Section 62. (c) Incorrect Forms of Expression.
If it is true that by the earnest and repeated study of the meanings
of words we are likely to find them in the end containing much deeper
sense and content than at the beginning, we are compelled to wonder
that people are able to understand each other at all. For if words
do not have that meaning which is obvious in their essential denotation,
every one who uses them supplies according to his inclination,
and status the "deeper and richer sense." As a matter of fact
many more words are used pictorially than we are inclined to think.
Choose at random, and you find surprisingly numerous words with
exaggerated denotations. If I say, "I posit the case, I press through,
I jump over, the proposition, etc.," these phrases are all pictures,
for I have posited nothing, I have pressed through no obstacle, and
have jumped over no object. My words, therefore, have not stood
for anything real, but for an image, and it is impossible to determine
the remoteness of the latter from the former, or the variety of direction
and extent this remoteness may receive from each individual.
Wherever images are made use of, therefore, we must, if we are to
know what is meant, first establish how and where the use occurred.
How frequently we hear, e. g., of a "four-cornered" table instead of
a square table; a "very average" man, instead of a man who is
far below the average. In many cases this false expression is half-consciously made for the purpose of beautifying a request or making
it appear more modest. The smoker says: "May I have some light,"
although you know that it is perfectly indifferent whether much or
little light is taken from the cigar. "May I have just a little piece
of roast," is said in order to make the request that the other fellow
should pass the heavy platter seem more modest. And again:
"Please give me a little water," does not modify the fact that the
other fellow must pass the whole water flask, and that it is indifferent
to him whether afterwards you take much or little water. So,
frequently, we speak of borrowing or lending, without in the remotest
thinking of returning. The student says to his comrade, "Lend
me a pen, some paper, or some ink," but he has not at all any intention
of giving them back. Similar things are to be discovered
in accused or witnesses who think they have not behaved properly,
and who then want to exhibit their misconduct in the most favorable
light. These beautifications frequently go so far and may be made
so skilfully that the correct situation may not be observed for a
long time. Habitual usage offers, in this case also, the best examples.
For years uncountable it has been called a cruel job to earn your
living honestly and to satisfy the absolute needs of many people
by quickly and painlessly slaughtering cattle. But, when somebody,
just for the sake of killing time, because of ennui, shoots and martyrs
harmless animals, or merely so wounds them that if they are not
retrieved they must die terrible deaths, we call it noble sport. I
should like to see a demonstration of the difference between killing
an ox and shooting a stag. The latter does not require even superior
skill, for it is much more difficult to kill an ox swiftly and painlessly
than to shoot a stag badly, and even the most accurate shot requires
less training than the correct slaughter of an ox. Moreover, it
requires much more courage to finish a wild ox than to destroy a
tame and kindly pheasant. But usage, once and for all, has assumed
this essential distinction between men, and frequently this distinction
is effective in criminal law, without our really seeing how or
why. The situation is similar in the difference between cheating
in a horse trade and cheating about other commodities. It occurs
in the distinction between two duellists fighting according to rule
and two peasant lads brawling with the handles of their picks according
to agreement. It recurs again in the violation of the law by
somebody "nobly inspired with champagne," as against its violation
by some "mere" drunkard. But usage has a favoring, excusing
intent for the first series, and an accusing, rejecting intent for the
latter series. The different points of view from which various
events are seen are the consequence of the varieties of the usage
which first distinguished the view-points from one another.
There is, moreover, a certain dishonesty in speaking and in listening
where the speaker knows that the hearer is hearing a different
matter, and the hearer knows that the speaker is speaking a different
matter. As Steinthal[1] has
said, "While the speaker speaks about
things that he does not believe, and the reality of which he takes no
stock in, his auditor, at the same time, knows right well what the
former has said; he understands correctly and does not blame the
speaker for having expressed himself altogether unintelligibly."
This occurs very frequently in daily routine, without causing much
difficulty in human intercourse, but it ought, for this reason, to
occur inversely in our conversation with witnesses and accused. I
know that the manner of speaking just described is frequently used
when a witness wants to clothe some definite suspicion without
expressing it explicitly. In such cases, e. g., the examiner as well
as the witness believes that X is the criminal. For some reason,
perhaps because X is a close relation of the witness or of "the man
higher up," neither of them, judge nor witness, wishes to utter the
truth openly, and so they feel round the subject for an interminable
time. If now, both think the same thing, there results at most only a
loss of time, but no other misfortune. When, however, each thinks
of a different object, e. g., each thinks of another criminal, but
each believes mistakenly that he agrees with the other, their separating
without having made explicit what they think, may lead
to harmful misunderstandings. If the examiner then believes that
the witness agrees with him and proceeds upon this only apparently
certain basis, the case may become very bad. The results are the
same when a confession is discussed with a suspect, i. e., when the
judge thinks that the suspect would like to confess, but only suggests
confession, while the latter has never even thought of it. The one
thing alone our work permits of is open and clear speaking; any
confused form of expression is evil.
Nevertheless, confusions often occur involuntarily, and as they
can not be avoided they must be understood. Thus, it is characteristic
to understand something unknown in terms of some
known example, i. e., the Romans who first saw an elephant, called
it "bos lucani." Similarly "wood-dog" = wolf; "sea-cat" = monkey,
etc. These are forms of common usage, but every individual is
accustomed to make such identifications whenever he meets with
any strange object. He speaks, therefore, to some degree in images,
and if his auditor is not aware of the fact he can not understand him.
His speaking so may be discovered by seeking out clearly whether
and what things were new and foreign to the speaker. When this is
learned it may be assumed that he will express himself in images
when considering the unfamiliar object. Then it will not be difficult
to discover the nature and source of the images.
Similar difficulties arise with the usage of foreign terms. It is
of course familiar that their incorrect use is not confined to the
uneducated. I have in mind particularly the weakening of the
meaning in our own language. The foreign word, according to
Volkmar, gets its significance by robbing the homonymous native
word of its definiteness and freshness, and is therefore sought out
by all persons who are unwilling to call things by their right names.
The "triste position" is far from being so sad as the "sad" position.
I should like to know how a great many people could speak, if they
were not permitted to say malheur, méchant,
perfide, etc.—words
by means of which they reduce the values of the terms at least a
degree in intensity of meaning. The reason for the use of these words
is not always the unwillingness of the speaker to make use of the
right term, but really because it is necessary to indicate various
degrees of intensity for the same thing without making use of attributes
or other extensions of the term. Thus the foreign word is
in some degree introduced as a technical expression. The direction
in which the native word weakens, however, taken as that is intended
by the individual who uses its substitute, is in no sense universally
fixated. The matter is entirely one of individual usage and must
be examined afresh in each particular case.
The striving for abbreviated forms of expression,—extraordinary
enough in our gossipy times,—manifests itself in still another
direction. On my table, e. g., there is an old family journal, "From
Cliff to Sea." What should the title mean? Obviously the spatial
distribution of the subject of its contents and its subscribers—i. e.,
"round about the whole earth," or "Concerning all lands and all
peoples." But such titles would be too long; hence, they are synthesized
into, "From Cliff to Sea," without the consideration that cliffs
often stand right at the edge of the sea, so that the distance between
them may be only the thickness of a hair:—cliff and sea are not
local opposites.
Or: my son enters and tells me a story about an "old semester."
By "old semester" he means an old student who has spent many
terms, at least more than are required or necessary, at the university.
As this explanation is too long, the whole complex is contracted into
"old semester," which is comfortable, but unintelligible to all
people not associated with the university. These abbreviations are
much more numerous than, as a rule, they are supposed to be, and
must always be explained if errors are to be avoided. Nor are silent
and monosyllabic persons responsible for them; gossipy individuals
seek, by the use of them, to exhibit a certain power of speech. Nor
is it indifferent to expression when people in an apparently nowise
comfortable fashion give approximate circumlocutive figures, e. g.,
half-a-dozen, four syllables, instead of the monosyllable
six;
or "the
bell in the dome at St. Stephen's has as many nicks as the year
has days," etc. It must be assumed that these circumlocutive
expressions are chosen, either because of the desire to make an
assertion general, or because of the desire for some mnemonic aid.
It is necessary to be cautious with such statements, either because,
as made, they only "round out" the figures or because the reliability
of the aid to memory must first be tested. Finally, it is well-known
that foreign words are often changed into senseless words of a similar
sound. When such unintelligible words are heard, very loud repeated
restatement of the word will help in finding the original.
[[ id="n62.1"]]
Cf. Zeitschrift fur Völkeranthropologie. Vol. XIX. 1889. "Wie denkt
das yolk über die Sprache?"