University of Virginia Library

THE FIRST REGIMENT OF SOUTH CAROLINA
(12 MONTHS) VOLUNTEERS

12TH APRIL, 1861 TO 12TH APRIL, 1862

FIRST SOUTH CAROLINA 12 MOS. VOLUNTEERS.
ORGANIZATION.

On the 17th December, 1860, in view of the probable passage of
the Ordinance of Secession by the State Convention then in
session, the Legislature of South Carolina passed "An Act to
Provide an Armed Military Force." This act provided that
whenever it shall appear that an armed force is about to be
employed against the State or in opposition to its authority, the
Governor be authorized to repel the same, and for that purpose
to call into the service of the State such portion of the militia
as he shall deem proper and to organize the same on the plan
therein indicated. Three days afterward, the Convention passed
the Ordinance of Secession, and the revolution which led to the
establishment of the Southern Confederacy was inaugurated.
Immediately after, the Convention provided for the raising of
one or more corps of regulars, and for the acceptance of a
regiment of six months' volunteers, both to be received into
immediate service. Towards the last of December the Governor
issued a call for volunteers under the legislative act, which
resulted in the raising and organizing of ten regiments for twelve
months' service. Under this call the militia regiments of Barnwell
district (the 11th and 43rd of the old organization) assembled
at Barnwell Village, and furnished, by volunteering, five
companies. The regiment of Orangeburg District (15th old
militia) assembled at its rendezvous, and furnished four companies;
while the regiment of Colleton District (13th old militia)
assembled at Walterboro and furnished two companies;—all on
the 3rd January, 1861. The Barnwell and Orangeburg companies
and one of the Colleton companies being the first ten
companies which responded to the call in the State, were

organized by the State War Department into a regiment under
the name of "The First South Carolina Volunteers," and elections
for field officers ordered. These elections were held on the 27th
January, 1861, and the organization of the regiment was complete.
It was officered as follows:

                     

Colonel	Johnson Hagood
Lieutenant-Colonel	Thomas J. Glover
Major	Watson A. O'Caim
Adjutant	P. K. Moloney
Quartermaster	G. B. Lartigue
Commissary Subsistence	W. B. Legare
Surgeon	Martin Bellinger
Assistant Surgeon	E. H. Dowling
Chaplain	Flynn Dickson
Sergeant-Major	R. B. Wilson
Quartermaster-Sergeant	J. H. O'Caim

Company A.

       

Captain	John V. Glover
First Lieutenant	John H. Felder
Second Lieutenant	James F. Izlar
Third Lieutenant	S. N. Kennerly

Company B.

       

Captain	Daniel Livingston
First Lieutenant	S. G. Jamison
Second Lieutenant	B. F. Pou
Third Lieutenant	G. D. Jones

Company C.

       

Captain	S. M. Kemmerlin
First Lieutenant	L. H. Zimmerman
Second Lieutenant	T. H. Cook
Third Lieutenant	John J. Stroman

Company D.

       

Captain	Collier
First Lieutenant	J. W. Sellars
Second Lieutenant	E. H. Holman
Third Lieutenant	Olin M. Dantzler

Company E.

       

Captain	T. H. Mangum
First Lieutenant	James M. Day
Second Lieutenant	G. E. Steadman
Third Lieutenant	H. R. Guyton

Company F.

       

Captain	Winchester Graham
First Lieutenant	George M. Grimes
Second Lieutenant	J. J. Weissinger
Third Lieutenant	G. W. Grimes

Company G.

       

Captain	E. J. Frederick
First Lieutenant	J. D. Rountree
Second Lieutenant	S. W. Trotti
Third Lieutenant	G. R. Dunbar

Company H.

       

Captain	J. Vincent Martin
First Lieutenant	A. T. Allen
Second Lieutenant	W. B. Flowers
Third Lieutenant	W. A. All

Company I.

       

Captain	James White
First Lieutenant	A. A. Hudson
Second Lieutenant	G. H. Breeland
Third Lieutenant	Lewis Kinsey

Company K.

       

Captain	J. J. Brown
First Lieutenant	W. D. Burt
Second Lieutenant	J. A. Bellinger
Third Lieutenant	F. M. Green

As thus organized, the regiment, together with the others raised
under the act of the legislature of 1860, was directed to hold
itself in readiness for service, and in the meanwhile to perfect, as
far as possible, its drill and discipline. The regiment, when
mustered into State service subsequently, numbered 832 rank
and file.

Note—The regiment of six months' men provided for by the Convention assumed
the name of "First South Carolina Volunteers," and were also known by this title, as
well as the regiment enlisted for the war, which, in the summer of 1861, was raised
by the field officers of the six months' regiment on the expiration of its service. Orr's
Regiment, subsequently raised, was called First South Carolina Rifles. There was a
regiment of infantry called First South Carolina Regulars. In consequence of this
number of first regiments (all infantry) they were most commonly known by the
names of their colonels being added to their numerical designation, thus: "1st S. C.
V. (Gregg's), 1st S. C. V. (Hagood's)," etc.

Fort Sumter.

The regulars and six months' volunteers provided for by the
Convention were rapidly enlisted or accepted, respectively, and
placed in service in Charleston harbor or on the adjacent islands.
These, together with the volunteer militia from the city of
Charleston (volunteers under the old militia organization. A. A.,
1841), were employed in pressing forward the works projected
for the reduction of Fort Sumter—still held by the Federal Government.
In April, 1861, the batteries being well advanced and
negotiations having failed to secure the delivery of the fortress,
it was determined to take it by force of arms,[1] and vindicate the
fact of secession.

South Carolina's resumption of her separate sovereignty had
been followed by the same act on the part of other Southern
States. Each for herself had dissolved her connection with the
Federal Union, and between themselves had formed a new Confederacy,
with its seat of government at Montgomery. The
operations against Fort Sumter had been carried on by South
Carolina unaided and were continued from her own resources.
Upon application of the State authorities to the Government at
Montgomery, in March, General Beauregard, a distinguished
officer of the army of the Confederate States, had, however, been
assigned to their direction. Now it was desired to have a considerable
body of troops in reserve in and near Charleston. A
large fleet of Federal vessels had sailed for Charleston, and it
was supposed that Sumter would be reinforced, if possible, or
that at least operations in the nature of a diversion would be
undertaken by the Federals. Accordingly, by an order dated
8th of April, several of the regiments raised under the legislative
act of 1860 were ordered to rendezvous at Charleston. This
order was received by the colonel of the First Regiment, at the
hands of a special aide of Governor Pickens, on the evening of
the 8th, and couriers immediately dispatched to extend it. The
First Battalion arrived in the city by railroad at 10 p. m. on
the 11th, and the Second Battalion just before day next morning.
Upon their arrival they were marched to the race track, where
they were at once mustered into the State service, and partially
equipped, being supplied with arms, ammunition, and an
inadequate supply of cooking utensils. At 8 a. m. on the 12th,
the muster rolls were handed in to the State Adjutant-General,
and the Regiment directed to report to General Beauregard. The
bombardment had commenced at 4 a. m. and was then in full
progress. The Regiment received orders to proceed by such
transportation as should be furnished it to Morris Island, and
report to the general then commanding. The Second (12
months') Regiment—Colonel Kershaw's—and a portion of the
Sixth—Colonel Rion's—from the greater railroad facilities of
the country in which they were raised, were enabled to reach
Charleston a few hours sooner, and had been sent over to the
same island directly across the harbor, just before the bombardment
commenced. The Fifth Regiment (Jenkins') arrived later,

and was sent to Sullivan's Island. The Third (Bacon's) and
the Fourth (Sloan's) arrived still later and were held in reserve
on Charleston neck. The other battalion of Rion's Regiment was
placed on Stono.

In consequence of the bombardment being in progress, the
First Regiment was directed to proceed across Ashley River to
Dill's Landing, on James Island; thence across James Island
to Legare Landing upon a creek running into Light House
Inlet, and thence to Morris Island. The quartermaster, Colonel
Hatch, was unable to furnish the transportation across Ashley
River until 3 p. m. that day. The men had been supplied with
neither haversacks nor knapsacks, and were without other camp
equipage than the cooking utensils above referred to. Their
rations had to be transported in bulk, and their baggage was in
trunks, valises and carpetbags with which they had left home.
The movement commenced, as intended, at 3 p. m., and the
Second Battalion was crossed over the Ashley without their
baggage or rations (the boat being unable to carry more than
the men), when the boat broke some of her machinery and the
crossing stopped. A cold, driving rain came up, succeeded for
the balance of the night by a bleak northeast wind. The regiment
bivouacked—one battalion upon the wharf in Charleston,
and the other at Dill's Landing, without food or shelter. Early
next morning the remaining battalion was got across the river,
and by noon the whole had moved across James Island to
Legare's, where deficiency of transportation again delayed them
some hours. Embarking before night, Morris Island was
reached between 10 and 11 o'clock of the night of the 13th. The
regiment was landed near where Battery Wagner subsequently
stood, and bivouacked in the sand hills in rear of the Vinegar
Hill Battery. One company of the Second Battalion (Captain
Graham's) had, however, crossed James Island on the night
of the 12th, and, obtaining transportation at Legare's, arrived
on Morris Island about daylight on the 13th. Much suffering
attended the whole movement. Ten or twelve men fainted on
the wharf in Charleston from exposure and want of food. The
only meal that many of the men obtained from leaving the race
course to the morning of the 14th was at Legare's Landing. It
was difficult to extricate the barrels, in which their rations were,

from the piles of luggage on the stream, and when extricated the
stomach revolted from the wet and soured mess. The proper
equipment of the men with knapsacks and haversacks at the
race course would have greatly mitigated their sufferings. But
in the inception of a revolutionary movement, and with men and
officers fresh from civil life, these troubles were unavoidable.
The bombardment, which had commenced at 4 a. m. on the 12th,
continued until about 1 p. m. on the 13th, when the fort surrendered.
During the passage of the Ashley and the march across
James Island we were in full view of the scene. The tempestuous
weather of the preceding night had been succeeded by a lovely
April day. Negroes were busily at work in the fields of James
Island, the air was vocal with birds, and vegetation was as forward
as it would have been a month later in the middle country
from which the regiment had come. Contrasting strangely with
this lovely rural scenery and continued pursuit of peaceful avocations,
the roar and reverberation of the distant bombardment
called attention to the doomed fortress in the bay. And, indeed,
to eyes unused to the grand spectacles of war, it was full of
sublimity. The bursting of the shells over the fort, marked by
light puffs of smoke, slowly fading out into fantastic wreaths,
the lurid flash from the portholes shooting out low down its level
column of smoke over the water, as the besieged sent back defiance
to the leaguer, the burning barracks, the consciousness that this
was war, with its glories, its terrors, its uncertainties—all tended
to impress vividly the imagination of the beholder. While
we were at Legare's the flagstaff of the fort was shot away, and
its fall was greeted with enthusiastic cheers by the regiment.
These had scarcely subsided when one generous fellow called out,
"Hurrah for Anderson, too," and more than one voice responded
to his call. There was one person, however, a type of her class,
perhaps, who did not take in fully the magnitude of the occasion.
A soldier called to an aged negress, patiently delving with others
in a field by the roadside, "Old woman, what's the matter over
yonder?" "Eh, eh; you no see the house afire?"

The formal evacuation of the fort took place on the 14th, the
garrison withdrawing with the honors of war, and being transferred
to one of the Federal vessels lying in the offing. A vast
concourse of people witnessed it from the shores of the harbor,

and the waters of the bay were alive with boats and sightseers.
Thus fell Fort Sumter. In a military point of view its defense
was contemptible—to realize how contemptible one need only
look to the ruins of the same work held later in the war by Rhett,
Elliott and Mitchell, without a gun to reply to Gilmore's 200
Parrotts, or a casement to shelter them, save such as they themselves
tunnelled in the debris, working under a merciless fire.
The tenacity of purpose which could avail itself of passive
resistance and fight for time had no place in their defense. A
formidable fleet lay idly by and witnessed the bombardment and
surrender without an effort either by force or stratagem to aid
the garrison.

The means at the disposal of the Carolinians to reduce the
fort, vigorously held, were totally inadequate. Their breaching
guns, necessarily placed at extreme range, were old-fashioned
smooth-bores of light caliber, save a rifled 12 dr., which for
such a purpose was a mere toy. From their shells the casements
of the fort were a perfect protection. It is true their hot shots
fired the wooden barracks on the terreplein of the fort, and this,
while burning, may have, as alleged, endangered the magazine,
but the barracks soon burned out. Endangered magazines are
an incident of every siege, and their explosion within beleaguered
forts was no uncommon occurrence on both sides later in the war,
and none were even surrendered in consequence. It is true that
Anderson's means of damaging his assailants, sheltered behind
epaulements, were as limited. He had nothing but smooth-bores,
firing round shot. But neither his ammunition nor commissariat
was exhausted when he surrendered. And photographs of the
work taken at the time forever forbid the assertion that its tenability
was seriously impaired. The walls were injured nowhere;
the projectiles of the nearest batteries had given them the look
of a bad case of smallpox, no more, and not a man had been killed
on either side when Anderson's flag was furled. No wonder that
European spectators smiled at the bombardment and defense.
It had to veteran eyes, which saw only the patent facts, something
of the characteristics of Chinese war. But the truth is
the doctrine of State Sovereignty, with its consequent State
Rights, was not then the exploded heresy which it has since
become. Taught by the most venerated sages of the early

republic, it had constituted the faith of a large majority of the
people, and shaped the course of the government almost uninterruptedly
from its inception. It was still a mighty, living
influence, and gave to the Carolinians the benefit of that morale
which is as potent in armies as is the nervous fluid in the human
frame. It paralyzed the defense, and gave audacity to the
assailant. The whole course of the Federal Government toward
the seceded States had been that of one who admits a right but
seeks to evade its consequences. The Northern press took no
higher ground; and some of its most influential exponents openly
admitted the Southern view of the question. Mr. Lincoln, in the
face of his life-long advocacy of the principles relied upon by
the secessionists, could find no higher ground upon which to put
his continued tenure of Sumter than its character of property—a
character in which the seceded State was more than willing to
consider and account for it in an equitable distribution of assets.
Major Anderson was himself a Democrat of the State's Rights
school, a Kentuckian by birth and a son-in-law of Duncan L.
Clinch, who had tendered his commission to the United States
Government years ago, when its mandates were about to place
him in antagonism to the sovereignty of Georgia.[2] On the other
hand, he was a trained soldier of the regular army, with all of
a soldier's ideas of honor. Thus situated, with his orders, such
as they were, emanating from the tricky and shuffling demagogues
who filled the high places at Washington; himself for
some time cut off from communication with his headquarters,
and the fleet (which was in direct communication with it, and
which was there for nothing if not to assist him) lying idly in
his view, and moving no hand to help him, no wonder that he
made only such a defense as could by possibility warrant an
honorable surrender. Insignificant, however, as was the defense
of Sumter and facile as was its reduction, in its results it was an
event of tremendous consequence. From that period what little
statesmanship and reason had so far marked the controversy,
fled the field, and the baleful passions of civil strife were loosed
for a four years' carnival of blood and ruthless destruction.

The First Regiment remained bivouacked in the sand hills
near Vinegar Hill for four days. It was then moved farther

down the Island to Gadberry Hill, extending its left toward
Vinegar Hill. Here they were again bivouacked. During this
time the fleet was still lying off the bar, and the men were constantly
disturbed at night by false alarms. No camp equipage
was received for ten or twelve days; the weather was again
tempestuous and cold; the exposure, the wretched water dug
from shallow pits in the sand hills, and the inefficient policing
of the camps, soon began to tell upon the health of the men.
Much sickness ensued. We were a week on the island before the
first drill could be had. The men were employed all the time in
endeavoring to obtain such shelter as could be improvised, even
in many instances constructing burrows in the sand hills, and
in the difficult task of getting their rations cooked.

In ten or twelve days, however, our supply of tents, etc., began
to arrive, and the men were enabled to make themselves more
comfortable. Uniforms—a short grey blouse—were distributed,
drilling was diligently prosecuted, and the regiment began to
assume something of discipline and acquaintance with the routine
of camp duty. Brigadier-General Simons (of the Charleston
militia), Major-General Bonham, and afterwards Brigadier-General
Nelson (the two latter of the 12 months' volunteer organization)
were in command. The Charleston militia was soon
after the bombardment relieved from duty. Rion's Battalion
was sent to Stono, and the First and Second 12 months' Regiments,
with a half troop of Charleston Volunteer Dragoons, were
retained on the island until the batteries bearing on the channel
were dismantled, and those bearing on Sumter were demolished.
This work accomplished, they also were withdrawn.

There was one of these batteries that deserves notice, the
"Stevens," or "Iron-Clad," Battery. The following diagram,
drawn from recollection, will give some idea of it. The gun is
"in battery" and ready for firing:

It was a structure of triangular section, presenting one of its
sides at a very obtuse angle to the enemy, and open to the rear.
The frame-work was of heavy timber and the side exposed to fire
was plated with common railroad iron, presenting to the hostile
projectiles a sloping corrugated surface thus: When
the guns were not in battery, the portholes were closed by curtains
similarly plated and worked from the inside by a lever.
It was a crude affair, but sufficient for Anderson's light, smoothbores.
It was struck several times; the only injury it showed
was a broken hinge to one of the curtains of a porthole, and a
partial loosening of one of the iron rails. The interest attaching
to this battery is that it was (the writer believes) the first instance
of the actual use of iron plating for defensive purposes in war.[3]
It was the precursor, if not the germ, of the iron-clad vessels
which played so important a part later in the contest. An ironclad
floating battery had also been attempted by the Carolinians.
It took some part at long range in the bombardment, but was
generally considered a failure. Clement C. Stevens, then cashier
in a bank in Charleston, suggested and executed this work. He
subsequently raised a regiment, (24th S. C. V.), was promoted
to a brigade and died in battle in the Western Army. General
Stevens was a man of high character and intelligence, and
earned the reputation of a most excellent officer. He was brother-in-law
of Barnard E. Bee, who knighted Jackson at Manassas,
dubbing him "Stonewall" a few moments before he himself was
borne from that field mortally wounded. Stevens, in the same
battle, was wounded on Bee's staff.

Orangeburg.

The First Regiment received orders on the 22nd of May to
proceed to, or near to, Orangeburg and there be encamped.
At 8 o'clock next morning the movement began; but the quartermaster's
department was again our evil genius. It was after
dark when we were landed in the city. We marched through,
stopping in front of the Charleston Hotel to hear a speech from
Governor Pickens, and took the cars for Orangeburg, where the
regiment arrived at daylight. During our stay at Orangeburg the

regiment improved rapidly in drill and knowledge of military
duties. The taking of Confederate service was, however, the chief
topic of interest in its history while at that camp, and indeed when
that question was decided the camp was broken up. Just after
the fall of Sumter, the Governor of Virginia called upon the
executive of South Carolina for military assistance. Virginia
had not then become a member of the Southern Confederacy,
though she had seceded and was threatened with Federal
invasion. Governor Pickens dispatched an aide to Morris Island
with a circular note to each of the colonels of regiments there,
requesting them to call on their respective commands to volunteer
for the service, and informing them that, in case of a favorable
response, they would move at ten o'clock that night. The Second
Regiment (Kershaw's) volunteered something like two hundred
men, and the six months' men (Gregg's) a like number. Next day
these bodies of volunteers left the island, each under command
of its colonel. The balance of these regiments remained on the
island. The six months' men that remained were disbanded
a few days afterward, and the part of the Second Regiment that
remained was subsequently recruited and known as Blanding's
Regiment, while the fragments of regiments which Gregg and
Kershaw carried to Virginia were rapidly filled up to full regiments
by independent companies from different parts of South
Carolina, who went on to join them.

The First Regiment when called upon responded by Mangum's
Company volunteering nearly unanimously; the other companies
volunteered from ten to thirty men each, but coupled with the
condition in each case that the whole company went. No special
effort was made by officers to induce the men to volunteer, for
it was seen that it would disrupt the regiment, and it was
thought more advisable, with a view to subsequently taking
Confederate service, to keep it together. A day or so previously
(16th April) Governor Pickens had sent over copies
of a resolution by the Convention of the State then in session
providing that "with their consent" the troops in State
service should be transferred to the service of the Confederate
States, and had directed the colonels commanding "to report
within five days" whether their regiments would consent to be so
transferred. A few days after the Virginia call, he came out

in the newspapers with a proclamation (which he also directed
to be read at the head of the troops) asserting his right to order
the twelve months' men to march and serve wherever he deemed
proper beyond the borders of the State, and declaring his intention
so to do whenever in his judgment the necessary occasion
arose. He called upon the Attorney-General for his legal opinion
of the Governor's powers in the premises under the act of 1860,
and this opinion sustained the views of the proclamation. The
troops seemed to consider the proclamation as an attempt to
coerce them in a matter in which the Convention, the supreme
power in the land, had required their consent. They saw no
practical difference, they said, in going abroad to serve the general
interests of the Confederacy, though they were called State
troops, and in going abroad entered into Confederate service.
They imagined, too, that the proclamation was dictated by irritation
at the response made to the Governor's call for Virginia
volunteers. And such indignation was felt with the course of the
executive that it required an exertion of authority by officers
in command to prevent its public expression. No report was
made under the Governor's communication of the 16th April,
and the question of taking Confederate service remained in this
condition at the time the regiment left Morris Island. The object
of selecting Orangeburg was because the locality was deemed
favorable to the consideration of the question. It was also
deemed best by the field officers to obtain (which they succeeded
in doing) a general furlough of ten days for the regiment before
presenting the subject. The soldier suddenly called from his
civil pursuits could in this interval make his arrangements for
that more extended service which the necessities of the country
required. The morning of the arrival at Orangeburg this
furlough was announced, and, upon the reassembling of the command,
the matter was fairly opened. In a communication from
the Adjutant-General, dated 23rd May, and read too late to communicate
to the regiment before going on furlough. was enclosed
the following order:

"The Secretary of War has made two requisitions for troops on the Governor,
amounting to 8,000 men. If the regiments were to be retained by the
State as volunteer regiments, then they are subject to orders to march

whenever and wheresoever directed by the Commander-in-Chief. The resolution
of the Convention seemed as intended to require that the Governor
should give the honor in the first instance to the volunteer regiments to be
mustered into the service of the Confederate States, and thus through the
action of that body their service should be changed. The President of the
Confederate States, under a recent Act of Congress, as intimated by the
Secretary of War, adopted the policy of calling only for companies to be
mustered in for the war, and then for the President to appoint the field
officers when such companies were formed into battalions or regiments; but
as eight volunteer regiments were already organized in South Carolina, it
has been determined to give them the honorable opportunity of going into
service as regiments with their field officers.

"Under these circumstances it is ordered that the eight regiments of
volunteers be prepared by their officers to be mustered into service for their
12-months' enrollment. For this purpose the field officers and company
officers with the men of each company will be required to sign a roll agreeing
distinctly to the terms. It will take sixty-four privates as a minimum
to make a company to be mustered in, and when a majority of the present
roll of a company so agree, then that company by this decision will preserve
its present organization as a basis to be filled upon, and if six or more
companies in any regiment so agree, then the organization of that regiment
may be preserved and a system hereafter to be adopted will be ordered to
make up the companies that may thus have a majority, but not sixty-four
as the case may be, in that regiment. And then, upon the same system,
orders will be given to make up the remaining companies after six, always
reserving the right of the company or regiment to elect officers when they
(the officers) do not choose to change their service. If ten companies, with
sixty-four present in each, be found to agree to the terms, then such regiment
is complete.

"When the eight regiments are made up, a portion of them will be
retained by order of the Governor to defend the State of South Carolina;
and if the regiments decline to be mustered into Confederate service, then
still a sufficient number of them, under the present organization, will be
retained for seacoast defense in this State. In any case, however, this
selection will be made. The mustering officer will be ready as soon as the
returns are made on this.

The following form of enlistment was communicated at the
same time:

"We, the undersigned officers and privates of — Company,
— Regiment of So. Ca. Volunteers, do hereby agree to be mustered
unconditionally into the service of the Confederate States of America,
to serve for the period of twelve months from the — day of
April last."

It will be observed that no plan of service is guaranteed in
these papers, and the order of the 19th May distinctly sets forth
that in any event a selection will be made for seacoast service in
South Carolina. In his speech to the regiment while passing
through Charleston, the Governor had told them that the portion
of the regiment that took Confederate service would go to Virginia,
and that which refused would be retained for local defense.
In a speech to Blanding's Regiment, which was made a few days
later and published in the newspapers (before the question was
submitted to the First Regiment), he told them the same thing.
And, in a conversation with the colonel and lieutenant-colonel
of the First he had expressed the same purpose. It was, moreover,
known that Heyward's and Manigault's Regiments (9th
and 10th, under Act of 1860), raised from the seacoast district,
and then being organized, preferred the local service. It may be
added that the Executive's speeches and statements, it was afterwards
learned, succeeded in giving to the other regiments the
same interpretation of the order of the 19th May. An impression
had, however, got abroad in the First Regiment that those not
taking Confederate service would be disbanded, though it was
never doubted that those taking it would go to Virginia.

For several days after the proposition was submitted but little
progress was made. But few men could be obtained and these
were distributed so equally among the companies that no company
could obtain "a majority according to its present roll." The
charms of home were too strong for the call of patriotism. The
enemy had been expelled from South Carolina by South Carolinians
unaided and at one effort; let other States do the same
thing. Virginia has not yet been invaded; let her drive the
Federal from Norfolk as South Carolina had done from Sumter,
and the Government at Washington, seeing that the
South was determined upon independence, will not be reckless
enough to involve the whole continent in war. Thus many of
the men and even officers reasoned; and not yet broken into
the requirements of the military code, and sore from its
unaccustomed restraints, they readily listened to such reasoning.
The regiment was encamped in the country from which
nearly half of it was raised; the friends and relatives of the
men were daily in camp, and, strange to say, this outside

influence was largely exerted against going into Confederate
service. This, too, in the Third Congressional District, the very
hotbed of secession. The people had no conception of the magnitude
of the struggle in which they had embarked. Thus matters
stood. The officers fearing the vacillation of Executive counsels,
with the disbandment of the portion of Gregg's Regiment (nearly
two-thirds) which did not take Confederate service and with the
terms of the order of the 19th May before them, hesitated to
take the only step by which it was evident the question could be
carried. They hesitated to assure the regiment that the question
was not between disbandment and Confederate service, but
between Virginia and the seaboard. At length General Jamison,
Secretary of War for South Carolina, happened unofficially to
visit the camp, and told them that they might safely take this
step, for he was apprised of the views of the Executive. The
assurance was accordingly given and it was found necessary to
pledge the honor of the officers that the issue was as presented.

Upon this six skeleton companies were raised, and the organization
of the regiment preserved under the terms of the order.
White's Company had at an earlier date unanimously declined to
take Confederate service, and arrangements had, with consent of
all parties, been effected to exchange it for Rice's Company of
Heyward's Regiment, who desired to go to Virginia.

A report of the facts was made on the 2nd June, with a request
for a mustering officer to be sent up to muster in the regiment as
it stood—to dispatch it at once to Virginia—and to allow the
necessary recruits to follow. The request was declined in an
Executive communication dated 3rd June, and the regiment was
informed that "A skeleton regiment cannot be sent to Virginia;
it must be full and complete." On the 4th June Lieutenant-Colonel
(afterwards General) Barnard E. Bee, having mustered
in Jenkins' (Fifth) Regiment, encamped near us, informed the
colonel commanding the First that he was also instructed to
muster in the First, if it was completed, and at the same time
handed him the following:

"Under instructions from the Governor, Colonel Hagood, commanding
First Regiment South Carolina Volunteers, will make the necessary arrangements

for transferring that portion of his regiment which has refused to
enter the Confederate service to the camp at Ridgeville. This portion will
be under command of Major O'Caim, and will at once be separated on the
regimental records from that portion which has elected to serve the Confederacy.

"The camp equipage will be retained for the use of the regiment, consequently
Major O'Caim will make requisition for camp and garrison equipage
on Colonel Hatch.

Previously, in a letter dated 1st June, the colonel commanding
had been instructed by the Governor: "After mustering into
Confederate service, the remaining companies and detachments
of companies not volunteering will be placed, on the departure
of the regiment, under command of the senior officer remaining,
who will report for orders to the Adjutant-General's Department."

Sufficient progress had not been made for Colonel Bee, under
his instructions, to muster in the regiment; but the order extended
by him was communicated to the command. It was received as
practical confirmation of the assurance given by the officers, and
before night two more skeleton companies were made up, being
eight in all and numbering near 500 men in the aggregate.
Collier's Company declined, as a company, to take Confederate
service, but many individuals of it had combined with a portion
of Kemmerlin's Company. Rice's Company made nine, and
Steadman, of Lexington, and Edward Cantey, of Camden, had
each, with full companies, applied for the tenth place. Steadman
being the first applicant was notified to bring his company
into camp. Recruiting officers were sent out to fill up the skeleton
companies, rolls dispatched to the adjutant-general with the
request to send up a mustering officer on the Monday following,
and the major of the regiment (who had declined Confederate
service) was sent down under Bee's order to make arrangements
for transferring his portion of the men to the seaboard.

On Sunday, Steadman marched his company into camp, over
80 strong, and the recruiting officers returned with recruits enough
to raise the skeleton companies to the same average, but, at the

same time, the major returned with the following communication
from the Governor:

"Sir: I received yours of the 2nd June in which you reported your regiment
ready for mustering into service. I sent the mustering officer with
special instructions to muster in, and, if under the required number, to
receive as a battalion, and, if under a battalion, to receive as companies. I
can delay no longer, as I have already delayed longer than I ought. Colonel
Glover thought if they could go to Orangeburg there would be no difficulty.
Have them mustered in, and the men who decline to muster into service, I
desire to have their arms, and those who muster in, I desire to receive immediately
and make a permanent arrangement for the summer in the manner
best suited to the public service. The five regiments recently mustered in,
together with the other two already there, are all I can spare out of the
State, and I must organize the rest to the best advantage for the State and
the public service as soon as possible. If the companies who muster in fall
below ten, then I can use them to recruit on and fill up to a regiment, if it
is thought necessary hereafter.

Matters were thus entirely reversed. The men whose spirit had
induced them to volunteer for honorable and active service
abroad were condemned to an inglorious summer campaign on
the coast, and those whose want of spirit had induced them to
prefer the miasma and the mosquitoes of the coast, with the certainty
of encountering no enemy, were to be rewarded with a
return to their homes. These last were highly jubilant. The men
who had signed the Confederate rolls were greatly exasperated.
The officers had solemnly pledged their honor that the issue was a
different one, and self-respect compelled them, as far as they
were concerned, to release the men from the obligation of enlisting
under the new Executive programme. The recent recruits
brought in utterly scouted the idea of entering a regiment condemned
to the coast. And when on Monday Captain Dunovant,
the mustering officer, came, not a man would muster in.

On this report being made, orders were received to retain the
whole regiment in service for State defense. A few days afterward
this again was countermanded; and on the 15th June the
regiment was "relieved from duty until further orders."

In the interval between the departure of the mustering officer

and the order for the relief of the regiment, the colonel commanding
visited Governor Pickens with a scheme to raise an
independent regiment for Virginia service. His Excellency
seemed utterly dismayed at the result of his communication of
the 6th June, and evinced every disposition to remedy the evil
by acquiescence in the scheme. The Confederate Secretary at
War telegraphed his assent from Richmond; but the men failed
utterly to respond. They had lost confidence in the authorities;
the delights of home loomed up in magnified proportions; the
last spark of volunteer enthusiasm was extinguished; and they
seemed bent on disbandment at whatever discredit to themselves
or consequence to the country. Desiring to disembarrass the
question of every difficulty, the field officers issued a card to the
regiment, pledging themselves to resign if one-half of each
of eighty names as six companies would again sign the roll for
Confederate service; and not a single name was given in. A
few spirited company officers then proposed that the officers
of the regiment band themselves into a company, and, taking the
beautiful banner with which the ladies of Barnwell had presented
us when the regiment was supposed to be going to Virginia, carry
out the purpose of the fair donors.[4] This, too, failed. It was a
pitch of self-devotion to which volunteer human nature could
not attain.

The issue of Confederate service was presented to the other
regiments who were already mustered in, in the same way that
it was to the First. Similar indisposition to accept was in each
of them, more or less, encountered. But the question was presented
to them ten days earlier in consequence of the furlough
which its field officers had perhaps unfortunately obtained for
the First, and consequently they got off for Virginia before their
own or any other recusants were disbanded. It may be too
that they were more adroitly managed by the officers in command.
When the subject of re-enlistment for the war came up,
twelve months afterwards, the First regiment redeemed itself by
raising and enlisting eleven companies quietly and without effort
before the first enlistment of the men had expired. The writer
is not accurately informed, but believes this was the only one of

the South Carolina regiments, and he is inclined to think the
only regiment in the Confederate army, which thus by voluntary
re-enlistment renewed its service at that time to that extent. The
pressure of the Confederate Conscription Act[5] directly or indirectly
gave continued existence to these original organizations.
Volunteering is by far the best method of raising suddenly large
armies for a popular war. The enthusiasm of the people is thus
utilized before it has evanesced; but once enlisted (and that for
the war) the word should be expunged from the soldier's vocabulary.
It was observed, too, under similar circumstances of so large
a number of offices to be filled, when an appointing power had not
the time or ability to make itself acquainted with the merits of
applicants, that the election of officers by the men in the first
instance resulted in as good, if not a better, selection than when
the government appointed. Any subsequent promotions by election
after the troops are in service, and men and officers have the
opportunity of exhibiting their fitness for position, is an unmitigated
evil. It was in the modified form in which it existed in the
regulations of the Confederate army, the lowest grade only being
elective, a drawback upon discipline, which none can realize who
has not experienced a similar state of affairs. Blanding's and
Rion's (Sixth) Regiment struggled on manfully after the First
was relieved from duty, and after a month's longer work were
mustered into Confederate service. No sooner was this done than
they were ordered to Virginia; and this, notwithstanding the
Governor's letter of the 6th June to the First Regiment.

Relieved From Duty.

During the time it was relieved from duty the State authorities
sometimes acted as if the regiment was finally disbanded; at
other times as if it was only temporarily relieved and no further
service expected from it. Mangum's Company was armed and
permitted to go West, where it entered Colonel Martin's First

Mississippi Regiment, of which Mangum himself became the
major. McCreery was encouraged to raise a company from
individuals of the regiment to join a new regiment Colonel Gregg
was raising "for the war," the time of the six months' men whom
he had carried to Virginia having expired.[6] And though a
remonstrance was made by Captain Brown, whose company was
chiefly affected, and the names of his men in McCreery's Company
furnished the Governor, yet his Excellency, while asserting
that he had forbidden McCreery to recruit from the First
Regiment, upon the filing of his roll in the Adjutant-General's
office, furnished him with transportation to Virginia. Captain
Lartigue, quartermaster of the regiment, and others also received
Executive countenance in efforts to raise independent commands.
On the other hand, individual members of the regiment were
required to obtain furloughs before leaving the State, sometimes
requiring the assent of the regimental commander and sometimes
not. Many members of the regiment without obtaining leave
straggled off to Virginia, where they permanently attached themselves
to different organizations. From Orangeburg the colonel
of the regiment went to Charleston and obtained a furlough for
three months, not supposing the regiment would be again called
into service, if at all, before the winter campaign in the South
should open. Thence, after a couple of days in making the
necessary preparations at home, he went to Virginia equipped as
a private and prepared to do such service as might offer during
his leave of absence. He was fortunate enough to be able to
render some assistance as engineer in charge, under Captain
Stevens, C. S. A., of the works near Fairfax Court House
between the Falls Church and Flint Hill Roads, and had the
honor to carry a rifle in the Palmetto Guard of Kershaw's Regiment
in the retreat from Fairfax, and in the battle of Bull Run
and of Manassas Plains.

At Bull Run the participation of Kershaw's Regiment was
confined to sustaining a canonade behind the lines and to two
sorties during the day in support of Kemper's Battery of Field
Artillery. At Manassas it was more actively engaged. After

the arrival of Colonel Hagood in Virginia, the following members
of the First came on with similar furloughs: Lieutenant
John H. Felder, Lieutenant John A. Bellinger, Sergeant E. I.
Felder, Sergeant Donald Rowe, Privates Meredith, Jaudon,
Robinson, Ben Hart, and Sergeant (afterwards Lieutenant)
Dibble.[7] They attached themselves as privates to Kershaw's
Regiment and did duty as such while in Virginia.

At Manassas Lieutenant Bellinger and Sergeant Felder,
together with Burwile Barnwell, of Beaufort, S. C., assisted
Colonel Hagood in working one of the guns of Rickett's captured
battery against the retreating enemy.

Summerville.

The regiment assembled at Summerville on the South Carolina
Railroad under the following order:

"Special Orders:

"No. 156.

"1. The Second (Blanding's) and Sixth Regiments of South Carolina Volunteers
having been ordered to Virginia, and Colonel R. H. Anderson, commanding
provisional forces in South Carolina, having made a requisition
for troops to replace them in the defense of the State, the First Regiment
of South Carolina Volunteers is ordered to rendezvous at Summerville on
the 20th day of July inst.

"2. Colonel Hagood being absent from the State, Lieutenant-Colonel
Glover is placed in command of the regiment and will extend this order.

"3. Colonel Glover will report for orders to Colonel R. H. Anderson, commanding
provisional forces. . .

Nine companies were represented at the rendezvous, Mangum's
company having gone West. None were full and some
were mere fragments. Colonel Hagood returned from Virginia
during the first week in August and took command on the 10th.
The recruiting of the regiment had been commenced; and the
question of entering military Confederate service was again presented
under the condition indicated in the following communication:

"Sir: In order to prevent any misunderstanding, I beg leave to say that
the alternative is not presented to your regiment to muster into Confederate
service or to be disbanded. On the contrary, such injustice will not be
done. . . . If any refuse Confederate service they will be kept on duty
until their time expires.

Under this communication all inducements to refuse Confederate
service was apparently removed. Still the bona fide of the
communication was doubted by some; and, to anticipate somewhat,
the sequel showed they were well posted upon the vacillating
counsels which ruled at State headquarters. After keeping
the recusants in service for some time they were, on the 30th
September following, disbanded. Brown's and Frederick's Companies
failed to obtain a basis to recruit upon for Confederate
service, as provided for in the order of 19th May, but many of
their respective commands entered other companies of the regiment
for that purpose. Two companies from Barnwell, commanded
respectively by Captains Duncan and Brabham, and
one from Williamsburg, commanded by Captain J. G. Pressly
(late of Gregg's six months' regiment), were received to fill the
vacant places. And thus at length the regiment was mustered

into Confederate service. As soon as this was accomplished,
attention was at once directed to obtaining orders for Virginia
service; and, though these efforts were principally made while
the regiment was stationed elsewhere, the subject will be disposed
of at once. In inducing the men to take Confederate service,
and especially in obtaining new companies to fill the vacant
places, it was impressed upon them that they were to enlist
"unconditionally," and without a pledge from the Government
as to the locality of service. The seacoast from the approach of
winter, when active operations might be then anticipated, had
become less unpopular. Still Virginia was in general estimation
the field of honor. The men composing the new Confederate
regiments desired to go there, and it was clear all the way through
that without the chance of the regiment being ordered to the seat
of war the regiment could not be raised. Governor Pickens had
made the proposition to Lieutenant-Colonel Glover, commanding,
for the regiment "to muster in, upon the same terms as had
been accorded to the Ninth and Tenth regiments. Those regiments
are now in Confederate service upon the understanding,
not expressed in writing, that they are to be used in defence of
South Carolina" (see his letter), and at the same time sending
him the printed "unconditional" rolls. The Governor's letter
was suppressed; it was thought if he wished to limit the written
contract he was encouraging a regiment, then undoubtedly under
his control, to make with the Confederate Government it was his
business to address his communication to that Government, and
if they were unwilling to accept his modifications (as they were
known to be) then to have kept the regiment on the State establishment,
as he had the right to do. On applying to Anderson
(now General), commanding in Charleston, for a mustering
officer, the General, as a matter of form, telegraphed the Governor
fir his assent and received for reply: "The Governor consents on
the same terms accorded to Heyward's and Manigault's regiments."
These were respectively the Ninth and Tenth. General
Anderson sent the mustering officer up, and with him sent the
telegram. Colonel Hagood did not communicate the telegram to
the regiment, but, taking advantage of some errors in the muster
rolls, sent the mustering officer back with the following communication:

"General: Lieutenant Miles (the mustering officer sent me today and
who will deliver this) desires the muster rolls made out anew in consequence
of some defect of form. He showed while here a telegram from
Captain Simonton, Acting Adjutant General of South Carolina, to you,
saying that Governor Pickens desired the First Regiment mustered in on
the terms accorded to Heyward's and Manigault's regiments. In a conversation
had with you a few days ago, I understood you to say that these
regiments were mustered into Confederate service unconditionally, and that
these were the only terms upon which any regiment had been, or would be,
received. The printed agreement furnished us by the State Adjutant General
Department to be signed preliminary to mustering in is expressly
unconditional in its terms, and I wish to state that it is upon the expressed
terms of that agreement and no other that the regiment has consented to,
and now takes Confederate service.

General Anderson sent the mustering officer back next day, and
we took leave of the State service with this protest on file and a
part of the contract.

Desiring to remove all obstacles whatever to our Virginia
scheme, General Jamison was induced to seek an interview with
the Governor, which resulted in his giving his written consent to
the regiment being ordered to that State. General Jamison forwarded
to Colonel Hagood the paper by mail, and it had hardly
arrived when Governor Pickens addressed a letter to Lieutenant
Colonel Glover revoking his consent. This letter was not
addressed to the "Lieutenant Colonel" with any addition indicating
that his Excellency thought Glover was in command, and
as Colonel Hagood was then in command, and had been since 10th
August, he took no notice of the revocation but wrote to General
Bonham in Virginia desiring that he would seek to have us
attached to his brigade, and commenced also the following correspondence
which shows the result of our aspirations in that
direction:

"Sir: I beg leave respectfully to enclose you a paper from Governor
Pickens, giving his consent for my regiment to leave for Virginia and to

apply for orders. My regiment was of the twelve months volunteers called
for by the State last winter, the first organized and received into service.
It has been late to take Confederate service for reasons that it is needless
to speak of now; but none of which reflect either upon the spirit of the
men or their readiness to serve the Confederacy. We have been in service
since 13th April last, and are as well drilled as any of the Carolina troops
now in Virginia. I speak from recent observation. We are receiving our
winter uniforms as fast as they are made, and I feel assured that by the
20th this month our equipment for the winter will be complete. If in your
judgment compatible with the interest of the service, it would be agreeable
to us to be brigaded with the other South Carolina troops in Bonham's
command.

"Sir: The Secretary at War has decided, and I am instructed to inform
you, that after considering the endorsement on your letter of the 8th inst.
by General Ripley, it is deemed inexpedient to order your regiment to Virginia
at this time. The following is the endorsement by General Ripley
referred to: `Colonel Hagood's regiment is eminently qualified to do good
service in Virginia, or elsewhere, but at present and until the coast defenses
are in proper condition, its services are indispensable in South Carolina.
It is now at Stono—a very important post.'

Thus terminated our present hopes of Virginia. But the regiment
had taken no local service. It was ready to serve when the
War Department thought its services were needed, and having
used all the means in its power to obtain marching orders for the
seat of war it felt that at length it stood straight upon the record.
The tide of war soon began to roll southward. Hatteras fell;
South Carolina was invaded, and the defeat of our Virginia
project was no longer the subject of serious regret.

Posts on Stono.

On the 28th August, the sailing of the Hatteras expedition
having become known, and its destruction being uncertain, General
Ripley (who had succeeded General Anderson in command

in South Carolina), ordered the First Regiment to Coles Island,
one of the posts on Stono—the back entrance into Charleston
harbor. Colonel Hagood was assigned to the command of these
posts and directed to make his headquarters on Coles Island.

Here the regiment remained for the rest of its twelve months'
enlistment. Its equipment was completed in every particular,
and a regular course of instruction instituted. The officers were
required to write on the tactics daily to the colonel, using a blackboard
in demonstration; and at the same time the officers and noncommissioned
officers were practically instructed in the drill. They
were together drilled in the school of the "soldier squad" and
"company," and then in a battalion skeleton drill. In this skeleton
drill the privates of the rank were represented by two men
carrying a light rod the length of a small company and the
officers and non-commissioned officers occupied their proper relative
positions. The colonel was throughout personally the
instructor. Afterwards the course was completed by extending it
to the regiment at large. Much attention was also given to the
proper performance of sentry and other camp duty. The beneficial
effects of these efforts were soon seen in the drill and
cheerful discipline of the command, and in the creation of a
high esprit du corps.

Afterwards, although the regiment was to be used only as an
infantry support, it was thought proper to instruct ten men of
each company in the use of heavy artillery, and subsequently two
companies were assigned to batteries and thoroughly instructed
in this duty. One of these companies (Captain Pressley's) was
placed in charge of Fort Pickens on Battery Island, and the
other (Captain Glover's) was put in charge of two batteries on
Coles Island.

A large amount of fatigue duty was also done by the regiment
in the construction of a wagon causeway between Fort Pickens
and Coles Island, and in the erection of barracks, the building of
bomb-proof batteries, etc. The island was made a strongly fortified
post with barracks for 1,000 men. Commissary and quartermaster
buildings, bake houses, hospital and everything else complete.
A well-supplied commissariat, with a sutler's shop, added
much to the comfort of the men. A daily mail, beside telegraphic
communication with the city, was established. And, in short, the

service for the last months of our time had more of the charaster
of garrison life in time of peace than of campaigning.

In addition to the First South Carolina Volunteers there were
stationed on Stono 150 Regulars under Major G. J. Lucas, and
two companies of Volunteers, under A. A. 1841, from Charleston,
commanded respectively by Captain J. J. Pope and Captain
S. Y. Tupper. When this class of Volunteers was recalled from
service, in order to reorganize the military system of the State,
two companies of Volunteers "for the war" from Charleston,
under Captains Simonton and Lloyd, were sent in their place.
These two companies called themselves the Eutaw Battalion and
carried the colors borne by Colonel William Washington's regiment
in the Revolutionary battle of that name. It was a piece
of red damask without device, and looked as if it had once covered
a piece of furniture.

The fall of Port Royal was the only event of interest that
marked the winter campaign of 1861-62 in South Carolina. It
was remarkably calm on both days of the attack, and the cannonade
was very distinctly heard at Coles Island. On the first
day Colonel Hagood telegraphed to the general commanding the
department asking for his regiment to be ordered to the scene of
action, but without success. After the reduction of that post of
defense, our line, which had been heretofore upon the outer beach
of the island lining the coast, was withdrawn to the main. All
the seacoast or island positions south of Coles Island were abandoned
after being first dismantled. The new line of defense
from Coles Island southwardly ran along the eastern bank of
Stono to the main and thence along the main to the Savannah
River. Occasional patrols visited the abandoned islands, and
sometimes considerable bodies of troops in the nature of advanced
guards occupied them. The enemy made an effort early in January
to force his way inland from Port Royal with a view to
cutting the Charleston and Savannah Railroad, but was repulsed.
Subsequently his efforts were limited to marauding upon the
abandoned territory, keeping well under the shelter of his gunboats.
His attention seemed directed more to the City of Savannah
and the coast southward and northward of South Carolina.
A blockading steamer was generally lying off Stono, but sometimes
it would disappear for weeks. During the last of December

this steamer running in rather close, several shots were exchanged
with one of our batteries. The distance, however, was too great,
and had Colonel Hagood been at the post he would not have permitted
the battery to reply to her fire. The blockade was run
two or three times from this inlet, and once a small vessel
attempting it was captured and a large one burned in our view,
but unfortunately beyond our range. This last was owned and
commanded by a New York Yankee, who had heard that salt was
scarce in Secesscia and had hoped to make an honest penny at
the expense of the "best government the world ever saw."

The posts on Stono, and their retention or abandonment in its
relation to the defense of Charleston, was a subject of earnest
and even angry discussion at the time, and the military critic
will have to accord to the decision finally enforced a most
important bearing upon subsequent operations against the city.
Stono Inlet is a little southwest of, and ten miles from Charleston.
A bar, as in all other Southern Atlantic bays, lies in front
of it and about two miles out at sea. Directly across its mouth
and a little in front of it lies Bird Key, a sand bank nearly
covered at high tide. Coles Island lies at the head of the inlet
towards the north. It is near two miles long and from one hundred
and fifty to three hundred and fifty yards wide. Folley Island is
the eastern and Kiawah Island the western boundary of the inlet.
At the head of the inlet Folley River comes in from the east and
Kiawah River from the west. These two rivers are mere arms of
the sea, making the inland boundaries of the islands of the same
name. Stono River comes into Kiawah River at the western
end of Coles Island. This river is also an arm of the sea, running
from the point at which it connects with Kiawah in a northerly
direction till it comes within four miles of Charleston. In this
part of its course it separates John's and James's Islands. At the
point nearest Charleston it connects with the waters of Charleston
Harbor by Wappoo Cut and creek, which last separates James
Island from the main. From Wappoo Cut the Stono runs first
northwesterly and then southwesterly until it communicates with
the North Edisto Inlet ten miles from and south of west from
Stono Inlet. From the time it leaves Wappoo Cut the Stono River
separates from the main first John's Island and then Wadmalaw
Island. In the latter part of its course it is known as Wadmalaw

River. Folley River communicates by a creek with the waters
of the harbor at a point between James Island and Morris Island,
as also with Light House Inlet. The channel across the bar in
front of Stono Inlet is five feet deep at low, and thirteen feet
deep at high water. It is deep but narrow after it has crossed
the bar until it has come round Bird Key and entered the inlet.
Here it is a mile and three-eights from the nearest point of Coles
Island. From that point the channel through the inlet up
Kiawah to Stono River and up Stono River to Church Flats is
wide and amply sufficient for vessels of any draft. Church Flats
is the point, some ten miles beyond Wappoo, where the Stono
changes its name to Wadmalaw River. Through these flats the
channel is intricate and shallow, but from thence to North Edisto
it is a again good. Through Wappoo Cut vessels which may at low
or half tide pass the Stono Bar, can pass to Charleston. Battery
Island lies up Stono some two and a half miles from Coles
Island and is, in fact, the southwestern point of James Island.
The Stono batteries were located by General Beauregard just
before the attack on Sumter. Their object then was to prevent
reinforcements being thrown into the fort in small boats; no more
serious efforts of the enemy were anticipated from that direction.
He, therefore, located one battery on the eastern end of Coles
Island to control Folley River and one on Battery Island, where
the Stono is not over 600 yards wide, to control that river.
Afterwards it became necessary to consider these posts in view
of operations against the city. In consequence of the strength of
its harbor defenses, it was supposed a land attack upon Charleston
must be conducted by first obtaining some harbor above or
below it on the coast as a base of operations. Bulls Bay lies
northeast of the city some thirty miles, but the country between
that point and the city is intricate, and Wando and Cooper
rivers intervene. It would be necessary to make a detour to head
the one and cross the other high up, in order to get upon the
peninsular on which Charleston is built. Port Royal to the south
was too far off for a good base of operations. North Edisto and
Stono Inlets remained. From either of these, water communications
could be had to Wappoo Cut, a point as before stated four
miles from Charleston and the very place for their depot of siege
material. It was the center of the semi-circumference around
which only the city could be attacked. From North Edisto, however,
the navigation through Church Flats was bad, and that line
of communication (as well as the line from either Bulls Bay or
Port Royal) was exposed to the effects of an army operating in
the field to assist the besieged city. From Stono Inlet the navigation,
once in, was excellent; and the line of communication was
entirely in the rear of and completely covered by an advancing
enemy. For these reasons it became important to strengthen the
defenses of Stono Inlet.

The engineer, Major (afterwards General) Trapier, charged
with the work, forgetting the different object had in view by
General Beauregard in locating his battery at Coles Island,
endeavored to strengthen that post by adding guns in the same
locality, and running a slight infantry trench across the island
near these guns to resist an enemy landed on the western part
of the island and assailing in flank. While this effectually closed
Folley River, it admitted of a fleet passing up the inlet at least
seven-eighths of a mile from the nearest gun; and once in Stono
River nothing remained but to reduce the slight barbette work at
Battery Island, which could only be considered as a second line
of defense, being too far to assist in the defense of Coles Island.
Again, Green Creek, a navigable stream over a hundred yards
wide, ran from Stono eastward and not over a half a mile in rear
of Coles Island, enabling an enemy who had reached that point
to take these batteries in reverse. From the length of Coles
Island and its crescent-like shape, the arch being toward the
inlet, Trapier's batteries could not be brought to bear upon an
enemy landing upon its western end. A flank land attack and an
attack in reverse were, therefore, tacitly accepted by this plan
of defense; and that with sand batteries (men epaulements) not
closed at the gorge, and with guns half of which could not be
traversed over 150 degrees.

Colonel Hagood, on taking command, urged upon General
Ripley, commanding the department, a rearrangement of the
defenses, and without success at first. Subsequently the general's
consent was obtained, and the following plan was adopted.
A system of detached batteries with few guns in each was
extended along the whole shore line of Coles Island from Folley
to Stono Rivers. At each of these batteries bomb-proof shelters

ARMAMENT.

Battery Island—2 24 drs.

Battery 1—1 32 drs. rifled.

Battery 2—2 24 drs. smooth.

Battery 3—2 24 drs. smooth.

Battery 4—2 18 drs. smooth.

Battery 5—2 32 drs. smooth.

Battery 6—1 Columb. 10′.

Battery 7—2 24 drs. smooth; 2 24 drs. rifled.

Battery 8—3 42 drs. smooth; 1 Columb. 10′.

Battery 9—2 32 drs. smooth; 1 Columb. 8″.

were constructed for the artillerists and infantry supports, and a
large bomb-proof for the infantry reserve was located in a central
position. These batteries and bomb-proof shelters were connected
by covered ways where the natural features of the island did not
afford sufficient protection for the passage of troops under fire.
The batteries were still barbette epaulements, but the chances of
being passed by a hostile fleet were diminished from the fact
that along the western part of the island (along the Kiawah)
the whole river was not more than 600 yards wide and in some
places the channel was within 200 yards of the batteries. Colonel
Hagood also recommended the piling or other obstructions of
Folley and Kiawah rivers under the fire of the batteries.
Trapier's infantry trench was leveled in order to give free passage
in rear of the batteries; half the guns at Battery Island were
brought to Coles Island; and some additional guns were obtained.
General Ripley, however, directed the piling down in Stono River
under the guns of Battery Island and the placing of infernal
machines across the channel between Bird Key and Folley Island.
By this arrangement Coles Island once passed by the enemy, even
with one ship, and he had the use of Green Creek; and the great
advantage of delaying him under our heaviest fire was given up.
The infernal machines, or torpedoes, were a failure. A few days
after they were put down, a large raft of logs intended for
building bomb-proofs broke loose from Coles Island and going
out with the tide floated over them. Froberg, the carpenter in
charge, took some assistants in a rowboat, went after the raft
and towed it back over them again without an explosion. The
Confederates later brought torpedoes to a nearer approach to
perfection, especially when they were not required to remain too
long before use.

Such were the defenses of Stono. When the batteries were as
first arranged by Trapier, General R. E. Lee, then Commander-in-Chief
in South Carolina, visited them and advised General
Ripley to abandon the position. Subsequently, when the changes
spoken of had been made, General Pemberton, who had succeeded
General Lee in the chief command, visited Coles Island
and expressed the opinion that it had been made too strong to
abandon now, but also expressed dissatisfaction with the selection
of the island for defense at all. He seemed to think that the

post could withstand a naval attack, but would fall before combined
land and naval operations. The adjacent islands of Kiawah
and Folley being conceded to the enemy in the plan of defense,
he laid much stress upon their ability to establish mortar batteries
on these. General Ripley still seemed bent on maintaining
the post, and Colonel Hagood suggested that there being no
adequate line of retreat for the garrison, and the comparatively
large armament being invaluable to us, of which the removal
in face of an enemy there was no possibility, the post should be
further strengthened until it filled the requisition of an isolated
self-sustaining fortress, capable of sustaining a siege as long as
the City of Charleston holds out. As such it would do good
service in depriving an enemy before the city of the use of Stono
and compelling him to have recourse to the more exposed and
difficult communication by Church Flats for bringing up his
supplies and siege material. To this the reply was made that
we had neither guns nor ammunition available for such a purpose.

On the 25th March, Colonel Hagood received orders, emanating
from General Pemberton, to evacuate the post. Believing that
an evacuation once determined upon should be rapidly executed,
he, in forty-eight hours afterward, had every gun but five, with
its ammunition, etc., loaded on flats ready to be towed up to
Charleston, when countermanding orders were received with
directions to have everything placed in statu quo, but to cease
completing the works as originally designed. The best explanation
he received of this vacillation of purpose was that the judgment
of General Pemberton dictated the order, and that outside
pressure from the State authorities induced him to defer its
execution.

Hagood's Regiment remained in occupation of Coles Island
until the 13th of April, 1862, when it was relieved by Stevens's
Twenty-fourth South Carolina Volunteers. Stevens remained a
short time on the island when the orders above referred to were
renewed and the troops and material withdrawn. A picket was
kept on the island with instructions to fire the buildings and
withdraw before the approach of the enemy. The steamer
"Planter" was used in withdrawing the material. Shortly afterward
the desertion of her crew to the enemy carried information

of the evacuation. This led to an immediate advance of the
enemy by way of Stono against Charleston, which terminated
in their repulse before Secessionville. Coles Island was never
afterward occupied by the Confederates. The waters of the inlet
were always held by one or more gunboats of the enemy, and
Stono was the point d'appui of all subsequent operations against
Charleston.

General Pemberton was severely criticized by military men for
the change in the plan of defense of the city, and, in fact, so lost
the confidence of the people of the State by it as to lead to his
removal from the command and assignment to duty elsewhere.

There can be no doubt of the error of the movement in the
light of the subsequent events of the war. There had been,
however, from the beginning of the war, exaggerated ideas of the
power of gunboats as compared with earthworks. Now their
development into ironclads was a new element to be considered,
and the success of the Virginia (or Merrimac) in silencing the
enemy's batteries at Newport News, since Pemberton's visit to
Coles Island, had produced the impression on the minds of many
that earthworks would prove no match for these new engines of
naval war. Accepting these views as correct, there was reason
to eliminate this formidable agency in which the greater mechanical
facilities of the enemy gave him superiority, by withdrawing
our lines whenever practicable beyond its reach. General Pemberton,
in a conversation with the writer in Virginia in 1864,
defended his action at length as the best under the circumstances;
cited General Lee's opinion when in command here, in confirmation,
and referred confidently to his correspondence with the War
Department on file in the office at Charleston for his vindication.
An important point stated as influencing him, perhaps
the chief consideration, was his supply of artillery. The majority
of his guns in number and weight of metal, he said, were at
Stono, and these were absolutely needed to make safe the more
important harbor approach. The War Department at Richmond
had positively informed him of their inability to supply more,
and he had no other course left. On the other hand, the development
of events showed that at this time the enemy was unprepared
for, and did not contemplate, any movement, land or naval,
against Charleston. The evacuation of Coles Island induced the

abortive effort terminating at Secessionville; and by the time he
was ready to move again in 1863, the Confederate resources in
artillery were increased. The test of actual experience, too,
modified the ideas entertained of ironclads. The enemy in the
meanwhile, however, were wise enough to hold by their gunboats
the gate we had left open, and when he came again it was ready
for his use.

The writer is satisfied now that Battery Island should have
been dismantled or reduced in importance to a mere cover for the
communication with Coles Island, and that a strong enclosed work
or moderate armament should have been erected on the south side
of Folley Island, from which to Bird Key obstructions should
have been placed. This, with the works on Coles Island as a second
line of defense, would have effectually closed the water approach
of the Stono Light House Inlet, then fortified in time, and we
would never have had such a siege as Gilmore was subsequently
enabled to inaugurate. A larger force than his would have been
needed, operating from a more distant base, and measurably
deprived of direct naval co-operation.

Re-enlistment.

The First Regiment had acquired drill and discipline and had
become thoroughly organized; it had got through with all the
initial diseases of the camp and become inured to the habits of
the soldier; and now, just as it had become a valuable regiment,
fit for efficient service, it was to be re-enlisted, and in the process
was to be subjected to all the demoralizing influences of the
hustings. It will be a question for the future historian how
much of the disaster that attended our arms in the spring of 1862
was due to the evil of short enlistment, and to the license permitted
in inducing the men to continue their service.

The attention of the Confederate Congress was directed to the
subject of retaining the twelve-months men in service early in
1862, and two Acts were passed. By one of these fifty dollars
bounty and a furlough not to exceed thirty full days at home
were offered each twelve-months man who re-enlisted. They
were also allowed to reorganize themselves into such companies,
battalions and regiments as they pleased, with a general
re-election of officers of every grade. By the other Act, provision

was made for recruiting upon these organizations. The term
of re-enlistment of the twelve-months man was to be for two
years—the recruit enlisted for three years. About the same time
a requisition was made on South Carolina for something over
twelve thousand men—7,000 to fill the place of the twelve-months
men whose term expired in April, and 5,000 in addition to her
quota, then in the field.

Hitherto in South Carolina, as well as throughout the Confederacy,
volunteering had been relied upon to furnish soldiers
for the war. There had always been a draft or conscription held
in terrorism in case volunteers failed, and, indeed, in Charleston,
as well as some other cities of the South, resort had to a limited
extent been had to this draft. Now, the Executive Council who
had recently been constituted in South Carolina and entrusted
with dictatorial powers, determined to change all this as far as
that State was concerned. On the 6th March they decreed a new
military system for the State, abolishing volunteering and substituting
conscriptions as the only mode of raising troops during
the present war. They further decreed that all conscriptions
should be "for and during the war"; and that all officers from
third lieutenant to colonel should be appointed by the Council.

Of course the Acts of Congress controlled in the case of the
First Regiment, but the decree of the Council had the effect of
destroying a project which to some extent had prevailed of
giving honor to reorganize. The only way to secure a volunteer
organization, with its elected officers, etc., was to re-enlist before
the present term expired, and before, as citizens and no longer
in Confederate service, the men came under the new military
system of the State. These various enactments were, as received,
published on parade, and in addition a copy furnished to each
company. The men were left to discuss and digest them at their
leisure, until about the 14th March, when the colonel called the
regiment together and in an address of some length, after
discussing and recapitulating the facts as heretofore brought to
their attention, required the commandants of companies to commence
the work of re-enlistment.

By the expiration of one term it resulted as follows: Martin's
company failed to reorganize, but some twenty of its numbers
joined other companies. Livingston's company divided and

recruited up to two companies under himself and Knotts respectively.
Duncan's company divided and also recruited up to two
companies under himself and Sanders. The other companies
each retained their organization with full numbers. The new
companies were officered as follows:

                                                                                       

First Company.	W. H. Sellars, Captain.
	L. A. Harper, First Lieutenant.
	J. G. Evans, Second Lieutenant.
	F. Shuler, Third Lieutenant.
Second Company.	T. K. Legare, Captain.
	W. W. Legare, First Lieutenant.
	B. M. Shuler, Second Lieutenant.
	J. B. Conner, Third Lieutenant.
Third Company.	I. S. Bamberg, Captain.
	W. W. Elzry, First Lieutenant.
	L. A. Wright, Second Lieutenant.
	P. C. Allen, Third Lieutenant.
Fourth Company.	B. B. Kirkland, Captain.
	J. F. Brabham, First Lieutenant.
	R. S. Barker, Second Lieutenant.
	R. B. Hogg, Third Lieutenant.
Fifth Company.	G. M. Grimes, Captain.
	G. W. Grimes, First Lieutenant.
	L. J. Sweat, Second Lieutenant.
	L. B. Kearse, Third Lieutenant.
Sixth Company.	F. Sanders, Captain.
	G. W. Stallings, First Lieutenant.
	R. T. Sanders, Second Lieutenant.
	S. C. L. Bush, Third Lieutenant.
Seventh Company.	W. H. Duncan, Captain.
	J. H. Thompson, First Lieutenant.
	P. H. Wood, Second Lieutenant.
	J. R. B. Best, Third Lieutenant.
Eighth Company.	D. Livingston, Captain.
	I. Inabinett, First Lieutenant.
	J. C. Wannamaker, Second Lieutenant.
	W. S. L. Rucker, Third Lieutenant.
Ninth Company.	J. E. Knotts, Captain.
	J. Elvin Knotts, First Lieutenant.
	J. H. Phillips, Second Lieutenant.
	J. H. Fanning, Third Lieutenant.
Tenth Company.	J. G. Pressly, Captain.
	T. I. China, First Lieutenant.
	C. Logan, Second Lieutenant.
	H. Montgomery, Third Lieutenant.
Eleventh Company.	John V. Glover, Captain.
	J. F. Izlar, First Lieutenant.
	S. M. Kennerly, Second Lieutenant.
	Sam'l Dibble, Third Lieutenant.

The First, Tenth and Eleventh Companies elected to seek
another regimental organization. The Eutaw Battalion, which,
with the addition of these companies and some others, became the
Twenty-fifth South Carolina Volunteers, of which Pressly became
lieutenant-colonel and Glover major. This regiment served principally
afterwards in "Hagood's Brigade." The Second and
Sixth Companies attached themselves to Lamar's Battalion of
Artillery, which then grew into the "Second South Carolina
Artillery" and served principally afterwards in the garrison of
Charleston. Sanders had been arraigned before a court-martial
as first lieutenant of Duncan's company in the twelve-months regiment
on charges of "conduct unbecoming an officer and a gentleman,"
and was in arrest awaiting sentence when the reorganization
took place and when he was elected captain of the Sixth
Company. The sentence of the court was promulgated shortly
after he reported to Lamar, and he was dismissed the service.
He went home and in a few weeks afterwards was licensed
as a Baptist preacher. Stallings commanded the company,
and did it well, during the remainder of the war. The
other six companies elected to combine with a view of retaining
their old regimental organization. They desired to retain the
name, rank and banner of the First Regiment and, by filling up
with four new companies, to preserve its existence. This filling
up was necessarily a subsequent matter. In order, therefore, to
preserve their cohesion, meanwhile, and without forfeiting their
claim to be in this regiment, they went into an election "for an
officer to command them, his rank and designation to be settled

by the subsequent action of the proper authority." Colonel
Hagood was elected by acclamation. There never was opposition,
which found expression, to Colonel Hagood in the attempt at
retaining the re-organized companies in the original regiment; but
for each of the other field officers there were numerous aspirants.
To this cause is attributable—in part—the failure to retain them.
The Eutaw Battalion and Lamar's Battalion, stationed near the
regiment and in frequent intercourse with it, afforded opportunities
to captains taking companies into them, for promotion. In
developing into regiments they furnished field officers to be filled.
One of these organizations, too, from its character of heavy
artillery, promised local garrison service instead of the less comfortable
life of a marching regiment. The spirit of change had
also its effect. And the result of all these various sources of disorganization
has been indicated.

Stevens's Regiment arrived on the 13th. On the 14th, at 2
a. m., the regiment marched for Charleston, and the following
order, received on the 12th of May, was carried out:

Special Order.

No. —.

* * * * * * * *

"II. Colonel Stevens' Twenty-fourth South Carolina will move to Coles
Island and relieve Colonel Hagood's First South Carolina as soon as possible.

"Colonel Hagood's regiment, upon being relieved, will proceed to the
vicinity of Binnaker's Camp Ground on South Carolina Railroad, where
such as have not re-enlisted for the war will be mustered out of service
by Colonel Hagood. . . .

"IV. Such companies as have re-enlisted for the war will be granted a
leave of absence until the 14th day of May; but it must be understood that
the men will reassemble upon any call for service that may arise during
their absence, the authorities at Richmond having consented to the leave
at this time only upon this condition.

"V. Upon reassembling, six companies will report to Colonel Hagood as
a portion of his regiment. Of the remaining companies, Captains Pressly,
Glover and Sellars will report to Captain Simonton, commanding Eutaw
Battalion, and Captains Legare and Sanders to Major Lamar, commanding
battery of artillery.

Appendix.

The First Regiment was at home ten or twelve days upon its
re-enlistment furlough, when it was recalled into service by a
special order and rendezvoused at Bamberg upon the South
Carolina Railroad, whence it was transferred to the City of
Charleston. Its ranks were here filled by the reception of
four new companies. Glover was re-elected lieutenant-colonel.
O'Caim declined to continue in service and Captain Duncan was
elected to the vacant majority. Of the staff, Captain Lartigue
declined reappointment and Lieutenant Flowers, of Company H
of the twelve-months regiment, was appointed quartermaster.
Legare having gone into the line and out of the regiment, Captain
J. V. Martin was appointed commissary. Dowling had been
broken by an examining board, and John S. Stoney was appointed
assistant surgeon in his stead. Mortimer Glover was sergeant-major
and Donald Rowe quartermaster-sergeant.

The four new companies were officered as follows:

Company D.

• Captain, R. L. Crawford.

• First Lieutenant, J. H. Kirk.

• Second Lieutenant, F. L. Welsh.

• Third Lieutenant, L. J. Perry.

Company F.

• Captain, T. D. Gwynn.

• First Lieutenant, William West.

• Second Lieutenant, T. W. Powell.

• Third Lieutenant, F. P. Newby.

Company H.

• Captain, J. C. Winsmith.

• First Lieutenant, W. A. Nesbitt.

• Second Lieutenant, J. N. Moore.

• Third Lieutenant, J. E. Vise.

Company I.

• Captain, J. H. Stafford.

• First Lieutenant, J. H. Harlee.

• Second Lieutenant, W. L. Manning.

• Third Lieutenant, R. Murchison.

The history of this regiment until July, 1862, when its first
colonel was promoted to a brigade, is contained in subsequent
pages of these Memoirs. In a week or ten days afterward the
regiment was ordered to Virginia, where it was attached to
Jenkins's (afterwards Bratton's) Brigade in the division then
commanded by Hood and later by Fields. This division was a
part of Longstreet's Corps. The history of the regiment, after
the promotion of its first colonel, was carefully prepared by
Colonel James R. Hagood, its last commander, whose manuscript
is now in the possession of the writer. Suffice it to say here that
its career was creditable and its services arduous and faithful

among the troops which composed the distinguished corps to
which it was attached.

Colonel Glover fell at the Second Manassas. He was a graduate
of the South Carolina College with its first honor, and a
lawyer who had already obtained distinction at an early age,
when the war broke out. In the reorganization at Coles Island
some temporary unpopularity was manifested toward him, the
result of a faithful discharge of duty, and sickness deprived him
of a share in the operations preceding Secessionville. In the
active operations in Virginia his worth was conspicuous and
endeared him much to his men. He fell universally lamented,
and his death was marked by distinguished heroism.

Duncan succeeded Glover, but saw little service with the regiment,
and resigned. Livingston succeeded Duncan and retained
the command somewhat longer, when he resigned. Neither of
these officers distinguished themselves and the regiment suffered
in discipline and usefulness in their hands.

Colonel Kilpatrick was now appointed to the command. He
was a South Carolinian and a graduate of the State Military
Academy. In another regiment he had won his commission by
gallant and meritorious service. He soon restored the discipline
and esprit of the regiment; and after a career which added to his
own and the reputation of the regiment, he, too, died upon the
field of battle.

Colonel James R. Hagood joined the regiment after the battle
of Secessionville and rose in two years from the ranks through
the successive grades sergeant-major, adjutant and captain to its
command. His colonel's commission was dated the day after he
was 19 years old, and like all of his others was "for distinguished
valor and skill." He got no step by seniority or election, and was
at the date of his promotion the youngest regimental commander
in the Confederate Army. Of him our great chieftain, General
Lee, wrote from the retirement of Lexington in March, 1868:
"During the whole time of his connection with the Army of
Northern Virginia he was conspicuous for his gallantry, good
conduct and efficiency. By his merit constantly exhibited, he rose
from a private in his regiment to its command, and showed
by his actions that he was worthy of the position." And Major
General Fields added: "During our eventful service together, in

the bivouac, on the march, or in the shock of battle, Colonel
Hagood's high-toned, soldierly bearing at all times, his thorough
handling of his regiment, and his distinguished gallantry in
action, won my hearty admiration and regard." My brother!
these immortelles are laid upon thy grave, upon which the grass
is not yet green. No better soldier wore the grey. No knightlier
spirit breasted the storm in twenty battles beneath the Red Cross
Flag, nor struggled more bravely amid the after difficulties that
befell the followers of a Lost Cause.

Colonel Hagood commanded the regiment from the death of
Kilpatrick, in Longstreet's Tennessee campaign in the winter of
1863, until the surrender at Appomattox Court House, in the
spring of 1865. In the terrible retreat which preceded the surrender,
when the veteran Army of Northern Virginia was by
hardship and hunger and fighting reduced from 27,000 to 8,000
men fit for duty, the First Regiment, which bore its full part of
these trials, lost but seven unwounded men to the enemy. This
fact speaks volumes for the spirit and devotion of the men and of
the able manner in which they were commanded.

Martial Law in Charleston.

The reverses of the Confederate arms in the spring of 1862,
commencing at Fort Donnelson and culminating at New Orleans,
had anxiously excited the minds of the people of South Carolina,
and daily bulletins portraying the sad fate of the Crescent City
under the iron rule of Butler, "The Beast," gave warning to the
people of Charleston of what might be expected should their city
be, as Mr. Lincoln mildly phrased it, "occupied and possessed."

The abandonment of the Coles Island line of defense was also
misunderstood, and a painful doubt had arisen in the public
mind, and was shared to some extent by the State authorities, of
the intention of the Confederate commander of obstinately
defending the city in the event of the siege which it was felt must
sooner or later come. Accordingly, the papers clamored for
earnest and active preparation. Editors and correspondents alike
claimed that Charleston would be disgraced unless Saragossa
should be surpassed. A "Citizen," in one of our daily prints,[8]

hardly exceeded the tone of other writers and talkers when he
exclaimed, in contemplation of the fall of the outer forts, "What,
then, shall the city be given up? We suppose not. That would
be indeed a very qualified defense. . . . Let the drill of the
troops be at once extended to fighting in the streets and from the
houses. . . ." The governor and council warned non-combatants
to depart and declared martial law in and around Charleston,
empowering the Confederate Commander to enforce it. A few
days later a formal resolve was promulgated from the Executive
Council Chamber," "That the Governor and Council concurred in
opinion with the people of South Carolina assembled in Convention,
that the City of Charleston should be defended at any cost
of life and property; and that in their deliberate judgment they
would prefer a repulse of the enemy with the entire city in ruins
to an evacuation or surrender on any terms whatever."

General Pemberton never at any moment contemplated anything
but making the best defense of which he was capable, with
the means at his disposal, and would no doubt, if required, have
fought it while brick and mortar held together. But he was a
soldier per se, and would have taken his inspiration from "orders"
from Richmond and not from the people and civil authorities
by whom he was surrounded. These he had not the tact to conciliate
and use, and, for their military opinions, entertained and
sometimes exhibited a most professional contempt. He, however,
eagerly embraced the power placed in his hands and on the 5th
of May issued his General Order No. 11, which, after reciting
the Governor's proclamation of martial law over Charleston and
the country within ten miles of its corporate limits, proceeded as
follows:

"Now I, John C. Pemberton, . . . do sustain the said proclamation
and announce the suspension of all civil jurisdiction
(with the exception of that enabling the Courts to take cognizance
of the probate of wills, the administration of the estates of
deceased persons, the qualifications of guardians, to enter decrees
and orders for the partition and sale of property, to make orders
concerning roads and bridges, to assess and collect county taxes)
and the suspension of the writ of habeas corpus in and over" the
limits embraced in the proclamation. Another paragraph
announced Colonel Johnson Hagood, First S. C. V., as provost

marshal and charged him with the execution of the foregoing
order and of the proclamation, under the direction of Brigadier
General Ripley, commanding the military district. The provost
marshal was further directed forthwith to establish a military
police and to put a stop to all sales of spirituous liquors.

An express train had been sent up to the camp of the First
South Carolina Volunteers at Bamberg on the 4th, with an order
for Colonel Hagood to return in person upon it and report that
day in Charleston; the regiment was directed to follow next day.
When Colonel Hagood was made acquainted with the provision
of the order about to be published making him provost marshal,
he earnestly asked to be excused from the duty, the condition of
his regiment requiring, in his opinion, all of his attention at that
time. The General, with something of his usual curtness, peremptorily
declined, but promised to relieve him as soon as he had
organized the system and got it to working, or earlier in the event
of active operations. To Colonel Hagood's further request for
detailed instructions as to the duties required of him, the General
answered that he had no further instructions than those
embodied in the order. This, by the way, was copied from a
recent promulgation of martial law in and around Richmond,
but of how it was there construed in practice we had no information
in Charleston. General Pemberton added that he expected
such a system of police that a dog could not enter the town without
the knowledge of the provost marshal and his ability to lay
hands upon said dog at any moment he was required. With this
chart of his duty and directions to make requisition for the
means to discharge it, the new provost departed to ponder upon
the work before him.

Martial Law, what was it? Very accurate ideas in relation to
it have since been acquired by the Southern people—but then?
General Pemberton had evidently no very definite perception of
what its promulgation effected in detail,—the provost had as
little. A conference with the State Attorney General, I. W.
Hayne, Esq., and reference to books brought little further light;
but, with such as was vouchsafed and with the order before him,
Colonel Hagood proceeded to digest an organization of martial
law upon the idea that it was the assumption of the execution of
such existing law as it was deemed necessary to retain, with the

making of such additional law as the military exigency required.
Rumor soon reached him that the mayor had, in conversation,
announced himself and his government as deposed; and, desiring
to retain the already organized police force of the city, Colonel
Hagood hastened to headquarters and obtained the publication
of the following:

"His Honor Charles McBeth, Mayor of Charleston, is respectfully invited
and expected to continue in the exercise of his municipal functions, as far
as they shall not infringe upon any requirements of martial law. . . . It
is the earnest desire of the major general commanding that the provost
marshal and the mayor will act in entire unison and render such mutual
aid as may be necessary to the efficient discharge of their respective duties.

"By order, etc., . . .

The next day, the Justice of the State Court of Common Pleas
and General Sessions, then sitting, adjourned his court upon
the ground that the proclamation of martial law had suspended
his jurisdiction. He was certainly right, under the wording of the
order, but it could hardly have advanced the defense of Charleston
for the provost marshal to have been hearing civil causes or
even trying criminal cases already on the docket, so Order No. 13,
6th May, was obtained and published:

"It is not intended that General Order No. 11, of the 5th May, from these
headquarters, shall interfere with the progress of business in the Court of
General Sessions and Common Pleas now sitting in this city.

In the meanwhile, however, a proclamation was received from
the President of the Confederate States declaring martial law
over the whole region under Pemberton's command, and using the
words of Pemberton's Order No. 11, "suspending civil jurisdiction,
etc." General Pemberton, therefore, rescinded his orders
continuing the mayoralty and sessions of the State court, and
putting his exercise of these prerogatives of martial law under
the President's and not the Governor's authority. The court
closed its doors; but the provost marshal never assumed cognizance

of the cases on its calendar, or to decide any purely civil
cases. These remained in abeyance. The organization of the
Common Council was also suspended, but the police force was
kept on duty under the supervision of the provost marshal. The
utility of this arrangement was to some extent marred by
jealousy existing between the assistant provost marshal in charge
of the police department and the mayor, having inception in their
past relations.

The presence of a large military force in the city was necessary
to carry out General Pemberton's "dog" specification; and
these troops themselves, newly raised and badly disciplined,
required the enforcement of the most stringent regulations to
keep them in order. A number were already in and near the
city; their officers infested the hotels and barrooms, and an editorial
in The Mercury of the 13th (the day on which it had been
announced that martial law would at noon go into effect) called
attention to outrages of a flagrant character already committed
with impunity by those of lower grade. The hegira of citizens
also greatly complicated the passport matter. A very stringent
supervision of passports was required by the provost's instructions,
and was necessary unless the whole matter was to be a
farce. The city was known to be infested with spies and the
enemy in daily receipt of information from it. Unfortunately
the citizens had already become accustomed to a very loose passport
system which had been inaugurated and put under the
mayor's charge. Under this system blank passports signed by
the mayor were filled up at any hour of the day or night by a
policeman at the guard house of the police force, and these were
sometimes examined and sometimes not by other policemen at
some of the more public places of arrival and departure from
the city. With a full sense of the difficulties surrounding it,
Colonel Hagood entered on his labor. The following regulations,
prepared and submitted for approval, on the morning of the 12th,
were published in all the daily papers with the appointments and
orders copied below. Headquarters were established in the court
house, office hours, etc., announced, and the experiment launched.

"REGULATIONS OF THE PROVOST MARSHAL.

"Under Martial Law.

"1. During the suspension of all civil jurisdiction announced in the l'roclamation
of the Major-General commanding, with the exceptions therein
contained, or which may hereafter be announced, a Provost Marshal's
Court is established, which will take cognizance of the offenses heretofore
within the jurisdiction of the Court of General Sessions, as well as of all
offenses against good order or other violations of martial law.

"2. The Provost Marshal's Court will be presided over by an assistant
provost marshal, his decisions to be supervised and approved by the provost
marshal. The provost marshal will also, in his discretion, refer any offense
to a court-martial, if circumstances make that instrumentality desirable or
necessary.

"3. No person will be allowed to leave the city without a written permit
from the office of the provost marshal. Every person coming into the city
shall report forthwith to the provost marshal under such regulations as he
may prescribe. An assistant provost marshal will be assigned to the duties
of this department.

"4. The necessary guards for the execution of the above regulations and
for the maintenance of good order in the city will be established. An
assistant provost marshal will also be assigned to the charge of this department.

"5. Such other regulations will be made and enforced from time to time
as may become necessary or expedient for the preservation of good order,
and the enforcement of martial law.

"6. These regulations will be enforced after 12 m. on Tuesday, the 13th
inst.

"1. C. Richardson Miles, Esq., Alex. H. Brown, Esq., and Captain G. B.
Lartigue are announced as assistant provost marshals.

"2. Mr. Miles is assigned to the duties of the Provost Marshal's Court.

"3. Mr. Brown is assigned to the duties of the passport office.

"4. Captain Lartigue is assigned to the supervision of the necessary
guards.

"Under the Proclamation of Martial Law it is Ordered:

"1. That all distillation of spirituous liquors is positively prohibited and
the distilleries will be closed.

"2. The sale of spirituous liquors of any kind is positively prohibited and
establishments for the sale thereof closed subject until further orders to the
following regulations and modifications:

"Hotels may obtain from this department licenses to allow the use of
liquors to boarders at meals at the public ordinary upon terms to be specified
in the license.

"Grocers who have obtained licenses from the city authorities may, until
otherwise ordered, sell liquors in quantities of not less than three gallons
to any person other than those in military service or employment: Provided,
That the same be not consumed on the premises.

"3. All barrooms and liquor saloons and places where liquors are retailed
shall be immediately closed.

"4. No liquor shall be sold in any quantity whatever to any soldier or
person in military employment without a special license from this office.

Captain Molony, A. A. G., also on the same day (12th) published
by order of Colonel Hagood in the daily prints for the
information of parties concerned, as well as the public generally,
extracts from the "Instructions to the Out Guards" and patrols
"of the garrison" and of "orders" issued to the troops composing
it. The following were the most important points:

A wharf was designated for the arrival and departure of small
boats. One or more other wharves for the transport steamers of
the department; wood, rice and provision boats were required to
anchor at certain points and report by small boat to the adjacent
officer of the guard where a wharf would be designated by them
to land at. Persons were only permitted to enter or leave the
city by land at designated points. Sentinels were ordered to fire
upon boats or persons attempting to enter or leave despite their
challenge.

Officers from camps without the city were required upon entering
it to exhibit to the lieutenant of the guard their commissions
or written leaves of absence, and immediately thereafter to report
at provost marshal's office and register their names and leave of

absence.[9] Non-commissioned officers and soldiers from the same
camp were prohibited from entering the city on any pretext
whatever, except upon duty, upon furlough, to pass through it,
or upon furlough to visit their families, when these resided there.

As to the troops within the city it was directed that they be
kept strictly within the limits of their respective camp guards.
Non-commissioned officers and soldiers will not be permitted to
leave the lines of their respective camps upon any pretext whatever,
except upon duty or on furlough to leave the city.

Commissioned officers when not upon duty will not be permitted
to leave the lines of their camps except upon special
permission of the superior officer in command of the camp, who
is required to exercise a sound discretion in limiting the numbers
at any one time of such permits. There were other orders and
instructions published, but these already given were sufficient to
show how far at that time it was deemed necessary by those in
command to push the stringency of martial law. To the garrison
the adjutant-general said in general orders: "They were brought
within the city to maintain good order. The colonel commanding
trusts they will set the example. Martial law has been proclaimed.
Offenses against it, however trival, become aggravated
when committed by those whose duty it is to enforce it. It is
earnestly hoped that the necessity for the stern punishments
which must follow such offenses will not arise." The Mercury
greeted the foregoing publications as follows: "At a juncture
like the present, doubtless there are good reasons for placing the
government of our ancient city in military hands. If the officers
who have been invested with the control of affairs in our midst
exercise their functions with wisdom, firmness and impartiality,
this establishment of martial law will prove to be a welcome—as
well as beneficial measure."

The Courier contented itself with the following: "Assistant
Provost Marshals. By reference to an advertisement in our
columns this morning, it will be seen that Colonel Johnson
Hagood, Confederate Provost Marshal, has appointed C. Richardson
Miles, Esq., Alex. H. Brown, Esq., and Captain Lartigue,

assistant provost marshals . . . The appointments are all good
and acceptable as conferred upon able, worthy and patriotic men;
but that of Colonel Brown especially challenges our approval.
Everyone remembers what an energetic and efficient captain of
the city guard or chief of police he made in bygone days, and
he is now again in his proper element."

The writer, at a later day, sometimes thought with amusement
of the editor's (Mr. Gradon's) commendation of Brown. He did
indeed prove an invaluable assistant and Colonel Hagood was
greatly indebted to him in the discharge of his duty. Brown was,
however, naturally an arbitrary and overbearing man, a long
resident of the city, with very decided affinities and repulsions,
and when he succeeded Colonel Hagood some were disposed to
think (Gradon among the number) that his little finger was
heavier than other folk's hands. Mr. Miles was a lawyer of
eminence and an estimable gentleman. Captain Lartigue was
the ex-quartermaster of the First South Carolina Volunteers and
afterwards, until the close of the war, quartermaster of Hagood's
Brigade. He was a graduate of the State Military School and
an old and intimate friend of Colonel Hagood's.

The enforcement of martial law came none too soon. To show
how loosely and negligently matters had been managed, the following
incident, added to the account given of the mayor's passport
office, will suffice. The steamer "Planter" had been chartered
with her officers and crew, and used as a transport and
harbor guard boat. She was armed with a 32 dr. and a 24 dr.
howitzer; her captain, mate and engineer were white; her pilot
and four or five hands, who were negroes, completed the crew.
She had taken aboard the evening previous four valuable, heavy
guns for Morris Island, and laid that night at her usual wharf
in front of General Ripley's headquarters on the bay. Three
sentinels were stationed in sight of her, and the bivouac of Ripley's
headquarter guard was near by. Between half-past three
and four a. m. the "Planter" steamed up and cast loose, the
sentinels supposing she was going about her business. She passed
Fort Sumter blowing her whistle and plainly seen. She was
reported by the corporal of the guard to the officer of the day as
the guard boat. The fort was only required to recognize authorized
boats passing, taking for granted that their officers are on

board. This was done as usual. The run to Morris Island goes
a long way past Sumter and turns. The "Planter" kept on to
the blockading fleet. Her white officers were not on board. They
had slept, as was their custom, on shore, notwithstanding a standing
order that the officers and crews of all light draft steamers in
Government employ remain on board night and day. Upon the
subsequent trial of these officers it was proven that no step had
been taken to enforce this order by inspection or otherwise,
though it was of long standing; and they were acquitted.

The Mercury gave a lively picture of affairs in the town next
day. "Martial law," said the editor, "went into force in Charleston
yesterday. Squads of the provost marshal's guard were to be
seen here and there, and many a luckless wight in military or
semi-military costume, who had no leave of absence to show, was
trotted off to the guard house, where he either did have or at
some future time will have an opportunity of giving an account
of himself. In more than one instance, eminently peaceful individuals,
affecting the jaunty and war-like Beauregard cap, were
hauled up with that true military sternness which is deaf alike
to entreaties and remonstrances. The quiet precincts of the city
hall were suddenly converted into a veritable camp, to the manifest
delight of the urchins who thronged the railings of the
enclosure gazing admiringly upon the taut canvass walls. There
was a great rush to the passport office. Owing to the very limited
time alloted to the issuing of passports, only a small proportion
of those desiring to leave the city were accommodated with the
necessary documents. Some arrangement should be made to
remedy this great inconvenience to the public. . . ."

But The Courier blazed out indignantly at the first pinch in
the working of the system, characterizing the limited time for
granting passports daily "as a grievous and intolerable oppression—an
unreasonable and tyrannical measure." It went on
to suggest that the power to issue passports be extended to the
mayor of the city again, as well as to be exercised by the military
authorities.

There was much justice in the complaint, though intemperately
urged by The Courier. In preparing the regulations, Colonel
Hagood had thought the time too short; but Colonel Brown, his
assistant, declared he could not spare more time from his other

duties in the police department to give to this. The personal
attention and attendance of the assistant provost marshal was
deemed necessary in the office while passports were being issued.
If the matter was to be entrusted to clerks and deputies, unsupervised,
it would be a failure. These considerations had prevailed;
and two hours daily, from 11 a. m. to 1 p. m., had been
fixed. But the exodus of the non-combatant population which
was desired, and which had been slowly going on, was not duly
considered, and the panic with which the people seemed taken
about getting off as soon as an impediment even of form was in
the way, was never imagined. Men who crowded and pressed to
get passports the first day, when they had got them, avowed that
they had no intention of leaving in several days. The next day
the force of men in the passport office was increased by appointing
Messrs. Gourdin, Pressly, Crafts, Dingle, Gantt, and Whiting
to the duty. These were all prominent gentlemen well acquainted
with the inhabitants, and were permitted to grant passports only
to persons personally known to them, or properly vouched for by
such. Captain W. J. Gayer, A. A. G., was put in extensive charge
of soldiers' passports. The civilians were continued on duty until
the pressure on the office by departing citizens was relieved.

The Courier in its next issue made the amende honorable:
"The Passport Matter. It affords us pleasure to state that Colonel
Johnson Hagood, our provost marshal, on learning the inconvenience
and distress which the original regulation in relation to
passports had caused in the community, very promptly so modified
it by increasing the agents and enlarging the time for issue
as to completely satisfy the wants of the community. . . ."

The passport office was now at leisure and finally organized by
establishing two offices in different apartments, one for citizens
with separate desks of application for males and females (whites),
and for negroes bond and free; another for the military with a
separate desk for invalid soldiers from which all other applicants
were excluded. Office hours were made from 8 to 1 and
from 4 to 7 o'clock. W. E. Dingle, Esq., was placed in charge
of the citizens' office, and Captain Gayer, A. A. G., continued in
charge of the military office. From each of these an appeal with
proper restrictions could be had to Colonel Brown, the assistant
provost marshal. This gave him the time which he really needed

as chief of the general police department. In this character he
held also a daily court in which he investigated and summarily
disposed of innumerable minor matters of petty police brought
before him, but investigated and reported to the provost marshal
on matters of any consequence. These the provost either disposed
of or sent for trial to Mr. Miles's court. Colonel Brown had at
his command a corps of detectives and, through the mayor, the
regular civil police force of the city. Mr. Miles had also a daily
court where he tried such cases as the regulations of the 12th May
prescribed, as well as those referred to him specially by the
provost. Captain Lartigue's duties were exclusively military.
At night the three assistants met the provost for consultation.
Colonel Hagood's duties were chiefly supervisory. The system of
guards adopted was a chain of infantry sentinels completely
around the city along the margin of the waters making the peninsular
and across the neck at the lines in rear. These sentinels
connected in their walk when the nature of the ground permitted,
and at other points were within hail and musket shot. Each regiment
furnished a certain number of posts, and the reliefs and
guard tent were at some central point. The First South Carolina
Regiment furnished the interior infantry guard, with guard tent,
in City Hall Park and posts in various parts of the city. Major
Frank Hampton's Battalion of Cavalry (afterwards part of the
Second South Carolina Cavalry Regiment) furnished a mounted
interior patrol on duty day and night. And from sunset until
sunrise a boat guard patrolled the rivers (at a distance of 300
yards from shore) from a point in Ashley above the lines, around
White Point Garden to a point in Cooper, again above the lines.
Each boat had an infantry detachment on board and rowed backward
and forward along its allotted beat. The troops in the city
filled every available camping ground in the parks and malls—
none occupied houses, and men and officers were rigidly kept
within their camp lines under the regulations heretofore given.
A large number of troops were necessary to the discharge of
provost duty, as indicated. But Charleston was a very good
place for the reserve troops of General Pemberton's command.
Large drafts were being made upon him, too, at this time for
Johnston's Army before Richmond; and when drawn from
points of his department further South, they all stopped in
Charleston for a few days, reporting to Colonel Hagood as town
commandant, during their stay and doing provost duty. Sometimes
there were as many as six or seven thousand troops thus
reporting. A brigade organization was adopted with Captain
Moloney, Adjutant First South Carolina, acting as A. A. G.,
and Major Motte Pringle of the general staff as quartermaster.
Commissary supplies were drawn by regimental commissaries
direct from the post commissary. Captain R. G. Hay (afterwards
Major Hay, commissary of Hagood's Brigade,) and some
other unattached officers were assigned to temporary duty with
Colonel Hagood. This officer had the satisfaction of receiving
the approval of General Pemberton (for whom as an earnest
and educated soldier he had a high respect) and believed he gave
as much satisfaction to the people as could be given in the exercise
of such arbitrary power for the first time in a community which
had no small idea of its importance.

During this time General Ripley, in consequence of disagreement
with Pemberton, and at his own request, was relieved from
duty and assigned elsewhere. He was succeeded at Charleston
by Brigadier-General Mercer, late commanding at Savannah.

The enemy landed on James Island 2nd June, and all the troops
which could be spared from the town were hurried thither. The
large drafts for Virginia had already straitened Pemberton for
men; and he called on the Governor of the State for additional
and temporary levies, to relieve the regular troops retained on
provost duty. On the 6th June, General DeSaussure, State Adjutant
General, came down from Columbia with a document from
Governor Pickens, empowering him (DeSaussure) to back the
Confederate commander in the defense of the city to the last
extremity. General DeSaussure published a vigorous proclamation
in accordance with these instructions, ordering a levy en
masse of all citizens up to 50 years of age, who were not already
in service, and directing them to report to the provost marshal.
One man reported! Colonel Hagood called on the General for a
roll of those liable to duty, under the order, that he might arrest
and put them on service. He was told that it could not be furnished
under fifteen days. Such is the value of unorganized
patriotism (for certainly prior and subsequent records of Charleston
in this war show no deficiency in that virtue); and the

danger of putting off organized preparation until the conflict is
at hand. The regiment of Charleston Reserves were now called
out and placed on provost duty, the city being left in their hands,
and the regular troops, with perhaps the exception of an unattached
company or two, taking the field.

This regiment had been organized some time before the proclamation
of martial law and owed its purely voluntary existence[10]

"Colonel:

". . . Before the passage of our resolutions establishing corps of reserves throughout
the State, the regiment you command had been formed upon voluntary principles.

"It was accepted as formed and made subject to orders. . . .

to that emulation of Saragossa alluded to as prevailing at an
earlier period.

The field officers were Colonel A. H. Brown (the assistant
provost marshal), Lieutenant Colonel R. N. Gourdin and Major
W. A. Wardlaw—the two latter prominent merchants of the city;
and in the ranks were such men as ex-Governor Aiken, Hon.
W. D. Porter (president State Senate), Chancellor Lesesne, Mr.
Bryan, afterwards judge of the United States Circuit Court, and
many others of equal position. In fact it embodied all the exempt
respectability of the city and numbered on a review before the
enemy landed 1,250 men. When called on for duty, 150 responded
—the balance had left the city with their families, or if present
succeeded in evading the call. Those who responded did their
duty with zeal and fidelity. It was at once a pitiable sight and
one to elicit admiration to see these old grey-haired gentlemen,
most of them wealthy, and all of them requiring and accustomed
to ease and comfort, exposed to the inclemency of the weather
and standing in their citizen's dress with double-barreled shotguns
as wardens over the half-burned and deserted city, while the

occasional boom of a gun from James Island furnished the
explanation of the spectacle.

Among these devoted men was William H. Heyward, lately
colonel of the Eleventh Regiment, assigned afterwards to
Hagood's Brigade. The writer of these Memoirs had not the
honor of a personal acquaintance with him. Educated at West
Point, and of large wealth, his life had been spent as a bachelor
in the indulgence of manly and refined pleasures. He had made
no effort at other than social achievement, but had certainly succeeded
to an unusual extent in not only attaching to himself a
circle of ardent friends, but in impressing upon them his ability
for high performance had circumstances called upon him for
exertion. Upon the organization of the Eleventh Regiment, he
had been without opposition made its colonel—had discharged
his office with ability—and had, with many other good officers,
perished in the elections consequent upon the recent re-enlistment.
Now, over 60 years of age, and unwell, he served as corporal in
the Reserve Regiment and died a few weeks afterwards from the
exposure.

When the enemy landed on James Island, Colonel Hagood
claimed General Pemberton's promise to relieve him, his regiment,
under Major Duncan, having been dispatched thither; but
obtained leave to be absent only for the engagement then imminent.
He was accompanied by his assistants, at their earnest
request, as volunteers. The engagement was but partial and the
experiences of the provost party were confined to sustaining a
heavy gunboat shelling and a night of picket duty accompanied
by heavy rain, and the dropping of an occasional shell on the
line.

Now, however, the occasion for keeping him on this detached
duty having passed, he on the 9th June obtained an order relieving
him, with directions to resume command of his regiment.

Colonel A. H. Brown, commanding Reserves, was appointed
provost marshal in his stead.

Secessionville Campaign.

After the fall of Port Royal in 1861, in the general abandonment
of the sea islands in South Carolina, possession of all of
them, as far north as and including Edisto, was conceded to the

enemy. When he chose, he took unopposed possession and
departed with like impunity. The Confederates only visited these
islands in scouting parties. Johns Island was dismantled of its
defense on North Edisto Inlet and the population withdrawn,
but upon it a movable Confederate force in the nature of an
advanced guard had been so far stationed. The enemy had
availed themselves of their success at Port Royal and were
holding within their lines all of the territory conceded; and it is
said that in May, 1862, the Federal chiefs, Hunter and Dupont,
were considering a combined land and naval effort to wrest Johns
Island also from the Confederate occupation. The escape of the
steamer "Planter" and the information she gave of the abandonment
of the posts on Stono, as well as of the condition of the new
lines on James Island, changed their programme to a sudden blow
at the city itself.[11]

The James Island lines, the construction of which as an interior
line of defense was commenced in the winter of 1860-61, had
become the main line of defense of the city upon the Stono front.
At the date of Hunter's advance, they consisted of a series of
redans for artillery connected by an infantry breastwork of slight
profile, running from Mellichamp's house on the eastern shore of
the island to Royall's house on New Town Creek. In its general
course here it was parallel to the Stono and two and a half
miles from the river. Advancing toward Stono along New
Town Creek, redans without connecting breastworks were placed
on the northern bank, and constituted the defense at a point
three-quarters of a mile from the river, the line turning at right
angles again became parallel to the river, and again consisted of
redans with connecting breastworks, till at Lawton's house, on
Wappoo, it reached the northwestern side of the island. On the
right and left of this line Fort Pemberton and Secessionville
(redoubts) were thrust forward. Fort Pemberton was a considerable
work on the banks of Stono River below the mouth of
Wappoo, and was advanced some three-quarters of a mile in
front of the main line on the right; on the left, Secessionville was
perhaps a mile in front and to the left of Mellichamp's. It was
at the extremity of a peninsular made by the divergence of a

[ILLUSTRATION]

creek from Folley River into two branches, the land approach
being from the Stono side, and communication with the rear
established by a bridge. An intrenchment across the narrowest
part of the peninsular made Secessionville also an enclosed work,
and it was further strengthened by a small flanking battery
across the northern creek or marsh, afterwards called Battery
Reed, in honor of the gallant Captain Sam J. Reed, killed in this
campaign. From Mellichamp's to Royall's there was a second
line of defense consisting of detached redoubts, each behind an
interval in redans of the first line.

Fort Pemberton was in fighting condition. But four guns were
mounted at Secessionville; a bomb-proof shelter, and a powder
magazine had been there constructed. The parapet was unfinished
in front of the guns—indeed, its profile was so slight that after
the battle of the 16th June Colonel Hagood rode his horse into
the ditch and over the parapet from the exterior approach. As
to the redans and redoubts of the rest of the defenses, they had
no guns mounted or platforms laid.

The whole system was not only incomplete in construction, but
faulty in design. The engineer, to avoid the then dreaded gunboat
fire, had drawn his line so far back from Stono River as to
give up full half of the island to the operations of the besiegers;
and had accepted for himself full five miles of entrenchments to
defend, separated into two divisions by New Town Creek, across
which his communication in rear was circuitous and difficult.
These evils were perceived early in the campaign, and a new line
laid out along the eastern division which would have somewhat
shortened it. But this line was never finished; and in the final
shape which the defense of James Island took under Beauregard
in 1863 to 1864, the whole system of defense heretofore indicated
was abandoned, and, starting from Secessionville, a much shorter
and better line was taken to Stono below the mouth of New Town
Cut.

About the middle of May, the movement of the blockading
vessels off Stono Inlet—sounding and buoying the channel—
indicated the intention to effect an entrance. No hostile troops
were then nearer than Edisto Island. The following extracts
from the diary of Captain Carlos Tracy, volunteer aid-de-camp

on the staff of General S. R. Gist, commanding on James Island,
furnish a memorandum record of events up to 9th June:

"19 May.—Several of the enemy's gunboats attempted to enter Stono
Inlet; one ran aground and the rest put back.

On the 9th of June Colonel Hagood was definitely relieved of
provost duty in Charleston, and reported in command of his regiment,
which had been on the island since the 3rd under Major
Duncan. The colonel had served one day with it, as noted in
previous journal.

The troops on the island were sufficient for its defense, but
without exception had never before seen actual service; and most
of them being newly raised corps, officers and men were alike
ignorant of field duty. In consequence of these facts, four of the
best regiments were organized into a temporary brigade, under
the name of the "Advanced Forces," and these were charged with
the whole picket duty along the extended front of the southern
division of the lines, except of that portion immediately in front
of Secessionville, which remained in charge of the commander
and was furnished by the garrison of that post until after the
battle of the 16th June. General Smith did Colonel Hagood the
honor to place him in command of this special brigade. It consisted
of Hagood's own regiment, First South Carolina; Stevens'
Twenty-fourth South Carolina, Simonton's Twenty-fifth South
Carolina, and McEnnery's Seventh Louisiana Battalion. A battery
of field artillery reported daily for duty with the Advanced
Forces, and ten or twelve cavalry for courier duty. Captain
Moloney, Adjutant First South Carolina, acted as assistant adjutant
general. Orderly Ben Martin as aid-de-camp, and Captains
Hay and Lartigue were volunteer aides. The regiments drew

their commissary, quartermaster and ordnance supplies through
regimental channels direct from the officers of the post staff in
Charleston.

Two regiments of the Advanced Forces on duty one day furnished
the pickets and alternated with the other two regiments in
reserve.

The arrangement of the picket system was as follows (see Map,
p. 200.):

Two grand guards; one at Artillery Cross Roads and one at
Frier's Cross Roads. Three outposts; one at Episcopal Church,
one at Presbyterian Church, and one on Battery Island Road.
The outposts furnished the chain of videttes, running from
where the Battery Island Road crosses the northern Secessionville
Marsh (near Hill's house), to which point the Secessionville
picket came, through fields and woods to the bridge over New
Town Cut near Stono River.

A section of the Light Battery on duty each day was placed
with the Grand Guard at Frier's, and the other sections with the
Grand Guard at Artillery Cross Roads.

The regiments of the Advanced Forces not on picket were
allowed to go into bivouac at convenient points near reserve.

Skirmishing along the lines was frequent, and the firing of the
videttes almost incessant—the usual custom, however, of green
troops. The Yankees were as nervous as we were, sometimes in
the night following up a fusillade that would break out without
occasion from their videttes with volleys from their grand guards
—at nothing, unless perhaps at their videttes running in. It
rained almost incessantly during the whole period of active
operations and there was something of ludicrous pathos in the
enquiry which a half-drowned Yankee shouted out one day across
the line, "I say, does it ever get dry in this country?" There was
no brigade or division organization of the Confederate troops on
the island except the "Advanced Forces," nor any distribution of
general command by localities. There were three different generals
commanding in this short campaign, and as each one arrived
he took charge of everything, holding the others in reserve as

* It is noteworthy that Beauregard afterwards rearranged the defenses upon this
idea.

second and sometimes third in command. The fact is, things
were pretty generally haphazard.

On the 10th, General Pemberton directed our lines advanced,
with a view to establishing a battery of heavy guns on the edge
of Grimball's clearing within sufficient range to drive the gunboats
from that landing and confine the enemy to the use of the
Battery Island landing[14] as well as to break up the Yankee camp
at Grimball's. General Smith took charge of the operation, and
in the afternoon of the same day sent forward Colonel Hagood
with the First South Carolina and the Seventh Louisiana Battalion
and two pieces of Preston's Field Battery on the road
through the Grimball woods, by the Presbyterian Church.
Colonel Williams, with the Forty-seventh Georgia, was started
more to the left from the point where these woods touched the
Battery Island Road. The instructions were to drive in the
enemy and seize and hold the line of the clearing. Colonel
Hagood advanced along his road with a part of his forces
deployed on either side of it, the rest following in supporting
distance in column. The enemy were driven before him with but
little resistance, and the sight of the deployed line had already
reached the clearing when he was recalled in consequence of a
reverse sustained by Williams. Williams had no road, but
advanced in line of battle without skirmishers in front, and when
he struck the clearing encountered the enemy in force behind the
ditch and bank fence of the plantation and supported by artillery.
The woods through which he had advanced were almost a jungle;
his line had become very much disordered; and he was in action
before he knew it. But his men rushed gallantly upon the enemy
in squads as they came up, and, of course, were driven back badly
cut up. His loss was some sixty or seventy men. Hagood lost
none, and killed upon the field but two of the enemy from the
feeble resistance encountered. They were not in force upon his
front of attack. He was, however, subjected to a rapid fire of
gunboat shells, which threatened as much damage from the falling
limbs cut from the trees as from themselves.

The enemy were engaged at this period in passing troops from
North Edisto to across Johns Island to Legareville on the Stono
nearly opposite Battery Island. To do this they had to make a
flank march of ten miles in front of an equal number of troops

under General Evans, commanding the Confederate forces on
Johns Island. Evans had orders to attack, information of which
was communicated to Hagood with instructions upon hearing the
sounds of battle in that quarter to begin to press the enemy with
the Advanced Forces and at once to report the fact. It would be,
he was told, the occasion of a general offensive movement for
which the troops on James Island were held in readiness.

General Evans allowed the enemy to pass, and they were
straggling along his front for more than two days and nights
without firing a gun. He was not court-martialed, for then, as
ever afterwards, it was the bane of Confederate service not to
hold its commanding officers to rigid account. Evans attempted
indirectly to clear himself of the slur upon his reputation by
court-martialing one of his colonels for drunkenness upon this
occasion, alleging in the charges that this drunkenness had balked
the attack. It was the unpleasant fortune of Colonel Hagood to
have been president of the court when it sat at a later period, and
the facts were thus brought before him. The officer was broken[15]
—the fact of his drunkenness was proved; but had Evans been
before the court he would have found it difficult, upon the evidence
elicited, to have escaped the same fate for the same offense.
Nor can it be conceived how the intoxication of a single colonel
of junior commission could have kept a considerable army from
assuming the offensive for over two days and nights, or, indeed,
for a longer period than it would have taken to arrest him and
order his successor to move. Would it be believed that during
the whole of the time his troops were watching for the passage
of the enemy and every preparation made for momentary attack,
Evans, without a subordinate general officer in his command,
went back to Adams Run every night, a distance of eighteen
miles, to escape the malaria of the island? Yet this fact was
incidentally proven upon the trial.[16] The enemy having without

molestation effected the passage across Johns Island to James,
General Evans, too, with a portion of his troops was transferred
to the same point, and arriving on the 14th took command, Smith
sinking to second and Gist to third in command. The general
officers were all quartered at Royall's, and there was considerable
unpleasantness among them, as much perhaps from the anomalous
relations in command which they held toward each other, as from
any other cause. General Evans occupied himself on the 14th
and 15th in riding along the lines and examining into the condition
of things, requiring Colonel Hagood to accompany him. On
the afternoon of the 15th he removed his headquarters to a point
near Lawton's house, on the shores of the harbor opposite
Charleston and four miles to the rear. On the night of the 15th-16th
June, the portion of the "Advanced Forces" on picket consisted
of seven companies of Twenty-fourth South Carolina, six
companies of First South Carolina, and one company of Williams'
Forty-seventh Georgia, temporarily assigned to Advanced Forces.
Boyer's Field Battery was on duty with the grand guards; and
all were under command of Colonel C. H. Stevens. The Twenty-fifth
South Carolina, the Seventh Louisiana and four companies
of the First South Carolina were in reserve. Colonel Hagood
was with these troops. At 4:30 a. m., on the 16th, he received a
dispatch from Colonel Stevens that the Secessionville picket,
which, as before mentioned, until after this date, was furnished
by that garrison and did not report to Hagood, was driven in,
and that the enemy were advancing in force upon that position.
Colonel Hagood immediately ordered under arms the reserve;
he directed Colonel McEnnery with the Fourth Louisiana Battalion
to proceed by the foot bridge in rear of Secessionville to
the re-enforcement of the garrison, and Colonel Simonton with
the Twenty-fifth South Carolina and detachment of the First
South Carolina, to proceed down the Battery Island road to
operate on the flank of the enemy's advance. Having delivered
these orders in person, he galloped on in advance in the same
direction, ordering forward from Artillery Cross Roads one of
the 6 drs. (under Lieutenant Jeter[17] ) of the section of Boyce's
Battery on duty at that point. Arriving at the scene of action,
the enemy were making their second assault upon the post at
Secessionville.

At 4 p. m. they had advanced upon that work, with, according
to their own account, two brigades of infantry and three companies
of artillery, numbering in all 3,337 men (2 Am. Conflict,
462) under command of General J. J. Stevens.[18] Moving
swiftly and noiselessly upon the picket, they succeeded in
capturing some of them and the rest fled without firing a
gun. The gallant Lamar (as he afterwards himself told
Colonel Hagood) had been superintending all night the operations
of a working party, and exhausted had fallen asleep
upon the parapet. Aroused by the sentinel over the guns, he
discovered the enemy at the heels of his picket, not fifty yards
from him. With no time to give an order, he himself pulled the
lanyard of a columbiad, ready shotted with grape, and as the
deadly missiles tore their way through the approaching column,
the bellowing thunder aroused the garrison to the bloody work
before them. It consisted of two companies of Lamar's own
regiment—Second South Carolina Artillery—the Charleston Battery
(afterwards Twenty-seventh South Carolina), Smith's Battery
and a portion of Goodlette's South Carolina Regiment. The
enemy assailed vigorously and with considerable dash; several
were slain upon the parapet, and one bold fellow, jumping into
the work and finding himself unsupported, effected his retreat,
but carried one of Lamar's men with him a prisoner. The enemy
were, however, in twenty or thirty minutes driven back with
considerable loss. Stevens reformed his lines and again advanced,
aided this time by another brigade under General Williams with
Hamilton's Field Battery of Regulars attached, these last moving
on the opposite side from Secessionville of the northern
marsh forming the Secessionville peninsular. This force numbered
2,663 men and moved by Hill's house. It was on the flank
of General Williams that Colonel Hagood found himself. A
thicket of felled trees ran parallel with their line of advance and
about 400 yards from it, on the edge of which, next to the enemy,
Colonel C. H. Stevens had deployed about 100 men who had been

on picket duty near that point. These men were from the Twenty-fourth
Regiment and from the companies of Captains Tompkins,
Pearson (Lieutenant Hamiter commanding), and Gooding (First
Lieutenant Beckman commanding). The Battery Island Road,
here so obstructed as to be impassable by artillery or by infantry
except with difficulty as to individuals, ran between this felled
thicket and the dense wood stretching towards Grimball's on
the Stono. Simonton's Twenty-fifth South Carolina, about 220
strong, coming up, was placed behind this felled thicket in line of
battle, its right resting near the Battery Island Road. Lieutenant
Jeter's piece was placed in position on Simonton's left
and directed to open on Williams's advancing column. Lieutenant
Colonel Capers of the Twenty-fourth was personally dispatched
to ascertain the cause of the unaccountable silence of
Battery Reed and to bring its guns also to bear upon Williams.
The detachment of the First South Carolina (about 120 men)
was held in column as a reserve on the Battery Island Road, and
directed to throw out a strong line of skirmishers on its right
flank towards the Stono. The first sound of Jeter's piece brought
all of Hamilton's guns upon our line from its position on the
right of the Battery Island Road, beyond and in front of the
felled thicket. Colonel Hagood saw the opportunity of pushing
the First South Carolina through the woods against Hamilton's
Battery, and advancing Simonton and Stevens against the rear
of Williams's men, now enfilading and slowly galling the front
despite the fire of Jeter's piece and Battery Reed, but apprehending
a general advance, and charged especially with picketing
the front of the southern division, he feared to take the offensive
with his small force, which constituted the whole picket reserve,
without re-enforcement or special orders. The disparity in men
and guns between his force and General Williams's (about 5 to 1)
was also perfectly apparent. While, therefore, making his dispositions
to take the offensive, he despatched Captain J. V. Martin,
commissary of First South Carolina, who had reported for
duty as A. D. C., to report the situation and ask for orders and
re-enforcements to attack. In the meantime Jeter's piece was
rapidly and effectively worked, the infantry merely supporting;
Battery Reed had also been opened by Capers and was doing
good service. In the fort, Colonel Lamar had been wounded on
the first assault and succeeded by Lieutenant Colonel Gaillard;
Gaillard was now wounded and succeeded in command by Major
Wagner. McEnnery arriving at a run with the Fourth Louisiana,[19]
went into action on the right, engaging Williams's flanking
line. The Third Rhode Island Heavy Artillery, acting as
infantry and which had been held in reserve near Hamilton's Battery,
advanced to take Jeter's piece, but were handsomely
repulsed by Colonel C. H. Stevens's skirmishers, except one
portion, which penetrated to Simonton's line on the left. One of
his companies was engaged for a few moments in driving them
back, exchanging the first volley at twenty paces, so closely had
they approached without being discovered in the dense abattis
of the thicket. But the Yankee bolt was shot. They fell back
sullenly and unpursued, leaving their dead and wounded upon
the field. Captain Martin arrived with permission for Colonel
Hagood to attack, and a few minutes afterwards Slaughter's
Georgia and Gadberry's South Carolina regiments reported as
re-enforcements for the purpose; but the enemy had regained
the shelter of his gunboats and the effort against Charleston was
over for this time. For such was the result of the Battle of Secessionville—one
of the decisive engagements of the war.

The Federals, by their own showing, had 6,000 men engaged
and 1,500 in reserve[20] (part of this reserve being the Third Rhode
Island). Colonel Hagood might have found Hamilton's Battery
on his flank had he advanced without first sending a force against
the position first occupied by it.[21] There were engaged on the
Confederate side, in the fort and out of it, not exceeding 1,300
men, of which 450 were with Colonel Hagood. The Federals
reported their loss at 574 men; the Confederates lost about 150
killed and wounded, of which 32 casualties were in Hagood's
force.

The people of the city and State were justly elated at this
stroke of good fortune. It was the first exploit upon the war
path of most of those engaged in it. Newspaper reporters were
anxious to obtain all the particulars and the parties interested in
no wise loath to furnish them. It was amusing for weeks afterwards
to see in Charleston papers the gross mistatements and, in
some cases, absolutely false representations that were made, the
writer or his friends always the hero of the tale. But to cap the
climax of eagerness to catch "all the glory going," General Evans
appeared in a card in the public papers announcing the fact that
he was in command on the 16th. In General Evans's official
report, which Pemberton showed Colonel Hagood before forwarding
to Richmond, there were almost as many inaccuracies
as in the newspaper accounts; and it really seemed as if he had
not read the reports of his subordinates which he forwarded
accompanying his own. For instance, he stated that he ordered
McEnnery to re-enforce the garrison, yet took no notice of
Hagood's or McEnnery's statements in their reports that the
latter had been sent into Secessionville as heretofore stated in
these Memoirs. Colonel Hagood received no order from any
superior until the enemy left the field. How it was in the fort
he could not say. But it always appeared to him that as far as
generalship went, this battle, decisive as it was on the Confederate
side, can only be characterized as an affair of outposts, in
which the subordinate officers and the troops on the spot did the
best they could upon the emergency; and whatever credit for
generalship, if any is awarded, should be to General Smith, under
whose direction the arrangement of the outposts was made.
There were on the island under Evans at least as many regiments,
and probably as good ones, as the enemy had, and not one was
brought into action. Had his headquarters been nearer to the
lines they might possibly have been used advantageously to some
extent. Williams's column might have been cut off. But the affair
was over very quickly, and the enemy had but a short distance
to retreat before regaining the shelter of their gunboats.

No further offensive movements were undertaken by the Federals
after the repulse of the 16th. They lingered upon the
island, protected by their steam fleet and by defensive entrenchments,
until 7th July, when the last of them embarked
unmolested.

Many valuable lives were lost, and much individual heroism
was displayed in this short and decisive campaign. Lamar
deservedly won much reputation and commenced a career which
promised much usefulness to the State, but this promise was soon
cut short. He perished, a victim of malaria, the following summer.
Gaillard, Wagner, Hopkins and others commenced here a series
of brilliant services, traced in subsequent pages of these Memoirs.
The fate of Captains Henry King, of Charleston, and Samuel J.
Reed, of Barnwell, was especially deplored. The latter was an
elevè of the State Military School and a most promising officer.
There was an incident, too, of brave and faithful conduct in
humble life, which deserves mention in any record of Secessionville.
Vich Jan Vohr's henchman in the dock at Carlisle had not
in his bosom a more leal and affectionate heart than the humble
hero.

Lieutenant John A. Bellinger, of the artillery, was asleep in
his quarters some distance from the battery when the roar of
Lamar's columbiad summoned the garrison to its defense. After
he had repaired to his post, his negro servant discovered that in
his haste he had left his pistol, and hastened to carry it to him
against the remonstrances of his companions, for the approach
to the battery was now swept by bullets as with the besom of
destruction. But the faithful servitor could not bear that his
young master should be in such deadly conflict without his trusty
weapon; and he fell, mortally wounded, in the attempt to bear
it to him. Every attention that affection could suggest to Bellinger
soothed poor Daniel's last moments during the week that
he lingered. He said to his master just before he died, "Duncan
and Normie"—Bellinger's little motherless sons—"Duncan and
Normie will be sorry when they hear that I am dead."

Second Military District, Department of South Carolina,
Georgia and Florida.

On the 19th July, 1862, Colonel Hagood was, by an order from
General Pemberton's headquarters, relieved from duty with his
regiment, then on James Island, and assigned to the command of
the "Second Military District of the Department of South Carolina,
Georgia and Florida." This was in consequence of a telegraphic
dispatch from Richmond that Colonel Hagood was to be

*The Federal reports (War Rebellion, Series I, Vol. XIV) place the Federal reserve
under Gen. Wright nearer Hamilton's Battery than in this sketch.

promoted to a brigadiership, and shortly afterwards he received
his commission, bearing date 21 July. Colonel Hagood was promoted
upon the recommendation of General Pemberton, and it
was peculiarly gratifying to him, both because it was entirely
unsolicited, and because it was a decisive mark of approval from
one whom he esteemed as a thorough soldier. General Pemberton
made few friends in Charleston, from his unfortunate want of
tact and brusquerie of manner. He was not to the taste of a
people at that time particularly disposed to be critical of military
men, and matters through the Coles Island business, which was
undoubtedly the cause of his removal from command in South
Carolina, was much misunderstood; and his misfortune at Vicksburg,
whither he was sent, completed the ruin of his reputation
as a general before the country at large. His conduct afterwards,
however, marked him both as a devoted patriot and a spirited
soldier.

Finding that his usefulness in the high rank he then held of
lieutenant general was impaired by want of public confidence,
he resigned that commission and reverted to his original grade of
lieutenant colonel of artillery in the Regular Army of the Confederate
States; in which capacity he served until the end of the
war. It was General Hagood's pleasant fortune to meet and
serve with him again, both in Virginia and North Carolina.

The Second Military District embraced the country south of
Charleston, from Rantowles to the Ashepoo River, with headquarters
at Adams Run, about twenty-five miles from the city.
Our lines of occupation chiefly followed the coast line of the main
upon which the enemy had never effected a lodgement—the
adjoining islands were debatable ground. The troops of the command
were always mixed, combining all the different arms and
varied in number from 1,000 to 1,200, or 3,000 to 4,000 from time
to time. They were constantly shifting, too, regiments coming
and going as the emergencies of the service required. It was not
a pleasant command. While no operations of a considerable character
were to be expected for some time, the country to be
guarded was extensive and penetrated in every direction by
water courses, giving facility for the petty marauding incursions
which were to be expected. In repelling these, little reputation
was to be made, and from their success much was sure to be lost.

In addition to this, the whole region was before the war considered
fatally malarious during the summer months. In the
winter the climate was delightful.

General Hagood's attention was given at once to a thorough
personal reconnoisance of the country committed to his charge,
and the perfecting of sanitary regulations for the troops consistent
with their indispensable duties.

His military position was that of a local guard, having reference
to the Charleston and Savannah Railroad, and the planting
interest along the coast, and also an advanced guard to the City
of Charleston. The result of his reconnoisance was the location
of batteries armed with siege guns at certain points, with infantry
entrenchments at these and other points; and the maturing of a
general plan of operations in the event of an advance upon
Charleston by a land force from this direction. Upon General
Beaureguard's succeeding General Pemberton in this quarter,
which happened shortly afterwards, he called upon each of his
district commanders to submit their views of operations in their
respective localities. The following paper was submitted by General
Hagood for the Second District and returned approved. It
may be premised that the whole country was a network of swamps
and water courses, and it will be seen that General Hagood, from
the topography of the country, dismissed the idea of the enemy
seeking the main within the limits of his district for an advance
upon Charleston, except between Pon Pon and Rantowles.

"MEMOIR OF OPERATIONS CONTEMPLATED IN SECOND MILITARY
DISTRICT.

General Hagood caused the country embraced in his district
to be thoroughly surveyed and mapped, and made himself personally

acquainted with all its intricacies. He required his staff
to do the same, as well as certain trusty and reliable mounted men
whom he kept about his headquarters as couriers and guides.

The country west of Edisto and to the Ashepoo was watched
by a cavalry company[22] encamped near Jacksonboro on the
Charleston and Savannah Railroad, which picketed Bear's Point,
the junction of the two rivers and a landing on the Ashepoo.
They were subsequently re-enforced by a field battery[23] of artillery;
and were sometimes supported by infantry, when the
number of the latter arms in the district permitted. This was,
however, seldom the case. Walpole's company of fifteen or twenty
men, known as the Stono Scouts, and composed exclusively of late
planters upon the island, were kept upon Johns Island. The
Ashepoo and Johns Island pickets reported direct to headquarters.
The line of pickets from Rantowles to Edisto on the main was
placed under the charge of a permanent superintendent and
reported through him. He was furnished with the following
instructions, which were also promulgated in General Orders:

"GENERAL INSTRUCTIONS FOR PICKETS.

Special instructions as to the number, station and conduct of
each outpost and vidette post was also furnished the superintendent.
The general scheme was a vidette post at each landing on
the line, or good point of observation, with outposts at proper
points to sustain them. These were all of cavalry. A strong
infantry grand guard was stationed at the Church a mile from
Adams Run, where the approaches from these landings chiefly
concentrated. The body of the troops was held at Adams Run
as a strategic center and for sanitary reasons. A permanent garrison
of infantry and artillery was, however, kept at Church
Flats, where siege guns were mounted; and a light battery was
kept encamped sometimes with, and sometimes without, an
infantry support at a landing on Wadmalaw River, known as
Younges Island; and another light battery at Willtown on the
Pon Pon. General Hagood was fortunate in the selection of his
superintendent of pickets, Major John Jenkins, of the Third
Cavalry, and the duty was in general well performed—as well as could be got out of corps newly raised and in which most commonly
the officers needed instruction in every detail.

Before passing from this portion of the subject, it may not be
amiss to say something of the use of cavalry, as developed in
this war. Its use, as on the plains of the eastern continent and
with the short range arms of former wars, seemed to have been
impracticable, for it was never done. They were used generally
merely as mounted riflemen, who dismounted to fight, leaving
every fourth man to hold the horses. Of course there were
exceptional instances. Yet throughout the war, as far as the
writer's observation extended, the former mode of equipping the

cavalrymen was retained. His sabre was slung to his waist, and
when he dismounted to go into action, almost always as skirmisher
when the greatest freedom of action was required, it was
of no earthly use and a most serious hindrance. The sabre came to
be regarded by most of the cavalry as an ornamental badge of
their arm of service, was kept as blunt as a frow, and in many
instances whole corps were without it. The rifle carbine and the
revolver pistol were relied upon, whether upon horseback or
afoot. Now, the use of the sabre has by no means passed away.
In encounters of cavalry with cavalry, and in exceptional cases
of cavalry against infantry, it still remains a more valuable
weapon than any firearm discharged from a horse in motion. To
hang the sabre to the pommel of the saddle on the left side, the
scabbard passing under the left leg of the rider to hold it steady,
and balance it on the right with a holster revolver, all to be
for use only when mounted, and left with the horse when the
soldier dismounted to fight with his carbine, apparently would
relieve the difficulty. Now, the sabre, kept sharp, carried in a
wooden scabbard to preserve its edge, and a repeating carbine
(without a bayonet), would fit the trooper for the discharge of
all the duties required of him in the most effective manner. He
should be taught on horseback to rely as of yore on the sabre
and pistol, and on foot upon the arms and tactics of the light
infantry. Such are the reflections of one who did not serve in
the cavalry arm of the service, but who had opportunities of
observing cavalry fighting and sometimes commanded them in
the field.

Dr. J. F. M. Geddings was the chief surgeon of the command
in the Second Military District, and at his suggestion the following
sanitary regulations were adopted for the sickly season,
and such portions of them as had general application were continued
afterward. They were enforced by the daily inspection
of the doctor himself, who, for the purpose, was relieved from all
other duty. He was untiring in his effort to give them effect:

"SANITARY REGULATIONS.

In addition to the rigid enforcement of the foregoing regulations,
quinine was at times issued to be taken as a prophylactic
in daily doses of three grains, and in default of quinine a decoction
of the bark of the cherry tree and dogwood with whiskey,
equal parts, was used. The good effect of these precautions was
soon visible in the improved health of the troops, which was
alarmingly bad upon General Hagood's taking command, and
we tided over the sickly season without the efficiency of the command
becoming at any time seriously impaired. Most of the
picket stations were upon rice swamps and some of the camps,
as at Rantowles, were in localities heretofore considered deadly
pestilential. The laws of malaria are subtle and but little understood.
Mr. Davis, in discussing the fact of the comparative
exemption of the troops on both sides from its effects during the
war, for this exemption seems also to have occurred in other
malarial sections, is reported to have said:[24] "That the excitement

of war itself was a prophylactic." We had none of the
excitement and all of the monotony of stationary camps.

To guard against the propensity of all troops to accumulate
impedimenta when long in camp, and to endeavor to secure
mobility to the command, the following was made a standing
order:

Schools of instruction by recitation were established in each
regiment and independent corps, followed by reviews and drills
in presence of the brigadier general commanding; and boards
were organized and kept in laborious session for the examination
of officers under the Act of Congress to relieve the army of
incompetent incumbents.

In the discharge of these unobtrusive but important duties,
General Hagood's service in the Second Military District wore
away. No event of military interest beyond an occasional collision
of pickets marked this time. When the enemy advanced upon

General Walker in the Third District in October, 1862, General
Hagood received an urgent dispatch from him calling for
assistance. Moving the Seventh South Carolina Battalion to the
railroad, General Hagood stopped and emptied a passing train
and dispatched the Seventh to Walker's assistance. It reached
him in time to materially assist in the decisive repulse of the
enemy at Pocotaligo. General Hagood, by permission of General
Beauregard, followed with other re-enforcements but arrived
after the battle.

In April, 1863, after the repulse of the enemy's fleet in the
attack on Fort Sumter, their ironclads rendezvoused in the North
Edisto Inlet, where they lay for some time with an infantry force
of some 2,500 or 3,000 men, encamped close by on Seabrook's
Island. General Beauregard organized a force to attempt to sink
the ironclads or drive them to sea, and capture the troops on Seabrook's.
He raised General Hagood's force by special re-enforcements
about 3,000 good infantry, with ten or twelve field guns,
and sent him a naval force of over 100 men with torpedo barges.
The plan was for the torpedo barges to get amongst the fleet just
before day, and as soon as they were routed, and upon condition
that they were, the infantry was to attack. The barges rendezvoused
safely in a creek not over a mile from the fleet on the
previous night; and the land forces were brought unsuspected
within short striking distance. Everything was in readiness for
the next day's work, when the order was countermanded, and
the troops directed to return with all speed to Charleston, to
proceed, most of them, to Pemberton's assistance, then hard
pressed in Vicksburg. A sailor from the naval force deserted
that evening to the enemy, betraying the plan of concealment of
the barges and they with difficulty escaped. Afterwards, while
in North Edisto, the enemy adopted huge rafts of timber as
fenders to each ironclad by way of precaution against the
approach of their diminutive enemies, the torpedo boats. An
instance of special gallantry occurring at this time deserves to be
recorded.

When the troops above referred to landed on Seabrook Island,
Captain Walpole, commanding the Scouts on Johns Island, dispatched
the fact to General Hagood, and received in reply the
order: "Get me a prisoner." It was between sundown and dark,

and taking Sergeant Gervais and Evans Fripp with him, Walpole
made his way through the enemy's chain of videttes and
charging in at full speed upon a regiment which had stacked
arms and was going into bivouac, discharged their six-shooting
rifles right and left, shooting down two men and wounding a
third, whom Walpole, a very active and strong man, jerked up,
as he ran, to the croup of his horse; and the party made their
escape, having obeyed the order to "get a prisoner." He was an
intelligent sergeant and gave all the information wanted before
he died from his wound, which proved mortal next day.

[ILLUSTRATION]

Yankee Ironclad in North Edisto April, 1863 (a monitor).

A few days after General Hagood was relieved of the command
of the Second District, an effort was made by the enemy to pass
up the Pon Pon River in gunboats to Jacksonboro and there
destroy the Charleston and Savannah railroad bridge. They
passed Willtown chiefly from the inefficiency with which the field
battery at that point was worked. The guns were in barbette
entrenchment upon a commanding bluff with the river obstructed
by piling under their fire, and should have turned the boats back.
They passed on, but Captain Walter, of the Washington Artillery,
stationed, as before mentioned, on the western side of the
river near Jacksonboro, came up rapidly with a section of his
battery, and unlimbering in an open old field, went into action
with the two gunboats just as they had reached within sight of

the bridge. He turned them back and sunk one of them, which
the enemy abandoned.[25]

Black's First Regiment of First South Carolina Cavalry
served for a short time after Hagood's taking command, in the
Second District. They were ordered to Virginia and Aiken's
Sixth South Carolina Cavalry took their place.[26] These with two
companies of the Third (Colcock's) under Major Jenkins composed
Hagood's mounted force for the remainder of the time.
The Washington Artillery (Walter's) and the Marion Artillery
(Parker's) were with him all the time. Shultz's Battery was
with him part of the time. The Seventh South Carolina Battalion,
afterwards of Hagood's Brigade, McCullough's Sixteenth
South Carolina, afterwards of Gist's Brigade, and Smith's
Twenty-sixth South Carolina, afterwards of Elliott's Brigade,
constituted his infantry force, details from which also acted as
heavy artillery for the siege guns in position. Other regiments
were with him for short periods. The Stono Scouts under Walpole
were also with him from first to last. Lieutenant-Colonel
Del. Kemper commanded the field batteries and the staff was:

• Captain P. K. Moloney—Assistant Adjutant General.

• Major G. B. Lartigue—Quartermaster.

• Major R. G. Hay—Commissary Subsistence.

• Lieutenant Isaac Hayne—Ordnance Officer.

• Lieutenant Ben Martin—Aid-de-camp.

• Captain Carlos Tracy—Volunteer Aide.

Service in the Second District had all the monotony of garrison
life, with something of its advantages. The families of the
officers to some extent were enabled to visit them from time to
time, the ladies finding shelter in the unoccupied summer residences
of the planters in the little hamlet of Adams Run. It was
a fine fish and game country, and, with railroad facilities for
drawing supplies from home, our tables were fairly furnished for
Confederate times. The troops were supplied from the resources

of the District, and at first these were ample. Towards the last,
however, these supplies became scant. Agricultural operations
had been greatly interfered with by the propinquity of hostile
armies, and the supply of beef cattle and sheep, at first large,
became exhausted. Hogs there were none. But few of the
planters continued to work the plantations south of the railroad.
Among these, however, was Hawkins S. King. He continued
to the last to carry on his several plantations, and truly his homestead
appeared to be a perfect Goshen, whose abundance he dispensed
with a lavish generosity. He obtained with the brigade
staff the sobriquet of "The King of St. Pauls."

General Hagood, however, chafed at his life of inactivity—
while the great game of war was being played so grandly in
Virginia and in the west, his friends and former comrades being
actors in the drama, and received in the spring of 1863 a promise
from General Beauregard to send him into one or the other of
these fields with the first brigade that left the department. Gist
claimed his seniority and got the brigade sent to Pemberton in
June, 1863. Two or three weeks afterward other troops were
ordered in that direction and General Hagood was placed in
command of the brigade organized to go. He left Adams Run
and had reached Charleston on his way, when a dispatch from
Richmond directed Evans's Brigade, lately arrived from North
Carolina, to be substituted in his place. General Beauregard,
when remonstrated with by General Hagood, under a misapprehension
of the source of this order, said he knew not what
induced the unusual course of the War Department in interfering
in this matter. Evans did not desire to go, but was unpopular
with Beauregard's chief of staff, and one of the colonels of
the brigade made for Hagood, who was very intimate with General
Gordon, preferred just then to remain where he was. The
conclusion on General Hagood's mind, whether justly or not, was
that the change had its inspiration in this "power behind the
throne," which was generally believed by those who served with
General Beauregard during this period to be sometimes without
the General's consciousness "stronger than the throne itself."
This belief and the equally general belief of Gordon's unworthiness
operated injuriously both with the officers and men. In the
following summer Captain Beauregard, a brother of the General's

and aid-de-camp on his staff, resigned his commission, and, calling
to say good-bye to General Hagood, told him that he had himself
informed his brother of the common estimate of Gordon's character,
and of its injurious influence upon the General himself.
But Beauregard either knew his chief of staff better, or thought
he could not do without him, for he retained him until he was
compelled to give him up by subsequent action of the War
Department. General Gordon immediately after the war signalized
himself by a very able and heartless attack in the
Northern papers upon Mr. Davis, with whom he had some personal
feud; and has since acquired some notoriety as the commander-in-chief,
by contract for a twelvemonth, of the Cuban
Insurgents.

General Hagood had to stomach his disappointment and return
to Adams Run, expecting another monotonous summer within its
precincts. He shortly after applied for a ten days' leave of
absence to arrange his private affairs, and while at home received
a dispatch from department headquarters ordering him to report
at once in Charleston. Gilmore had developed his batteries
against the south end of Morris Island, and the siege of Charleston
had begun.

Note.—In the winter of 1863 the ladies of Nelson's country sent him a flag for
his battalion, with a request that General Hagood should, for them, make the
formal presentation. This was the last incident of the kind the writer remembers
to have witnessed in the war. They were frequent at an earlier period; perhaps
no one of the earlier regiments marched to the war without some such memorial
of the dear ones at home to nerve them for the fray. These flags were generally
beautifully embroidered State flags and were really used in but few engagements.
The use of a general flag was ordered and as soon as the regiments got into the
larger armies they were required to lay these aside for the regular Confederate
battle flags.

General Hagood's address to the battalion in presenting the ladies' banner is
appended as characteristic of the times. He said:

"I am commissioned, soldiers of the Seventh Battalion, by the ladies of the section
of the State in which your corps was raised, in their name to present you with this
banner.

"For two long years our fair Southern land has been drenched in blood; her plains
have been torn with the rush of contending hosts; her hills have echoed and re-echoed
with the dread voice of battle. The world has beheld with amazement a struggle in
which a million and a half of armed men have been engaged, with almost a continent
for a battlefield. Upon the one side it has seen a gigantic foe, trebling its
adversary in numbers and wealth, and with all the appliances of war at its command,
again and again, with a pertinacity rarely equaled, advancing to the onset.
Upon the other it has seen a people cut off from all save the sympathies of the
brave, standing desperately by their hearthstones and again and again repelling the
insolent foe. We have met them upon our deserted fields; we have fought them
by the light of our blazing homes; in rags, and with imperfect weapons, we have
encountered their serried hosts. In defeat as in victory our high purpose has never
quailed, and in the darkest hour of this unequal war a murmur of repining at its
hardships has never passed the lips of a Southern man; it has never entered into
his heart to conceive a termination to his efforts short of absolute and unqualified
success. It is a spectacle, soldiers, which may well challenge comparison with the
heroic struggles of classic fame, and upon this grand page of history you, too, have
written your names. Upon the weary march, in the comfortless bivouac, and upon the
field of battle, you have borne your part. Beneath the old oaks of Pocotaligo you
have seen a comrade's glazing eye `look fondly to heaven from a deathbed of fame,'
and sadder, far sadder, in tent and hospital, afar from the gentle ministering of
home, you've seen a comrade's spirit flutter its way to God, crushed out by the
merciless requirements of war.

"But while the sons of the South have vindicated the blood they have inherited
from patriot sires, her daughters have illustrated all that is admirable in the
attributes of woman. No Joan has arisen from among them to gird on the harness
of battle, no Charlotte Corday to drive the dagger home to the tyrant's heart. There
has been no need for them to unsex themselves, nor will there ever be a dearth of
manhood requiring such a sacrifice while woman remains the true and holy creature
which God made her. But it is scarce an exaggeration to say that the voluntary
efforts of our women, themselves laboring under cruel and unaccustomed privations,
have clothed our armies, and organized all of comfort that exists in our hospitals. No
high bred Dame of Chivalry ever belted her knight for battle with a more devoted
spirit than that with which the humblest Southern woman has sent her loved ones
to this war. She has checked the cry of wailing over the slaughtered corpse of her
husband, to prepare her first born to take his place; and when disaster has befallen
our arms and the heel of the oppressor has ground into the dust the souls of the few
men who have remained to bear his yoke, the spirit of patriotism has survived in
the women. Insult and injury have failed to crush it—until the indignant utterances
of the civilized world have compelled the oppressor for very shame to desist.[27]

"It is from such women as these, soldiers of the Seventh Battalion, that I present
you with this beautiful banner. Wrought by fair hands, consecrated by the pure
and tender aspirations of wife, and mother, and sister, which cluster in its folds, it
is committed to your keeping.

"Colonel Nelson, it is narrated in martial story that a general, desiring to hold
a pass upon which much depended, posted in the defile a battalion whose metal he
knew, and left them with this stern and simple charge: `Here,' said he, `colonel,
you and your men will die.' And the order was literally obeyed. There they died!
In a like spirit, and with a like confidence, I say to you: `In defense of this flag you
and your men will die.' "

The Siege of Charleston.

The naval attack on Fort Sumter in April, 1863, was prefatory
to Gilmore's operations, and General Ripley's report of it is
given below:

"General: Upon the first inst., the increase of the enemy's force in the
Stono, and information from North Edisto, gave warning that the long-threatened
combined movement upon Charleston was about to take place.
Brigadier-General S. R. Gist, commanding 1st subdivision of this District

(James Island and St. Andrew's Parish), took prompt measures for the
observation and repulse of any attack in that direction. Colonel R. F.
Graham, commanding 3rd subdivision, occupied the shore of Morris Island
on Light House Inlet to control the passage from Folley Island, and a strict
watch has been kept up to the present time on the land movements of the
enemy.

"On the 5th, the ironclad fleet of the enemy, consisting of seven (7)
monitors and one (1) double turreted vessel, hove in sight from Fort Sumter,
and came to anchor outside in the vicinity of the Ironsides frigate, then a
part of the blockading squadron. The 6th was apparently spent by the
enemy in preparation, and by our artillerists in verifying the condition of
their material. On the morning of the 7th, the enemy was inside the bar
with all his ironclads, including the frigate, but from his proximity to the
shoals and the haziness of the atmosphere his position could not be determined.

"The various works of preparation were progressed with, both upon the
exterior and interior lines of defense, until about 2 p. m., when the enemy
steamed directly up the channel, the Weehawken (supposed) with a false
prow for removing torpedoes attached, leading, followed by three monitors;
the Keokuk, double turreted, bringing up the rear.

"At each fort and battery, officers and men made preparations for immediate
action, while the enemy came slowly and steadily on. At 3 o'clock
Fort Moultrie opened fire. At 5 minutes past 3, the leading vessel having
arrived at fourteen hundred yards, Fort Sumter opened upon it with two
guns. Batteries Bee, Beauregard, Wagner and Gregg opened about this
time; and the action became general, the four leading monitors closing upon
the Weehawken, and taking position from the forts and batteries at an average
distance of about fifteen hundred yards. In accordance with instructions
the fire from the different points was concentrated upon the leading vessel;
and the effort was soon apparent in the withdrawal of the leading monitor
from action, her false prow having been detached and otherwise apparently
injured. The remaining monitors in advance of the flag ship held their
position, directing their fire principally at Fort Sumter, but giving occasional
shots at Fort Moultrie, of which the flagstaff was shot away, Batteries
Beauregard and Bee.

"The Ironsides meantime opened fire and drew the attention of Forts
Moultrie and Sumter and Battery Gregg. A few heavy and concentrated
discharges caused her to withdraw out of range, where she was followed by
two other monitors.

"At 5 minutes past 4 the Keokuk left her consorts, and came to the front,
approaching to within nine hundred yards of Fort Sumter, twelve hundred
from Battery Bee, and one thousand from Fort Moultrie. Her advance was
characterized by more boldness than had yet been exhibited by any of the
enemy's fleet, but receiving full attention from the powerful batteries opposed
to her, the effect was soon apparent. The ten-inch shell and seven-inch rifled
bolts crashed through her armor, her hull and turrets were riddled and
stove in, her boats were shot away, and in less than forty minutes she

retired with such speed as her disabled condition would permit.

"The remaining monitors kept their position for a short time, but soon
one by one dropped down the channel, and came to anchor out of range,
after an action of two hours and twenty-five minutes at ranges varying
from nine hundred to nineteen hundred yards.

"The full effect of our batteries upon the enemy could not be precisely
ascertained, and, as our strength had not been fully put forth, it was
believed the action would soon be renewed. The monitor which had led in
the action proceeded south outside of the bar the same evening.

"Before the commencement of the affair, I was proceeding in a boat to
Battery Bee, and watched the progress of the cannonade from that point.
The guns were worked with as much precision as the range would admit.
There were no damages or casualties. Visiting Fort Moultrie, the damaged
flagstaff was being replaced and everything prepared for a renewal of fire
should the enemy again approach. One man had been mortally wounded
by the falling of the staff. Crossing the channel to Fort Sumter, the effect
of the impact of the heavy shot sent by the enemy against the fort they
are so anxious to repossess, greater in caliber and supposed destructive
force than any hitherto used in war, was found to have been much less
than had been anticipated. Five men had been injured by splinters from
the traverses, one 8-inch columbiad had exploded, one 10-inch carriage had
its transom shot away and two rifled 42 drs. had been temporarily
disabled from the effect of recoil on defective carriages.

"The garrison was immediately set to work to repair damages, and, the
strength of the enemy's projectiles having been ascertained, to guard such
points as might be exposed to their effect should the attack be renewed.
Battery Gregg and Battery Wagner were uninjured except from the accidental
explosion of an ammunition chest in Battery Wagner.

"During the night of the 7th, stores were replenished; threatened points
upon land re-enforced; working parties from the Forty-sixth Georgia Regiment
brought to Fort Sumter, and the renewal of the struggle in the morning
awaited with confidence.

"When day dawned on the morning of the 8th, the enemy's fleet was discovered
in the same position as noticed on the previous evening. About 9
o'clock the Keokuk, which had been evidently the most damaged in the
action, went down about three and a half miles from Fort Sumter and
three-quarters of a mile from Morris Island. The remainder of the fleet
were repairing damages. Preparations for repulsing a renewed attack
were progressed with in accordance with the instructions of the commanding
general, who visited Fort Sumter on that day. A detachment of seamen,
under Flag Officer W. F. Lynch, arrived from Wilmington, and on
the 9th temporarily relieved the artillerists in charge of Battery Gregg.
The operations of the enemy's fleet consisted only of supply and repair.
Towards evening of the 9th, a raft, apparently for removing torpedoes or
obstructions, was towed inside the bar. Nothing of importance occurred
during the 10th. During the night of the 10th, Lieutenant-Colonel Dargan,

of the Twenty-first South Carolina Regiment, crossed Light House Inlet,
drove back the enemy's picket with loss, and returned with one prisoner.

On the 11th, there were indications that the attacking fleet were about to
withdraw; and on the 12th, at highwater, the Ironsides crossed the bar and
took up her position with the blockading fleet; and the monitors steamed
and went toward the southward—leaving only the sunken Keokuk as a
monument of their attack and discomfiture.

"In this, the first trial of the enemy's iron fleet against brick fortifications
and their first attempt to enter the harbor of Charleston, in which
they were beaten before their adversaries thought action had well commenced,
they were opposed by seventy-six pieces in all, including mortars.
Thirty-seven of these, exclusive of mortars, were above the caliber of
thirty-two pounders. The guns which the enemy brought to bear were,
if their own account is to be believed, thirty-six in number, including
eight-inch rifled, eleven, thirteen and fifteen-inch guns, which would make
their weight of metal at one discharge nearly, if not quite, equal to that
thrown by the batteries.

"During the action Brigadier-General Trapier, commanding 2nd subdivision
of this District, was present at Fort Moultrie. Brigadier-General
Gist, commanding 1st subdivision, at Fort Johnson. Colonel R. F. Graham,
commanding 3rd subdivision, at Morris Island, and Colonel L. M. Keitt,
commanding Sullivan's Island, at Battery Bee, attending to their duties,
and awaiting the developments of the attack.

"The action, however, was purely of artillery; forts and batteries against
ironclad vessels—other means of defense, obstructions and torpedoes not
having come into play. Fort Sumter was the principal object of the enemy's
attack and to that garrison, under its gallant commander, Colonel Alfred
Rhett, ably seconded by Lieutenant-Colonel Yates, and Major Blanding,
and all the officers and men, special credit is due for sustaining the shock
and with their powerful armament contributing principally to the repulse.
The garrison of Fort Moultrie, under Colonel William Butler, seconded by
Major Baker and the other officers and soldiers, upheld the historic reputation
of that fort and contributed their full share to the result. The
powerful batteries of Battery Bee was commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel
John C. Simkins[28] and were served with great effect. Battery Wagner,
under Major Cleland F. Huger; Battery Gregg, Lieutenant Lesene, and
Battery Beauregard, under Captain Sitgreaves, all did their part according
to their armament.

"Indeed, from the reports of commanders, it is hard to make any distinction
where all did their duty with zeal and devotion. Those cases which
have been ascertained will be found in the reports of the subordinate commanders.
The steady preparation for receiving a renewed attack, and the
discipline of the troops, especially in the garrison of Fort Sumter, the labor
being necessarily great, have been quite as creditable as their conduct
under fire.

"While service in immediate action is that which is most conspicuous
after such a result has been accomplished, the greater credit is due to that
long, patient and laborious preparation by which our works and material,
never originally intended to withstand such an attack as this, have been
so prepared as to enable our gallant and well-instructed officers and men
to obtain their end with comparatively small loss. In that preparation the
late Lieutenant-Colonel Thomas M. Wagner contributed much on both sides
of the channel, and Colonel Rhett and Lieutenant-Colonel Yates, Major
Blanding and other officers of Fort Sumter have been more or less engaged
since the fort fell into our hands two years since. Colonel Butler, Lieutenant-Colonel
Simkins, and other officers of the First South Carolina
Infantry, have been for more than a year engaged in the work on Sullivan's
Island. Besides various officers of engineers and other branches
of the department staff known to the commanding general have been at
different times principal contributors in the work, and although in the
limits of this report it is impossible to mention all to whom credit is due,
it is well that works like these, without which in such emergencies as the
present personal gallantry avails nought, should be appreciated.

"During the seven days while the presence of the enemy's fleet threatened
action, Captain William F. Nance, principal Assistant Adjutant General on
the District staff, performed his difficult duties in the administration of a
command of twenty thousand men in a prompt, judicious and efficient manner.
He was assisted by Lieutenants H. H. Rogers and W. H. Wagner,
aid-de-camps. Captain F. B. DuBarry, District Ordnance Officer, was
especially active and energetic in the supply of ammunition and material
for the batteries. He was assisted by Lieutenant C. C. Pinckney.

"Captain B. H. Read, Assistant Adjutant-General, Colonel Edward Manigault,
and Lieutenant-Colonel St. Clair Dearing, volunteers upon the staff,
were present during the action at Fort Sumter. Captain Seabrook, volunteer
aid-de-camp, and Lieutenant Schirmlee, enrolling officer and acting
aid-de-camp, were generally with me during the active period and all were
energetic and prompt in the duties required of them. To Majors Motte A.
Pringle and Norman W. Smith, post and district quartermasters, and
Captain McCleneghan, assistant commissary sergeant, many thanks should
be rendered. The duties of the quartermaster's department were excessively
laborious on account of the limited means of transportation, and it
is a matter of congratulation that with such means they were so well performed,
Captain John S. Ryan, A. C. S., acted on my immediate staff.

"The reports of the engineer officers will inform the commanding general
of the condition of the various works as well as of the action of the
officers in that branch of the service.

"I have the honor to transmit herewith a return of the guns engaged, a
return of the ammunition expended, and a numerical return of casualties,
together with the reports of the different commanders.

"I have also to transmit herewith two Federal ensigns obtained from the
Keokuk as she lies off Morris Island beach, by Lieutenant Glassell, C. S.
Navy, one of which is evidently the ensign under which she fought and was

worsted. None of the ironclad fleets flew large flags, the object having
doubtless been to avoid presenting a mark to our artillerists.

RETURN OF CASUALTIES.

       

Fort Sumter	Wounded 5
Fort Moultrie	Wounded 1
Battery Wagner	Wounded 5	killed 3 (by explosion ammunition chest)
Total Casualties	14

RETURN OF GUNS AND MORTARS AT BATTERIES ENGAGED.

               

	10-in. Columbiad	9-in. Dahlgren	7-in. Brooke	8-in. Columbiad	42 Dr. Rifled	32 Dr. Smooth	32 Dr. Rifled	10-in. Mortar
Fort Sumter	4	2	2	8	7	13	1	7
Fort Moultrie				9		5	5	2
Battery Bee	5			1
Beauregard				1			1
Wagner							1
Gregg	1	1
	10	3	2	19	7	18	8	9	Total 76

CONSOLIDATED RETURN OF AMMUNITION EXPENDED.

           

Round Shot	1,539
Round Shell	98
Shot, Rifle	359
Shot Bolts	233
Friction tubes	2,856
Cannon Powder	21,093 lbs.

Resuming operations against Charleston, General Gilmore, on
the 10th July, assaulted and carried the south end of Morris
Island. His infantry moved in a flotilla of small boats from the
north end of Folley Island under cover of a heavy fire from
batteries on the latter constructed without attracting serious
attention from the Confederates. The movement was well
planned and executed with considerable dash. Co-operative with
it was the attempt to cut the Charleston and Savannah Railroad

at Jacksonboro, the failure of which has already been mentioned
in speaking of events in the Second Military District, and a
demonstration in force from Stono on James Island.

Upon reporting on the evening of the 10th July at General
Beauregard's headquarters in pursuance of the dispatch received
at Barnwell, General Hagood was sent to James Island to take
command of that sub-district. All day from Blackville down,
whenever the cars stopped, the booming of the guns from Morris
Island could be heard. Captain Moloney, Assistant Adjutant
General, was with General Hagood, and Mr. William Izard Bull,
acting as volunteer aide to General Beauregard, was by order of
the latter directed to report to him for temporary duty. General
Hagood arrived on the island about 12 o'clock at night, and
learned from Colonel Simonton, in command, the condition of
affairs. The enemy were in force on the Stono shore of the
island, with gunboats and transports in the river. Our defensive
works were the same as at the close of the Secessionville campaign;
nothing had been done to them save at Secessionville,
which had been much strengthened. These works looked only
to an advance from the Stono front; and the enemy, now
holding Folley and the south end of Morris Island with their
transports in Light House Inlet, were in rear of their left flank
with an uninterrupted water approach of from one and a half
to two miles available for light-draft steamers, and the landings
not even picketed. Had a flotilla of boats with two thousand
men and a light battery landed that night at Legare's Landing,
it is probable that Fort Johnson, unentrenched to the rear, would
have fallen before day; and, within the limits of possibility, that
before the following night the whole of James Island except the
garrison of Secessionville and Fort Pemberton, which would have
been cut off and isolated, would have been in their possession. A
vigorous co-operative march of General Terry's force on the
Stono side of the island, against the center of our line by way
of Royall's house, would have made it almost a certain thing;
and then the northern shore of James Island held by four thousand
men would have been safe against any force at Beauregard's
command for several days. Gilmore could have re-enforced
afterward as fast as Beauregard, had the James instead of the

Morris Island route to Charleston been taken. This was at that
time and for a day or two the promising plan.

The Confederate force on James Island consisted of the regiment
of Frederick (late Lamar's), the battalions of White and
Lucas, three companies of Rhett's—all heavy artillery; the siege
train, consisting of four companies under Major Manigault, some
cavalry as couriers, and one regiment of infantry, the Twenty-fifth
South Carolina, under Colonel Simonton. This last was
the only force available for movement. The heavy artillerists
were barely enough to garrison the three forts in which they
were stationed and to man the few guns in position on the lines.
Major Manigault was with all dispatch moved that night from
his camp near Wappoo to Legare's Landing, where he arrived
at daylight and immediately proceeded to erect epaulements for
his siege guns. This was the beginning of Battery Haskell and
the series of works on the eastern shore of the island. The enemy
on the Stono under General Terry remained quiet, advancing
their pickets without opposition some short distance. General
Beauregard rapidly pushed re-enforcements over to James Island
as they arrived. Large working parties of negroes were, together
with the troops, kept steadily at work, and in a few days the
opportunity of doing anything by surprise or assault on James
Island had passed away.

Subsequently General W. B. Taliaferro was assigned to the
command of James Island, and Generals Hagood and A. H. Colquitt
commanded the eastern and western divisions of the lines
respectively under him. Secessionville was the dividing point in
these sub-commands. These general officers served with others
on the detail of commanders on Morris Island during the operations
in that quarter, and when not on duty there resumed their
positions on James Island.

General Hagood's tours of duty on Morris Island were: From
the 18th to 22nd July, from the 6th to 10th August, from the 21st
to 25th August; arriving and leaving generally on the nights of
these respective dates. His next tour of duty would have commenced
on the 7th September. The island was evacuated on the
previous night. Of his staff, Captain Moloney, acting adjutant-general,
and his aides, Ben Martin and Tracy, with his orderly,
S. N. Bellinger, always accompanied him. Majors Hay and

Lartigue and Captain Hayne, commissary quartermaster and
ordnance officer, were with him on the first tour; afterwards these
offices on the island were made post offices and others filled them.
Lieutenant-Colonel Del. Kemper served the first tour with him
as chief of artillery. This officer had distinguished himself in
Virginia at First Manassas, and subsequently an unclosed wound
in his shoulder unfitted him for field duty and he was sent to this
department, where he served the rest of the war. He was in
person very like General Beauregard, of high mental and social
culture, and an officer of much dash and merit. General Hagood
was thrown much with him and formed a warm regard for him.
Lieutenant-Colonel Welsman Brown served the second tour as
chief of artillery, and Major F. F. Warley the third. These
officers all discharged their duties with credit to themselves and
to the entire satisfaction of their chief. Captain Moloney
especially was invaluable, cool, intelligent and indefatigable. He
relieved the command of half its burthen.

The period of active operations against Charleston, looking to
its direct capture, was from 10th July to 10th September.
Afterward the siege was marked only by the bombardment of
Sumter and the city, with comparatively harmless cannonading
of each other by the opposing batteries and some skirmishes.
This continued until the spring of 1864, when Gilmore and Beauregard
were both, with the bulk of their troops, transferred to
the theatre of war in Virginia, where the conflict was then culminating,
and Charleston was left with a skeleton garrison to
hold its own against a force adequate to little more than protect
from assault the long-range guns which continued day and night
to hurl their crashing and exploding missiles into the ruins of
the devoted city. For twelve months longer this continued,
while the contest upon which depended alike the fate of Charleston
and the Confederacy was elsewhere prosecuted to the bitter
end. At length in the spring of '65, when all that was left of the
Confederacy was concentrated for the last desperate hazard, the
garrison of Charleston, her artillerists converted into infantry,
silently and sadly, and bearing with them their warworn banners,
marched to strengthen the hands of Johnston in North Carolina.
There, upon the fields of Averysboro and Bentonville, in two
field fights, they lost nearly as many men in killed and wounded

as in all their service under Gilmore's guns and before his assailing
columns. So much for the art of the engineer.

In arranging the material of this memoir of the siege, General
Beauregard's report embracing the time from his assumption
of command until the evacuation of Morris Island is taken; then
General Ripley's report continues the narrative till the 10th of
September; and from that time till the departure of General
Hagood for Virginia in May, '64, his recollection is relied upon.
In notes to these official papers, the writer has embodied such
comments as appeared to him proper.

Of events in and around Charleston, subsequent to April, '64,
in the absence of personal knowledge or official reports, no
attempt will be made to give an account.

GENERAL BEAUREGARD'S REPORT.

Headquarters
Department Georgia, South Carolina and Florida.

General: I arrived in Charleston on the 13th September, 1862,
and assumed command on the 24th. In the interval I was
engaged in ascertaining the plans and measures of Major-General
Pemberton, my predecessor, for the defense, particularly of
Charleston and Savannah, and in a rapid inspection of the condition
and defensive resources of the department, the results of
which were communicated to the War Department in two papers,
dated the one relative to Charleston on the 3rd, and the other
chiefly concerning Savannah on the 10th of October, 1862.

At the time the troops in this department as organized consisted:

           

In South Carolina—
Infantry	6,564
Artillery in position	1,787
Artillery in field	1,379
Cavalry	2,817
		12,547

Note.—See Publications by U. S. Government of Official Records of the War of
the Rebellion, Series I, Vol. XXVIII, Parts 1 and 2.

             

In Georgia—
Infantry	3,834
Artillery in position	1,330
Artillery in field	445
Cavalry	1,580
		7,189
Total of all arms		19,736

Of this force 1,787 artillery in position, 727 light artillerists,
4,139 infantry and 410 cavalry were assembled in the First Military
District for the defense of Charleston; and 1,330 artillery
in position, 445 light artillery, 3,834 infantry and 1,580 cavalry
for the defense of Savannah. My predecessor before being
relieved furnished me with his estimate of the smallest number
of troops which he regarded as essential for the defense of
Charleston and Savannah, to-wit:

                             

For the defense of Charleston—
Infantry	15,600
Artillery in position	2,850
Cavalry	1,000
		19,450
and 9 light batteries.
For the defense of R. R. (Charleston & Savannah) land approaches—
Of all arms		11,000
For defense of Savannah—
Infantry	10,000
Artillery in position	1,200
Cavalry	2,000
		13,200
and 8 light batteries.
Total exclusive of light battery		43,650

Hence a total of 25,216 troops of all arms additional to those
in the department were needed to meet this estimate.

On the 7th April, 1863, the day of the ironclad attack on Fort
Sumter, the troops at my disposal in South Carolina and Georgia
gave an effective total of 30,040, distributed as follows:

         

In the First Military District	11,229
In the Second Military District	2,849
In the Third Military District	5,837
Georgia	10,125
	30,040

But the withdrawal of Cook's Brigade to North Carolina,
immediately after the repulse of the ironclad fleet, of Brigadier-General
S. R. Gist's and W. H. T. Walker's brigades and light
batteries about the 4th May, reduced my force materially. The
Department is aware of the circumstances under which this
reduction took place, and in this connection I beg to refer to my
letter to the Honorable Secretary of War of the 10th May and
to General S. Cooper, Adjutant and Inspector General, of June
15th and July 20th, 1863.

The force in the First Military District on the 10th July was:

               

Infantry	2,462
Artillery, heavy and light	2,839
Cavalry	560
		5,861
In Second Military District, of all arms		1,398
In Third Military District, of all arms		2,517
In District of Georgia of all arms		5,542
Grand total[29]		15,318

Meanwhile, as in duty bound by numerous telegrams and letters
during the month of April, May, June and July, I kept the
War Department advised both through yourself and directly of
the threatening nature of the enemy's preparations upon the
coast of my department and of my own fears concerning the
imminence of an attack. On the 25th of April, however, in
answer to my telegram of the preceding day asking for heavy
guns for Morris Island and other points, the Secretary of War
telegraphs:

"I regret to be unable to spare the guns even for the object
mentioned. The claims of Wilmington and of the Mississippi are
now regarded as paramount."

On the 1st May I was directed to send a full brigade to North
Carolina to report to General Hill, and in compliance General
Clingman's Brigade was dispatched. The following day the
Secretary of War telegraphed, "Advices show the enemy abandoning
their attack on the eastern coasts, and concentrating great
forces on the Mississippi River. Send with the utmost dispatch
eight or ten thousand men, including those heretofore ordered to
Tullahoma, to General Pemberton's relief."

My answer was: "No orders sending troops to Tullahoma have
been received. Cook's and Clingman's brigades have been
returned to North Carolina. Have ordered 5,000 infantry and
two batteries to report forthwith to General Pemberton, leaving
only 10,000 infantry available for the whole of South Carolina
and Georgia. Cannot send more without abandoning Charleston
and Savannah Railroad. Shall await further orders. Enemy
still occupy in force Folley and Seabrooks Islands and Port
Royal. To reduce this command further might become disastrous."

On the 4th May I sent the following dispatch to Secretary of
War: "Enemy's fleet reported at Hilton's Head and Port Royal
yesterday is four steam frigates, five wooden gunboats, six ships,
four barges, three brigs, five ocean steamers, six river steamers,
five tugs, eighty-seven transports and fifty-eight schooners, being
one hundred and eighty-three in all—a very remarkable increase
since last report."

Hon. Mr. Sedden, Secretary of War, telegraphed on 9th May:
"Foster, with his own and part of Hunter's forces, is believed to
have returned to North Carolina. More re-enforcements to General
Pemberton are indispensable. If General Evans's brigade
has returned to you send 5,000 men; if not, with a number which
with that will make 5,000 men." On the following day I telegraphed
in reply: "To the Secretary of War: The order sending
additional troops to Pemberton will be executed. Evans's Brigade
included have but 1,000 infantry to support extensive lines
and batteries at Savannah, but 750 infantry to hold line of railroad
to Savannah, virtually yielding up that country and large
stores of rice to the enemy, as well as opening even Charleston
and Augusta and Columbia Railroads to attack at Branchville,
leaving here 1,500 infantry at most, all of which will be known

to the enemy in a few days. Meantime General W. S. Walker
reports increased strength of enemy's outposts in his vicinity.
Hagood reports 2,500 infantry on Seabrooks Island fortifying,
five monitors still there. Enemy in force on Folley Island,
actively erecting batteries there yesterday. Season favorable for
enemy's operations for quite a month."

On the 12th, I telegraphed to the Honorable Secretary of War
as follows:

"Have ordered to General Pemberton (contrary to my opinion)
Evans's Brigade and one regiment amounting to 2,700 men,
leaving only 6,000 infantry available in the whole of South Carolina
and Georgia. The other 1,000 will await further orders of
Department. General Evans reports two brigades of the enemy
on Folley Island yesterday. Please answer." A letter to the
same address on the 11th May exhibited certain conditions and
explanations, being more fully my views on the subject of an
attack, with the object of showing to the War Department the
actual menacing aspect of the enemy on the coast of my department.
I transcribe an extract from that letter. . . .

"A week ago, under your orders, I put in motion for Jackson,
Miss., two brigades under Generals Gist and W. H. T. Walker,
the former commanding South Carolina, and the latter Georgia
troops,—somewhat over 5,000 infantry in all, and two light batteries
of the best class in the department. Your orders have been
based apparently upon the conviction that the troops of the
enemy assembled in this department for operations against
Charleston have been mainly withdrawn and directed to other
expeditions in North Carolina and the Valley of the Mississippi.
This conviction I regret I cannot share, as I am satisfied from
the reports of the district commanders, and from other reasons,
that there has been really but little reduction of the command
of Major-General Hunter. General Walker, commanding at
Pocotaligo, reports that on yesterday the outposts of the enemy
in his front had been much increased in strength. General
Hagood reports them to be occupying Seabrooks Island with at
least 2,500 infantry. They are erecting fortifications at that
point, as well as on Folley Island, which is likewise still occupied
in force. Five of the monitors remain in North Edisto with some
twenty gunboats and transports. With these and the transports

still in the waters of Port Royal, and the forces which I am
unable to doubt are still at the disposal of the enemy, he may
renew the attack by land and water on Charleston at any moment.
Acting on the offensive and commanding the time of attack, he
could simultaneously call troops here from North Carolina, and
sooner than my command could be re-enforced from any quarter
out of the department. . . . A letter to you of the 20th May
further calls attention to the fact that important changes are
reported to be on foot in the armament of the monitors and
urges strenuously that Fort Sumter be armed comformably with
the original plan, with the heaviest guns, rifled or smooth bore,
which could be obtained, in anticipation of a renewal of the
attack of the 7th April. I was informed, however, through your
letter of 10th June, that Northern papers report the reduction
of Hunter's force by sending troops to the gulf. If this be true,
you will with such force as you can properly withdraw from your
defensive lines proceed to Mobile to resist an attack if one be
designed at that place, but if the purpose of the enemy be to send
his forces to the Mississippi, you will go on and co-operate with
General Johnston in that quarter."

This I answered by telegram on the 13th of same month as follows:
"Enemy's ironclads and forces still as heretofore reported
to department, except a gunboat expedition reported in Altamaha,
and one preparing for St. John's River, Fla. I will prepare
as far as practicable for contingencies referred to in Department
letter of the 10th inst. Please send me any positive information
relative to movements or intentions of enemy. But in order that
the War Department should be thoroughly cognizant of the state
of affairs in my department, I further addressed to you on the
13th June a letter in which I pointed out how utterly insufficient
were the forces at my command to resist those of the enemy and
that on my responsibility I could not further deplete the force in
the department. I drew your attention in the same letter to the
danger of an attack by way of Morris Island—indeed, to the very
route which General Gilmore has since operated. I take the following
extracts from that letter:

". . . Thus it will be seen that the force in this department
is already at the minimum necessary to hold the works around
Charleston and Savannah constantly menaced by the proximity

of the enemy's ironclads. The garrison of no work in this harbor
can be withdrawn or diminished, as they are all necessary links
in the chain of defense. Reduce the command on James Island,
and the enemy may readily penetrate by such a coup de main as
was attempted last year at the weakened point. James Island
would then fall, and despite our harbor defenses the City of
Charleston would be thrown open to bombardment. It is not safe
to have less than a regiment of infantry on Morris Island, which,
if once carried by the enemy, would expose Fort Sumter to be
taken in reverse and demolished. . . . Late Northern papers
say Admiral Du Pont has been relieved of the command of the
fleet on this coast by Admiral Foot, an officer whose operations
in the west evinced much activity and enterprising spirit. And
even were considerable reductions made in the enemy's forces,
the valuable coast districts would be left a prey to such destructive
raids as devastated the Combahee a few days ago. Thus far,
however, I can see no reduction. General Hunter was at Hilton
Head on the 8th July; his troops hold the same positions as heretofore
and apparently in the same force—a brigade on Folley, one
on Seabrooks Island and the balance on the islands about Port
Royal. One of these monitors is at Hilton Head and five in the
North Edisto. Nor has the number of their gunboats and transports
diminished or at any time recently been increased, as must
have been the case had a material removal of troops taken place."

On the 25th June his Excellency, President Davis, telegraphed
the following: "From causes into which it is needless to enter,
the control of the Mississippi connection between the States east
and west of it will be lost unless Johnston is strongly and
promptly re-enforced within the next sixty days. Can you give
him further aid without the probable loss of Charleston and
Savannah? I need not state to you that the issue is vital to the
Confederacy." My answer was: "Telegram received. No more
troops can be spared from this department without losing railroad
and country between here and Savannah. Georgetown District
will also have to be abandoned. See my letter to General
Cooper of the 15th inst."

Thus on the 10th July, 1863, I had but 5,861 men in the First
Military District guarding the fortifications around Charleston
(or more than one-third the troops in my department) with an

enemy whose base of operations threatened Savannah, the line
of coast, and the important railroad connecting the latter city
with the former, with such immense transportation resources at
his command as to enable him to concentrate and strike at will
at any selected point before I could gather my troops to oppose.

In attacking Charleston itself five different routes of approach
present themselves to an enemy. First, by landing a large force
to the northward, say, at Bulls Bay, marching across the country
and seizing Mt. Pleasant and the northern shores of the inner
harbor. Second, by landing a large force to the southward,
cutting the line of the Charleston and Savannah Railroad and
taking Charleston in rear. Neither of these routes did I consider
practicable or likely to be adopted by the enemy, as his numerical
force would not have allowed him to cope with us, unless under
the shelter of his gunboats and ironclads, a fact which General
Gilmore has always carefully recognized. Before he adopts the
overland approaches he will require a large addition to his land
forces. The third, fourth and fifth approaches by James Island,
Sullivan's Island and Morris Island, respectively, permitted the
co-operation of the navy; and I always believed, as experience
has demonstrated, that of the three immediate routes to Charleston,
that by James Island was the most dangerous to us and the
one which should be defended at all hazards; that by Sullivan's
Island ranking next; and that by Morris Island last in importance
for the following reasons: An enemy, who could gain a
firm foothold on James Island and overpower its garrison (at
that time having to defend a long, defective and irregular line
of works), could have erected batteries commanding the Inner
Harbor, at once taking in rear our outer line of defenses, and by a
direct fire on Charleston compel its evacuation in a short period;
because in such case it would have become of no value as a strategic
position, and prudence and humanity would alike revolt at
the sacrifice of life necessary to enable us to retain possession of
its ruins. The route by Sullivan's Island was also of great
importance, for the occupation of that island would not only
have enabled the enemy to reduce Fort Sumter, as an artillery
fortress, but would also have given entire control of the entrance
to the inner harbor to his ironclad fleet. At that time, owing to
the want of labor and of heavy guns, the important works which

now line the shores of the inner harbor had not been erected and
armed, and the enemy's fleet would have been able to shell the city
comparatively unmolested, and by controlling and cutting off
our communication with Fort Sumter and Morris Island would
have soon necessitated their surrender or evacuation.

The remaining route by Morris Island was certainly the least
injurious to us; for the occupation of that island by the enemy
neither involved the evacuation of Fort Sumter, the destruction
of the city by a direct fire as from James Island, nor the command
by the ironclad fleet of movements in the inner harbor.
The James Island route I had long thought the most likely to be
attempted by the enemy, as its proximity to Folley Island (for
many months back in their possession) gave them facilities for the
execution of a coup de main, whilst the neighboring harbor of
North Edisto gave their fleet a convenient shelter from bad
weather, which they could not have had on the long island coast
had their attack been by way of Sullivan's Island. Moreover the
seizure of the island would have given the Federal Government
opportunity of making capital with its own people and with
foreign powers.[30]

To counteract these very apparent advantages of the enemy, I
had several months previously planned and ordered to be erected
on the south end of Morris Island suitable works. On Black
Island, which lies between James and Morris Islands and from
its position enfilades Light House Inlet, between Morris and
Folley Islands, I had determined to build two batteries for two
guns each. This island was further to have been connected with
the mainland by a branch from the bridge, planned to connect
James and Morris Islands, and nearly completed when the enemy
made their attack in July.[31] At Vincent's Creek a battery had
been commenced and had it been completed would have played
effectively upon the sand hills on the south end of Morris Island.
Battery Wagner was substantially strengthened and arranged
for these guns on the sea face, but owing to the scarcity of labor

and the want of the necessary ordnance to put in the works on
the south end of Morris Island, they were not, on the 10th July,
in that condition which would have characterized them had I
had sufficient labor, transportation and ordnance at my disposal.
Labor and transportation have always been serious drawbacks,
not only to the defense of Charleston, but of the whole
department. In reference to the labor question, I may here
state that no subject relative to the defense of this department
has engrossed more of my attention. Constant appeals were made
to the Governors and Legislature of South Carolina and to eminent
citizens since my first arrival, but few seemed to appreciate
the vital necessity of securing the proper amount of slave labor
for the fortifications of Charleston, and instead of the State providing
2,500 negroes monthly, as desired by me for Charleston,
I received for the first six months of 1863 the following number
of negroes from the State authorities, viz.: In January, 196;
in February, 261; March, 864; April, 491; May, 107, and June,
60, being 1,979 in all, and an average of 350 monthly. Consequently,
I had to detain these hands longer than 30 days, which
was the original term of service required for each negro. This
step caused considerable discontent among the owners of slaves,
and in the month of July, 1863, the number of negro hands in
the employ of the engineer department, provided under my call
on the State, amounted to only 299 hands. In the meanwhile
the troops of the command, in addition to their regular duties,
were employed in erecting fortifications, nearly the whole of the
works on the south end of Morris Island having been thrown up
by its garrison. The engineer department used every exertion to
hire labor, but their efforts were not crowned with appreciable
success.

In the middle of June the batteries on the south end of Morris
Island were engaged with the enemy on Folley Island, and
undoubtedly retarded the progress of their operations, as the
following extract from the reports of Brigadier-General Ripley
will show:

". . . June 12th, 1863.—The enemy having advanced light guns
to the extremity of Folley Island (Little Folley) yesterday to
shell the wreck of the steamer `Ruby' now ashore at Light House
Inlet, in accordance with directions, Captain Mitchel, commanding

the batteries on south end of Morris Island, opened fire,
silencing them at the second shot. This morning I gave instructions
to open fire in case he observed any indications of work
on Little Folley on the part of the enemy; and this afternoon.
about 5 o'clock, seeing parties apparently at work, he commenced
shelling. About fifty men left Little Folley for the main island.
The enemy replied from his batteries on Big Folley, and from his
light guns." Again, on the 14th June, the same officer reports:
". . . The enemy having appeared to be at work on Little Folley,
Lieutenant-Colonel Yates opened fire upon them, shelling them for
about three-quarters of an hour, and putting a stop to their operations,
which appeared to be erecting a shelter or battery near
the inlet.[32] " At the time of the attack on Charleston in the beginning
of April the enemy occupied Big Folley[33] and Seabrooks
Island in force estimated at one or two brigades. This force was
increased to about four brigades before July 10th, a considerable
number of troops landing on Coles and James Islands. During
the latter part of June and up to the first week in July, no extraordinary
activity was manifested by the enemy. On Big Folley
Island they were occupied as usual in fortifying the neck,
strongly picketing Little Folley and interfering with wrecking
parties on the steamer Ruby. On the morning of the 7th July, four
monitors appeared off the bar, but no other increase of the fleet in
that direction was observable. On the night of the 8th of July, a
scouting party under Captain Charles Haskell, visited Little
Folley and discovered the enemy's barges collected in the creeks
approaching Morris Island. Commencing on the 7th July, and for
the three succeeding days, working parties of the enemy were seen
engaged on Little Folley, supposed to be in erecting light works
for guns. The wood on the island, but more especially the configuration
of the ground which consists of sand hills, gave the
enemy every facility for the concealment of his designs. On the
night of the 8th July, considerable noise from chopping was
heard, and in the morning some works were discernible, the wood
and brush having been cleared away from their front. On the
night of the 9th July, an immediate attack being anticipated, the
whole of the infantry force on the island was kept under arms at
the south end.

At 5 o'clock on the morning of the 10th July, the enemy's
attack commenced by a heavy fire from a great number of light
guns, apparently placed during the last forty-eight hours in the
works lately thrown up on Little Folley Island. Their monitors
about the same time crossed the bar and brought their formidable
armament to bear upon the left flank of our position, while
several howitzers on barges on Light House Inlet flanked our
right. For two hours the enemy kept up their fire from these
three different points, our batteries replying vigorously. The
barges of the enemy having been seen in Light House Inlet in the
direction of Black Island, and Oyster Point being the most
accessible point for debarkation for them, it was justly considered
the one most necessary to protect, and, therefore, the infantry,
consisting of the Twenty-first South Carolina, about 350 men,
were stationed by Colonel R. F. Graham, the immediate commander
of the island, on the peninsular leading to that point. In
this position the infantry were unavoidably exposed to the fire
of the boat howitzers, but sheltered by the nature of the ground
from that of the guns on Little Folley.

About 7 o'clock the enemy advanced on Oyster Point in a
flotilla of boats, containing between two and three thousand men,
a considerable portion of whom endeavored to effect a landing,
in which they were opposed by the infantry until 8 o'clock, when
another force of two or three regiments made good a landing in
front of our batteries on the south end of Morris Island proper.
These formed a line of battle on the beach and advanced directly
upon our works, throwing out on east flank numerous skirmishers
who very soon succeeded in flanking and taking in reverse the
batteries. After an obstinate resistance, our artillerists had to
abandon their pieces and fall back, leaving in possession of the
enemy three 8-inch navy guns (shells), two 8-inch seacoast howitzers,
one rifle 24 dr., one 30 dr. Parrott, one 12 dr. Whitworth,
and three 10-inch seacoast mortars—eleven pieces in all. Two

companies of the Seventh South Carolina Battalion, which
arrived about this time, were ordered to the support of the batteries,
but they could not make head against the overwhelming
numbers of the enemy. This success of the enemy threatened to
cut off our infantry engaged at Oyster Point from their line of
retreat, and, consequently, about 9 o'clock, Colonel Graham gave
the order to fall back on Battery Wagner, which was accomplished
under a severe flanking fire from the monitor.

The enemy thus gained possession of the south end of Morris
Island by rapidly throwing across the inlet a large number of
troops, which it was impossible for the available infantry on the
spot, about four hundred men, to resist. It was not the erection
of the works on Little Folley that caused the abandonment of our
position. It was clearly the want on our side of infantry supports,
and the enemy's superior number and weight of guns. The
woods that remained unfelled on Little Folley were of no
material use to the enemy, for, even had there been labor to
remove them (which I never had), the formation of the ground
being a series of ridges of sand hills formed a screen which hid
the enemy's movements completely from us, and afforded all
the concealment he could desire. The attack was not a surprise;
neither was the erection of works on Little Folley unknown to
the local commander of these headquarters. The enemy, indeed,
made little effort to conceal them. With a sufficient infantry
support on Morris Island, the result of the attack on the 10th
July, I am confident, would have been different; but, as I have
already explained, the threatening position of the enemy on
James Island entirely precluded the withdrawal of a single
soldier from its defense until the point of attack had been fully
developed, and the only re-enforcements that could be sent to
Morris Island (the Seventh South Carolina Battalion, some 300
men,) arrived too late to be of any material service on the morning
of the 10th July. The long protracted defense of Battery
Wagner must not be compared with the evacuation of the south
end of Morris Island to the discredit of the latter movement.
The two defenses are not analogous. In the one a large extent
of exposed ground had to be guarded by an entirely inadequate
force; in the other a strong earthwork with a narrow line of
approach could be held successfully by a body of men numerically

quite insufficient to have opposed the landing of an enemy
on the south end of Morris Island.

Whilst the enemy on the 9th July was threatening Morris
Island, he also made a strong demonstration against James
Island by the Stono River. At 12 m. on that day, Colonel Simonton,
commanding at Secessionville, telegraphed: "The enemy are
landing on Battery Island. Their advanced pickets and our's are
firing. Pickets from Grimballs (on the Stono higher up)
report the enemy landing at that point." Their gunboats and a
monitor proceeded up the river as far as the obstructions. On
the morning of the 10th July, whilst the attack was progressing
on Morris Island, Colonel Simonton telegraphed that the main
body of the enemy were moving in force from Battery Island to
Legare's house. Later in the day, however, he telegraphed that the
reported advance was premature—"They are in force on Battery
Island." Though the demonstration of the enemy on Stono and
on James Island was made to distract our attention from Morris
Island, yet it was made in such force that at any moment it
could have been converted into a real attack of the most disastrous
kind to us had the garrison been weakened to support
Morris Island.

On the afternoon of the 10th July, detachments of the First,
Twelfth, Eighteenth and Sixty-third Georgia, under Colonel
Ormstead, arrived from the District of Georgia, and with the
Twenty-first South Carolina and Nelson's Seventh South Carolina
Battalion became the garrison of Battery Wagner. At daylight
on the 11th July the enemy assaulted Battery Wagner and
were repulsed with much loss, two officers and ninety-five men
being left dead in front of our works, and six officers and one
hundred and thirteen rank and file taken prisoners, about forty
of the latter being wounded. Our loss was one officer and five
privates wounded. During the day three monitors and three
wooden gunboats shelled Battery Wagner, and in the evening a
fifth monitor crossed the bar. From James Island, at 7 a. m., the
report was no forward movement on that front, two gunboats
and several transports off Battery Island. At 9 p. m., the enemy
were reported advancing in force both towards Legare's house
and Grimball's, our pickets falling back before him.

On the 12th July, the Marion Artillery, four guns and thirty-nine

effectives, arrived from the Second Military District and
was placed on James Island, as well as the Eleventh South Carolina,
from the Third Military District, four hundred effectives,
but these last soon had to be returned to guard our communication
with Savannah. A portion of General Clingman's Brigade,
550 men of the Fifty-first North Carolina, and 50 men of the
Thirty-first North Carolina, arrived from Wilmington about the
same time in consequence of my urgent call for re-enforcements.

The enemy was occupied during the day in erecting works on
the middle of Morris Island, whilst five monitors and three
wooden gunboats shelled Battery Wagner. The armament of
Battery Wagner was increased by four 12 dr. howitzers, two
32 dr. carronades on siege carriages.

On the 13th July, the enemy was actively engaged in throwing
up works on the middle of Morris Island, but was interrupted
by the fire of Gregg and Sumter. During the day four monitors,
three gunboats and two mortar vessels shelled Gregg and Wagner,
but with light effect and slight casualty. Four monitors only
were seen with the fleet, the fifth was observed going to the south
without a smokestack on the evening of the 12th. Orders were
issued this day for the construction of a new battery on Shell
Point (Battery Simkins) in advance of Fort Johnson for one
10-inch columbiad, one 6.40 Brooke gun and three 10-inch
mortars. The armament of Fort Moultrie was ordered to be
increased by guns taken from Sumter. An appeal was made to
his Excellency Governor Bonham for slave labor to work on the
fortification.

The arrival of Clingman's Brigade and re-enforcements from
other quarters having increased to some extent my available
force, the consideration arose whether or not the expulsion of the
enemy from Morris Island could yet be attempted. The number
of men required for such an attempt would have been 4,000, the
surface of Morris Island not permitting the manœuvering of a
larger force. The only hope of success lay in the possibility of our
troops carrying the enemy's works before daylight, otherwise the
advance and attack would necessarily have been made under the
fire of the enemy's fleet, in which case it must have ended disastrously
for us. After a consultation with my general officers,
the idea of this attack was abandoned from the consideration

that our means of transportation was so limited as to make it
impossible to throw sufficient re-enforcements on Morris Island
in one night and in time to allow the advance of our troops to
the south end before daylight.[34]

Two regiments under Brigadier-General Colquitt arrived on
the 14th and were sent to James Island. During the day the
enemy's gunboats and mortar vessels shelled Wagner at long
ranges, doing but little damage. The enemy worked hard on his
Morris Island works, making considerable progress, though the
fire from Fort Sumter and Batteries Gregg and Wagner annoyed
him much.

The impossibility of expelling the enemy from Morris Island
being fully recognized, I was reluctantly compelled to adopt the
defensive. Orders were issued for closing the gateway in the
gorge of Fort Sumter and removing a portion of the guns also
for the construction of a covered way from Fort Moultrie to
Battery Bee. During the night Brigadier-General Taliaferro,
commanding at Morris Island, sent out a party of 150 men under
Major Rion, of the Seventh South Carolina Battalion, who drove
the enemy's pickets from the rifle pits across the island some
three-quarters of a mile in front of Battery Wagner. On the 15th
the enemy on Morris Island appeared to be largely re-enforced,
and during the night of the 14th the frigate "Ironsides" had
crossed the bar.

The enemy was busy on his works, and our men employed in
repairing damages in Battery Wagner, and answering the fire of
the monitors and gunboats. The following instructions were
given the engineer department: To have Shell Point Battery
constructed for three guns instead of two; the mortar batteries
at Fort Johnson to be converted into gun batteries for one heavy
rifled gun, or 10-inch columbiad each; to strengthen the gorge
wall of Fort Sumter by means of wet cotton bales filled in
between with sand and kept moist by means of tubes or hose from
upper turpline. General Ripley was also instructed to reduce
the force on Morris Island to a command simply competent to
hold the works against a coup de main, also to furnish the troops
on that island with several hundred empty rice casks for the construction

of "rat holes" in the sand hills in rear of Battery Wagner.[35]
Instructions were given to the chief of subsistence to keep
rations on Morris Island for five thousand men for thirty days
and on James Island for five thousand men for fifteen days, with
a reserve supply in the city. On the same day the enemy's pickets
along the Stono on James Island were observed to be increased
by negro troops. Brigadier-General Hagood made a reconnoisance
of the enemy in his front on James Island. At daybreak on the
morning of the 16th July Brigadier-General Hagood, in accordance
with instructions, attacked the enemy on James Island,
driving them to Battery Island under shelter of their gunboats.
The loss was small on both sides; three men killed, twelve
wounded and three missing on our side. The enemy left forty
killed on the field and fourteen prisoners (negroes) taken by us
prisoners. This retreat of the enemy was followed by the
advance of our troops who have occupied the ground ever since.
In the engagement the gunboat Pawnee was forced to retire
down the Stono under fire of our light artillery.[36] During the
day the monitors, gunboats and mortar vessels shelled Battery
Wagner. The enemy worked diligently on their batteries. In
the evening large bodies of infantry were landed on the south
end of Morris Island.

Colonel Harris, chief of engineers, was directed to increase the
batteries on James Island bearing on Morris Island by at least
twenty guns on siege carriages, so as to envelope in a circle of
fire the enemy whenever he should gain possession of the north
end of Morris Island; all works to be pushed on night and day.

On the morning of the 17th the enemy's fleet left the Stono
River after embarking his forces at Battery Island, and appeared
to concentrate them on Little Folley and Morris Islands. Both
the fleet and land batteries shelled Wagner throughout the day,
answered vigorously by our guns. The construction by the enemy
of batteries on Morris Island proceeded rapidly. In a telegraphic
dispatch today, I pointed out that the contest had passed
into one of engineering skill, where, with sufficient time, labor
and long-range guns, our success was very probable, owing to the

plan of defense adopted; otherwise it was doubtful in proportion
to the lack of these elements of success.

The fire of the enemy's batteries from this date prevented communication
with Cummings Point during daylight, and henceforth
it had to be effected at night; the very limited transportation
at my command added considerably to the difficulty of
relieving the garrison at Battery Wagner as often as I could have
wished. The time of service was at first limited to forty-eight
hours, but owing to this difficulty it was now extended to three
days.

On the morning of the 18th July it became evident that the
enemy were about to attempt serious operations against Wagner.
The south end of Morris Island was crowded with troops, and in
their batteries and advanced works great activity was apparent,
large bodies of men being engaged in pushing them rapidly to
completion. Troops from Folley were being continually landed
on Morris Island; these advanced and took up position in line
of battle behind their breastworks. At 8:10 a. m. Battery
Wagner opened; five minutes afterward Battery Gregg joined.
At 10 a. m. four of the enemy's vessels were in action. At 11:30
Fort Sumter opened on the enemy's rifle pits on Morris Island.
The guns of Wagner about this time seemed to harass the enemy's
working parties extremely. At 12:10 the frigate "Ironsides" and
one monitor moved up abreast of Wagner, and at 12:30 were
joined by two other monitors, when they opened fire on the work.
At 1 p. m. the Ironsides, five monitors, a large wooden frigate, six
mortar boats (these last could get the range without exposing
themselves) and the land batteries mounting five guns, concentrated
their fire on Battery Wagner and continued it till dark.
The enemy's fire throughout the day was very rapid, averaging
fourteen shots per minute, and unparelleled until this epoch
of the siege in the weight of the projectiles thrown. Brigadier-General
Taliaferro, commanding at Battery Wagner, estimated
that there were nine thousand shot and shell thrown in and
against the battery in the eleven and a half hours that the
bombardment lasted. During that time our casualties in the
work were four killed and eleven wounded. During the day the
garrison replied slowly to the terrific fire to which it was exposed,
whilst Fort Sumter and Battery Gregg fired rapidly. Circumstances

indicating an attack at dark, Brigadier-General Hagood
was relieved from the command of James Island, and, with
Colonel Harrison's Thirty-second Georgia Regiment, was ordered
to the re-enforcement of Morris Island. During the passage of
these troops the assault was made and repulsed; but they arrived
in time to dislodge a portion of the enemy who had gained a footing
in the southeastern salient of Battery Wagner.

The garrison of Battery Wagner consisted of the Charleston
Battalion, the Fifty-first North Carolina and the Thirty-first
North Carolina, two companies of the Sixty-third Georgia Heavy
Artillery and two companies of the First South Carolina
Infantry, acting as heavy artillery. During the bombardment
the garrison were kept under the shelter of the bomb-proofs,
with the exception of the Charleston Battalion, which was stationed
along the parapet of the work, a position which they
gallantly maintained throughout the day, exposed to a free
d'enfre. At a quarter past 8 p. m. the assaulting lines of the
enemy were seen advancing from their works, and the bombardment
from the fleet and land batteries subsided. The garrison
were quickly called to their allotted positions and with the exception
of one regiment responded manfully to the summons? The
Charleston Battalion guarded the right of the work and the
Fifty-first North Carolina the center. These two regiments drove
back the enemy opposed to them with frightful slaughter, whilst
our guns discharging grape and cannister into their shattered
ranks completed their discomfiture. On the left of the work,
however, the Thirty-first North Carolina disgracefully abandoned
their position, and no resistance being offered at that point the
enemy succeeded in crossing the ditch and gaining a footing upon
the rampart. The main body of the enemy, after vainly endeavoring
to gain a position on the parapet, retreated in disorder
under a destructive fire from our guns, including those of Fort
Sumter. The ditch and slope of the southeastern salient was
then swept with a fire of grape and musketry to prevent the
enemy lodged there from retiring, and after a brief resistance
they surrendered.[37]

The assault was terribly destructive to the enemy; his loss in
killed and wounded and prisoners must have been three thousand,
as eight hundred bodies were buried in front of Battery Wagner
next day.

The enemy's forces on this occasion consisted of troops from
Connecticut, Pennsylvania, New Hampshire and the Fifty-fourth
Massachusetts (negro) regiments—the whole said to have been
under command of General Seymour, with Brigadier-General
Strong and Colonel Putnam commanding brigades. General
Seymour is said to have been wounded, and Brigadier-General
Strong and Colonel Putnam killed. General Taliaferro reported
that his troops, with the exception of the Thirty-first North Carolina,
behaved throughout with the utmost gallantry. The heroic
conduct of the Fifty-first North Carolina counterbalanced the
unworthy behavior of the Thirty-first and retrieved the honor of
the State. Our loss during the bombardment and assault was
174 killed and wounded.[38]

At 1 a. m. on the morning of the 19th, during the engagements,
I telegraphed General Ripley at Fort Sumter that Morris Island
must be held at all costs for the present, and re-enforcements must
be thrown there to push any advantage possible before daylight.
The 19th passed in comparative quiet. The enemy sent in a flag
of truce to arrange for the burial of the dead. Brigadier-General
Hagood reported that 600 of the enemy's dead in and around our
works were buried by our troops and at least 200 more were by the
enemy.[39]

The strengthening of the gorge wall of Sumter by cotton bales
and sand proceeded rapidly. On the 20th the enemy opened fire
from two new batteries. Throughout the day the fleet joined
in the bombardment and were answered by Sumter, Gregg and
Wagner. At 3 p. m. information was received that a 10-inch gun
at Battery Wagner was dismounted. I impressed upon General

Hagood, commanding the work, that I did not consider a 10-inch
columbiad essential to the defense of the position for which siege
guns, musketry, stout arms and hearts, and the strength of sand
parapets must be relied on.[40] Orders were, however, issued for the
remounting of the 10-inch gun if practicable.

The enemy's fleet this morning consisted of four monitors, the
Ironsides, and seventeen vessels inside the bar; fourteen vessels
outside; thirty vessels in Folley River; one gunboat and four
vessels in North Edisto, and one steam frigate, one sloop of war,
one gunboat and thirty-four transports at Hilton Head.

General Ripley was instructed to have the guns for Battery
Haskell mounted immediately, and to open fire with them as soon
as practicable. Brigadier-General Mercer was telegraphed to
send on, if practicable, another 10-inch columbiad from the
Savannah works. At 2 p. m. a shell struck Fort Sumter, and
some eight or ten 80 dr. Parrott shot were fired at the fort from
a distance of 3,500 yards. Five casualties in Wagner today and
one in Sumter.

On the 21st a flag of truce was sent in with a communication
from General Gilmore requesting an interview between General
Vogdes and the officer commanding Battery Wagner. The proposal
was agreed to and the flag of truce was met by an officer
from that work. While the conference was proceeding the fleet
opened a bombardment on Wagner. This gross violation of the
usages of war was responded to by General Hagood by an abrupt
termination of the interview. During the day the enemy's gunboats
and land batteries shelled Battery Wagner. The enemy
had apparently mounted eight new guns in their batteries.
Colonel Rhett reported that from the want of proper appliances
he had been unable to dismount the guns in Fort Sumter which
I had ordered to be removed. The bombardment continued
throughout the day of the 22nd, with an interval, when General
Vogdes, U. S. A., requested, under a flag of truce, another interview
with Brigadier-General Hagood. This was refused until
an apology should be made for the breach of truce the day
before. This having been given and deemed satisfactory, General
Vogdes verbally proposed an exchange of prisoners, mentioning
that they had but a few of ours, all except those recently captured

having been sent north; that as we had the excess "of
course we could select whom to exchange." He abstained from
any reference to negroes, whilst intimating that a mutual parole
of prisoners without regard to excess would be agreeable.[41]

The following instructions were given to Brigadier-General
Ripley: Not to open from the new James Island batteries until
their completion; then to carry on a vigorous fire on the enemy's
works, sorties to be made at night whenever practicable.[42]

In my telegram to you of this date, I mentioned the continued
re-enforcement of the enemy; that I had to guard these important
lines of approach, James, Morris and Sullivan's Islands, and
requested the balance of Colquitt's Brigade with more troops as
soon as practicable.

No gun was fired on either side during the 23rd. Our men
were engaged in repairing damages and the enemy in erecting
batteries and throwing up traverses to protect them from the
James Island batteries.

On the morning of the 24th a heavy bombardment was opened
on Battery Wagner from five monitors, two gunboats, two mortar
vessels, the Ironsides and land batteries, which continued till
9:30 a. m., when the steamer with prisoners on board proceeded
to the fleet and the exchange was effected as previously agreed
on. "Upon the arrival of the boat in the neighborhood of the
place appointed, the fire of the enemy, which for a portion of the
time had been very heavy, ceased. The 10-inch gun on the sea
face was dismounted and one of the magazines so much exposed
as to require the removal of the ammunition. General Taliaferro,
who had previously relieved General Hagood in command, anticipating
a renewal of the bombardment upon the completion of
the exchange of prisoners, as a matter of prudent precaution
requested that all necessary arrangements should be made for
the transfer of the troops from the island in case of necessity.
The enemy, however, did not renew his attack and the time thus
allowed was improved in repairing damages. . . . Instructions
were sent General Taliaferro not to abandon the works without

express orders to that effect."[43] Colonel Harris, chief engineer,
having inspected Battery Wagner, reported no material damage
to the work; the guns on the sea face unserviceable; those on the
land face in good order; the enemy's stockade within 700 yards of
the work. Brigadier-General Taliaferro came to the city to confer
with me personally regarding the condition of his garrison, the
officers having reported their men as much dispirited. After a
conference with him, I communicated my views as follows:

The position must be held if possible until the guns en route
from Richmond be received and put in position. No idea of
evacuation must be entertained if there is a chance at night to
repair the damages done in the day. Every night preparations
will be made to remove troops from Morris Island in case of
need. Battery Wagner must be held and fought to the last
extremity. The garrison might rest assured that every preparation
will be made for their withdrawal in case of necessity.[44]

My telegram to you of this date was: "The enemy shelled Battery
Wagner heavily this morning. Our loss one killed and seven
wounded. Am anxiously waiting for heavy guns promised from
Richmond. Hope to repair damages during the night."

On the 25th the enemy's fleet remained quiet on account of the
high seas, and his land battery fired but little. Fort Sumter,
Battery Gregg and the James Island batteries answered. A
30 dr. Parrott was again brought to bear on Fort Sumter from
the same battery as on the 20th. During the day several of my
new batteries were ready for their armament. The strengthening
of Fort Sumter proceeded day and night; and in anticipation of
the damaging effect which the enemy's rifled guns from stationary
batteries would produce on this work, a partial disarmament
was carried on nightly.

On Sunday, the 26th, the bombardment of the enemy slackened.
During the night shelling of the enemy's works was carried

on from Fort Sumter. Re-enforcements were seen throughout
the day debarking from Morris Island. I telegraphed on this
day: "Have nine positions for heavy guns ready. Not one
promised from Richmond has arrived. Cannot their transportation
be expedited?"

The weather on the 27th was too windy for the co-operation
of the fleet, which had been increased by the addition of another
monitor. During today the bombardment from the land batteries
slackened. Our defenses were pushed on vigorously, whilst
the strengthening of Fort Sumter and the withdrawal of guns
from that work proceeded. The enemy showed great activity in
advancing their works, though harassed by the fire of our batteries.

On the 28th, Battery Wagner had another very severe bombardment
from the enemy's land and naval batteries, but no
great damage was done. Two men were killed and five wounded.
My telegraphic dispatch on the evening of the 28th was: "Many
transports of the enemy are arriving with troops. At least 2,500
men are required at present for James Island. Cannot they be
ordered here immediately? Enemy's land and naval batteries are
now playing on Wagner, which she answers bravely, assisted by
Gregg and Sumter."

On the 29th, Battery Wagner was heavily bombarded throughout
the day. In a telegram to you of this date notified the
arrival from Richmond of some of the promised guns: "Have
received four 10-inch columbiads and four 10-inch mortars.
Regret to say that by order of the Secretary of the Navy two
Brooke guns have been taken from me to be shut up in a new
gunboat so pierced as only to give a range of a mile and a half
at most."

Throughout the 30th Batteries Wagner and Gregg were subjected
to a furious fire from both land batteries and fleet. As an
example of the rapidity of the enemy's fire, I may mention that
between the hours of 10:30 a. m. and 1 p. m. five hundred and
ninety-nine shots were fired at our different batteries—principally
Gregg and Wagner. During the same time one hundred and ten
shots were fired from our works. Our loss was two killed and
seven wounded in Battery Wagner—no damage of any consequence
to the works. Brigadier-General Ripley was instructed

to transport as early as possible one of the 10-inch columbiads
recently arrived from Richmond to Battery Wagner, which was
accomplished on the night of the 30th.

The enemy fired heavily on Wagner throughout the 31st. Our
loss was seven wounded. Our new works progressed very satisfactorily,
and the strengthening of Sumter and the removal of its
guns went on rapidly.

The enemy's fire on the 1st of August was slack and did but
little execution, save to the front traverse of the 8-inch shell
gun at Wagner, which did not, however, disable it. The casualties
today were only two wounded. The enemy was industriously
engaged in throwing up new batteries and advancing
his trenches. Every endeavor was made by firing from Sumter,
Gregg, Wagner and the James Island batteries to annoy and
delay his approaches.

Throughout the morning of the 2nd August the enemy did not
answer our fire, but about 2 o'clock they opened vigorously on
Wagner. The damage, however, done to the work was comparatively
small. In my telegram of that date I mentioned that
"Transports going south from Stono, filled with troops, are
reported, probably intended to operate against Savannah. Cannot
some of my troops sent to General Johnston be ordered back
for the defense of that city?"

Orders were given to the chief quartermaster to have trains in
waiting sufficient to transport two regiments of infantry to
Savannah. The difficulties attending the defense of Charleston
were greatly increased by the celerity with which the enemy could
remove his operations from one point to another and from the
paucity of troops in my command. Savannah and the coast line
were nearly denuded. All these places had to be guarded.

Instructions were given for increasing the armament of Fort
Johnson by two 6-40 Brooke guns, turned over by the Navy
Department, and to place floating torpedoes in certain localities.
Brigadier-General Mercer was instructed to forward a detachment
of artillerists to relieve that from the Sixty-third Georgia
which had become reduced by casualties and sickness. The
ordnance department in Richmond was applied to for Coehorn
mortars.

The fire of the enemy on the 3rd was not heavy, but his sharpshooting

annoyed the garrison of Wagner considerably. No
casualties. Brigadier-General Mercer, at Savannah, was informed
that transports were moving south from here with troops and
that two regiments were held in readiness to move at a moment's
notice. I was informed that Evans's Brigade was ordered
to Savannah from Mississippi. In a personal visit paid to
Morris Island that evening I found Battery Wagner in a very
serviceable condition. The work was more solidly constructed
than when the attack commenced; the garrison appeared to be in
fine spirits and ready to defend the work to the last. At Fort
Sumter the filling of the officers' quarters and the casemates was
rapidly approaching completion. An exterior sand-bag revetment
was ordered for the gorge wall, as well as a series of traverses
in barbette on the east, south and northeast faces, and
many changes and removals in the armament.

During the 4th August but little firing occurred upon either
side. Orders were given to rearrange certain guns on the batteries
of James Island. Major Trezvant, commanding Charleston
Arsenal, was requested to collect all of the old iron in the
burnt district to cast into projectiles. Orders were given to
General Ripley to arrange with Captain Tucker of the navy an
attempt to capture the enemy's picket in the marsh battery near
Vincent's Creek.

On the 5th, the guns in Battery Wagner were all in fighting
order. Our sharpshooters, armed with Whitworth rifles, seemed
to annoy the enemy greatly, who endeavored to silence their fire
with Coehorn mortars. About 9 o'clock that night a picket of
the enemy, which had taken possession of our unfinished battery
on Vincent's Creek and, by signalling the arrival of our steamers
at Cummings Point, interfered materially with our operations,
was attacked by a party from the Twenty-fifth South Carolina.[45]
The result was satisfactory. One captain and ten enlisted men
were captured. Our loss one man killed. Our defensive works
at Fort Sumter and elsewhere proceeded satisfactorily. The telegram
of this day was: "Enemy still being largely re-enforced
from the northward. Cannot General Colquitt's other regiments
be ordered here at once? Other troops are absolutely needed."

Throughout the 6th the enemy fired occasional shots from his

land batteries and fleet, without material result. One casualty
occurred. Our batteries fired at intervals throughout the day.
Brigadier-General Cobb was ordered by telegraph to send 500
infantry and one light battery to report to Brigadier-General
Mercer at Savannah. The enemy on Morris Island worked laboriously
on his trenches, whilst strong re-enforcements of troops
were daily seen arriving.

On the 7th, I received a telegram from you, informing me that
the balance of Colquitt's Brigade was ordered to Charleston.
There was little firing throughout the day and two casualties
occurred on Morris Island.

On the 8th, Brigadier-General Evans reported his arrival at
Savannah. A large increase was visible in the enemy's fleet in
the Stono. During the day the firing from our batteries was
carried on at intervals, but the enemy remained quiet until
evening, when they opened on Battery Wagner and continued the
fire throughout the night. Instructions were issued to the chief
engineer to expedite the putting up in Fort Sumter of the sandbag
"chemise" to the gorge wall, the interior traverses and
merlons, and to erect a covered way from Gregg to Battery
Wagner.

The firing of the enemy during the morning of the 9th was
heavy and rapid from his land batteries. The officer in command
of the advanced pickets reported that the enemy worked industriously
in his trenches till 2 a. m. The fire of our sharpshooters
evidently annoyed the enemy much, as he occasionally fired with
great spirit but ineffectually to dislodge them.[46] The effective
force on Morris Island was 663 infantry, 248 artillery and 11
cavalry—total 922. During the day I received the following
telegram from Brigadier-General M. Jenkins, dated Petersburg,
Va.: "My scouts report shipment of troops, both infantry and
cavalry, from Norfolk, supposed to be for Charleston; large
quantities of forage shipped. Cavalry left 6th inst."

The chief engineer was instructed to lay out and erect a line
of works on James Island, from Secessionville to Dills's house
on the Stono, in lieu of the present defensive lines; to consist of
lunettes with closed gorges; disposed at one-half to three-quarters
of a mile apart and connected by cumulative infantry lines.

Captain Tucker, Confederate States Navy, was informed of the
practice of the enemy of putting out boat pickets at night to
observe the movement of our transportation to Morris Island;
and it was suggested to him that steps should be taken by the
navy to break up these pickets. Upon the approach of our
steamers signals would be exchanged between the enemy's boats
and their land batteries, and immediately a heavy fire upon Cummings'
Point rendered our communication extremely dangerous
and difficult. At times also the enemy illuminated the landing
with a powerful light, so as to prevent the approach of steamers
and forcing us to transport our supplies of men and munitions
in small boats.

During the 10th the enemy remained comparatively quiet until
about 8 p. m., when he opened briskly on Wagner. On our
side fire was kept up from Battery Simkins (Shell Point) with
columbiads from 11 a. m. to 11 p. m., when mortar firing was
resumed and continued until morning. The enemy was busy
during the night and his advanced works were now about 600
yards from Wagner, though no guns were yet in that position.
My telegram to you of this date was: "Nothing of importance
has occurred since yesterday. Evans's Brigade is arriving in
Savannah and Colquitt's Regiment arriving here."

About 7 o'clock, on the morning of the 11th, the fleet and land
batteries opened heavily on Wagner and were replied to by
Sumter, Gregg and Simkins.[47] One casualty occurred during the
day, the enemy as well as ourselves working persistently in spite
of the heat which was excessive. Our garrison of Morris Island
consisted of 1,245 of all arms.

At 5:45 a. m. on the 12th, the enemy opened on Fort Sumter
with an 8-inch Parrott gun, firing from a battery to the north
and west of Craig's Hill on Morris Island, the distance estimated
to be at least 4,400 yards. Eleven shots in all were fired at the

fort. Four missed, three struck outside, and four struck within
the fort. Again, at 5:30 p. m., the enemy opened from the same
battery on Fort Sumter, firing at intervals of ten minutes till
dark. Eleven 8-inch rifled shot struck the fort. Heavy firing
was carried on throughout the day against Battery Wagner.
Fort Sumter and Battery Gregg as well as Simkins directed their
fire throughout the day against the enemy's working parties on
the left of his approach and dispersed them, stopping the work
they were engaged on. At dark, Battery Wagner opened with
eight guns on the enemy's advanced trenches, and in conjunction
with Sumter and Simkins prevented any progress on the part
of the enemy.[48] His batteries in rear replied to the fire of Wagner
and interrupted our communications with Cumming's Point.

On the 13th, the enemy endeavored several times to repair the
damage done to his advanced works, but well directed shots from
Wagner as often drove him back. The batteries in rear of the
fleet then opened on Wagner and Gregg, and were answered by
Sumter and Simkins.

At 5:30 a. m., the enemy opened with 8-inch Parrotts from the
same battery as the day before, firing two or three hours only.
At 11 a. m., three or four wooden gunboats approached within
4,000 and 5,000 yards of Sumter and opened slow fire. They were
armed with heavy rifled guns. Some fifteen shots were fired at this
great range; three only struck the fort; one shot passed over at
great elevation and dropped a mile to the westward. At 5 p. m.,
the enemy opened again on the fort with the 8-inch Parrotts; no
great damage was done, the farthest penetration into the brickwork
was four feet.

On the 14th, the land batteries opened on Sumter, firing three
shots; two struck. About 11 a. m. the wooden gunboats shelled
the fort at long range; and at 5:15 p. m. the land batteries again
opened on the fort. Throughout the day the enemy remained
quiet, firing occasionally, and were replied to by our batteries. The
sharpshooters on both sides kept up an incessant fire. During
the night the fire of Battery Wagner put a stop to the operations
on its front. The strengthening of Fort Sumter advanced rapidly

[ILLUSTRATION]

SKETCH OF BATTERY WAGNER, 1863.—J. H.

1. Fieldpiece. 2. 10″ Mortar. 3 and 4. Carronades. 5. 32 dr. 6. 8″ Navy.
7. 32 dr. 8. 8″ Navy. 9. 32 dr. 10. 8″ Howitzer. 12. 32 dr. Rifled.
13. 10″ Columbiad. 14. 8″ Gun. 15 and 16. 12 dr. Field Howitzers.

both day and night. Brigadier-General Ripley was instructed
as to the armament of a certain position of the new lines on James
Island and of a new battery thrown up near Fort Johnson.

During the greater part of the 15th the enemy, both on land
and sea, were unusually quiet, only occasionally firing at Battery
Wagner. Later in the day they opened with some vigor on
Battery Gregg. The enemy's fleet consisted this morning of the
Ironsides, six monitors, eight gunboats, three mortar vessels, with
thirteen other vessels inside and seven outside the bar. At Hilton
Head, fifty-two vessels, including gunboats and ironclads. My
telegram of this date was: "No change worth recording since
yesterday. . . . Sand bag revetment of gorge wall of Sumter and
traverses inside of fort progressing as rapidly as means of transportation
will admit."

On the 16th, the enemy's batteries fired but little on Gregg and
Wagner, but during the afternoon the two 8-inch Parrots opened
on Sumter, throwing forty-eight shell. Four passed over, four
fell short, two struck inside the parade and thirty-two hit in
various places, exterior and interior. At this date, the armament
of the fort consisted of thirty-eight guns and two mortars; at
least twenty guns having been withdrawn since the landing of the
enemy on Morris Island. Orders were given to Brigadier-General
Ripley to remove to Battery Gregg the two mortars in Sumter as
soon as it should become impossible to use them to advantage in
the latter work, and to transport to other points every gun in
Sumter not actually required for its defence and the new relations
of that work to the defence of the harbor. The chief engineer
was instructed to strengthen Castle Pinckney with sand bags;
Fort Johnson to be arranged for two additional 10-inch guns;
and positions to be arranged for three 10-inch guns to be placed
on the James Island shore of the harbor.

Battery Wagner was bombarded heavily by the enemy about
daylight on the 17th, their guns were then turned on Sumter and
a heavy cannonade was directed against that work. About 9
o'clock the Ironsides and six monitors joined in the action.
During the engagements Captain Rodgers, commanding the
Weehawken, was killed in the pilot house of his ship. In the
twenty-four hours 948 shot were fired against Fort Sumter; 448

struck outside, 233 inside, and 270 passed over. The casualties
in the fort amounted to fourteen.

On the 18th, 19th, 20th, 21st, 22nd, 23rd of August the fierce
bombardment of Fort Sumter by the enemy continued both from
his land and naval batteries. From the 17th to the 23rd inclusive
he fired against the fort a total of 5,643 shot, of which 2,643
struck inside, 1,699 outside and 1,301 missed. These projectiles
were fired from 30 dr. and 300 dr. Parrotts and from 15-inch
smooth bore guns. An average of 150 pounds per shot would
give a weight of nearly 385 tons discharged against the walls
of Fort Sumter during this period of seven days. At the end of
this time nearly all the guns remaining in the fort were unserviceable
and the damage to the gorge wall and the northwest face
by the severe fire great; but the sand that had been placed upon
the outside of the gorge wall, in conjunction with the filling up
of the barracks and casemates with cotton bales, and above all
the crumbling under the enemy's fire of the masonry converted
this portion of Fort Sumter into a mass of debris and rubbish
on which the enemy's powerful artillery could make but little
impression. Throughout the siege the unremitting exertions of
the engineer corps hourly increased the defensive power of the
work.

The following extract from the journal of the engineer officer
at Fort Sumter for August 23rd will show the condition of the
work at that date: ". . . The northwest front has now five
arches with ramparts fallen in; northeast barbette battery
unserviceable; east front scarp much scaled by slant fire, with
large craters under traverses; principal injury at level of arches
and terreplein; two-thirds of southern wall east of magazine
damaged; stone abutment unhurt and protected by rubbish; gorge
not damaged since yesterday. Another shot has penetrated above
sand filling of second-story rooms, making three since the attack
began. East barbette parapets much loosened and undermined,
though not displaced. One 10-inch and one 11-inch gun
untouched. Brooke gun carriage shattered, but can easily be
remounted on 10-inch columbiad carriage."

During the seven days that the enemy so vigorously bombarded
Sumter his approaches to Wagner were slowly pushed
forward under the fire of our guns and sharpshooters. On the

21st he made an unsuccessful attack on our rifle pits directly in
front of that battery. The same day General Gilmore sent a
demand, under flag of truce, for the surrender of Fort Sumter
and Morris Island, with the threat that in the case of non-compliance
he would open fire on the city; four hours were allowed
for a reply. This communication was received at the headquarters
of the department at 10:45 p. m.; the enemy carried his
threat into execution by throwing several shells into the city on
the morning of the 23rd, at about 1:30 a. m.

On the 24th, the fire against Fort Sumter lessened considerably;
not more than 150 shot were thrown against it in the course of
the day.

Every endeavor was made to retard the approach of the enemy
to Battery Wagner. His working parties were fired upon by
the guns of the battery during the night, but during the day
this had to be discontinued and the embrasures closed to prevent
our guns from being dismounted. Until 3 o'clock of the 25th,
enemy's fire was principally directed against Sumter. After that
time Wagner was fiercely bombarded, as well as the space
between that work and the rifle pits. At dark the enemy endeavored
to carry these pits but were repulsed. Our loss was five
killed and nineteen wounded.

A very large amount of ammunition and ordnance stores were
removed from Fort Sumter during the night.

On the 26th, 630 shot were fired at Sumter; Wagner and Gregg
received the bulk of the fire. At 5 o'clock in the evening the
enemy concentrated his fire on the rifle pits in front of Wagner.
Between 7 and 8 p. m. the rifle pits were carried by an overwhelming
force and seventy-six out of the eighty-nine men of the
Sixty-first North Carolina, who formed the picket, were captured.[49]

The firing on the 27th against Sumter was limited to four
shots. In front of Wagner the enemy had advanced his trenches
to within 300 yards of the work, whilst the number of his guns
and the accuracy of his fire prevented the opening of its
embrasures except during the night. The Honorable Secretary
of War informed me by telegraph, in answer to a request that I
made for the services of some of the sailors stationed in Savannah,

that the Secretary of the Navy declined sending sailors from
Savannah and urged a detail of men. I replied by letter setting
forth the fact that the army was depleted already by details for
the navy, and that no more can be spared. The importance of
keeping our water transportation to Morris Island in an efficient
condition was represented, and that without an additional force
of boatmen it could not be preserved. Further, that our ironclads
at Savannah were safely sheltered behind obstructions, and
were a portion of their crews sent to Charleston they could be
returned in case of an emergency there.

On the 28th, the enemy were extremely quiet, firing only six
shots at Sumter; but his approach as to Wagner advanced
rapidly notwithstanding the fire from Gregg, the James Island
batteries and the sharpshooters in Wagner. The enemy did not
fire at Sumter during the 29th, but worked industriously upon
his approaches to Wagner. His advanced works were shelled
throughout the day by Wagner, Moultrie and the James Island
batteries. During the night the enemy's guns were silent in front
of Wagner, but they renewed the bombardment of Sumter before
daylight.

During the day of the 30th they threw 634 shot against Sumter.
The enemy was also busy completing his advanced works,
though greatly disturbed by the fire from Wagner and the James
Island batteries, which compelled them to desist from the work
of advancing a sap to the left of Battery Wagner. In the evening
the enemy opened a brisk fire on Wagner, both with monitors and
Parrott guns. No serious damage was done the work, but several
casualties occurred. During the night Wagner kept up a steady
and effective fire on the enemy's advanced works.

Early on the morning of the 31st, as the steamer Sumter was
returning from Morris Island with troops on board, she was
unfortunately fired into from the Sullivan's Island batteries and
sunk. Four men were killed or drowned, and the greater portion
of the arms lost. Between 11 and 12 m. one of the monitors
approached Fort Moultrie, and when within range was opened
upon by that work. The enemy replied with schrapnell, all of
which fell short; and after about an hour's engagement the monitor
withdrew. About 2 p. m. the enemy again approached with
four monitors and engaged the fort for four hours. A steady

fire was kept up on them from Fort Moultrie and other Sullivan's
fire was kept up on them from Fort Moultrie and other Sullivan
Island batteries. During the engagement the enemy fired sixty
shot, striking Moultrie fifteen times but doing no damage. The
fort fired 132 shot. The enemy's fire on Sumter was slack
throughout the day.

Captain Leroy Hammond, Twenty-fifth South Carolina Volunteers,
reported today that in obedience to instructions he had
made a reconnoisance of Light House Inlet on the south side of
Black Island. On the island he saw pickets and bivouac fires, but
discovered no entrenchments. During the night the enemy succeeded
in advancing their sap a short distance towards Wagner,
notwithstanding the heavy fire that was kept up on them from
that work.

At daylight, the 1st September, the enemy opened on Wagner
with mortars and continued at intervals during the entire day.
The two 32 dr. howitzers in the salient of the work were disabled.
From early morning their land batteries kept up a heavy fire on
Fort Sumter, firing throughout the day 382 shot; 166 struck
outside, 95 inside and 121 missed. This fire was very destructive,
disabling the remaining guns en barbette and damaging the fort
considerably. An extract from the report of the engineer in
charge gives the following account of its condition: ". . .
Towards noon the effect of the fire was to carry away at one fall
four rampart arches on the northeast front with terreplein platform
and guns, thus leaving on this front only one arch and a
half which are adjacent to the east spiral stair. Some of the
lower casemate piers of the same front have been seriously
damaged, rendering unsafe the service of two guns hitherto
available in that quarter. On the exterior, the chief injury done
is to be noticed on the southeast pan coupiè and two next upper
casemates on east front. From these localities the scarp has
fallen away completely and left the arches exposed, as well as
the sand filling half down to the floor of second tier."

At 11:40 a. m., on the 2nd September, six monitors opened on
Sumter at distances of 800 to 1,000 yards. They were joined at
1 p. m. by the Ironsides, and together fired 185 shot, of which
116 struck outside, 35 inside and 34 passed over. The projectiles
used were 8-inch Parrott rifle shell and 11- and 15-inch smoothbore

shot and shell. Fort Sumter was unable to answer, not
having a gun in working order, but a heavy fire was kept up
on the fleet by Fort Moultrie with good effect, two of the monitors
being apparently injured and requiring assistance when they
retired. The effect of this fire on Sumter is thus described by
the engineer officer in charge: ". . . The chief external injury
has been done on the east scarp, which now has lost its integrity
and hangs upon the arches apparently in blocks and detached
masses."

The remainder of the day was passed in comparative quiet.
The fleet was occupied in placing sand bags on the decks of the
monitors. The enemy's land batteries fired but 148 shot, of which
38 were directed against Sumter. In the same period our batteries
fired 66 times. During the night the enemy was engaged
in front of Wagner in strengthening his advanced position,
which was then within 80 to 100 yards of the salient. Owing to
the difficulty of transporting ammunition to Wagner the fire of
that work was slack.

Early on the morning of the 3rd, the enemy opened on Wagner
with mortars and continued it throughout the day. Fort Sumter
was not fired at. In that work all hands were busy in repairing
damages. During the past night, as usual, large quantities of
ordnance stores and several guns were removed. The condition
of the fort of this date was as follows: The northeast and northwest
terrepleins had fallen in, and the western wall had a crack
entirely through from parapet to beam. The greater portion of
the southern wall was down, the upper east magazine penetrated,
and lower east magazine wall cracked. The eastern wall itself
nearly shot away and large portions down, ramparts gone, and
nearly every casemate breached. The casemates on the eastern
face were still filled with sand and gave some protection to the
garrison from shell. Not a single gun remained en barbette, and
but a single casemate gun that could be fired—a 32 dr. smoothbore
on the west face.

During the night of the 3rd, Wagner fired steadily and the
James Island batteries occasionally. Throughout the 4th the
enemy confined themselves to shelling Wagner and were answered
by the James Island guns. During the night of the 4th their
approach was pushed close to Wagner.

At 12 m., on the 5th, the Federal flag was abreast of the south
angle of the work. Throughout the day a very heavy fire was
concentrated on Wagner from the Ironsides, monitors and land
batteries, which severely injured the work; our casualties were
also greatly increased, some forty occurring during the day.
Large bodies of troops were transferred from Folley to Morris
Island, and other indications pointed to an early assault. There
is good reason to believe that the enemy's plan was to carry Battery
Gregg by a boat attack on the night of the 5th, or early on
the morning of the 6th; that the fleet should prevent the landing
of re-enforcements at Cummings Point; that Wagner should be
heavily shelled by ironclads, and on the morning of the 6th, on a
given signal, Battery Wagner should be assailed.

This plan was frustrated, however, by the repulse of the attacking
party on Battery Gregg. About 1:30 a. m., on the 6th, they
were seen approaching in from fifteen to twenty barges from the
passages leading from Vincent and Schooner Creeks that lie
between James and Morris Islands. The garrison of Gregg[50]
was on the alert and received them with a brisk fire of grape
and musketry. The enemy was evidently disconcerted and, after
discharging their boat howitzers, retired.

On the 4th September, I had convened a meeting of general
officers and the chief engineer of the department to assist me in
determining how much longer the Confederate forces should
attempt to hold Morris Island. The rapid advance of the
enemy's trenches to Battery Wagner having made it evident that
before many days that work must become untenable, the following
questions were propounded to the council:

"1. How long do you think Battery Wagner can be held without
regard to the safety of the garrison?

"2. How long can it be held with a fair prospect of saving its
garrison with the means of transportation at our command and
circumstances relative thereto as heretofore indicated by actual
experience?

"3. How long, after the loss or evacuation of Wagner, could
Battery Gregg be held?

"4. Can the heavy guns (two in Wagner and three in Gregg)

in those works be removed before the evacuation without endangering
the safety of the works and their garrisons?

"5. Can we take the offensive suddenly with a fair prospect of
success by throwing during the night 3,000 men on the north end
of Morris Island, making in all 4,000 available men, bearing
in mind that no re-enforcements could be sent them until night,
and probably for several nights, according to the movements of
the enemy's ironclads and the fire of his land batteries?"

These questions were thoroughly discussed, as well as the probable
plan of attack by the enemy, our means of defense, transportation,
and reasons for prolonging our possession of the
north end of Morris Island. It was agreed that the holding of
Morris Island as long as possible was most important to the
safety and free use of Charleston harbor; and our ability to keep
up easy communication with the works on Sullivan and James
Islands, in view of which I deemed it proper to renew application
to the secretaries of war and of the navy, by telegraph, for some
200 sailors for oarsmen.

It was further decided that the five heavy guns at Morris
Island were necessary morally and physically for the defense, to
the last extremity, of the position; and such being the difficulty,
if not indeed the insurmountable obstacles to their removal at
this time, that no effort should be made to save them, and consequently
that they should be ultimately destroyed with as much of
the works as possible when further defense was abandoned.

The result was my determination to hold Morris Island as long
as communication with it could be maintained at night by means
of rowboats, but for which purpose sailors or men able to handle
oars with efficiency were essential.

On the 5th inst., Brigadier-General Ripley prepared by my
order a confidential letter to the officer commanding Battery
Wagner, pointing out that it might be necessary to evacuate Morris
Island, and giving full instructions for destroying the magazines
and rendering the guns useless in that event.

Early on the morning of the 6th, a dispatch was received from
Colonel L. M. Keitt, commanding Battery Wagner, to the following
effect: ". . . The parapet of the salient is badly breached;
the whole fort is much weakened. A repetition of today's fire
(alluding to the 5th inst.) will make the work almost a ruin.

The mortar fire is still very heavy and fatal and no important
work can be done. Is it deemed advisable to sacrifice the garrison?
To continue to hold it is to do so. Captain Lee, the
engineer, has read this and agrees." The casualties in Wagner on
the 5th were 100 out of 900.

Another dispatch, dated 8:45 a. m., was received from Colonel
Keitt: "Incessant fire from Yankee mortars and Parrott battery;
can't work negroes, better look after them promptly. Had thirty
or forty soldiers wounded in an attempt to work. Will do all I
can, but fear the garrison will be destroyed without injuring the
enemy. The fleet is opening, but I hope that we may hold till
night." Again, at 10:30 a. m., Colonel Keitt signalled, "Boats must
be at Cummings Point without fail." During the day a letter was
received from the same officer as follows: ". . . The enemy will
tonight advance their parallel to the moat of this battery. The
garrison must be taken away immediately after dark, or it will
be destroyed or captured. It is idle to deny that the heavy Parrott
guns have breached the walls and are knocking away the
bomb-proofs. Pray have boats at Cummings Point immediately
after dark to take away the men. I say deliberately that this
must be done or the garrison must be sacrificed. I am sending
the wounded and sick to Cummings Point now, and will, if possible,
continue to do so until all are gone. I have a number of
them now here. I have not in the garrison 400 effective men,
excluding artillery. The engineers agree with me in opinion,
or rather shape my opinion. . . ."

Colonel Keitt's last dispatch was as follows: "The enemy's
sap has reached the moat and his bombardment has shattered
large parts of the parapet. The retention of this post after
tonight involves the loss of the garrison. If the necessities of
the service require their sacrifice, the men will cheerfully make
it, and I will cheerfully lead them. I prefer to assail the enemy
to awaiting his assault, and I will at 4 o'clock in the morning
assail his works."

Things being in this condition, it became evident that an
attempt to longer retain possession of Batteries Gregg and Wagner
must of necessity involve the loss of the garrisons. But
before giving the final order for the evacuation, I directed
Colonel D. B. Harris, my chief engineer, to proceed to Morris

Island and to examine into and report upon the condition of
affairs. His opinion was as follows:

". . . I visited our works on Morris Island today, and in
consideration of their condition, of our inability to repair damages
to Wagner as heretofore, of the dispirited state of the
garrison, and of the progress of the enemy's sap, am constrained
to recommend an immediate evacuation of both Batteries Gregg
and Wagner. . . . In consequence of the accuracy of the fire
from the enemy's land batteries which are now in close proximity
(say from 500 to 800 yards) to Wagner, aided by reverse
fire from his fleet, it is impossible, in the opinion of the officer
commanding the fort, to keep up a fire either of artillery or small
arms, and the enemy are thus left free to work in the trenches
which he is rapidly pushing forward. The head of the sap is
within forty yards of the salient, which is so badly damaged by
a Parrott battery kept constantly playing upon it as to render it
untenable. . . ."

Under these circumstances, I concluded the period had arrived
when it would be judicious to evacuate Morris Island, and in the
following special order detailed the manner in which I desired
the movement to be accomplished:

"Battery Wagner, Morris Island, being no longer tenable, without
undue loss of life and the risk of final capture of the entire
garrison, that position and Battery Gregg will be evacuated as
soon as practicable, to which end the following arrangements
will be made by the district commander:

"I. Two of the Confederate States ironclads should take up
position near Fort Sumter with their guns bearing on Cummings
Point and to the eastward of it. At the same time, all our land
batteries will be held prepared to sweep the water face of Battery
Gregg. Transport steamers will take position within the harbor,
but as near to Cummings Point as practicable, to receive the men
from the row boats by which the embarkation of the men from
Morris Island will be effected. As many row boats as are necessary,
or which can be provided with efficient oarsmen, will be kept
in readiness at once to proceed to and reach Cummings Point or
that vicinity as soon after dark as may be prudent. Having
reached Morris Island a courier or relay of footmen will be dispatched
by the naval officer in charge with notice of the fact to

the officer in command of Battery Wagner, and of the exact
transport capacity of the boats. A naval officer with proper
assistants will have exclusive charge of the boats and their movements.

"II. The commanding officer of Wagner having made during
the day all arrangements for the evacuation and destruction of
the work and armament, will, when informed of the arrival of
the boats, direct first the removal and embarkation of all wounded
men, and thereafter, according to the capacity of the boats at
hand, will withdraw his command by companies with soldierly
silence and deliberation. Two companies will remain in any
event to preserve a show of occupation and repair and to defend
from assault during the embarkation; and it is strictly enjoined
that no more men shall quit the work and go to the landing than
can be safely embarked. The embarkation will be superintended
by the field officers or regimental or battalion commanders, who
will halt and keep their commands about 100 yards from the
boats, divide them into suitable squads for assignment to the boats
in exact conformity with the directions of the naval officer in
charge of the embarkation; and then superintend the disposition
of the men accordingly, impressing upon all the vital necessity of
silence, obedience to orders and coolness.

"III. The companies left to occupy Wagner will be under
charge of a firm and intelligent field officer, who will not withdraw
his command until assured that there is sufficient transportation
for all the remaining garrisons of the island, including
that of Battery Gregg.

"IV. The final evacuation will depend for success on the utmost
coolness and quiet on the part of every man. At least two officers
previously selected will be left to light the fuses already arranged
and timed to about fifteen minutes to blow up the magazine and
bomb-proof, and to destroy the armament in the manner already
indicated in special instructions from district headquarters. But
the fuses must not be lighted until it is certain there is sufficient
transportation for the removal of all the garrison, or except the
enemy become aware of the evacuation and are evidently about to
storm and enter the work. The men must be embarked with arms
loaded ready to repel an attack from the boat parties of the
enemy.

"V. The garrison of Battery Gregg will stand staunchly to
their posts until the last company from Wagner shall be
embarked. It will then take the boats in silence and with deliberation,
provision having been made as at Wagner for the
destruction of the work and its ordnance. Both explosions will
be as nearly simultaneous as possible; and the complete success
of the evacuation will probably be in the hands of those whose
high duty it will be to apply the match to the fuses at Wagner.
The garrison of Gregg will be embarked with the same precautions
and regulations as prescribed for that of Wagner. In case
the enemy should carry Wagner immediately after the garrison
shall have evacuated it, or in any way the explosion of the magazine
should be prevented, a signal of three (3) rockets in rapid
succession shall be made from Battery Gregg, when the naval
vessels in position and our land batteries bearing on Wagner will
be opened with a steady fire on the site of that work, as will be
done likewise immediately after an explosion shall have taken
place, and this fire shall be maintained slowly during the night.

"VI. Brigadier-General Ripley will give such additional
orders as will be calculated to secure the successful evacuation of
Morris Island, or to meet emergencies. He will confer with Flag
Officer Tucker and procure all necessary assistance. The operation
is one of the most delicate that can be attempted in war.
Coolness, resolute courage, judgment and inflexibility on the part
of officers—obedience to orders and a constant sense of the
necessity for silence on the part of the men, are essential for
complete success, and the credit which must attach to those who
achieve it."

The evacuation began at 9 p. m. on the night of the 6th September.
According to instructions a guard of 35 men, under Captain
T. A. Hugenin, had been left to bring up the extreme rear and
to fire the only magazine which contained powder. The necessary
arrangements having been completed, and Colonel Keitt having
been informed that the transportation was ready, the embarkation
commenced and was continued with the utmost quietness and
dispatch. The wounded were first embarked and were followed
by the remnants of the infantry garrison. Captain Kanapaux,
commanding light artillery, was then ordered to spike his guns
and embark his command. Captain Lesesne, commanding Gregg,

spiked the guns of that battery and followed with his command;
and the rear guard from Wagner, coming up at that time in pursuance
of orders from Colonel Keitt, the fuses communicating
with the magazines were lighted, that at Wagner by Captain
Hugenin, and that at Gregg by Major Holcombe, commissary of
subsistence, and the remainder of the command was safely and
expeditiously embarked. Owing to defects in the fuses themselves,
they failed to accomplish the purpose designed, though
their lighting was superintended by careful and reliable officers.
The magazines were, therefore, not destroyed. The guns in the
batteries were spiked as far as their condition allowed, and the
implements and equipments generally destroyed or carried off.
The evacuation was concluded about 1:30 a. m., on the 7th September.
The boats containing the portion of the garrison last
embarked were fired upon by the enemy's barges, but without
effect. Two of our boats containing crews of 19 sailors and 27
soldiers were captured by the enemy's armed barges between
Cummings Point and Sumter.

Thus Morris Island was abandoned to the enemy on the 7th
September with but little loss on the part of the garrison, either
in men or material. The total loss in killed and wounded on Morris
Island, from July 10th to September 7th, was only 641 men;
and deducting the casualties due to the landing on the 10th July
and to the assaults of the 11th and 18th July, the killed and
wounded by the terrible bombardment, which lasted almost uninterruptedly
night and day during fifty-eight days, amounted only
to 296 men, many of whom were only slightly wounded. It is
still more remarkable that during the same time when the enemy
fired 6,202 shot at Sumter, varying in weight from 30 to 300
pounds, only three men were killed and forty-nine wounded in
that work.

It is difficult to arrive at the loss of the enemy during these
operations, but judging from the slaughter made in their ranks
on the 11th and 18th July, it will be within the mark to say that
his casualties were in the ratio of ten for our one.

It may be well to remark that the capture of Morris Island
resulted in but a barren victory to the enemy, if his only object
was to gain a position from which to hurl his missiles and Greek
fire into the City of Charleston. A reference to the map will

show that the possession of Cummings Point placed him no
nearer the city than he was when he held part of James Island,
from whence he was driven by the Battle of Secessionville in
June, 1862, and again in July, 1863, when he was driven from
the same island on the 16th of the same month.[51]

In conclusion, I cannot express in too strong terms my admiration
of the bravery, endurance and patriotism displayed by the
officers and men engaged in these operations, who during so
many days and nights withstood unflinchingly the extraordinary
fire from the enemy's land and naval batteries, and repulsed with
heroic gallantry every effort to surprise or carry the works by
storm.[52]

I have particularly to commend the gallantry, coolness and zeal
of Brigadier-General W. B. Taliaferro, Brigadier-General Johnson
Hagood, Brigadier-General A. H. Colquitt, Colonel L. M.
Keitt and Colonel G. P. Harrison, who at different periods had
immediate command of the defenses of Morris Island. To particularize
would be invidious; they one and all on every occasion
did their duty nobly.

I have to express my acknowledgment of the valuable services
rendered by Brigadier-General R. S. Ripley, in command of the
First Military District, which included the City of Charleston
and its outworks. He was invariably active, industrious and
intelligent, and carried out his important duties to my entire
satisfaction. Although Major-General J. T. Gilmer arrived in
Charleston a few days before the evacuation of Morris Island, he
was nevertheless active, zealous and of great assistance to me in
holding the island to the last moment.

I also take pleasure in recording the services of Colonel Alfred
Rhett, who during the siege of Wagner had command of Fort
Sumter, and with his brave garrison endured a long and terrific
bombardment. His conduct throughout met my entire approval
and satisfaction.

To Colonel D. B. Harris, chief engineer of the department, I
have to return my most sincere thanks. He was ever cool, gallant
and indefatigable in the performance of his arduous duties
during the whole period of the operations on Morris Island.

Always present in the hour of need, he exposed himself when
necessary to the hottest fire and the greatest danger in the most
reckless manner.[53]

EXTRACT FROM GENERAL RIPLEY'S REPORT

Continuing Narrative of Siege from 7th September, 1863.

". . . September 7th. The enemy occupied Battery Wagner
about daylight, and was opened upon by Batteries Simkins and
Cheves and Fort Moultrie with the works adjacent.

"Soon after Admiral Dalgreen, commanding enemy's fleet, sent
a demand to Major Stephen Elliott, commanding Fort Sumter,
for a surrender of that post. Major Elliott declined, meantime
referring the matter to the headquarters of the district. Under
instructions from headquarters of the department, Admiral Dalgreen
was informed that he could have Fort Sumter when he
could take and hold it.

"About 6 p. m., the Ironsides and five monitors came up the
channel and opened fire on Fort Sumter and the batteries on Sullivan's
Island, which was promptly replied to by our guns and
with some effect until it was too dark to observe the results. The
enemy kept up his fire until about 9 o'clock, doing but little
damage to the works. Lieutenant E. A. Ervin, First South Carolina
Infantry, was killed at Battery Beauregard.

"September 8th. On the morning of the 8th, a monitor, supposed
to be the Weehawken, was observed aground in the channel

leading to Cummings Point and the shore of Morris Island. A
slow fire was opened upon her from a treble-banded Brooke gun
and a 10-inch columbiad from Sullivan's Island and such guns as
could be brought to bear from Fort Johnson. The endeavor was
made to strike her below her armor, which was out of water at
low tide. She was struck several times below the usual water
lines, and about 9 o'clock the Ironsides and five monitors came to
her assistance, engaging the forts and batteries at distances ranging
from 800 to 1,500 yards, keeping up a very heavy cannonade.
A shell from the Weehawken struck and disabled an 8-inch
columbiad in Fort Moultrie, and glancing burst near a service
magazine which was protected by a heavy traverse throwing
incendiary contents into and exploding the magazine, killing
sixteen and wounding twelve men of Captain R. Press Smith's
company, First South Carolina Infantry. This disaster interrupted
the practice but little, for Captain Bennett's company
relieved Captain Smith's under a heavy cannonade, and an accurate
and deliberate fire was maintained against the enemy from
all the batteries on the island for about five hours, when the
enemy withdrew much cut up and disabled. From personal
observation, I take pleasure in commending the conduct and
practice of the officers and men engaged in Colonel Butler's regiment.
The effect on the ironclads I believe to have been greater
than on the 7th April, and since the action but one monitor has
fired a gun, and their number has been decreasing; four only are
now in view. Besides the casualties from the explosion, three men
and two officers were killed—Captain Wardlaw and Lieutenant
DeSaussure; and fourteen men were wounded at Fort Moultrie.

"Having met with but little success in the cannonade of the
Sullivan's Island batteries, the enemy's naval commander next
made an attempt to take possession of Fort Sumter, and at 1
o'clock on the morning of the 9th attacked that fort with a
fleet of from thirty to forty barges. Major Elliott caused his
fire to be reserved until the enemy was within a few yards of
the southern and eastern faces upon which the landing was
attempted. He was then received with a close fire of musketry;
hand grenades and fragments of epaulement were thrown over
on the heads of his men, demoralizing and completely repulsing
him. The crews near the fort sought refuge in the recesses and

breaches of the scarp and those at a distance turned and pulled
rapidly away. The gunboat `Chicora,' the Sullivan's Island
batteries and Fort Johnson opened a fire enfilading the faces of
Sumter as soon as the signal was made, cutting up the retreating
barges, of which several were seen floating capsized and disabled.
Next morning Major Elliott succeeded in securing five boats, five
stands of colors, twelve officers and one hundred and nine men,
including two officers and nineteen men wounded.

"The prisoners reported the attacking force four hundred
strong. It was probably larger, and the enemy's loss was
undoubtedly larger than that portion which fell into our hands
and under our observation. Amongst the captured colors was a
worn and torn garrison flag, reported by some of the prisoners
as that which Major Anderson was permitted to take from the
fort on the occasion of his being compelled to surrender it in
April, 1861. This had been brought to hoist and to be made the
subject of boast had the assault succeeded. Whether it was
really the flag in question or not, it would doubtless have been
so asserted. . . . The gallant conduct of Major Steven Elliott,
commanding Fort Sumter, and of his garrison, the Charleston
Battalion under Major Blake, in repelling this assault, is to be
especially commended. . . ."

Thus terminated the direct efforts of the enemy to take Charleston.
With the capture of Morris Island, and the demolition of
the offensive power of Sumter, General Gilmore, with his land
forces, had done all he was able to do; and contended that he had
done all he had engaged to do; and that it was enough that the
gate was now open for the fleet to enter and finish the undertaking.[54]
The fleet thought otherwise. From thenceforward,
until the operations of Sherman in the interior of the State
compelled the evacuation of the city, the enemy's operations
before Charleston, as heretofore stated, were confined to a cannonade
upon Sumter to prevent its rehabilitation as an artillery
post, to the exchange of shots with our James Island batteries,
from which nothing resulted, and to the regular bombardment
of the city from Cummings Point. The fleet occasionally joined
in the pounding of Sumter or engaged indecisively the Sullivan's
Island batteries.

General Beauregard's efforts were confined principally to completing
the defenses of Charleston. On James Island, with which
the writer was most familiar, these became very complete. Pemberton's
and Ripley's lines from Secessionville, by way of Royall's
house to Fort Pemberton, were abandoned. Starting at Secessionville
a line much shorter was carried to Dill's, just above
Grimball's on the Stono. This was a cremaillere infantry breastwork
of strong profile, with heavy enclosed redoubts at distances
of 700 and 800 yards, having defensive relations to each other.
On the Stono were one or two heavy redoubts securing that flank.
Fort Pemberton was nearly, if not quite, dismantled. From
Secessionville to Fort Johnson, along the eastern shore of the
island looking towards Folley and Morris Islands, heavy batteries,
opened to the rear with trenches or breastworks for
infantry supports, were erected, and from Johnson to opposite the
city heavy batteries for the defense of the inner harbor[55] Bombproofs,
covered ways, rifle pits and all the appliances of the
engineer's art were exhausted in strengthening this system of
works. Magnetic telegraphs were put up from Pemberton,
Secessionville, Fort Haskell and Johnson, respectively, to headquarters
at Royall's house, and a complete system of signals by
rockets established. The command was divided into two divisions
—Generals Hagood and Colquitt in charge, and General Taliaferro
commanded the island.

In November, President Davis visited James Island. General
Taliaferro was absent on leave and General Hagood in command.
Mr. Davis inspected the works closely, going at a rapid gallop
with his cortege from battery to battery and stopping long enough
to receive a salute and ride around the regiments which were
drawn up along his route, each near its post. He seemed in good
spirits; the troops betrayed much enthusiasm, but he acknowledged
their cheers for "Our President" by simply raising his
hat. General Hagood rode with him as commander of the island,
and necessarily had much conversation with him. Here and on
the field of battle at Drury's Bluff when General Beauregard was
pleased to present him again, with a compliment, to the President,
were the only times he was ever in conversation with this distinguished

man. That night ex-Governor Aiken, with whom Mr.
Davis was a guest, entertained the party in the city.

In February, 1864, the enemy inaugurated a campaign in
Florida, covering the movement of troops from before Charleston
by a demonstration upon Johns Island. Colquitt was
sent with his brigade to re-enforce our troops in that quarter, and
the battle of Olustee terminated the campaign. The Eleventh
South Carolina was sent after Colquitt, but arrived after the
battle. It was, however, creditably engaged afterwards in an
affair of pickets.

Olustee, like Secessionville, was one of the decisive battles of
the war, with comparatively small forces engaged. At the time,
and so far since, the credit seemed to attach to General Finnigan,
the district commander. From what General Hagood learned
of it from those engaged he was inclined to believe the credit
solely due to Colquitt. He was said to have been on a reconnoisance
in force under orders from Finnigan, when he unexpectedly
encountered the advance of the Yankee Army and
engaged it without orders. He received no orders or re-enforcements
during the fight until, just as he was preparing for his
decisive charge, a message from Finnigan, five miles in rear,
directed him to fall back. The charge was made, and the enemy
thoroughly routed.[56] No fresh troops were sent in pursuit. Colquitt
ordered forwarded a squadron or two of cavalry which had
accompanied his reconnoisance and been unengaged in the fight.
They did not get out of sight of the field of battle before they
bivouacked for the night. The enemy, it was said, abandoned
artillery in the road twenty miles from the field of action.

Taliaferro was now sent to Florida to take command of that
district; he was in a short time superseded by Major-General
Patton Anderson and returned to James Island.

The troops on James Island were generally hutted, and, from
the facility of getting private supplies from home (they were
chiefly Georgians and South Carolinians), lived tolerably well.
The commissariat supply was irregular and bad. Major Guerrin
in Charleston and Northrop in Richmond were too much for us.
Under Confederate regulations, the commissary department was
almost independent of even a general commanding a separate

army; and General Beauregard more than once spoke to the
writer of his plans being thwarted by the interference of
Northrop, the chief at Richmond. Colonel Northrop's qualifications
for this high position, it was said with sarcastic bitterness,
were to have been at West Point with President Davis some
thirty years before and to have lived a misanthrope since without
active participations in even civil life. It was a popular notion
among the soldiers that he was a vegetarian and did not think
meat healthy. Guerrin had been an office clerk for a physician
in Charleston before the war and had married Northrop's niece.
The writer knows that the movement and supply of troops is the
most difficult of the problems of war; and he trusts he is not
disposed to criticise harshly any man or set of men who "wore the
grey." But he also knows that on James Island, had it not been
for private sources of supply, the troops would have often been
on siege rations, and that, too, when there was uninterrupted communication
with the middle and back country of Georgia and
South Carolina which teemed with provisions. A year later
Sherman and his men expressed themselves amazed at the abundance
they encountered here. During the winter (of 1863-64)
the wives of many of the officers came down, and there was quite
a pleasant society on the island. Ladies on horseback and in carriages
were not an uncommon sight, and sometimes during a
lull in the firing of the batteries a dancing party was had at a
post liable to be opened upon at any time. Horse racing, coursing
rabbits with greyhounds, and cock fighting amused the fancies
of each sport; and occasionally a whole regiment would be seen
on a grand battue. Deploying as skirmishers, each man armed
only with a club, they would sweep over the extensive field,
whooping and yelling; and it was astonishing to see what numbers
of rabbits, partridges and other small game, too scared to
escape, they would bring to bag. The health of the troops was
good, their morale excellent, and many a tatterdemalion who
followed the Red Cross flag under Lee and Johnston in '64 and
'65 looked back upon this portion of his service at the siege of
Charleston with fond regret.

Before leaving for Virginia, whither he had been ordered
in April, 1864, General Hagood went over to Sumter to look at its
condition. He had last seen it on the night of the 18th July, 1863,

on his way to Wagner. Then it was an imposing artillery fortress,
armed at all points, equalled for offensive power by perhaps
few in the world, and triumphant in its recent decisive repulse
of the ironclad fleet. The first day from Gilmore's huge rifled
projectiles had demonstrated the inability of its masonry to
withstand land breaching batteries, and despoiled by friends and
battered by foes, it now lay in the moonlight a huge misshapen
mound upon the quiet bosom of the bay. Save the battle flag floating
in the night breeze, there was no sign of life or occupation,
as we approached, until the quick decisive challenge of the
warden obscured in the shade of the ruin arrested us. The watchword
given, and landing, the visitors dived by a zigzag and
obstructed entrance into the bowels of the mass of debris and
came into a securely ceiled and well lighted gallery running the
whole circle of the ruins, neatly whitewashed, thoroughly ventilated,
widening here into a barrack room with bunks in which
the reserve of the garrison were quietly sleeping; narrowing there
into a covered way loopholed to give a musketry fire upon what
was once the parade; and again developing itself into a hospital
room, a compact headquarters office and a place of arms for
defense, with ample and ingeniously defended passages for egress
to summit of the ruins. Here sentinels in single rifle pits were
stationed, having for giving the alarm, in addition to their guns, a
wire by each, upon pulling which a bell was rung at the same time
in the headquarters office and in each station of the garrison
within. Boat howitzers, securely sheltered upon the interior
slope of the debris, were so placed and combined with arrangements
for musketry fire as to sweep every part of the parade.
Wire entanglements, movable during the day or a bombardment
upon the exterior slope, added to the difficulties of escalade which
the action of the tides already made difficult enough. For at the
edge of the water, the debris, which from the summit so far had
a natural slope, was washed away, making here a nearly perpendicular
wall five or six feet high. One or two heavy guns were
mounted in the northwest angle of the fort which was sheltered
by its position from Gilmore's land batteries. These had a field
of fire upon the inner harbor, and would have been serviceable
upon vessels succeeding in reaching that position in an advance
of the fleet upon the city. The general appearance of the work
now, as viewed from the summit ridge of the ruin and looking
inward, was that of the crater of an extinct volcano.

As barrack and bomb-proof and casemate and magazine of the
original fort had crumbled under the enemy's unparalleled fire,
until protected alone by what had once been its defenses, no living
thing could have survived even one day's ordinary bombardment;
and the garrison, clinging tenaciously to the site, had burrowed
into the increasing debris. Working under almost ceaseless fire,
they had converted this wreck of an artillery fort, without a
single gun to reply to her long range assailants, into an infantry
post comparatively safe for its defenders, and with which, after
one feeble effort, its assailants had never the nerve to grapple in
assault.

Elliott, who had held the fort since the fall of Morris Island[57]
without relief in the arduous and wearing duty, had just been
promoted to a regiment and gone to Virginia, where in further
recognition of his services he received the first vacant South
Carolina brigade. Captain Mitchell was now in command and
Captain Johnson remained the resident engineer. After the war,
and not long before his untimely death, the writer was walking
with Elliott on the streets of desolated Columbia, when they met
and stopped to speak with Mrs. Pickens. After a few moments
of conversation, the lady presented her little daughter to him and
said in an aside to the child, "When you are old enough, my dear,
to read the story of Fort Sumter, you will know why mamma
wished to present you to General Elliott." Mitchell found his
grave amidst its ruins, and Johnson here established a reputation
for genius in his profession and for devoted gallantry unsurpassed
in the war.

NOTES TO GENERAL BEAUREGARD'S OFFICIAL
REPORT.

NOTE A.

The Different Routes to Charleston.

Of the five routes of approach mentioned by General Beauregard, the
two involving operations in rear appear to have been entirely beyond
Gilmore's power with the land force at his disposal—by his own account
some 17,000 men. It is worth noting, however, that both times when
Charleston has fallen (in the Revolution and in the late war), it was from
operations in this quarter after the direct attack had failed. The route by
James Island is the only remaining one, the pursuit of which could have
effected the fall of the city. Success upon this line of approach would
undoubtedly have effected this object had Gilmore taken it. He would
not have as efficient co-operation from the navy here as at Morris Island,
principally from the greater facility with which the defense could have
protected itself from the enfilading fire of the fleet. The lines on James
Island, as already mentioned, were at that time exceedingly defective in
location, incomplete in construction, and requiring a large force, not then
in position, to man them. By vigorous and rapid operations against their
center advancing from Grimball's and Dill's on the Stono, and a movement
upon their flank and rear from Light House Inlet, as indicated in previous
pages of these Memoirs, they may have been carried by assault. The
slower these operations the less would have been their chance of success;
and against these lines as established by General Beauregard later in the
slege, from Dill's to Secessionville with heavy works from Secessionville to
Fort Johnson defending that flank and rear, Gilmore with the means at
his disposal would certainly have failed. He himself seemed to have had
a full appreciation of the difficulties of this route. "Upon James Island,"
says he in his official report, "our progress would soon have been stopped
by the concentration of superior force in our front. Upon Morris Island,
on account of its narrowness, our force was ample. James Island was too
wide to operate upon with a fair promise of success with our force."

Success on the Sullivan's Island route, from the nature of the channel,
would have completely closed the channel for purposes of blockade running,
would have furnished as good a point d'appul for the disabling of
Sumter and given a direct fire upon almost every part of the inner harbor.
But if it had taken as long to reduce Sullivan's Island as it did Morris
Island (and it probably would), the same defenses would have sprung up as
afterwards lined the shores of the inner harbor; and the navy would have
had to exhibit more dash than it did at any time during the siege to have
passed them. Charleston would not necessarily have fallen, had this route
been taken. Another consideration of weight was this: To attack Sullivan's

Island, a lodgment upon Long Island, then occupied by the Confederate
pickets, was necessary, when by a coup de main Sullivan's Island was to
be reached across Breach Inlet. This could not have been done without
attracting attention and totally depriving the coup of the attribute of
surprise. Breach Inlet was also defended by works in a better state of
completion than Light House Inlet was. Of Folley Island the enemy had
for some time been in quiet possession as well as of the adjoining waters
of Stono Bay, which gave them the opportunity of preparing measurably
unobserved for a sudden descent upon Morris Island. And whatever stress
they may have laid upon it, it was this element of surprise in their descent
upon the south end of the island that gave them all the success they met
with. What followed (the lodgment once made) was, with the conditions
imposed, but a matter of time. General Beauregard in his report, it will
be observed, denies the surprise, and attributes the fall of this end of the
Island to the inadequate means of preparation and defense at his disposal.
He undoubtedly, from his report, and, the writer may add, from very
full conversations with him, appreciated the importance of strongly
defending this point, and had planned and ordered a system of works
adequate to the end; but they were not executed in time. Could it have
been done? Could, under the circumstances of locality, the vigilance
possibly have detected the massing on Little Folley for attack in time to
have increased our infantry supports? Was there infantry available for
this purpose? On these questions turns the whole matter. General
Beauregard's report ably presents the difficulties that beset him. Gilmore
says: "Wise defense would have kept us off of Morris Island entirely."
And it was a general opinion of the Confederate troops, as well as the
impression of the public mind, that this was the weak point in the otherwise
masterly defense of Charleston. General Ripley took the opportunity
of an investigation of the matter by General Beauregard's inspector-general
to submit an elaborate defense of himself as district commander
which he read to the writer, whose information of facts (he up to that time
serving in another district) is not sufficient to warrant the expression of
a decisive opinion as to where the fault was. The inclination of his mind
then was and still is to attribute the laches rather to his subordinates and
to circumstances, which he could not control, than to any oversight or
negligence of the general commanding.

Upon the whole it appears that the route by Morris Island, though, in
the language of General Beauregard, "the least injurious to us" that
could have been taken, was the only one with the resources at his disposal
by which Gilmore could have accomplished anything.

The narrow front upon which he operated and the difficult communication
between Morris Island and the Confederate base of supply made
difficult the concentration of a force in his front superior or even equal to
that he could with easier communications at all times operate. His flanks
were rendered unassailable by the ocean on one side and an impassable
marsh from one and a half to two miles wide on the other. And, above
all, he had the fullest possible benefit of the enfilade and reserve fire of the

fleet, each vessel of which was for this purpose a movable battery. The
Federal commander flatters himself, when he says in his report, "that it
would have been entirely practicable to have pushed his approaches to Fort
Wagner without the co-operating fire of the gunboats." The siege journal
appended to his report decisively indicates the reverse. Without this fire
the role would have been changed and from besieger he would probably
have become besieged.

NOTE B.

Taking the Offensive.

When General Hagood reported, on the evening of the 11th July, to General
Beauregard, the latter seemed very solicitous as to James Island front;
and, in assigning General Hagood to that command, earnestly sought to
impress its importance upon him. At the district headquarters immediately
afterward General Hagood proposed to Ripley that instead of sending him
to James Island that he be put on Morris Island that night with a sufficient
force to take a vigorous offensive. General Hagood stated that he
would be satisfied to do so with 2,000 fresh troops, the garrison of the
island being sufficient to act as a reserve in the attack—provided, he could
be landed with his men on the island by 12 o'clock that night. General
Ripley thought the suggestion practicable, seemed much pleased with it,
and they forthwith went together to General Beauregard with the proposition.
He dismissed it summarily, with the statement that he had not the
troops at hand, nor was the transportation available to put them there in
time, if he had. The writer now knows General Beauregard was right.
General Hagood was not at the council of general officers on the 13th. At
the council, just before the evacuation of Wagner, he thought it too late to
assume the offensive, and, indeed, never thought it practicable with our
means to expel the enemy from Morris Island after the first night. Had
the enemy's position not then been carried by assault before he had sufficiently
entrenched, it would have grown under a slower approach into the
dimensions of Wagner. A counter-siege, with the fire of the fleet enfilading
and taking in reverse our approaches and the ground permitting no enfilade
batteries for us, was simply out of the question.

NOTE C.

The Affair of the 16th July on James Island.

Captain: I have the honor to make the following report of the operations
of the troops under my command on the 16th instant:

I had been instructed on the day previous to observe and report the possibility
of offensive operations against the enemy in my front, and had
reported two plans, the one of which limited to driving in their pickets on

the left and making a reconnaisance of that part of their line with the
further object of capturing or destroying the part of their force nearest
Grimball's was the one approved.

The enemy occupied Battery Island and Legare's plantation principally
and a part of Grimball's, and their gunboats lay in Folley and Stono
Rivers, giving in front of their position a cross-fire extending as far as our
picket line.

General Colquitt was ordered with about 1,400 infantry and a field
battery to cross the marsh dividing Legare's plantation from Grimball's
at the causeway nearest Secessionville, drive the enemy rapidly as far as
the lower causeway (nearest Stono), recross the marsh at that point by a
flank movement, and cut off and capture the force camped near Grimball's
house. Colonel Way, Fifty-fourth Georgia, with about 800 infantry, was
directed to follow en echellon on the Grimball side of the marsh, the advance
of General Colquitt, and co-operate with him. A reserve of one section
of artillery, supported by a company of infantry and a squadron of cavalry,
under Lieutenant-Colonel Jeffords, Fifth South Carolina Cavalry, was
held in hand near Rivers' house. On the extreme right a battery of four
rifled twelve dr. and one of four Napoleons under Lieutenant-Colonel Del
Kemper, supported by Colonel Radcliffe, North Carolina, with about 400
infantry, was ordered to engage the gunboats lying highest up the Stono.

The troops moved upon the enemy in the grey of the morning and the
whole enterprise was carried out as planned. The force at Grimball's was,
however, smaller than was anticipated, and, by retreating across to Battery
Island, as soon as Colquitt's firing was heard, managed to save themselves
before he could get into position to intercept them. Colonel Kemper
engaged the Pawnee and another gunboat at 250 yards, and after some ten
rounds drove them down the river beyond his range. The reserve artillery
was not brought into action. The cavalry did good service in sweeping
up fugitives over which the advancing infantry had run. The troops were
under fire one hour and a half and behaved well. This fire was chiefly
shell from gunboats and shell and cannister from a field battery. The
enemy's infantry fought badly. Those encountered were chiefly colored
troops, fourteen of whom were captured. These belonged to the Fifty-fourth
Massachusetts. About thirty of the enemy were killed upon the
field.

I beg leave to refer to the accompanying reports of subordinate commanders
for full details.

The enemy were supposed to have been not above 2,000 infantry and
one battery of field artillery. Upon the following night they evacuated
James Island and Battery Island, leaving behind them arms and stores,
of which a full return will be made. Our casualties were three killed,
twelve wounded and three missing. Colonel Bull and Captain Beauregard,
of the staff of General Beauregard, and Captain B. H. Reed, of General

Ripley's staff, reported to me for duty on the occasion, and, together with
my own staff, rendered efficient service.

The foregoing is the official report. Colquitt drove in the pickets and
the main body of the enemy with only a strong line of skirmishers until
they reached the narrow neck between James and Battery Islands. Here
they formed a double line of battle with field artillery on the flank and
a cross-fire at close range from gunboats in Stono and Folley Rivers sweeping
their front. A rapid exchange of fire of field artillery took place. The
force at Grimball's had already escaped, and the instructions of department
headquarters not permitting a further advance, which, too, would
probably have resulted in little good, after a close reconnaissance of the
position, the troops were recalled.

Federal newspaper accounts and their subsequent histories state that
their force on this occasion was General Terry's Division, consisting of
Montgomery's black brigade (two regiments) and General Stevenson's
Brigade (white). This would make their force over 3,000[58] men. The
prisoners on that day insisted that there were eight regiments. It seems
they were right. The assistant surgeon of the Pawnee, who had been
detailed to assist the wounded of the land forces after the assault on
Wagner of the 18th July, and, wandering into our lines on the field, was
picked up by our picket, told General Hagood that the Pawnee was struck
forty-three times, principally in her upper works. She slipped her cables
and fled after the tenth round. Kemper galloped up and unlimbered at
the short range stated in an open field and fought without epaulements.
The enemy's fire all passed over him, and he had neither man nor horse
wounded.

Greely's History (American Conflict) states Terry's loss at 100. This
is believed to have been the first time the colored troops of the Federal
army were ever in action. It was certainly the first time that any were
captured by the Confederates. When it was understood that such troops
were being organized, by Confederate proclamation it was announced that
prisoners taken from them would be turned over to the State authorities
to be tried under the local laws relating to servile insurrection, and that
white men commanding them would be dealt with as outlaws. It was not
done in this or any subsequent case.

NOTE D.

The Style of Fighting Wagner.

There was but one gun, at the time referred to by General Beauregard,
on the sea face to reply to the iron-clad fire which greatly annoyed the
garrison of Wagner—these vessels being enabled to take us both in reverse

and enfilade. When vigorously worked, this gun (the ten-inch columbiad
spoken of) kept these vessels at a greater distance, rendered their fire less
accurate, and the iron-clads seemed to have considerable respect for its
missiles. On that day a monitor took up position for action within 800
yards of the fort, but, on being struck once or twice by the columbiad,
withdrew two or three hundred yards, and the writer never knew them to
engage the fort at closer range afterward. Besides, the demoralizing
effect upon the garrison of making no reply to this very destructive fire
was marked. It was in the light of this experience that General Hagood
telegraphed the dismounting of the gun and asked that steps be taken to
replace it that night. The gun, by the way, was an old one and was said
by an artillery officer, who knew its history, to have already been fired
1,200 times. General Beauregard sent in substance the reply indicated in
the report, and, with all deference, the writer would say that it foreshadowed
the only defect, as it occurred to him, in the immediate defense of
Wagner. It was too passive. Its artillery was not used enough to delay the
approaches of the enemy, and the right kind of artillery was not used.
Sorties, too, should have been resorted to. There was but one (Rion's, a
success) during the siege. 'Tis true, no doubt, as stated in General Beauregard's
report, that he ordered them made when practicable, but the
writer, as a commander of the fort, does not recollect to have had this
order extended to him—and it certainly should have had obedience to it
enforced. Until the enemy captured the rifle pits, or ridge, as they called
it, sorties were entirely practicable, notwithstanding the torpedoes in front
of the work. The troops could have been moved out in column by the path
which the pickets used, avoiding the torpedoes, and formed behind the pits
for the attack.

With regard to the artillery—when this tour of duty was over—General
Hagood brought fully to General Beauregard's attention the importance
and efficiency of columbiads on the sea face, stating that he thought a
battery of two or three ten-inch guns should be placed there; and further
called attention to the absence of mortars for curved fire against the
enemy's approaches, the only one in the fort, a ten-inch seacoast, having
been disabled on the 10th July by the breaking of one of the trunnions and
not having been used since. The general spoke of his inability to spare the
guns and mortars, and laid less stress upon their importance to the defense
of the fort. The dismounted columbiad, however, was in a few days
remounted. Later in the siege another was sent down, but by this time,
or shortly after, the first from continuous use had become unserviceable.
So that in fact one ten-inch columbiad was the only armament opposed
to the fleet during the siege. A 32 dr. rifled, on the sea face, became
unserviceable after very few discharges. The landward armament consisted
for offense chiefly of 32 dr. howitzers and eight-inch naval guns; a
section of field guns on the left flank and one field gun on the right flank
were kept for defense against assault, and this armament, in the
writer's opinion, was not worked as much as it might have been by the
successive commanders of the fort upon the enemy's sap.[59] The plan of

defense generally acted upon was a vigorous use of sharpshooters
and but a moderate use of artillery from Wagner, while the fire of
distant batteries was to retard the enemy's approaches, and the garrison
of Wagner should be husbanded in bombproofs to repel the assault.
Upon relieving his predecessor before day, on the 21st August, General
Hagood found the embrasures on the land face closed with sandbags
and learned that for three or four days sharpshooting alone had been
used from Wagner. He directed Major Warley, accompanying him as chief
of artillery, to open at once a vigorous fire from his 32 drs. This fire by
the enemy's siege journal[60] put a stop to their work until daylight, when it
ceased. At 9 o'clock we opened again, with the result, as learned from the
same source, of stopping it for the day, and no further effort was made to
advance their sap till the 23rd, when Wagner again opened, "completely
destroying it," says the Journal. By this mode of fighting, Wagner drew a
very heavy artillery fire, and we were compelled quickly after each discharge
to fill the throats of the embrasures with sand bags to prevent
dismounting our guns, notwithstanding which, on the evening of the 24th,
the last one on the land face was temporarily disabled. General Hagood
now caused Major Warley to try the experiment of wedging up into position
the disabled mortar and throwing shell with small charges into the head
of the sap, then some three hundred and fifty yards off. Eight ounces of
powder was found sufficient, and the practice was beautiful. This was
the first time curved fire was used from the fort. The enemy's progress
was stopped. His siege journal says: "This mortar proved to be a great
annoyance. Its fire was directed on the head of the sap, was very accurate,
and our sappers had no shelter from it. Six such mortars well served
would have stopped our work till subdued by superior fire." His battery
of Parrotts, heretofore breaching Sumter, was now turned upon the parapet
of Wagner to get at the mortar by breaching, but the mortar was not
silenced.

Again, on the 25th, the mortar fire greatly retarded their sap, and Major
Brooks, in their siege journal, records, "This has been the saddest day to me
of the siege. Less has been done than on any other. No advance has been
made." And so, throughout the siege, the enemy's record shows that
whenever the artillery was actively brought to bear upon them the result
was always to stop or greatly retard their progress. The value of the
mortar as exhibited at this time caused another to be sent to replace it,
when the old one became utterly unserviceable, and curved fire was more
or less used till the end of the siege.

These comments upon the masterly defense of Wagner by General Beauregard
are made with much hesitation. They are given for what they are
worth.

NOTE E.

The Flag of Truce and Exchange of Prisoners.

On the 21st July, the enemy's fire ceasing and a flag of truce appearing,
Captain Tracy, A. D. C., was sent to meet it. After a short interview the
flags separated, and, before either party had reached their lines, the fleet
opened on the fort. Captain Tracy had to proceed a distance of two
hundred yards along the exposed beach across which every projectile fired
at Wagner from the fleet passed at the height of a man, they firing low to
ricochet. Captain Tracy providentially reached the fort without being
harmed and delivered a communication from General Gilmore requesting
a personal interview between the officer commanding Wagner and General
Vogdes commanding in the trenches. He also said the next afternoon
had been suggested for the interview. The commander of Wagner, deeming
the fire of the fleet an accident, and that it would every moment cease,
did not at first permit his guns to reply. But the enemy's land batteries
soon took it up; Wagner responded and the bombardment went on.

On the 22nd, at the hour suggested, the enemy's flag reappeared, and,
as stated by General Beauregard, the interview was refused until the
breach of truce was explained. The excuse as remembered was some misunderstanding
between the naval and land commanders, and the fire could
not be immediately stopped on account of General Gilmore's absence on
Folley Island, and General Vogdes had no authority or perhaps means of
communicating with the fleet. It was a lame excuse for the outrage, as
far as the navy was concerned, for the whole interview had been on the
open beach, in sight of the whole fleet, and Tracy was perfectly visible to
every gunner as he returned with his flag in his hand. The explanation
was, however, accepted with the profuse apologies tendered and the interview
accorded.

General Vogdes stated his mission to be to ask for Colonel Putnam's
body and to return to us Lieutenant Bee's with the sword of the latter.
He had with him poor Bee's body for delivery. His request was complied
with, and he then verbally proposed an exchange of prisoners, mentioning
that they had but few of ours, all except those recently captured having
been sent North, that "as we had the excess, of course, we could select
whom to exchange," whilst intimating that a mutural exchange without
regard to excess would be agreeable. Pending the interview, General
Hagood received a dispatch from Ripley's headquarters in Charleston,
where the interview and its objects were known, directing him to agree to
an exchange of wounded prisoners without regard to excess on our side,
except the negro prisoners; not to introduce them into the negotiations,
but, if introduced by General Vogdes, to refuse, as they would not be given
up; and that it was desirable on the score of humanity to get rid of the
numerous white prisoners wounded in our hands, and for whom no
adequate accommodation existed in our hospitals. The contents of the
dispatch is given in substance and was not communicated to Vogdes. He
carefully avoided any direct mention of negro prisoners, and his remark

quoted above, that having the excess we could choose whom to exchange,
etc., was in allusion to them, and all that was made. The Confederate
proclamation outlawing negro troops and white officers commanding them
was well known to the enemy; and, anxious to effect the exchange, it was
apparent that the Federal party did not desire to complicate matters. It
was observed that neither General Vogdes nor either of the three or four
officers accompanying him enquired after Shaw, the colonel of the negro
regiment engaged in the recent assault, although they asked after everybody
else, and we subsequently learned by their newspapers that they did
not then know whether he was killed or captured.

The negotiation was arranged, all in parol, by accepting the basis proposed
by General Vogdes—the line to be the following Friday, at 10 a. m.,
and the place the point in the outer harbor from which the fleet generally
conducted the attack on Wagner.

The exchange took place, and General Gilmore afterward accused
Beauregard of bad faith in not sending the negro prisoners for delivery.

The foregoing narrative is believed to be perfectly correct.

NOTE F.

Sharpshooting.

Whatever may be said of the artillery of Wagner not having been sufficiently
active at all times, no objection on that score can be taken to her
sharpshooters.

At first the infantry of the garrison served in this capacity by detail,
and used their ordinary weapon—the Enfield rifle. Later, upon a suggestion
which General Hagood had the honor to make, a special detail of men
from the Twenty-first and Twenty-seventh South Carolina Regiments was
made under Lieutenant Woodhouse, of the Twenty-first, and armed with
Whitworth's telescopic rifles, a small lot of which had recently been
brought through the blockade. The detail was sent to Sullivan's Island
for a few days to become familiar by target practice with the weapon,
and were then put on duty in the fort. At night they slept undisturbed in
the hospital bomb-proof, and were excused from all fatigue duty at any
time. From dawn until dark they were incessantly at work with their
rifles, and of the value of their services the siege journal of the enemy
gives abundant proof. They were even at times used against the monitors.
In revolving their turrets, after a discharge, in order to bring the opposite
gun to bear, a man on each side of the turret would for a moment expose
himself, and would be complimented with the notice of a sharpshooter.
The men detailed became greatly interested in the duty and were not
relieved regularly as the rest of the garrison was. Later still in the siege,
when the enemy got nearer to the fort, the Whitworths were returned to
the city, and the Enfield resumed as better adapted to snap shooting at
close quarters.

The sharpshooters perched themselves wherever they could best get a
good view of the enemy from the fort, and sheltered themselves with little
andbag epaulements loopholed.

NOTE G.

The Rifle Pits.

About 300 yards in advance of Wagner a flattened ridge ran from the
sea beach to the marsh, and here the island was narrowed. Behind this
ridge in pits, two men to each, were stationed until the 26th August an
infantry force, which served both as a picket and as sharpshooters. It
served by ordinary detail from the garrison and used the habitual Enfield
rifles. The sustained efforts of the enemy to shell them out with curved
fire met with no success; and against direct artillery fire they seemed to
be better sheltered than men in the fort who could be enfiladed more or
less behind the breastheight. The fact of the pits being detached, one
from the other, seemed to traverse them effectually against the flank fire
of the fleet. The detail here served twenty-four hours; at dusk, however,
it was doubled and the re-enforcement withdrawn at dawn of day.

Their sharpshooting was very annoying to the enemy, and as pickets
they were invaluable, giving notice of assault in time to get the garrison
out of the bomb-proofs. When the enemy's sap approached this ridge,
he made an effort, on the 21st of August, to carry it by assault with the
One Hundredth New York Volunteers, but failed. Again, on the 25th, a
more determined effort was made. "Experience," says Major Brooks'
journal, "had now proved that the sap cannot proceed unless the artillery
fire of Wagner be subdued, or the enemy driven out of the ridge. . . . At
5:30 p. m., four 8-in. mortars and three Coehorn mortars opened on the
ridge. At the same time the navy howitzers and Requa Battery fired to
enfilade the reverse of the ridge. . . . The two Requa Batteries in the
fourth parallel also took part."

An Infantry Assault and Repulse Followed.

Both these efforts were made during General Hagood's last tour of
duty in Wagner. Upon relieving Colonel Keitt, on the 21st, he discovered
after daylight that, in accordance with the practice established by the
colonel on his recent tour, but 19 men were left in the pits for the day,
instead of the heretofore usual number of seventy-five or eighty. They
could not be re-enforced until night, and the enemy were greatly nearer
them for attack than we were for support. To add to the general's anxiety,
a flag of truce came in during the day, and the bearer was imprudently
allowed to come near enough to observe the weakness of the force in the
pits. When, therefore, in the evening a heavy and continuous bombardment
of the pits and the space intervening between them and the fort commenced,
it was evident what was coming, and the general drew out four
companies (about 175 men) from the bomb-proofs and formed them behind
the breastheight of the land force ready to go out of the right sally port
by a flank when required. Having fully explained to the senior captain
his anxieties and anticipations, he took his place, sheltered as best he
could, to watch from the parapet the time to start this re-enforcement.

To start them too soon, before the fading light would obscure them, was
to send them to butchery under the fire of artillery that could be concentrated
on the intervening space; to send them too late was to lose the
pits, for the enemy, once in them, would be as hard from their construction
to drive out as the original occupants were. Deeming the time to have
arrived, the general gave the word, "Now, captain, go." "General, I wish
you would detail some other man to take this command. I don't feel
competent to it."

Fortunately, General Hagood saw just then Lieutenant-Colonel Dantzler,
of the Twentieth South Carolina, standing in the door of the bomb-proof
opening on the parade, and, beckoning to him, he came at double quick
under the shelling going on. Explaining hastily the situation, the general
put him in command, and, as he moved off, the assault commenced. Going
at a run, Dantzler reached the pits after three on the right had been captured.
The fight continued obstinately till 10 o'clock at night, when, forced
out of the captured pits, the enemy gave over his efforts. After putting
out his advanced videttes, who were required to crawl forward and lie on
their stomachs during the night some twenty paces in front of the pits,
the enemy's videttes in like position facing them some twenty paces
beyond, Dantzler was going on his hands and knees down the line, inspecting
them, when he discovered one post vacant. The heart of the occupant
had failed him and he had slunk back into the pits. Jerking him forward
into his place, with some harsh words, the attention of the opposite videttes
was attracted and his fire drawn. The bullet struck the colonel, as he
stood upon his hands and knees, in the breast of his coat and passed down
the length of his body between his clothing and skin and out over his hip
without other injury than a decided wheal. Poor Dantzler! Few braver
men shed their blood in this war. At Wauboteam Church, in Virginia, in
'64, he threw away his life in the effort, by a deed of "derring do," to make
something of a worthless regiment to which he had been promoted. And
the captain so inopportunely modest! In December, '64, on the lines before
Richmond, when, in the current slang of the soldiers, chaplains were
"played out," General Hagood was invited by the commanding officer of
one of his regiments to attend divine service to be conducted by one of his
line officers. After listening to an excellent sermon from an officer whom
he had noticed during the past campaign always at his post and doing
his duty well, his aide, Ben Martin, asked him if he remembered his first
interview with the preacher. It was the modest Battery Wagner captain!

In the second attack (on the 23th) upon the pits, a full force was in
them during the day from the Fifty-fourth Georgia, Captain Roberts commanding;
and they were re-enforced at dark by Colonel Devorne's Sixty-first
North Carolina. The fight was gallantly and obstinately maintained,
the enemy giving over without success about 9 p. m. Captain Roberts was
mortally wounded before sundown, but could not be brought into the fort
before dark. When the fort had been arranged for the night, the commanding
officer went into the hospital bomb-proof to enquire after him.
Having expressed the hope that he was not seriously wounded, he replied

that his injuries were mortal. Taking him by the hand his commander
spoke of his gallant bearing in the fight, when the brave fellow half rose
from his litter and said, "Thank you, general," and fell back exhausted. He
asked for a chaplain, but there was none in the fort—no

A layman, a member of Parker's Light Battery (the Marions), a section
of which was on duty in the fort, visited him at the request of the commanding
officer, and spent the time, until his removal to the city, in administering
to him the consolations of religion.

On the 18th of July, a Catholic clergyman was in the fort and administered
the rites of his church in the bomb-proof just before the troops were
drawn out to meet the assault. The chaplain of Ormstead's Georgia command
and Mr. Dickson, chaplain of the Twenty-fifth South Carolina, each
accompanied his regiment on its tour of duty in the fort. The writer heard
of no others.

Upon being relieved before day, on the 26th, by Colonel Harrison, General
Hagood called his attention specially to the critical condition of the rifle
pits. They were carried by an infantry assault that night. The special
circumstances the writer never learned. But the trouble was in re-enforcing
them at the right time; for a sufficient force could not with safety be
kept in them during the day, nor could they be re-enforced while there was
light, and, as before remarked, the enemy could mass for attack closer
than we were for support. Ripley's report says: "Just before dark the
enemy threw forward an overwhelming force on the advanced pickets and
succeeded in overpowering them before they could be supported."

NOTE H.

Incidents of Service at Wagner.

First Sergeant Tines, of Captain John A. Gary's company, Lucas's battalion,
a plain man from one of the mountain districts of South Carolina,
but a true patriot and good soldier, was mortally wounded at his gun. To
Gary's expression of sympathy he replied: "I am glad it is I and not you,
captain; the country can better spare me." General Beauregard, on being
informed of this incident, ordered one of the best of his new James Island
batteries to be called "Battery Tines" in honor of the noble fellow.

Gary himself was killed a few days afterwards. He was a younger
brother of Captain M. W. Gary, a generous and spirited officer, and much
beloved by his comrades.[61]

On the 24th of August, Captain Robert Pringle, of the same battalion,
was commanding a gun replying to the fire of a monitor. Three shells
fired at a low elevation would richochet twice upon the water, the last time
close to the beach and then explode just over the parapet of the fort. The
practice was extremely accurate; and, although bright daylight, the huge
projectiles coming straight for the spectator could be seen from the time
they left the gun—presenting the appearance of a rapidly enlarging disk as
they approached. One of these shells struck a school of mullet at its last
rebound on the water and knocked one of the fish at least 100 yards into
the gun chamber. Pringle picked it up and gaily remarked that he "had
made his dinner." At the next fire from the monitor he was killed. The
writer had been a good deal thrown with this young officer, and had been
much pleased with his fine social traits and soldierly qualities. He was a
descendant of the Mrs. Motte of Revolutionary fame.

Extracts from the diary of Lieutenant-Colonel Pressley, Twenty-fifth
South Carolina:

"1st September. Ordered to Wagner. . . . Embarked from Fort Johnson
all of the regiment except Company A, in a light draft steamer. Company
A went in a rowboat. The steamer stopped near Sumter; harbor very
rough. I got in the only boat the steamer had for debarking us, with
about fifty officers and men. When we had got half way from the steamer
to Cummings Point, a bombardment of Sumter by monitors commenced and
the steamer returned to Fort Johnson with the balance of the regiment.
At Cummings Point I found Company A, making with the men I brought,
eighty or ninety men of my command, and no prospect of getting the others
till next night. Reported to General Colquitt, in command, and was
ordered to the sand hills in rear of Wagner. So we spent the balance of
the night in what the soldiers called "private bomb-proofs"—holes in the
sand. Not finding these comfortable, I myself spread my blanket between
two sand hillocks. Fort Wagner and the enemy exchanged shots slowly all
night.

"2nd September. Went into Wagner at daylight. Found the enemy's
sap within about 120 yards of the salient; enemy working industriously.
Garrison busy repairing damages and keeping up a slow fire. My
command detailed as a working party for Battery Gregg. Enemy shelling
Wagner, Gregg and Sumter all day. Transferred to Wagner at night, and
by 11 p. m. the balance of my regiment arrived and reported to me. My
companies, as they arrived, were stationed around the parapet, relieving
the North Carolina regiment.

"We occupied from the extreme left along the sea face around the left
salient and part of the land force; the Twenty-fifth Georgia the rest. These
two regiments, with the artillerists, occupied the fort; another regiment, the
Twenty-seventh Georgia, was in the sand hills in the rear. Enemy fired
very little tonight. I was up most of the night posting and visiting my
men; towards morning I took a nap in the left salient, resting my head
against the parapet.

"3rd September. One or two of our guns and one mortar keep up a fire
against the enemy's approaching sap.

"My command in high spirits,—a great many building loopholes with
sand bags for sharpshooting. This has become very dangerous work; as
soon as a hole is darkened on either side, a shot from the opposite sharpshooter
follows, and with frequent success. Not much artillery fire by
or at Wagner, but the enemy are hard at work and approaching. Our
James Island batteries are firing briskly on the enemy's trenches. During
the day from one-third to one-fourth the garrison are kept at the parapet,
the rest in the bomb-proof—at night all are turned out. The Yankees are
so near they can hear when we turn out, and quicken their fire. The garrison
is heavily worked repairing damages.

"Colonel Keitt, Twentieth South Carolina, relieved General Colquitt last
night in command of Morris Island. I was up nearly all night, slept a
little before day in the same salient as last night.

"4th September. Quite a lively bombardment from the enemy today, number
of the sand bag covers for sharpshooters knocked away. Sharpshooting
still very brisk, however. . . . Batteries on James Island do good shooting,
particularly Battery Simkins. Major Warley, chief of artillery, wounded;
Captain Hugenin replaces him. Our parties very hard at work repairing
damages. A corporal of Company A and several men wounded in my
regiment. Several killed and a good many wounded in the balance of
garrison. The enemy's fire slacked after dark. They display a calcium
light tonight upon Vincent's creek. Towards day I tried to get a little
sleep in my old place in the left salient. The shells from Fort Moultrie
were passing immediately over it. A fragment from one of our own mortar
shells came back into the fort and nearly struck me. This has been happening
for some time, the enemy were so close. . . .

"5th September. The fleet early this morning opened upon the fort, the
land batteries also cannonading with great fury—200 and 100-pound Parrotts,
8 and 10-inch mortar shells and 15-inch shell from the navy pouring
into us. The shells are exploding so fast they cannot be counted. All our
guns are silenced. Working them under such a fire is out of the question.
The men are being wounded and killed in every direction. I have been
around amongst my men a good many times and am covered with sand when
I return. The three-fourths of the garrison are still kept in the bomb-proofs.
The suffering of these from the heat and want of water is intolerable.
The supply of water brought from the city is very inadequate; that from
the shallow wells dug in the sand in and adjacent to the fort is horrible.
Famishing thirst alone enables the men to drink it. . . . I have seen some
horrible sights—men mangled in almost every manner. I saw a sharpshooter
knocked from the parapet to the middle of the parade, some forty
or fifty feet, and going fully twenty feet in the air. This was Rawlinson,
of Company G, and the brave fellow clutched his rifle to the last. Of course,
he lived but a short time. Lieutenant Montgomery, of Company C, was
killed this morning—his head taken off by a shell.

"An attack upon Battery Gregg is expected tonight; a detachment of my

regiment, under Captain Sellars, and of the Twenty-eighth Georgia, under
Captain Hayne, are to be sent to re-enforce it. As they march out Captain
Hayne enquires of Lieutenant Blum for Captain Sellars; a shell kills
both. . . . It is apparent that our force manning the parapet tonight must
be as small as possible. . . . In making our arrangements for the night
there are many casualties in our detachment, commanded by Lieutenant
Ramsey, Company Twenty-fifth. In a short time after it was posted every
man but one was killed or wounded. The fleet has withdrawn and the land
batteries slacked their fire, save the mortars, which are as active as ever.
I have seen four shells start from the same battery at the same time. . . .

"There was an alarm of an assault tonight. It was felt to be a relief—
the prospect of changing this passive endurance of artillery into the hot
blood of an infantry fight. The enemy's calcium light illuminated the
whole fort, and the sharpshooters, contrary to custom, were at work all
night. The enemy attacked Gregg and were repulsed. . . . Wells dug in the
bomb-proofs give some relief in better water, but not enough. . . ."

Lieutenant-Colonel Pressley served until the evacuation; but the foregoing
extracts from his diary are sufficient to give a picture of life in
Wagner.

RESULTS AND SPECIALTIES OF THE SIEGE.

In the council before undertaking the operations on Morris
Island, "the principal question," says General Gilmore's Official
Report, "was to what extent the fall of Fort Sumter or the
destruction of its offensive power would exert an influence on the
fate of Charleston, that, of course, being the ultimate object in
view. A consideration which possessed much weight was the
great practical advantage of a blockade thorough and complete
of Charleston harbor. The capture of Morris Island by allowing
a portion of the blockading fleet to lie inside the bar, even though
they should fail to finally occupy the inner harbor, would secure
this end. The naval authorities at the seat of government
regarded Fort Sumter as the key to the position. That stronghold
once destroyed or its offensive power practically destroyed,
the monitors and other ironclads, they affirmed, could remove
the channel obstructions, secure the control of the entire harbor
and reach the city."

Were these purposes accomplished?

1. Did Charleston fall before Gilmore's operations? Certainly
not. Charleston, when it did fall, was evacuated in consequence
of Sherman's march. It had withstood the direct attack

until the enemy, wearied out, had abandoned further efforts thus
to capture the city.

2. Was a "blockade, in all respects thorough and complete,"
established? No. Moffett Channel, under Sullivan's Island,
remained available to the Confederates, and though the hazards
of blockade running were greatly increased it still went on.

3. Did the disabling of Sumter open the inner harbor to the
fleet? Sumter was thoroughly destroyed as an artillery post,
but the channel obstructions and the new batteries that sprung
up on the shores of the inner harbor kept the fleet lying off Morris
Island. And here it may as well be remarked that these same
channel obstructions were far less formidable than imagined,
the tide destroyed most of them about as fast as they were
devised.

What, then, was accomplished? Narrower limits were set to
blockade running, and by the bombardment much suffering and
damage to property was inflicted upon the inhabitants of Charleston.
Was the game "worth the candle"? It was upon the "attrition"
theory, said General Grant in 1865. "The resources of the
enemy and his numerical strength were greatly inferior to ours
. . . I therefore determined . . . to hammer continually against
him until by attrition, if in no other way, there should be nothing
left to him but submission." And he succeeded. The "attrition"
at Charleston contributed its share to the result.

In engineering the siege taught no new principles. On the
contrary, its lessons enforced most emphatically the time-honored
principles of the schools. The masonry of Sumter crumbled like
an egg shell before the breaching batteries of the enemy; and
when its debris had been pounded into earth with natural slopes,
no further impression could be made upon it. On the other
hand, the parapet of Wagner constructed from the first with
natural slopes of sand were good to the last. For though Colonel
Keitt talks of a breach, the writer is persuaded there was no
breach in the engineering sense, both from Colonel Harris's
report and from the diagram in Gilmore's report of the effect of
his fire on the left salient, to which Colonel Keitt alludes. The
truth was the superior artillery fire of the enemy could at all
times, when concentrated upon the fort, make it a butcher pen, if
the whole garrison were at their posts. But few men could be

kept on the lines of the work during a bombardment—artillery
enough to man the guns with infantry enough to act as a lookout
and but little more. The practice always was during the daytime
to keep a part of the garrison among the sand hillocks in rear of
the fort; and during the bombardment to keep out of the bombproofs
about 100 men.

By the 6th of September the sap of the enemy on the crest of
the glacis put them in position when, deployed along its length,
they could rush over the parapets of Wagner upon the cessation
of the bombardment before its garrison could be drawn from
the bomb-proofs to its defense. The relief of the fort was never
greater than that of a strong field work, and the ditch was now
half full by the drifting sand. The fort was, therefore, no longer
tenable.

The great development of the merlons between the guns was
claimed by General Beauregard as an improvement of his own;
and it certainly is in earthworks, when casemates are impossible,
a great one.

The writer became satisfied from his observation of these
operations that ironclads, such as were opposed to us, could be
kept out of any harbor when sand batteries could be located
within 1,000 yards of the channel; provided, the batteries did not
exceed one or two guns to each and were sufficiently detached.
Where infantry supports were needed they should be bombproofed
at convenient supporting distances and not at the guns.
This, with the necessary covered ways, would be preferably his
plan of defense.

The defenses of Coles Island as arranged during the latter part
of our occupation were an illustration of this plan.

In this siege it is presumed more novelties were developed in
artillery and larger experience gained than in any of modern
times. The range and accuracy of fire obtained was never before
equalled. The objections which the enemy's experience found to
the larger sized Parrotts, their liability to burst, it is not thought
were found by us to apply to the Brooke gun, which was the
equal of the Parrott in every other respect.

An admirable invention of Lieutenant-Colonel Yates for transferring
guns on columbiad carriages was used with perfect success.
It was a wheel and ratchet arrangement by which the

gunner alone could quickly and accurately bring the gun to bear.

The progress made in the use of torpedoes, both for offense
and defense, was marked. Much, however, is yet to be attained.
Where used for defense and required to be put in position for
any time before hand, they were liable to get out of order and
fail at the right moment. They were freely used in front of
Wagner, yet the enemy sapped through them with but eight
casualties from this source. About half that number occurred
with us from carelessness with regard to them.

In the assault on Wagner, on the 18th July, the enemy's official
report makes no mention of torpedoes; their newspaper accounts
spoke of hand grenades used by the defense. This was not so,
but in the night the impression might have been produced by
torpedoes.

Next day the officer in charge not knowing of the torpedoes,
the enemy's dead on the glacis were buried among them where
they were placed and no casualty occurred. The burial party dug
them up, but as they were ordinary spherical shell with the
explosive arrangement in the fuse, they were deemed to have been
fired the previous day without exploding. When used for offense,
the writer thought more of them, and his impression is that their
use at the prow of small boats, moving totally or partially submerged,
was very near a success.

The fleet of "cigar boats" that sprung up in Charleston harbor
and the "diving boat" were curious things to a landsman's eye;
and some of the highest heroism of the war was exhibited in
their use.

The writer regrets that he has not the data to speak fully of
their exploits or to record the names of the gallant men who were
distinguished in this service.[62]

The calcium light of the enemy was novel and efficient.

As a tactical movement the evacuation was an eminent success;
and, though admirably executed, the chief credit is due to the
comprehensive and explicit order in relation to it prepared by
General Beauregard himself.