REFUTATION OF IDEALISM.
Idealism— I mean material* idealism— is the theory which declares the
existence of objects in space without us to be either () doubtful
and indemonstrable, or (2) false and impossible. The first is the
problematical idealism of Descartes, who admits the undoubted
certainty of only one empirical assertion (assertio), to wit, I
am. The second is the dogmatical idealism of Berkeley, who
maintains that space, together with all the objects of which it is the
inseparable condition, is a thing which is in itself impossible, and
that consequently the objects in space are mere products of the
imagination. The dogmatical theory of idealism is unavoidable, if we
regard space as a property of things in themselves; for in that case
it is, with all to which it serves as condition, a nonentity. But
the foundation for this kind of idealism we have already destroyed
in the transcendental æsthetic. Problematical idealism, which makes
no such assertion, but only alleges our incapacity to prove the
existence of anything besides ourselves by means of immediate
experience, is a theory rational and evidencing a thorough and
philosophical mode of thinking, for it observes the rule not to form a
decisive judgement before
sufficient proof be shown. The desired proof
must therefore demonstrate that we have
experience of external things,
and not mere
fancies. For this purpose, we must prove, that our
internal and, to Descartes, indubitable experience is itself
possible only under the previous assumption of external experience.
[*]
In opposition to formal or critical idealism — the theory of Kant — which denies
to us a knowledge of things as things in themselves, and maintains that we can know only
phænomena. — Tr.
