University of Virginia Library

NOTE D.

The Style of Fighting Wagner.

There was but one gun, at the time referred to by General Beauregard,
on the sea face to reply to the iron-clad fire which greatly annoyed the
garrison of Wagner—these vessels being enabled to take us both in reverse

and enfilade. When vigorously worked, this gun (the ten-inch columbiad
spoken of) kept these vessels at a greater distance, rendered their fire less
accurate, and the iron-clads seemed to have considerable respect for its
missiles. On that day a monitor took up position for action within 800
yards of the fort, but, on being struck once or twice by the columbiad,
withdrew two or three hundred yards, and the writer never knew them to
engage the fort at closer range afterward. Besides, the demoralizing
effect upon the garrison of making no reply to this very destructive fire
was marked. It was in the light of this experience that General Hagood
telegraphed the dismounting of the gun and asked that steps be taken to
replace it that night. The gun, by the way, was an old one and was said
by an artillery officer, who knew its history, to have already been fired
1,200 times. General Beauregard sent in substance the reply indicated in
the report, and, with all deference, the writer would say that it foreshadowed
the only defect, as it occurred to him, in the immediate defense of
Wagner. It was too passive. Its artillery was not used enough to delay the
approaches of the enemy, and the right kind of artillery was not used.
Sorties, too, should have been resorted to. There was but one (Rion's, a
success) during the siege. 'Tis true, no doubt, as stated in General Beauregard's
report, that he ordered them made when practicable, but the
writer, as a commander of the fort, does not recollect to have had this
order extended to him—and it certainly should have had obedience to it
enforced. Until the enemy captured the rifle pits, or ridge, as they called
it, sorties were entirely practicable, notwithstanding the torpedoes in front
of the work. The troops could have been moved out in column by the path
which the pickets used, avoiding the torpedoes, and formed behind the pits
for the attack.

With regard to the artillery—when this tour of duty was over—General
Hagood brought fully to General Beauregard's attention the importance
and efficiency of columbiads on the sea face, stating that he thought a
battery of two or three ten-inch guns should be placed there; and further
called attention to the absence of mortars for curved fire against the
enemy's approaches, the only one in the fort, a ten-inch seacoast, having
been disabled on the 10th July by the breaking of one of the trunnions and
not having been used since. The general spoke of his inability to spare the
guns and mortars, and laid less stress upon their importance to the defense
of the fort. The dismounted columbiad, however, was in a few days
remounted. Later in the siege another was sent down, but by this time,
or shortly after, the first from continuous use had become unserviceable.
So that in fact one ten-inch columbiad was the only armament opposed
to the fleet during the siege. A 32 dr. rifled, on the sea face, became
unserviceable after very few discharges. The landward armament consisted
for offense chiefly of 32 dr. howitzers and eight-inch naval guns; a
section of field guns on the left flank and one field gun on the right flank
were kept for defense against assault, and this armament, in the
writer's opinion, was not worked as much as it might have been by the
successive commanders of the fort upon the enemy's sap.[59] The plan of

defense generally acted upon was a vigorous use of sharpshooters
and but a moderate use of artillery from Wagner, while the fire of
distant batteries was to retard the enemy's approaches, and the garrison
of Wagner should be husbanded in bombproofs to repel the assault.
Upon relieving his predecessor before day, on the 21st August, General
Hagood found the embrasures on the land face closed with sandbags
and learned that for three or four days sharpshooting alone had been
used from Wagner. He directed Major Warley, accompanying him as chief
of artillery, to open at once a vigorous fire from his 32 drs. This fire by
the enemy's siege journal[60] put a stop to their work until daylight, when it
ceased. At 9 o'clock we opened again, with the result, as learned from the
same source, of stopping it for the day, and no further effort was made to
advance their sap till the 23rd, when Wagner again opened, "completely
destroying it," says the Journal. By this mode of fighting, Wagner drew a
very heavy artillery fire, and we were compelled quickly after each discharge
to fill the throats of the embrasures with sand bags to prevent
dismounting our guns, notwithstanding which, on the evening of the 24th,
the last one on the land face was temporarily disabled. General Hagood
now caused Major Warley to try the experiment of wedging up into position
the disabled mortar and throwing shell with small charges into the head
of the sap, then some three hundred and fifty yards off. Eight ounces of
powder was found sufficient, and the practice was beautiful. This was
the first time curved fire was used from the fort. The enemy's progress
was stopped. His siege journal says: "This mortar proved to be a great
annoyance. Its fire was directed on the head of the sap, was very accurate,
and our sappers had no shelter from it. Six such mortars well served
would have stopped our work till subdued by superior fire." His battery
of Parrotts, heretofore breaching Sumter, was now turned upon the parapet
of Wagner to get at the mortar by breaching, but the mortar was not
silenced.

Again, on the 25th, the mortar fire greatly retarded their sap, and Major
Brooks, in their siege journal, records, "This has been the saddest day to me
of the siege. Less has been done than on any other. No advance has been
made." And so, throughout the siege, the enemy's record shows that
whenever the artillery was actively brought to bear upon them the result
was always to stop or greatly retard their progress. The value of the
mortar as exhibited at this time caused another to be sent to replace it,
when the old one became utterly unserviceable, and curved fire was more
or less used till the end of the siege.

These comments upon the masterly defense of Wagner by General Beauregard
are made with much hesitation. They are given for what they are
worth.