University of Virginia Library

RESULTS AND SPECIALTIES OF THE SIEGE.

In the council before undertaking the operations on Morris
Island, "the principal question," says General Gilmore's Official
Report, "was to what extent the fall of Fort Sumter or the
destruction of its offensive power would exert an influence on the
fate of Charleston, that, of course, being the ultimate object in
view. A consideration which possessed much weight was the
great practical advantage of a blockade thorough and complete
of Charleston harbor. The capture of Morris Island by allowing
a portion of the blockading fleet to lie inside the bar, even though
they should fail to finally occupy the inner harbor, would secure
this end. The naval authorities at the seat of government
regarded Fort Sumter as the key to the position. That stronghold
once destroyed or its offensive power practically destroyed,
the monitors and other ironclads, they affirmed, could remove
the channel obstructions, secure the control of the entire harbor
and reach the city."

Were these purposes accomplished?

1. Did Charleston fall before Gilmore's operations? Certainly
not. Charleston, when it did fall, was evacuated in consequence
of Sherman's march. It had withstood the direct attack

until the enemy, wearied out, had abandoned further efforts thus
to capture the city.

2. Was a "blockade, in all respects thorough and complete,"
established? No. Moffett Channel, under Sullivan's Island,
remained available to the Confederates, and though the hazards
of blockade running were greatly increased it still went on.

3. Did the disabling of Sumter open the inner harbor to the
fleet? Sumter was thoroughly destroyed as an artillery post,
but the channel obstructions and the new batteries that sprung
up on the shores of the inner harbor kept the fleet lying off Morris
Island. And here it may as well be remarked that these same
channel obstructions were far less formidable than imagined,
the tide destroyed most of them about as fast as they were
devised.

What, then, was accomplished? Narrower limits were set to
blockade running, and by the bombardment much suffering and
damage to property was inflicted upon the inhabitants of Charleston.
Was the game "worth the candle"? It was upon the "attrition"
theory, said General Grant in 1865. "The resources of the
enemy and his numerical strength were greatly inferior to ours
. . . I therefore determined . . . to hammer continually against
him until by attrition, if in no other way, there should be nothing
left to him but submission." And he succeeded. The "attrition"
at Charleston contributed its share to the result.

In engineering the siege taught no new principles. On the
contrary, its lessons enforced most emphatically the time-honored
principles of the schools. The masonry of Sumter crumbled like
an egg shell before the breaching batteries of the enemy; and
when its debris had been pounded into earth with natural slopes,
no further impression could be made upon it. On the other
hand, the parapet of Wagner constructed from the first with
natural slopes of sand were good to the last. For though Colonel
Keitt talks of a breach, the writer is persuaded there was no
breach in the engineering sense, both from Colonel Harris's
report and from the diagram in Gilmore's report of the effect of
his fire on the left salient, to which Colonel Keitt alludes. The
truth was the superior artillery fire of the enemy could at all
times, when concentrated upon the fort, make it a butcher pen, if
the whole garrison were at their posts. But few men could be

kept on the lines of the work during a bombardment—artillery
enough to man the guns with infantry enough to act as a lookout
and but little more. The practice always was during the daytime
to keep a part of the garrison among the sand hillocks in rear of
the fort; and during the bombardment to keep out of the bombproofs
about 100 men.

By the 6th of September the sap of the enemy on the crest of
the glacis put them in position when, deployed along its length,
they could rush over the parapets of Wagner upon the cessation
of the bombardment before its garrison could be drawn from
the bomb-proofs to its defense. The relief of the fort was never
greater than that of a strong field work, and the ditch was now
half full by the drifting sand. The fort was, therefore, no longer
tenable.

The great development of the merlons between the guns was
claimed by General Beauregard as an improvement of his own;
and it certainly is in earthworks, when casemates are impossible,
a great one.

The writer became satisfied from his observation of these
operations that ironclads, such as were opposed to us, could be
kept out of any harbor when sand batteries could be located
within 1,000 yards of the channel; provided, the batteries did not
exceed one or two guns to each and were sufficiently detached.
Where infantry supports were needed they should be bombproofed
at convenient supporting distances and not at the guns.
This, with the necessary covered ways, would be preferably his
plan of defense.

The defenses of Coles Island as arranged during the latter part
of our occupation were an illustration of this plan.

In this siege it is presumed more novelties were developed in
artillery and larger experience gained than in any of modern
times. The range and accuracy of fire obtained was never before
equalled. The objections which the enemy's experience found to
the larger sized Parrotts, their liability to burst, it is not thought
were found by us to apply to the Brooke gun, which was the
equal of the Parrott in every other respect.

An admirable invention of Lieutenant-Colonel Yates for transferring
guns on columbiad carriages was used with perfect success.
It was a wheel and ratchet arrangement by which the

gunner alone could quickly and accurately bring the gun to bear.

The progress made in the use of torpedoes, both for offense
and defense, was marked. Much, however, is yet to be attained.
Where used for defense and required to be put in position for
any time before hand, they were liable to get out of order and
fail at the right moment. They were freely used in front of
Wagner, yet the enemy sapped through them with but eight
casualties from this source. About half that number occurred
with us from carelessness with regard to them.

In the assault on Wagner, on the 18th July, the enemy's official
report makes no mention of torpedoes; their newspaper accounts
spoke of hand grenades used by the defense. This was not so,
but in the night the impression might have been produced by
torpedoes.

Next day the officer in charge not knowing of the torpedoes,
the enemy's dead on the glacis were buried among them where
they were placed and no casualty occurred. The burial party dug
them up, but as they were ordinary spherical shell with the
explosive arrangement in the fuse, they were deemed to have been
fired the previous day without exploding. When used for offense,
the writer thought more of them, and his impression is that their
use at the prow of small boats, moving totally or partially submerged,
was very near a success.

The fleet of "cigar boats" that sprung up in Charleston harbor
and the "diving boat" were curious things to a landsman's eye;
and some of the highest heroism of the war was exhibited in
their use.

The writer regrets that he has not the data to speak fully of
their exploits or to record the names of the gallant men who were
distinguished in this service.[62]

The calcium light of the enemy was novel and efficient.

As a tactical movement the evacuation was an eminent success;
and, though admirably executed, the chief credit is due to the
comprehensive and explicit order in relation to it prepared by
General Beauregard himself.