II
Semiotics (sometimes called semiology) originated at about the same
time as the New Bibliography, in the early years of the present century. Its
places of origination were Switzerland and the United States. The reason for
this dual citizenship of semiotics is that the field was created at about the
same time by two scholars working independently in different disciplines:
the Swiss linguist Ferdinand de Saussure (1857-1913), the founder of
structural linguistics, and the American philosopher C. S. Peirce
(1839-1914), usually credited with the foundation of American
pragmatism.[22] Since most of the
work of both men was published posthumously, it is not possible to say
precisely when semiotics came into being. Neither Peirce nor Saussure had
apparently any knowledge of the work of the other. Their separate systems,
therefore—Saussure's linguistically based semiotics and Peirce's
logically
based semiotics—seldom overlap, so that combining the two into
one great system would be a very complex task. Most work in semiotics is
consequently accomplished through the application of either one system or
the other.
It is to Peirce's logical semiotics that we should now direct our
attention, or rather to one small aspect of it, namely the Second Trichotomy
of Signs. While the Second Trichotomy may have attained some notoriety
among philosophers because it is "Peirce's most important division of
signs,"[23] the popularity it has
achieved outside of philosophy is probably more a result of the fact that it
is, at least on the surface, one of the easiest of Peirce's many sets of
definitions to understand. Even so, it should be well noted that what follows
in no way presumes to be anything like a complete exposition of Peirce's
Second Trichotomy, for Peirce's philosophy was systematic,[24] and to discuss any single part
without
reference to the whole is open to justifiable charges of misrepresentation.
Our subject is bibliography, however, not philosophy, and if we
end up ignoring the full philosophical implications of Peirce's
categories—which we will—it is because the full implications
are not
essential to our subject. We are concerned here not with what Peirce
ultimately meant, but rather with the application to our own subject of an
isolated segment of what he said.
Peirce was of the opinion that logic is basically semiotics, the
"quasi-necessary, formal, doctrine of signs" (II,134). A sign is simply
"something which stands to somebody for something in some respect or
capacity" (II,135). Words, for instance, are signs, most of which stand for
specific objects or actions. All such semiotic relationships consequently
consist of three parts: there is the sign (Peirce's word is "representamen"),
there is the entity for which the sign stands (its "Object"), and there is
one's mental image (the "interpretant") of the object triggered by one's
encounter with the sign.
Semiotics—or logic—consists, according to Peirce, of
three
parts: speculative grammar, critical logic, and speculative rhetoric.
Speculative grammar, "the first and most fundamental of Peirce's three
main divisions" is primarily concerned with "the meaning of signs and
symbols" (Feibleman, p. 89). A central aspect of speculative grammar is
the idea that all signs are divisible into three trichotomies.[25] The second and most famous of
these
divides signs into three categories from the standpoint of their relationships
to their Objects. Peirce named these three categories of signs "icons,"
"indexes," and "symbols."
An icon is a "sign which refers to the Object that it
denotes merely by virtue of characteristics of its own . . ." (II,143). It is
linked to its object by virtue of similarity. A portrait of
someone, for example, is an icon.
An index is a "sign which refers to the Object that it
denotes by virtue of being really affected by that Object" (II,143). It is
linked to its object by virtue of causality. The symptoms of
a
disease are indexes to that disease.
A symbol is a "sign which refers to the Object that it
denotes by virtue of a law . . ." (II,143). Peirce's concept of the symbol is
often accepted as being very similar to Saussure's definition of the linguistic
sign. Most linguistic signs are arbitrary, or rather the connection between
the sign and its Object (the "signifier" and the "signified" to use the English
equivalents of Saussure's own terms) is an arbitrary one. There is no
reason, for example, why the sounds which make up the word "tree" should
refer to a large plant with branches. They do so only
on the basis of
convention, or as Peirce would have it, by
virtue
of a "law." A word, then, in Peirce's terms, is a symbol.
Before proceeding to apply these categories to the field of
bibliography, we must first make one terminological adjustment. While
Peirce uses the word "Object" to denote that entity for which the sign
stands, we shall instead use the word referent. Thus the word
"tree" is a sign and its referent is a large plant with branches. We will
continue to use the word "Object" in a non-semiotic sense specifically to
denote the object of study of a particular discipline. Thus the Object of all
bibliography, as we have already noted, is a document or any material
medium (i.e. sign system) designed and used for the transmission of
information.
