. However
extensive the territory and however numerous the
people, if the lord of men is deluded and the chief vassals
have all powers to themselves, that state is the same as
Yüeh.[13] If the ruler only perceives[14] no resemblance of his
state to Yüeh but fails to perceive no resemblance of the
state out of his control to the state under his control, he
never thoroughly understands what resemblance is.

People[15] speak of the fall of Ch`i. Not that the land and
cities fell to pieces, but that the Lü Clan failed to rule while
the T`ien Clan assumed the ruling power. They speak of
the fall of Chin. Not that the land and cities fell to pieces,
but that the Chi Clan failed to rule while the Six Nobles
had all powers to themselves. To-day, if chief vassals have


102

the ruling power in their grip and decide on all state policies
by themselves and the sovereign does not know how to
recover his prerogatives, it is because the lord of men is not
intelligent. Whoever catches the same diseases as dead
people did, cannot survive; whoever shows the same
symptoms as ruined states did, cannot exist. Therefore, the
present followers of the footsteps of Ch`i and Chin, even
though they want to secure and preserve their states, will
find it to be an unattainable task.

In general, the difficulty in enacting law and tact is met
not only by rulers of ten thousand chariots but also by rulers
of one thousand chariots. As the attendants of the lord of
men are not necessarily intelligent, if in estimating new
personnel he first takes counsel from men whom he considers
wise and then discusses their words with his attendants, he
is talking about wise men to fools. As the attendants of the
lord of men are not necessarily worthy, if in estimating new
personnel he first pays respect to men whom he considers
worthy and then discusses their deeds with his attendants,
he is talking about worthies to ruffians. If wise men have to
submit their plans for fools' approval and worthies have to
see their deeds estimated by ruffians, men of worthiness
and wisdom will feel ashamed and the ruler's conclusions
will be full of fallacies.

Among the sovereign's subjects aspiring to official honours,
refined men would keep their characters clean, and wise men
would advance their careers[16] by improving their eloquence.
They cannot please anybody with bribes. Counting on


103

their cleanness and eloquence,[17] they are unable to join
governmental service by bending the law. Consequently,
refined and intelligent men would neither bribe the attendants
nor comply with private requests.

The attendants of the lord of men are not as upright in
conduct as Poh-i.[18] If they fail to get what they want and
receive the bribes they expect, then the refined and intelligent
men's merits of cleanness and eloquence will come to naught
while words of slander and false accusation will ensue instead.
When merits of eloquence[19] are restricted by the courtiers
and virtues of cleanness are estimated by slanderers, then
refined and intelligent magistrates will be deposed while the
sagacity of the lord of men will be debarred. When the ruler
estimates wisdom and virtue not according to meritorious
services and judges crimes and faults not through the
processes of investigation and testimony but simply listens
to the words of the courtiers and attendants, then incapable
men will fill up the court and stupid and corrupt magistrates
will occupy all posts.

The threat to the ruler of ten thousand chariots is the chief
vassals' being too powerful. The threat to the ruler of one


104

thousand chariots is the attendants' being too much trusted.
Both these threats, indeed, are common to every lord of
men. Moreover, whether ministers commit major offences
or the lord of men has serious faults, ruler and minister
always have mutually[20] different interests. How is this
known? In reply I say: "The sovereign is interested in
appointing able men to office; the minister is interested in
securing employment with no competent abilities. The
sovereign is interested in awarding rank and bounties for
distinguished services; the minister is interested in obtaining
wealth and honour without merit. The sovereign is interested
in having heroic men exerting their abilities; the minister is
interested in having their friends and partisans effect self-seeking
purposes. Accordingly, when the land of the state
is dismembered, private families are enriched; when the
sovereign is degraded, chief vassals are empowered. In
consequence, when the sovereign loses his influence, ministers
gain the rule over the state; when the sovereign changes
his title into that of a feudatory vassal, the prime minister
splits tallies into halves.[21] These are the reasons why ministers
attempt to beguile the ruler and further their private
interests."

Thus, if the sovereign ever changes the circumstances,[22]
not even two or three out of ten chief vassals of the present
age can remain in favour with him. What is the reason


105

therefor? It is because crimes committed by ministers are
serious.

Ministers guilty of major offences must have deceived
their sovereign. Such crimes deserve the death penalty.
The wise men, far-seeing and afraid of death, never will
obey the heavy-handed men. Similarly, the worthies,
anxious to cultivate their personal integrity and ashamed
of joining the wicked ministers in deceiving the sovereign,
never will obey the chief vassals. That being so, the adherents
and dependents of the authorities concerned, if not stupid
and ignorant of the impending calamity, must be corrupt
and mind no wickedness.

The chief vassals, holding such stupid and corrupt men
under control, co-operate with them in deceiving the sovereign
from above and collect spoils from below. Their friends
and partisans exploit the masses of the people,[23] associate for
treasonable purposes, bewilder the sovereign by unifying
their words, and disturb the gentry and commoners by
breaking the law. In so doing they incline the state towards
danger and dismemberment and the sovereign towards
hardship and disgrace. Such is a major offence. When
ministers are guilty of such a major offence and the sovereign
never suppresses them, he is then committing a serious
fault. Should the sovereign commit such a serious fault
and ministers commit such a major offence, to prevent the
state from going to ruin would be impossible.

 
[1]

[OMITTED]. This chapter vividly reflects the political and social background
of the author's intellectual responses. Since Lin Yutang in his book, My
Country and My People,
repeatedly quoted Han Fei Tzŭ and since almost
every page of the book reveals his solitary indignation at his country and
his people, I wonder if it was this work, if not the whole works, of Han Fei
Tzŭ that inspired him to protest against his age.

[2]

[OMITTED] was rendered by Forke, Duyvendak, and Bodde as "method",
which is too vague and therefore rather misleading. My rendering is "tact"
in most cases and "craft" or "statecraft" sometimes.

[3]

[OMITTED].

[4]

Wang Hsien-shen reads [OMITTED] for [OMITTED].

[5]

They will be found guilty and dismissed from office.

[6]

[OMITTED]. The personnel directing the course of the state.

[7]

I read [OMITTED] for [OMITTED].

[8]

With Ku Kuang-ts`ê [OMITTED] reads [OMITTED].

[9]

[OMITTED] here refers to every upholder of law and tact living in solitude
and singleness.

[10]

With Ku Kuang-ts`ê [OMITTED] should be [OMITTED].

[11]

I propose the supply of [OMITTED] below [OMITTED].

[12]

Ku Kuang-ts`ê proposed the supply of [OMITTED] below [OMITTED]. Wang Hsien-shen
disagreed with him. I agree with Ku because Han Fei Tzŭ apparently intended
to maintain parallelism between this sentence and the corresponding sentence
in the preceding paragraph.

[13]

It is because that state slips off the sovereign's control just as Yüeh
was situated beyond the reach of the control by the sovereign of a Central
State.

[14]

With Wang Hsien-shen [OMITTED] in both cases should be [OMITTED].

[15]

With Sun I-jang [OMITTED] below [OMITTED] is superfluous.

[16]

With Yü Yüch and Wang Hsien-shen [OMITTED] below [OMITTED] is
superfluous.

[17]

With Ku Kuang-ts`ê [OMITTED] should be [OMITTED].

[18]

Poh-i and Shu-ch`i were sons of the Ruler of Ku-chu. The father
appointed the younger brother Shu-ch`i to be his successor. After the father's
death each refused the throne, because each considered the other more
entitled thereto. When the people in the country established the middle
brother on the throne, they went to spend the rest of their life under the
protection of the Earl of the West. On the way they met Fa, subsequently
King Wu of Chou, who had revolted against Chow during the mournful
period of the Earl. As they never approved of such an action, instead of
submitting to the change of the ruling dynasty which they condemned as
a change from tyrant to tyrant, they left for the Shou-yang Mountains,
where they died of starvation. Hence both brothers became types of morality.

[19]

With Ku Kuang-ts`ê [OMITTED] should be [OMITTED]. With Wang Hsien-shen Chang
Pang's edition has [OMITTED] in place of [OMITTED].

[20]

With Ku [OMITTED] above [OMITTED] should be below it.

[21]

[OMITTED] means to issue official decrees and exercise the ruling authorities.
On issuing them the prime minister would put each decree on a tally which
he first splits into two halves and gives one to the appointee and keeps the
other half in his office for subsequent identification.

[22]

[OMITTED]. For instance, the sovereign comes to realize his past faults,
discards favouritism, and enforces strict legalism.

[23]

With Wang Hsien-shen [OMITTED] should be [OMITTED].


106

Chapter XII

DIFFICULTIES IN THE WAY OF PERSUASION[1]

i.—Difficulties in the way of persuasion, generally
speaking, are not difficulties in my knowledge with which
I persuade the ruler, nor are they difficulties in my skill of
argumentation which enables me to make my ideas clear,
nor are they difficulties in my courage to exert my abilities
without reserve. As a whole, the difficulties in the way of
persuasion lie in my knowing the heart of the persuaded in
order thereby to fit my wording into it.

If the persuaded strives after high fame while you persuade
him of big profit, you will be considered low-bred, accorded
mean treatment, and shunned from afar. If the persuaded
strives after big profit while you persuade him of high fame,
you will be considered mindless and ignorant of worldly
affairs and will never be accepted. If the persuaded strives
after big profit in secret but openly seeks for high fame
while you persuade him of high fame, you will be accepted
in name but kept distant in fact; and, if you persuade him
of big profit, your word will be adopted in secret but your
person will be left out openly. These points should be
carefully deliberated.

Indeed, affairs succeed if kept secret and[2] fail if divulged.


107

Though you never intend to expose the ruler's secrets, yet
if you happen to speak of anything he wants to conceal,
you are then in danger. When the ruler embarks openly
on an enterprise but plans thereby to accomplish a different
task, if the persuader knows not only its motive but also its
purpose, he is then in danger. When the persuader has
devised an extraordinary scheme which suits the ruler, if
another wise man finds it out by inferring it from other
sources and divulges the secret to the world, the ruler will
think he has divulged the secret, wherefore he is in danger.
If the persuader exhausts all his wisdom before his master's
favour becomes thick, then though his persuasion prevails
and has merits, his fruitful services will be forgotten with
ease. If his persuasion takes no effect and has demerits, he
will fall under suspicion. In such a case he is in danger.
Supposing the ruler had an aptitude for certain faults and
the persuader spoke plainly on propriety and righteousness
and thereby challenged his vices, he would be in danger.
If the ruler has taken a scheme from somebody else, which
he assumes to be his own work, and the persuader happens
to know the whole secret, he is in danger. Whoever forcibly
persuades the ruler to do what he cannot do and not to do
what he cannot stop doing, is in danger.

Therefore, if you talk about great men to him, he thinks
you are intimating his defects. If you talk about small men
to him, he thinks you are showing off your superiority. If
you discuss an object of his love, he thinks you are expecting
a special favour from it. If you discuss an object of his hate,
he thinks you are testing his temper. If you simplify your
discussion, he thinks you are unwise and will spurn you.
If your discussion is lucidly wayward and extensively


108

refined,[3] he thinks you are superficial and flippant.[4] If you
omit details and present generalizations only, he thinks you
are cowardly and incomplete. If you trace the principles
of facts and use wide illustrations, he thinks you are rustic
and arrogant. These are difficulties in the way of persuasion,
which every persuader should know.

2.—In general, the business of the persuader is to embellish
the pride and obliterate the shame of the persuaded. If he
has any private urgent need, you ought to encourage him
with the cause of public justice. If the persuaded has a mean
intention but cannot help it, you ought to praise its excellent
points and minimize its harmfulness to the public. If he has
a high ambition in mind but his real ability falls short of
the mark, you ought to enumerate its mistakes, disclose its
disadvantages, and esteem his suspension from realizing it.
If he aspires to the pride of wisdom and talent, you ought
to enumerate different species of the same genus with
reference to every object of knowledge and thereby supply
him with abundant information and let him derive ideas
from you but pretend to ignorance of his derivation so as
to elevate his wisdom.

If you want the persuaded to adopt your suggestion to
cultivate inter-state friendship, you ought to explain it in
the light of a glorious cause and intimate its accord with
his private interest. If you want to describe things dangerous
and injurious to the state welfare, you ought to enumerate


109

the reproaches and slanders against them first and then
intimate their discord with his private interest.

Praise those men doing the same things as he does. Esteem
the tasks under the same scheme as his tasks are. In regard
to men having the same faults as he has, be sure to defend
their harmlessness. In regard to men having met the same
failures as he met, be sure to bring out their incurring no
loss. If he makes much of his own strength, do not bring in
any difficult task that impedes him. If he thinks his own
decisions brave, do not point out their unlawfulness; that
angers him. If he thinks his own scheme wise, do not recall
his past failures which embarrass him. When your meaning
is not offensive and your wording is not flippant, you are
then under way to use all your wisdom and eloquence to
persuade anybody. In this way you can become near and
dear to him, avoid all suspicion, and exert your speech to
the utmost.

I Yin had to work as a cook and Pai-li Hsi had to go as
a captive, both aiming thereby to approach their masters.
These two men were sages. Still they could not help lowering
themselves to such a humble level in order to introduce
themselves to notice. Now take me[5] as cook or captive.
If you find it possible to take advice from me, carry out
my suggestion, and thereby save the world, it is no shame
to an able man.

Indeed, as days multiply in the long course of time and
favour with the ruler grows well-grounded, when you are
no longer suspected of devising schemes profoundly and
not convicted in joining issue with the ruler on any point,


110

then you may frankly weigh[6] the relative advantages and
disadvantages of the trend of the times and thereby forecast
your meritorious services and straightly point out what is
right and what is wrong in the course of government and
thereby assert yourself. If ruler and minister stand together
in such relationship, it is due to the success of persuasion.

3.—In by-gone days, Duke Wu of Chêng, thinking of
invading Hu, married his daughter to the Ruler of Hu and
thereby pleased his mind. Then he asked his ministers,
"I am thinking of starting a military campaign. Which
country should be invaded?" In reply High Officer Kuan
Ch`i-ssŭ said, "Hu should be invaded." Angered thereby,
Duke Wu executed him saying: "Hu is a sister[7] state.
Why do you suggest invading her?" Hearing about this,
the Ruler of Hu thought Chêng was friendly to him and so
took no precaution against her invasion. Meanwhile, the
Chêngs made a surprise attack upon Hu and took the
country.

There was in Sung a rich man. Once it rained and his
mud fence collapsed. Thereupon his son said: "If the fence
is not immediately rebuilt, burglars might come." So also did
the father of his neighbours say to him. On the evening
of that day he incurred a great loss of money. Thereafter
his family had high regard for his son's wisdom but suspected
the father of the neighbours.

Now, what these two men[8] said came out equally true.
Yet, the one in the serious case met the death penalty while


111

the other in the minor case incurred suspicion. Not that
they had difficulties in getting knowledge, but that they had
difficulties in using their knowledge.

Therefore, Jao Ch`ao,[9] after his words had proved true,
became a sage in Chin but was executed in Ch`in. This is
what every persuader should carefully deliberate.

In by-gone days, Mi Tzŭ-hsia was in favour with the
Ruler of Wei. According to the Law of the Wei State,
"whoever in secret rides in the Ruler's coach shall have his
feet cut off." Once Mi Tzŭ-hsia's mother fell ill. Somebody,
hearing about this, sent a message to Mi Tzŭ late at night.
Thereupon Mi Tzŭ on the pretence of the Ruler's order rode
in the Ruler's coach. At the news of this, the Ruler regarded
his act as worthy, saying: "How dutiful he is! For his
mother's sake he even forgot that he was committing a
crime making him liable to lose his feet." Another day,
when taking a stroll with the Ruler in an orchard, he ate
a peach. It being so sweet, he did not finish it, but gave the
Ruler the remaining half to eat. So, the Ruler said: "You
love me so much indeed, that you would even forget your
own saliva taste and let me eat the rest of the peach." When
the colour of Mi Tzŭ faded, the Ruler's love for him
slackened. Once he happened to offend the Ruler, the
Ruler said: "This fellow once rode in my coach under


112

pretence of my order and another time gave me a half-eaten
peach." The deeds of Mi Tzŭ had themselves never
changed. Yet he was at first regarded as worthy and
later found guilty because his master's love turned into
hate.

Therefore, if anybody stands in his master's favour, his
wisdom will function well and his intimacy with him will
grow; once he incurs the master's hatred, his wisdom will
stop functioning[10] and his relationship with him will become
more and more distant. For this reason, whoever attempts
remonstration, persuasion, explanation, and discussion,
before the Throne, must carefully observe the sovereign's
feelings of love and hate before he starts persuading him.
Indeed, when the dragon moves like a worm, man can tame
it, play with it,[11] and ride on its back. However, there are
below its throat inverted scales, each one foot in diameter.
These scales would kill anyone touching them. So does
the lord of men have inverted scales. Any persuader
able to avoid touching the inverted scales of the lord of
men must be very near to the mastery of the art of
persuasion.

 
[1]

[OMITTED]. This chapter as a whole is so systematic that it naturally falls
into three sections. In the first section the author explains what the difficulties
are in the way of persuasion. In the second section he suggests the kind of
tact a persuader ought to master in order to get over the difficulties. The
last one contains certain facts illustrating his viewpoint, while the concluding
paragraph sums up the main points of the whole discussion. For convenience's
sake I have marked the beginning paragraph of each section with a numeral.

[2]

With Lu Wên-shao the Historical Records has [OMITTED] in place of [OMITTED].

[3]

With Lu Wên-shao the Historical Records has [OMITTED] in place
of [OMITTED].

[4]

With Ku Kuang-ts`ê and Wang Hsien-shen [OMITTED] should be [OMITTED].

[5]

With Kao Hêng [OMITTED] below [OMITTED] is superfluous.

[6]

With Ku Kuang-ts`ê the Historical Records has [OMITTED] in place of [OMITTED].

[7]

[OMITTED] literally means "brother state".

[8]

Kuan Ch`i-ssŭ and the neighbours' father.

[9]

In 614 b.c. during the reign of Duke Ling of Chin the Chin Government
devised a scheme to get an able man, Shih Hui, back from the Ch`in
State. Having discovered the secret plot, Jao Ch`ao submitted to Duke
K`ang of Ch`in a word of warning, which, however, was not listened to.
At the departure of Shih Hui from Ch`in, Jao Ch`ao said: "Do not think
that nobody in Ch`in succeeded in detecting the scheme of Chin. Because
my word was not adopted, you are now able to leave for your country."
This astonished the Chins, who, accordingly, esteemed him as a sage. In
Ch`in, however, he fell under suspicion and was executed.

[10]

With Wang Hsien-shen the Extracts from Classical Works has no
[OMITTED] below [OMITTED].

[11]

With Kao Hêng [OMITTED] should be [OMITTED].


113

Chapter XIII

THE DIFFICULTY OF PIEN HO[1]

Once a man of Ch`u, named Pien Ho, came by an uncut
jade in the Ch`u Hills. He brought it home and submitted
it as a present to King Wu.[2] Thereupon King Wu had a
jeweller give an opinion of it. "It is an ordinary stone,"
said the jeweller. The King, regarding Ho as a liar, had
his left foot cut off. Upon King Wu's death, King Wên
ascended the throne, when Ho again submitted it as a present
to King Wên. King Wên also had a jeweller give an opinion
of it. Again he said, "It is an ordinary stone." The King,
also regarding Ho as a liar, had his right foot cut off.

When King Wên died and King Ch`êng ascended the
throne, Ho, carrying the uncut jade in his arms, cried at
the foot of the Ching Hills.[3] After three days and three
nights his tears were all exhausted and blood flowed out.
At this news the King sent men out to ask him the reason,
saying, "Throughout All-under-Heaven men whose feet
were cut off are many. Why should you be crying so
bitterly?" "I am lamenting not the loss of my feet,"
said Ho in reply, "but for the calling a precious gem an
ordinary stone and for their dubbing an honest man a liar.
This is the reason why I am lamenting." Meanwhile, the
King had a jeweller polish up the jade and got the treasure
out at last. So it was designated "the Jade of Pien Ho".


114

Indeed, pearls and gems are what the lord of men wants
badly. Though Ho presented the uncut jade to the Throne,
before it was made beautiful, he was never a harm to His
Majesty. Nevertheless, it was only after both his feet had
been cut off that the treasure was acknowledged. That to
establish an opinion of a treasure should be so difficult!

To-day, the lord of men feels the need of law and tact
not necessarily as badly as he wants the Jade of Pien Ho,
whereas he has to suppress the self-seeking wickedness of
all officials, gentry, and commoners.[4] That being so,
upholders of the right way of government are not punished
because they have not as yet presented the uncut jade of
emperors and kings to the Throne.

If the sovereign uses tact, then neither the chief vassals
can fix the state policies at their will, nor will the courtiers
dare to sell off any personal favour. If the magistrate enforces
the law, then vagabonds have to turn to tillage while itinerants
have to stop talking about warfare. If so, law and tact offer
a drawback to the officials, gentry, and commoners. Therefore,
unless the lord of men can rise against the chief vassals'
protests, above the vagabonds' slanders, and exclusively
follow[5] the dicta of the true path, upholders of law and
tact, even though driven to the verge of death, will never
see the true path acknowledged.

In by-gone days, Wu Ch`i taught King Tao of Ch`u
a state policy for Ch`u, saying: "When chief vassals are
too powerful and enfeoffed retainers too numerous, the
body of officials will intimidate the ruler and oppress the


115

people, which is the way to impoverish the state and weaken
the army. Therefore, better confiscate the ranks and bounties
of the enfeoffed retainers after the third generation of their
successors, reduce[6] the salaries and allowances of the
magistrates, and eliminate such superfluous offices as of no
urgent need, in order thereby to maintain well-chosen and
well-trained warriors." King Tao, after enforcing this
policy for a year, passed away, whereupon Wu Ch`i was
dismembered in Ch`u.

Lord Shang taught Duke Hsiao of Ch`in to organize
groups of ten and five families, and establish the system of
denunciation of crime and joint responsibility for offence,
to burn the Books of Poetry and History[7] and thereby make
laws and orders clear, to bar the requests of private families
and thereby encourage services to public offices, to prohibit
idlers from purchasing official posts, and to celebrate farmers
and warriors. The theory was carried into effect by Duke
Hsiao with the immediate result that the sovereign thereby
became glorious and secure and the state thereby became
rich and strong. Eighteen[8] years later the Duke passed
away, whereupon Lord Shang was torn to pieces by chariots[9]
in Ch`in.

Ch`u, not employing Wu Ch`i, was dismembered and
disturbed; Ch`in, practising the Law of Lord Shang, became


116

rich and strong. Though the two philosophers' words
turned out true, yet how came it that Ch`u dismembered
Wu Ch`i and Ch`in tore Lord Shang to pieces by chariots?
It was because the chief vassals had regarded law as annoyance
and the masses had resented order. Now that in the present
age the chief vassals' covetousness of power and the masses'
content with disorder are more vivid than the conditions
that once prevailed in Ch`u and Ch`in,[10] if the lord of men
does not have the same aptitude for counsels as King Tao
and Duke Hsiao had, then how can upholders of law and
tact run the risk of the two philosophers to make their
principles of law and tact clear? This is the reason[11] why
the age is chaotic and has no Hegemonic Ruler.

 
[1]

[OMITTED]. Pien Ho being the real name is used throughout my translation.

[2]

With Wang Hsien-shen the three successive kings were Kings Wu,
Wên, and Ch`êng. So throughout my translation [OMITTED] is found in place
of [OMITTED] in place of [OMITTED], and [OMITTED] in place of [OMITTED].

[3]

With Wang [OMITTED] should be [OMITTED].

[4]

Wang Hsien-shen gave up all hope of elucidating the hiatus below this
passage. I have attempted to make the translation of this and the following
passages as faithful to the original and intelligible to the reader as possible.

[5]

With Kao Hêng [OMITTED] means [OMITTED].

[6]

For [OMITTED] Ku Kuang-ts`ê proposed [OMITTED] meaning [OMITTED].

[7]

The Historical Records and other books never mention Lord Shang's
teaching to burn the Books of Poetry and History. Lord Shang might have
taught it, but Duke Hsiao apparently never carried it into effect.

[8]

With Wang Hsien-shen it seemed better to supply [OMITTED] above [OMITTED]
inasmuch as Duke Hsiao reigned for eighteen years and during the last
ten years Yang held the office of premier.

[9]

The chariots bound to the head and limbs of the criminal were driven
in opposite directions to tear them off his body.

[10]

Evidently this essay was written before the author entered Ch`in.

[11]

With Ku Kuang-ts`ê [OMITTED] should be supplied below [OMITTED].

Chapter XIV

MINISTERS APT TO BETRAY, MOLEST,
OR MURDER THE RULER[1]

Wicked ministers, in general, all think of following the
mind of the lord of men in order to attain the status of
enjoying the sovereign's confidence and favour. For this
reason, whatever the sovereign likes they praise accordingly;
whatever the sovereign hates they blame accordingly. On


117

the whole, such is the general nature of mankind that people
regard each other as right if their matters of acceptance and
rejection are in common, and as wrong if their matters of
acceptance and rejection are diverse. Now that what the
ministers praise is what the lord of men regards as right,
this is called "acceptance in common"; since what the
ministers blame is what the sovereign regards as wrong, this
is called "rejection in common". Indeed, people who have
their matters of acceptance and rejection in common[2] and
offend each other, are never heard of. That is the way the
ministers win the sovereign's confidence and favour.

Indeed, if wicked ministers can take advantage of the
status of enjoying the sovereign's confidence and favour to
blame, praise, promote, and degrade the officials, it is because
the lord of men has neither the tact and measure[3] to keep
them under control nor[4] the procedures of comparison and
verification to judge them. Worse than this, because in
the past they held every judgment in common with him,
he would believe in any word they now utter. This is the
reason why favourite ministers can deceive the sovereign
and accomplish self-seeking tasks. In consequence, the
sovereign is always deluded and the ministers are always
powerful. Such ministers are called "lord-manipulating
vassals".[5]

If the state has "lord-manipulating vassals", then no
official will be able to exert his wisdom and strength and


118

thereby express his spirit of loyalty nor will any magistrate
be able to uphold the law and thereby accomplish his merits.
How to explain this? Indeed, to choose safety and profit
and leave danger and trouble, this is human nature. Now,
if men who, being ministers to a ruler, apply their forces to
accomplish their merits and exert their wisdom to express
their spirit of loyalty, eventually plunge themselves into
misery, incline their families towards poverty, and entangle
their fathers and sons in their own troubles, and if those
who delude the sovereign for the sake of wicked profits
and serve nobles and vassals with bribes of cash and
commodities, always glorify themselves, enrich their
families, and benefit their fathers and sons, then how can
people leave the way to safety and profit and choose the
place of danger and trouble? Should there be such a fault
in the government of the state, it is clear that it would be
impossible for the superior to expect the inferior to do no
wickedness and the magistrates to uphold the law.

For this reason, as soon as the attendants come to know
the impossibility of seeking safety[6] by remaining honest
and faithful, they will certainly say: "When we serve the
superior honestly and faithfully and increase our meritorious
services, to seek safety is as hopeless as to distinguish between
black and white colours with blind eyes. When by following
the true path and the right tact[7] we serve the superior,[8]
practise righteous principles, and never covet wealth and
nobility, to seek safety is the same as to discriminate between


119

flat and sharp notes with deaf ears, which is still more
hopeless. If neither road leads to safety, why should we
not associate for the purpose of deluding the sovereign,
committing villainy, and thereby pleasing the heavy-handed
men?" Such people will no longer regard the intentions
of the lord of men.

Likewise, as soon as officials of all posts come to know the
impossibility of seeking safety by playing square and upright,
they will certainly say: "When we serve the superior
cleanly and incorruptibly, to seek safety is as hopeless as to
make squares and circles without the carpenter's compasses
and squares. If we hold office by observing the law and
not forming juntos, to seek safety is the same as to scratch
the head with the foot, which is still more hopeless. If
neither road leads to safety, why should we not discard the
law, practise selfishness, and thereby please the heavy-handed
men?" Such people will no longer regard the laws
of the sovereign.

Such being the case, those who work for the heavy-handed
men by practising selfishness are many; those who
serve the ruler by observing the law are few. For this
reason, the sovereign stands in isolation above while the
ministers form juntos below. This was the very reason why
T`ien Ch`êng finally murdered Duke Chien.

Indeed, tactful men, when ministering to a ruler, would
enforce[9] theories of regulations and measures to clarify the
law of the sovereign and harass wicked ministers in order to
glorify the sovereign and tranquillize the state. Accordingly,
as soon as theories of regulations and measures are enforced,


120

reward and punishment will infallibly become applicable.
The lord of men will then earnestly illustrate the tact of
the sage but never have to follow[10] the commonplaces of the
world. He will decide between right and wrong according
to the relation between name and fact and scrutinize words
and phrases by means of comparison and verification.

For this reason, attendants and courtiers, as soon as they
come to know the impossibility of seeking safety by means
of falsehood and deceit, will certainly say: "If we do not
stop wicked deeds and apply our strength and exert our
wisdom to serve the sovereign, but merely associate with
one another for treasonable purposes and make arbitrary
blame and praise so as to seek safety, it is as hopeless as to
expect to live by falling into an abyss of immeasurable
depth with a weight of thirty thousand catties[11] carried on
the back."

Likewise, officials of all posts, as soon as they come to
know the impossibility of seeking safety by coveting wicked
profits, will certainly say: "If we do not obey the law by
keeping ourselves pure, incorruptible, square, and upright,
but simply want to secure wicked profits by bending the
law with the greedy and corrupt minds, it is as hopeless as
to expect to live by going up to the top of a high hill and
then falling down into the bottom of a deep ravine."

If the road to safety and danger is so clear, then how
can the attendants beguile the sovereign with empty words?
And how dare the officials exploit the masses covetously?
Accordingly, ministers able to express their spirit of loyalty


121

are never put out of sight[12] ; inferiors able to attend to
their duties never show resentment. That was the way
Kuan Chung governed Ch`i and Lord Shang strengthened
Ch`in.

From such a viewpoint, I can see that the sage in governing
the state pursues the policy of making the people inevitably
do him good[13] but never relies on their doing him good
with love. For to rely on the people's doing him good
with love is dangerous, but to rely on their inevitability
to do him good is safe.

To be sure, ruler and minister having no blood kinship,
if able to seek safety[14] by following the right and straight
way, the minister will apply all his strength to serve the
sovereign; if unable to seek safety by following the right
and straight way, he will practise selfishness and thereby
violate the superior. Knowing this well, the intelligent
sovereign simply establishes the system of advantages and
disadvantages and thereby shows the world what is right
and what is wrong.

Certainly for this reason, though the lord of men neither
teaches the officials with his own mouth nor finds the culprits
and ruffians with his own eyes, yet the state is always orderly.
The lord of men does not have to possess such eyes as those
of Li Lou in order to be bright, nor does he have to possess
such ears as those of Musician K`uang in order to be acute.
If he does not trust to measures but relies on his eyes alone
for his brightness, then what he sees will be little. For it


122

is not the technique to avoid delusion. If he does not count
on his august position but relies on his own ears alone for
his acuteness, then what he hears will be little enough. For
it is not the way to avoid deception. The intelligent sovereign
would make All-under-Heaven inevitably see and hear on
his behalf. Therefore, though his person is confined in the
innermost court, his brightness illumines everything within
the four seas. If nobody in All-under-Heaven can delude
or deceive him, what is the reason therefor? It is because
the roads to darkness and chaos have crumbled while the
faculties of acuteness and brightness have appeared.

Therefore, who can hold his august position skilfully,
finds his state in safety; who does not know how to utilize
his august position, finds his state in danger. For illustration,
in by-gone days it was the custom in Ch`in for both ruler
and minister to discard state laws and uphold private creeds,
wherefore the country was disorderly, the army weak, and
the sovereign ignoble. Thereupon Lord Shang persuaded
Duke Hsiao of Ch`in to alter the law and renovate the
custom by making public justice clear, rewarding the
denouncers of culprits, discouraging secondary callings,[15] and
encouraging primary works.[16] In those days the people of
Ch`in were used to the beaten track that men guilty of
crimes could be pardoned and men of no merit could be
honoured. Therefore, they were very apt to violate the
new law. In the meantime, however, the censure of offenders
against the new law became strict and definite; the reward
of the denouncers of culprits became big and of faith.
Hence no culprit was missed. Men sentenced to punishment


123

became many. The people grumbled and resented it.
Criminal offences[17] were heard every day. Lending no ear
to all these, Duke Hsiao enforced the Law of Lord Shang
to the utmost, until at last the people came to know that
men guilty of crimes would infallibly be censured and
informers against culprits[18] became many. Hence the people
dared not violate the law and penalty could be inflicted on
nobody. Therefore, the state became orderly, the army
strong, the territory extensive, and the sovereign honourable.
The cause of all these was nothing other than heavy punishment
for sheltering criminals and big rewards for denouncing
culprits. Such was also the way to make All-under-Heaven
see and hear on the ruler's own behalf.

The law and craft of the best government are thus clear
enough. Yet scholars in the world never understand them.

Further, all stupid scholars in the world do not know the
actual conditions of order and chaos but chatter nonsense
and chant too many hackneyed old books to disturb the
government of the present age. Though their wisdom and
thought are not sufficient to avoid pitfalls,[19] they dare to
absurdly reproach the upholders of tact. Whoever listens
to their words, will incur danger. Whoever employs their
schemes, will invite confusion. Such is the greatest height
of stupidity as well as the greatest extreme of calamity.
Though they gain fame for discussion and persuasion just
as the upholders of tact do, yet in reality the former are as
far apart from the latter as a distance of thousands of li.


124

That is to say, the similarity is nominal but the difference
is actual.

Indeed, what the stupid scholars in the world are to the
upholders of tact, that is the ant-hill to the big mound.
They are very different from each other. The sage is the
one who scrutinizes the facts of right and wrong and
investigates the conditions of order and chaos. Therefore,
when governing the state he rectifies laws clearly and
establishes penalties severely in order to rescue all living
beings[20] from chaos, rid All-under-Heaven of misfortune,
prohibit the strong from exploiting the weak and the many
from oppressing the few, enable the old and the infirm to
die in peace and the young and the orphan to grow freely,
and see to it that the frontiers be not invaded, that ruler and
minister be intimate with each other, that father and son
support each other, and that there be no worry about being
killed in war or taken prisoner. Such is one of the greatest
achievements. Yet the stupid men do not understand it
and condemn it as misgovernment.

Of course, the stupid men want order but dislike the true
path to order.[21] They all hate danger but welcome the way
to danger. How do I know this? Indeed, severe penalty
and heavy conviction are hated by the people, but by them
the state is governed. Mercy and pity on the hundred
surnames and mitigation of penalty and punishment are
welcomed by the people, but by them the state is endangered.
The sage who makes laws in[22] the state is always acting


125

contrary to the prevailing opinions of the age, but is in
accord with Tao and Teh.[23] Who understands Tao and
Teh, will agree with the principles of justice but disagree
with the commonplaces of the world. Who does not understand
Tao and Teh, will disagree with the principles of
justice but agree with the commonplaces of the world. If
throughout All-under-Heaven those who understand Tao
and Teh are few, then the principles of justice will generally
be disapproved.

If the upholders of law and tact, being located in an
unrighteous position, accorded slanders by everybody, and
addicted to the words of the age, want to face the severe
Son of Heaven and seek safety, is it not hard for them to
hope[24] for any success? This is the reason why every wise
man to the end of his life never becomes celebrated in the
world.

Lord Ch`un-shên,[25] younger brother of King Chuang of
Ch`u, had a beloved concubine named Yü. The son born
by his wedded wife was named Chia. Yü first wanted the
Lord to desert his lawful wife. So she injured herself. She,
showing[26] the injuries to the Lord, shed tears and said:
"To be able to become Your Excellency's concubine, is
very fortunate, indeed. However, to please madame is not
the way to serve the master; to please the master is not the


126

way to serve madame. Being unworthy myself and not able
enough to please two lords, thy servant will eventually by
force of circumstances displease both. Therefore, instead
of dying at the madame's place, I prefer to be allowed to
kill myself in front of Your Excellency. After[27] allowing
thy servant to kill herself, if Your Excellency favours anybody
else among the maid attendants, will Your Excellency be
more considerate than now and never become a laughingstock
of people?" The Lord, accordingly, took the falsehood
of his concubine Yü as true, and deserted his lawful wife.

Yü next wanted to kill Chia and make her own son the
heir apparent instead. So she tore the lining of her own
petticoat. Showing the torn clothes to the Lord, she shed
tears and said: "It is a long time since Yü became able to
enjoy Your Excellency's favour, which Chia has known of
course. Just a while ago, he thought of taking liberties with
Yü by force. Yü struggled with him, till he tore her clothes.
No other impious act committed by a son could be worse
than this!" Enraged thereby, the Lord killed Chia. Thus,
the wife was deserted because of the falsehood of the
concubine Yü and the son was killed because of the
same.

From this I can see that even the father's love of the son
can be demolished and damaged. Now that the mutual
relationship of ruler and minister does not involve the
kinship of father and son and the slanderous words of the
officials are not so simple as those coming out only from
the single mouth of a concubine, no wonder worthies and
sages are slaughtered and executed! This was the very


127

reason why Lord Shang was torn to pieces by chariots in
Ch`in and Wu Ch`i was dismembered in Ch`u.

In general, ministers, when guilty of crimes, never want
to be censured, but, when of no merit, all want to be honoured
and celebrated. However, the sage, when governing the
state, never bestows rewards on men of no merit but definitely
inflicts censures on culprits. If so, the characters of the
upholders of tact and measure are certainly disgusting to
the attendants and wicked ministers. Accordingly, nobody
but an intelligent sovereign can take advice from them.

Scholars of the present age in counselling the lord of men
do not say, "Make use of the august and commanding
position and thereby harass the wicked and villainous
ministers," but all say, "Practise nothing but benevolence,
righteousness, favour, and love!" Accordingly, rulers of
the present age have praised the names of benevolent and
righteous men but have never examined their realities, so
that in serious cases they have ruined their states and lost
their lives and in minor cases they have seen their territories
dismembered and their ranks relegated. How to explain
this? Indeed, to give alms to the poor and destitute is what
the world calls a benevolent and righteous act; to take pity
on the hundred surnames and hesitate to inflict censure and
punishment on culprits is what the world calls an act of
favour and love. To be sure, when the ruler gives alms[28]
to the poor and destitute, men of no merit will also be
rewarded; when he hesitates to inflict censure and punishment
upon culprits, then ruffians never will be suppressed.
If men of no merit in the country are rewarded, the people


128

will neither[29] face enemies and cut heads off on the battlefield
nor will they devote their strength to farming and
working at home, but all will use articles and money as
bribe to serve the rich and noble, accomplish private virtues,
and make personal names, in order that they may thereby
get high posts and big bounties. In consequence, wicked
and self-seeking ministers become many and violent and
outrageous fellows gain the upper hand. Under such
circumstances, what but ruin can befall the state?

Indeed, severe penalty is what the people fear, heavy
punishment is what the people hate. Accordingly, the wise
man promulgates what they fear in order to forbid the
practice of wickedness and establishes what they hate in
order to prevent villainous acts. For this reason the state
is safe and no outrage happens. From this I know very well
that benevolence, righteousness, love, and favour, are not
worth adopting while severe penalty and heavy punishment
can maintain the state in order.

Without the severity of the whip and the facility of the
bridle, even Tsao-fu could not drive the horse; without
the rule of the compasses and squares and the tip of the
inked string, even Wang Erh could not draw squares and
circles; and without the position of authority and power
and the law of reward and punishment, even Yao and Shun
could not keep the state in order. Now that rulers of the
present age thoughtlessly discard heavy punishment and
severe censure and practise love and favour, to realize the
achievement of the Hegemonic Ruler is also hopeless.

Therefore, the skilful sovereign makes rewards clear and
displays advantages to encourage the people and make them


129

get rewards for meritorious services but no prize for any
act of benevolence and righteousness. He makes penalties
severe and punishments heavy to restrain the people and
make them get censure for criminal offences but no pardon
by love and grace. Therefore, men of no merit never long
for any reward and those guilty of crimes never look for
an amnesty.

If you have a solid carriage and a good horse, you can
go over slopes and cliffs on land; if you embark in a safe
boat and hold its easy helm in hand, you can get over the
hazards of streams and rivers on water. Similarly, if you
have the measures of law and tact in your grip and carry
heavy punishment and severe censure into effect, you will
be able to accomplish the achievement of the Hegemonic
Ruler. Now, to have law and tact, reward and punishment,
in governing the state, is the same as to have a solid carriage
and a good horse in travelling on land and have a fast boat
and an easy helm in travelling on water. Whoever has them
in his grip will eventually accomplish his purpose.

Yi Yin mastered them, wherefore T`ang became supreme;
Kuan Chung mastered them, wherefore Ch`i became
hegemonic; and Lord Shang mastered them, wherefore Ch`in
became a powerful state. These three men all understood
the statecraft of supremacy and hegemony clearly and
observed the measures for order and strength closely
and were never restrained by worldly and popular sayings.
Thus, meeting the demands of the intelligent sovereigns of
their times, they emerged from the status of wearers of
hemp cloth[30] to the posts of High Official and Prime Minister.


130

When holding office and governing the state, they actually
accomplished the task in honouring their masters and
extending their territories. Such persons are called "ministers
worthy of respect".[31]

T`ang, because he got Yi Yin, rose from one hundred
square li of territory to become the Son of Heaven. Duke
Huan, because he got Kuan Chung, became the first
Hegemonic Ruler, called nine meetings of the feudal lords,
and brought All-under-Heaven under one rule. Because
Duke Hsiao got Lord Shang, his territory was extended
and his army was strengthened. Therefore, whoever has
loyal ministers, has no worry over enemy states outside
and no anxiety about rebellious ministers inside, enjoying
permanent peace in All-under-Heaven and handing down
his name to posterity. Such ministers are the so-called
loyal ministers.[32]

Take the case of Yü Jang. When ministering to Earl
Chih, he could not counsel the lord of men and make him
clearly understand the principles of law and tact, rule and
measure, so as to avoid disasters, nor could he lead and
control his masses so as to keep the state in safety. When
Viscount Hsiang had killed Earl Chih, Yü Jang branded[33]
his face and cut off his nose, thus destroying his facial features
in order to avenge Earl Chih on Viscount Hsiang. In this
wise, though he earned the reputation for destroying his
features[34] and sacrificing his life for the cause of the lord


131

of men, yet in reality he rendered Earl Chih not even such
a bit of benefit as the tips of autumn spikelets. Such a man
is what I look down upon, whereas rulers of the present
age regard him as loyal and exalt him. In antiquity, there
were men named Poh-i and Shu-ch`i. When King Wu
offered to transfer All-under-Heaven to them,[35] both declined
it and starved to death on the Shou-yang Mound. Ministers
like them, neither afraid of heavy censure nor fond of big
rewards, cannot be prohibited by punishment, nor can
they be encouraged by reward. They are called "ministers
of no account".[36] They are what I make light of and cast
aside, but are what rulers of the present age think much of
and seek out.

There is a proverb saying, "Even the leper feels pity for
the king."[37] It is not a reverent saying. Nevertheless, since
in antiquity there was no empty proverb, everybody should
consider it carefully. It speaks for[38] such sovereigns as are
liable to molestation or murder.

If the lord of men does not have law and tact to control
his ministers, then though he is still on the green margin of
his life and has excellent talents, chief vassals will, as usual,
gain influence, administer all state affairs at their will, and
make all decisions on their own authority, everybody working
to his own advantage. Fearing lest uncles and brothers of
the sovereign or some heroic men should exercise the


132

authority of the lord of men to suppress and censure them,
they would depose[39] worthy, full-grown rulers and set up
young, weak ones on the throne, or set aside lawful heirs[40]
and place unlawful ones in their stead.

Hence it is recorded in the Spring and Autumn Annals:
"Prince Wei of Ch`u was once on his way to visit the court
of Chêng. Before he crossed the state border, he heard about
His Majesty's illness and therefore turned homeward. When
he went in to inquire after the King's illness, he strangled
His Majesty to death with the ribbons of his hat, and finally
established himself on the throne.[41] The wife of Ts`ui Chu
of Ch`i was beautiful. Duke Chuang formed a liaison with
her and frequented the house of the Ts`ui Clan. One day,
when Duke Chuang went again, a dependent of Ts`ui Tzŭ,
named Chia Chü, led the followers of Ts`ui Tzŭ and attacked
the Duke. The Duke rushed into a room and suggested
dividing the state with him, but Ts`ui Tzŭ would not grant
the request. The Duke then asked permission to kill himself
in the ancestral shrine, but again Ts`ui Tzŭ would not
listen to the request. So the Duke started to run away.
When he was going across the mud fence on the north of
the compound, Chia Chü shot him with an arrow and hit
his thigh. The Duke fell down upon the ground, where
Ts`ui Tzŭ's followers cut the Duke with lances and killed
him.[42] Thereupon his younger brother was installed on the
throne as Duke Ching."


133

As witnessed in recent times, no sooner had Li Tai[43]
come into power in Chao, than he starved the Father
Sovereign[44] for one hundred days till he died; no sooner
had Nao Ch`ih come into power in Ch`i, than he pulled
out the sinews of King Min[45] and hanged him on the
beam of the ancestral shrine where he died after one
night.[46]

Therefore, the leper, despite the boils and swellings all
over his body, as compared with rulers of the Spring and
Autumn Period, never suffers such miseries as neck-strangling
and thigh-shooting, and, as compared with rulers of recent
times, never suffers such miseries as starvation to death and
sinew-pulling. Thus, the mental agony and physical pain
of the rulers molested and murdered certainly exceed those
of the leper. From this viewpoint, though the leper feels
pity for the king, there is good reason for it.

 
[1]

[OMITTED]. The content of this chapter appears not very unique. The
thought seems to lack unity, too. Only the various paragraphs at the opening
and towards the end fit well into the subject matter. On the whole, however,
the work shows no contradiction to the general system of the author's
teachings. With Wang Hsien-shen Chao Yung-hsien's edition has [OMITTED] in
place of [OMITTED].

[2]

With Wang [OMITTED] below [OMITTED] should be [OMITTED].

[3]

For [OMITTED] I usually use "measure" and casually "number" or
"statistics".

[4]

Wang Hsien-shen suggested the supply of [OMITTED] below [OMITTED].

[5]

[OMITTED].

[6]

With Wang Hsien-shen [OMITTED] below [OMITTED] is superfluous.

[7]

Wang regarded [OMITTED] as a mistake for [OMITTED].

[8]

With Wang [OMITTED] above [OMITTED] should be above [OMITTED].

[9]

With Wang [OMITTED] above [OMITTED] is superfluous.

[10]

With Wang [OMITTED] should be [OMITTED].

[11]

[OMITTED]. One chün is about thirty catties.

[12]

With Ku Kuang-ts`ê the Taoist Thesaurus edition has [OMITTED] in place of [OMITTED].

[13]

With Yü Yüeh [OMITTED] should be [OMITTED].

[14]

With Wang Hsien-shen [OMITTED] should be [OMITTED].

[15]

[OMITTED]. Such professions as trade and handiwork.

[16]

[OMITTED]. Such professions as farming and fighting.

[17]

With Wang Hsien-shen [OMITTED] should be [OMITTED].

[18]

With Wang [OMITTED] should be [OMITTED].

[19]

With Wang [OMITTED] should be [OMITTED].

[20]

[OMITTED], an indigenous expression, was seemingly replaced by [OMITTED]
after Buddhistic ideas began to influence Chinese thought (vide supra, p. 55).

[21]

With Wang Hsien-shen [OMITTED] should be supplied below [OMITTED].

[22]

Kao Hêng proposed to supply [OMITTED] between [OMITTED] and [OMITTED].

[23]

[OMITTED] here as elsewhere cannot be rendered as "reason and virtue"
or "morals" or "morality". Inasmuch as [OMITTED] refers to the natural course
of the cosmos and [OMITTED] to the standard of conduct derived from it, transliteration
seems preferable to translation.

[24]

With Ku Kuang-ts`ê [OMITTED] above [OMITTED] should be below it.

[25]

Different from another Lord Ch`un-shên whose real name was Huang
Hsieh.

[26]

With Wang Hsien-shen [OMITTED] should be [OMITTED].

[27]

With Kao Hêng [OMITTED] reads [OMITTED].

[28]

With Ku Kuang-ts`ê [OMITTED] above [OMITTED] is superfluous.

[29]

With Ku [OMITTED] should be [OMITTED].

[30]

In ancient China all commoners, before they became white-haired,
were supposed to wear no silk but hemp cloth. Hence wearers of hemp
cloth came to mean commoners.

[31]

[OMITTED].

[32]

[OMITTED].

[33]

With Ku Kuang-ts`ê [OMITTED] should be [OMITTED].

[34]

With Wang Hsien-shen [OMITTED] should be [OMITTED].

[35]

They declined their father's offer, but nowhere else is mentioned King
Wu's offer.

[36]

[OMITTED].

[37]

According to the Schemes of the Warring States, the passages beginning
with this sentence and ending with the present chapter were written by Sun
Tzŭ to Lord Ch`un-shên.

[38]

With Wang Hsien-shen [OMITTED] should be [OMITTED].

[39]

With Lu Wên-shao I prefer [OMITTED] to [OMITTED].

[40]

With Ku Kuang-ts`ê the Taoist Thesaurus edition and the Schemes of the
Warring States
have [OMITTED] in place of [OMITTED].

[41]

515 b.c.

[42]

548 b.c.

[43]

He became the Grand Assistant to King Hui-wên of Chao in 298 b.c.

[44]

[OMITTED] was the title King Wu-ling of Chao gave himself after his
abdication in favour of his younger son Ho in 298 b.c. Three years later,
his eldest son, Chang, who had once been the Crown Prince, launched a
revolt against Ho, then King Hui-wên, but failed and sought refuge in the
Father Sovereign's detached palace at the Sandy Hill. Li Tai upon his arrival
first killed the rebellious prince and then locked up the Father Sovereign
inside the palace and starved him to death.

[45]

Having suffered a crushing defeat by the invading forces of Yen in
284 b.c., he asked for rescue from Ch`u. King Ch`ing-hsiang, accordingly,
appointed Nao Ch`ih commander of the reinforcements. Upon his arrival
at Ch`i, Nao Ch`ih was appointed Prime Minister by King Min. Fearing the
Yen invaders, however, he betrayed the King, secretly made peace with
Yen, and finally murdered the King in 283 b.c.

[46]

With Wang Hsien-shen [OMITTED] should be [OMITTED].