University of Virginia Library

NOTES TO GENERAL BEAUREGARD'S OFFICIAL
REPORT.

NOTE A.

The Different Routes to Charleston.

Of the five routes of approach mentioned by General Beauregard, the
two involving operations in rear appear to have been entirely beyond
Gilmore's power with the land force at his disposal—by his own account
some 17,000 men. It is worth noting, however, that both times when
Charleston has fallen (in the Revolution and in the late war), it was from
operations in this quarter after the direct attack had failed. The route by
James Island is the only remaining one, the pursuit of which could have
effected the fall of the city. Success upon this line of approach would
undoubtedly have effected this object had Gilmore taken it. He would
not have as efficient co-operation from the navy here as at Morris Island,
principally from the greater facility with which the defense could have
protected itself from the enfilading fire of the fleet. The lines on James
Island, as already mentioned, were at that time exceedingly defective in
location, incomplete in construction, and requiring a large force, not then
in position, to man them. By vigorous and rapid operations against their
center advancing from Grimball's and Dill's on the Stono, and a movement
upon their flank and rear from Light House Inlet, as indicated in previous
pages of these Memoirs, they may have been carried by assault. The
slower these operations the less would have been their chance of success;
and against these lines as established by General Beauregard later in the
slege, from Dill's to Secessionville with heavy works from Secessionville to
Fort Johnson defending that flank and rear, Gilmore with the means at
his disposal would certainly have failed. He himself seemed to have had
a full appreciation of the difficulties of this route. "Upon James Island,"
says he in his official report, "our progress would soon have been stopped
by the concentration of superior force in our front. Upon Morris Island,
on account of its narrowness, our force was ample. James Island was too
wide to operate upon with a fair promise of success with our force."

Success on the Sullivan's Island route, from the nature of the channel,
would have completely closed the channel for purposes of blockade running,
would have furnished as good a point d'appul for the disabling of
Sumter and given a direct fire upon almost every part of the inner harbor.
But if it had taken as long to reduce Sullivan's Island as it did Morris
Island (and it probably would), the same defenses would have sprung up as
afterwards lined the shores of the inner harbor; and the navy would have
had to exhibit more dash than it did at any time during the siege to have
passed them. Charleston would not necessarily have fallen, had this route
been taken. Another consideration of weight was this: To attack Sullivan's

Island, a lodgment upon Long Island, then occupied by the Confederate
pickets, was necessary, when by a coup de main Sullivan's Island was to
be reached across Breach Inlet. This could not have been done without
attracting attention and totally depriving the coup of the attribute of
surprise. Breach Inlet was also defended by works in a better state of
completion than Light House Inlet was. Of Folley Island the enemy had
for some time been in quiet possession as well as of the adjoining waters
of Stono Bay, which gave them the opportunity of preparing measurably
unobserved for a sudden descent upon Morris Island. And whatever stress
they may have laid upon it, it was this element of surprise in their descent
upon the south end of the island that gave them all the success they met
with. What followed (the lodgment once made) was, with the conditions
imposed, but a matter of time. General Beauregard in his report, it will
be observed, denies the surprise, and attributes the fall of this end of the
Island to the inadequate means of preparation and defense at his disposal.
He undoubtedly, from his report, and, the writer may add, from very
full conversations with him, appreciated the importance of strongly
defending this point, and had planned and ordered a system of works
adequate to the end; but they were not executed in time. Could it have
been done? Could, under the circumstances of locality, the vigilance
possibly have detected the massing on Little Folley for attack in time to
have increased our infantry supports? Was there infantry available for
this purpose? On these questions turns the whole matter. General
Beauregard's report ably presents the difficulties that beset him. Gilmore
says: "Wise defense would have kept us off of Morris Island entirely."
And it was a general opinion of the Confederate troops, as well as the
impression of the public mind, that this was the weak point in the otherwise
masterly defense of Charleston. General Ripley took the opportunity
of an investigation of the matter by General Beauregard's inspector-general
to submit an elaborate defense of himself as district commander
which he read to the writer, whose information of facts (he up to that time
serving in another district) is not sufficient to warrant the expression of
a decisive opinion as to where the fault was. The inclination of his mind
then was and still is to attribute the laches rather to his subordinates and
to circumstances, which he could not control, than to any oversight or
negligence of the general commanding.

Upon the whole it appears that the route by Morris Island, though, in
the language of General Beauregard, "the least injurious to us" that
could have been taken, was the only one with the resources at his disposal
by which Gilmore could have accomplished anything.

The narrow front upon which he operated and the difficult communication
between Morris Island and the Confederate base of supply made
difficult the concentration of a force in his front superior or even equal to
that he could with easier communications at all times operate. His flanks
were rendered unassailable by the ocean on one side and an impassable
marsh from one and a half to two miles wide on the other. And, above
all, he had the fullest possible benefit of the enfilade and reserve fire of the

fleet, each vessel of which was for this purpose a movable battery. The
Federal commander flatters himself, when he says in his report, "that it
would have been entirely practicable to have pushed his approaches to Fort
Wagner without the co-operating fire of the gunboats." The siege journal
appended to his report decisively indicates the reverse. Without this fire
the role would have been changed and from besieger he would probably
have become besieged.

NOTE B.

Taking the Offensive.

When General Hagood reported, on the evening of the 11th July, to General
Beauregard, the latter seemed very solicitous as to James Island front;
and, in assigning General Hagood to that command, earnestly sought to
impress its importance upon him. At the district headquarters immediately
afterward General Hagood proposed to Ripley that instead of sending him
to James Island that he be put on Morris Island that night with a sufficient
force to take a vigorous offensive. General Hagood stated that he
would be satisfied to do so with 2,000 fresh troops, the garrison of the
island being sufficient to act as a reserve in the attack—provided, he could
be landed with his men on the island by 12 o'clock that night. General
Ripley thought the suggestion practicable, seemed much pleased with it,
and they forthwith went together to General Beauregard with the proposition.
He dismissed it summarily, with the statement that he had not the
troops at hand, nor was the transportation available to put them there in
time, if he had. The writer now knows General Beauregard was right.
General Hagood was not at the council of general officers on the 13th. At
the council, just before the evacuation of Wagner, he thought it too late to
assume the offensive, and, indeed, never thought it practicable with our
means to expel the enemy from Morris Island after the first night. Had
the enemy's position not then been carried by assault before he had sufficiently
entrenched, it would have grown under a slower approach into the
dimensions of Wagner. A counter-siege, with the fire of the fleet enfilading
and taking in reverse our approaches and the ground permitting no enfilade
batteries for us, was simply out of the question.

NOTE C.

The Affair of the 16th July on James Island.

Captain: I have the honor to make the following report of the operations
of the troops under my command on the 16th instant:

I had been instructed on the day previous to observe and report the possibility
of offensive operations against the enemy in my front, and had
reported two plans, the one of which limited to driving in their pickets on

the left and making a reconnaisance of that part of their line with the
further object of capturing or destroying the part of their force nearest
Grimball's was the one approved.

The enemy occupied Battery Island and Legare's plantation principally
and a part of Grimball's, and their gunboats lay in Folley and Stono
Rivers, giving in front of their position a cross-fire extending as far as our
picket line.

General Colquitt was ordered with about 1,400 infantry and a field
battery to cross the marsh dividing Legare's plantation from Grimball's
at the causeway nearest Secessionville, drive the enemy rapidly as far as
the lower causeway (nearest Stono), recross the marsh at that point by a
flank movement, and cut off and capture the force camped near Grimball's
house. Colonel Way, Fifty-fourth Georgia, with about 800 infantry, was
directed to follow en echellon on the Grimball side of the marsh, the advance
of General Colquitt, and co-operate with him. A reserve of one section
of artillery, supported by a company of infantry and a squadron of cavalry,
under Lieutenant-Colonel Jeffords, Fifth South Carolina Cavalry, was
held in hand near Rivers' house. On the extreme right a battery of four
rifled twelve dr. and one of four Napoleons under Lieutenant-Colonel Del
Kemper, supported by Colonel Radcliffe, North Carolina, with about 400
infantry, was ordered to engage the gunboats lying highest up the Stono.

The troops moved upon the enemy in the grey of the morning and the
whole enterprise was carried out as planned. The force at Grimball's was,
however, smaller than was anticipated, and, by retreating across to Battery
Island, as soon as Colquitt's firing was heard, managed to save themselves
before he could get into position to intercept them. Colonel Kemper
engaged the Pawnee and another gunboat at 250 yards, and after some ten
rounds drove them down the river beyond his range. The reserve artillery
was not brought into action. The cavalry did good service in sweeping
up fugitives over which the advancing infantry had run. The troops were
under fire one hour and a half and behaved well. This fire was chiefly
shell from gunboats and shell and cannister from a field battery. The
enemy's infantry fought badly. Those encountered were chiefly colored
troops, fourteen of whom were captured. These belonged to the Fifty-fourth
Massachusetts. About thirty of the enemy were killed upon the
field.

I beg leave to refer to the accompanying reports of subordinate commanders
for full details.

The enemy were supposed to have been not above 2,000 infantry and
one battery of field artillery. Upon the following night they evacuated
James Island and Battery Island, leaving behind them arms and stores,
of which a full return will be made. Our casualties were three killed,
twelve wounded and three missing. Colonel Bull and Captain Beauregard,
of the staff of General Beauregard, and Captain B. H. Reed, of General

Ripley's staff, reported to me for duty on the occasion, and, together with
my own staff, rendered efficient service.

The foregoing is the official report. Colquitt drove in the pickets and
the main body of the enemy with only a strong line of skirmishers until
they reached the narrow neck between James and Battery Islands. Here
they formed a double line of battle with field artillery on the flank and
a cross-fire at close range from gunboats in Stono and Folley Rivers sweeping
their front. A rapid exchange of fire of field artillery took place. The
force at Grimball's had already escaped, and the instructions of department
headquarters not permitting a further advance, which, too, would
probably have resulted in little good, after a close reconnaissance of the
position, the troops were recalled.

Federal newspaper accounts and their subsequent histories state that
their force on this occasion was General Terry's Division, consisting of
Montgomery's black brigade (two regiments) and General Stevenson's
Brigade (white). This would make their force over 3,000[58] men. The
prisoners on that day insisted that there were eight regiments. It seems
they were right. The assistant surgeon of the Pawnee, who had been
detailed to assist the wounded of the land forces after the assault on
Wagner of the 18th July, and, wandering into our lines on the field, was
picked up by our picket, told General Hagood that the Pawnee was struck
forty-three times, principally in her upper works. She slipped her cables
and fled after the tenth round. Kemper galloped up and unlimbered at
the short range stated in an open field and fought without epaulements.
The enemy's fire all passed over him, and he had neither man nor horse
wounded.

Greely's History (American Conflict) states Terry's loss at 100. This
is believed to have been the first time the colored troops of the Federal
army were ever in action. It was certainly the first time that any were
captured by the Confederates. When it was understood that such troops
were being organized, by Confederate proclamation it was announced that
prisoners taken from them would be turned over to the State authorities
to be tried under the local laws relating to servile insurrection, and that
white men commanding them would be dealt with as outlaws. It was not
done in this or any subsequent case.

NOTE D.

The Style of Fighting Wagner.

There was but one gun, at the time referred to by General Beauregard,
on the sea face to reply to the iron-clad fire which greatly annoyed the
garrison of Wagner—these vessels being enabled to take us both in reverse

and enfilade. When vigorously worked, this gun (the ten-inch columbiad
spoken of) kept these vessels at a greater distance, rendered their fire less
accurate, and the iron-clads seemed to have considerable respect for its
missiles. On that day a monitor took up position for action within 800
yards of the fort, but, on being struck once or twice by the columbiad,
withdrew two or three hundred yards, and the writer never knew them to
engage the fort at closer range afterward. Besides, the demoralizing
effect upon the garrison of making no reply to this very destructive fire
was marked. It was in the light of this experience that General Hagood
telegraphed the dismounting of the gun and asked that steps be taken to
replace it that night. The gun, by the way, was an old one and was said
by an artillery officer, who knew its history, to have already been fired
1,200 times. General Beauregard sent in substance the reply indicated in
the report, and, with all deference, the writer would say that it foreshadowed
the only defect, as it occurred to him, in the immediate defense of
Wagner. It was too passive. Its artillery was not used enough to delay the
approaches of the enemy, and the right kind of artillery was not used.
Sorties, too, should have been resorted to. There was but one (Rion's, a
success) during the siege. 'Tis true, no doubt, as stated in General Beauregard's
report, that he ordered them made when practicable, but the
writer, as a commander of the fort, does not recollect to have had this
order extended to him—and it certainly should have had obedience to it
enforced. Until the enemy captured the rifle pits, or ridge, as they called
it, sorties were entirely practicable, notwithstanding the torpedoes in front
of the work. The troops could have been moved out in column by the path
which the pickets used, avoiding the torpedoes, and formed behind the pits
for the attack.

With regard to the artillery—when this tour of duty was over—General
Hagood brought fully to General Beauregard's attention the importance
and efficiency of columbiads on the sea face, stating that he thought a
battery of two or three ten-inch guns should be placed there; and further
called attention to the absence of mortars for curved fire against the
enemy's approaches, the only one in the fort, a ten-inch seacoast, having
been disabled on the 10th July by the breaking of one of the trunnions and
not having been used since. The general spoke of his inability to spare the
guns and mortars, and laid less stress upon their importance to the defense
of the fort. The dismounted columbiad, however, was in a few days
remounted. Later in the siege another was sent down, but by this time,
or shortly after, the first from continuous use had become unserviceable.
So that in fact one ten-inch columbiad was the only armament opposed
to the fleet during the siege. A 32 dr. rifled, on the sea face, became
unserviceable after very few discharges. The landward armament consisted
for offense chiefly of 32 dr. howitzers and eight-inch naval guns; a
section of field guns on the left flank and one field gun on the right flank
were kept for defense against assault, and this armament, in the
writer's opinion, was not worked as much as it might have been by the
successive commanders of the fort upon the enemy's sap.[59] The plan of

defense generally acted upon was a vigorous use of sharpshooters
and but a moderate use of artillery from Wagner, while the fire of
distant batteries was to retard the enemy's approaches, and the garrison
of Wagner should be husbanded in bombproofs to repel the assault.
Upon relieving his predecessor before day, on the 21st August, General
Hagood found the embrasures on the land face closed with sandbags
and learned that for three or four days sharpshooting alone had been
used from Wagner. He directed Major Warley, accompanying him as chief
of artillery, to open at once a vigorous fire from his 32 drs. This fire by
the enemy's siege journal[60] put a stop to their work until daylight, when it
ceased. At 9 o'clock we opened again, with the result, as learned from the
same source, of stopping it for the day, and no further effort was made to
advance their sap till the 23rd, when Wagner again opened, "completely
destroying it," says the Journal. By this mode of fighting, Wagner drew a
very heavy artillery fire, and we were compelled quickly after each discharge
to fill the throats of the embrasures with sand bags to prevent
dismounting our guns, notwithstanding which, on the evening of the 24th,
the last one on the land face was temporarily disabled. General Hagood
now caused Major Warley to try the experiment of wedging up into position
the disabled mortar and throwing shell with small charges into the head
of the sap, then some three hundred and fifty yards off. Eight ounces of
powder was found sufficient, and the practice was beautiful. This was
the first time curved fire was used from the fort. The enemy's progress
was stopped. His siege journal says: "This mortar proved to be a great
annoyance. Its fire was directed on the head of the sap, was very accurate,
and our sappers had no shelter from it. Six such mortars well served
would have stopped our work till subdued by superior fire." His battery
of Parrotts, heretofore breaching Sumter, was now turned upon the parapet
of Wagner to get at the mortar by breaching, but the mortar was not
silenced.

Again, on the 25th, the mortar fire greatly retarded their sap, and Major
Brooks, in their siege journal, records, "This has been the saddest day to me
of the siege. Less has been done than on any other. No advance has been
made." And so, throughout the siege, the enemy's record shows that
whenever the artillery was actively brought to bear upon them the result
was always to stop or greatly retard their progress. The value of the
mortar as exhibited at this time caused another to be sent to replace it,
when the old one became utterly unserviceable, and curved fire was more
or less used till the end of the siege.

These comments upon the masterly defense of Wagner by General Beauregard
are made with much hesitation. They are given for what they are
worth.

NOTE E.

The Flag of Truce and Exchange of Prisoners.

On the 21st July, the enemy's fire ceasing and a flag of truce appearing,
Captain Tracy, A. D. C., was sent to meet it. After a short interview the
flags separated, and, before either party had reached their lines, the fleet
opened on the fort. Captain Tracy had to proceed a distance of two
hundred yards along the exposed beach across which every projectile fired
at Wagner from the fleet passed at the height of a man, they firing low to
ricochet. Captain Tracy providentially reached the fort without being
harmed and delivered a communication from General Gilmore requesting
a personal interview between the officer commanding Wagner and General
Vogdes commanding in the trenches. He also said the next afternoon
had been suggested for the interview. The commander of Wagner, deeming
the fire of the fleet an accident, and that it would every moment cease,
did not at first permit his guns to reply. But the enemy's land batteries
soon took it up; Wagner responded and the bombardment went on.

On the 22nd, at the hour suggested, the enemy's flag reappeared, and,
as stated by General Beauregard, the interview was refused until the
breach of truce was explained. The excuse as remembered was some misunderstanding
between the naval and land commanders, and the fire could
not be immediately stopped on account of General Gilmore's absence on
Folley Island, and General Vogdes had no authority or perhaps means of
communicating with the fleet. It was a lame excuse for the outrage, as
far as the navy was concerned, for the whole interview had been on the
open beach, in sight of the whole fleet, and Tracy was perfectly visible to
every gunner as he returned with his flag in his hand. The explanation
was, however, accepted with the profuse apologies tendered and the interview
accorded.

General Vogdes stated his mission to be to ask for Colonel Putnam's
body and to return to us Lieutenant Bee's with the sword of the latter.
He had with him poor Bee's body for delivery. His request was complied
with, and he then verbally proposed an exchange of prisoners, mentioning
that they had but few of ours, all except those recently captured having
been sent North, that "as we had the excess, of course, we could select
whom to exchange," whilst intimating that a mutural exchange without
regard to excess would be agreeable. Pending the interview, General
Hagood received a dispatch from Ripley's headquarters in Charleston,
where the interview and its objects were known, directing him to agree to
an exchange of wounded prisoners without regard to excess on our side,
except the negro prisoners; not to introduce them into the negotiations,
but, if introduced by General Vogdes, to refuse, as they would not be given
up; and that it was desirable on the score of humanity to get rid of the
numerous white prisoners wounded in our hands, and for whom no
adequate accommodation existed in our hospitals. The contents of the
dispatch is given in substance and was not communicated to Vogdes. He
carefully avoided any direct mention of negro prisoners, and his remark

quoted above, that having the excess we could choose whom to exchange,
etc., was in allusion to them, and all that was made. The Confederate
proclamation outlawing negro troops and white officers commanding them
was well known to the enemy; and, anxious to effect the exchange, it was
apparent that the Federal party did not desire to complicate matters. It
was observed that neither General Vogdes nor either of the three or four
officers accompanying him enquired after Shaw, the colonel of the negro
regiment engaged in the recent assault, although they asked after everybody
else, and we subsequently learned by their newspapers that they did
not then know whether he was killed or captured.

The negotiation was arranged, all in parol, by accepting the basis proposed
by General Vogdes—the line to be the following Friday, at 10 a. m.,
and the place the point in the outer harbor from which the fleet generally
conducted the attack on Wagner.

The exchange took place, and General Gilmore afterward accused
Beauregard of bad faith in not sending the negro prisoners for delivery.

The foregoing narrative is believed to be perfectly correct.

NOTE F.

Sharpshooting.

Whatever may be said of the artillery of Wagner not having been sufficiently
active at all times, no objection on that score can be taken to her
sharpshooters.

At first the infantry of the garrison served in this capacity by detail,
and used their ordinary weapon—the Enfield rifle. Later, upon a suggestion
which General Hagood had the honor to make, a special detail of men
from the Twenty-first and Twenty-seventh South Carolina Regiments was
made under Lieutenant Woodhouse, of the Twenty-first, and armed with
Whitworth's telescopic rifles, a small lot of which had recently been
brought through the blockade. The detail was sent to Sullivan's Island
for a few days to become familiar by target practice with the weapon,
and were then put on duty in the fort. At night they slept undisturbed in
the hospital bomb-proof, and were excused from all fatigue duty at any
time. From dawn until dark they were incessantly at work with their
rifles, and of the value of their services the siege journal of the enemy
gives abundant proof. They were even at times used against the monitors.
In revolving their turrets, after a discharge, in order to bring the opposite
gun to bear, a man on each side of the turret would for a moment expose
himself, and would be complimented with the notice of a sharpshooter.
The men detailed became greatly interested in the duty and were not
relieved regularly as the rest of the garrison was. Later still in the siege,
when the enemy got nearer to the fort, the Whitworths were returned to
the city, and the Enfield resumed as better adapted to snap shooting at
close quarters.

The sharpshooters perched themselves wherever they could best get a
good view of the enemy from the fort, and sheltered themselves with little
andbag epaulements loopholed.

NOTE G.

The Rifle Pits.

About 300 yards in advance of Wagner a flattened ridge ran from the
sea beach to the marsh, and here the island was narrowed. Behind this
ridge in pits, two men to each, were stationed until the 26th August an
infantry force, which served both as a picket and as sharpshooters. It
served by ordinary detail from the garrison and used the habitual Enfield
rifles. The sustained efforts of the enemy to shell them out with curved
fire met with no success; and against direct artillery fire they seemed to
be better sheltered than men in the fort who could be enfiladed more or
less behind the breastheight. The fact of the pits being detached, one
from the other, seemed to traverse them effectually against the flank fire
of the fleet. The detail here served twenty-four hours; at dusk, however,
it was doubled and the re-enforcement withdrawn at dawn of day.

Their sharpshooting was very annoying to the enemy, and as pickets
they were invaluable, giving notice of assault in time to get the garrison
out of the bomb-proofs. When the enemy's sap approached this ridge,
he made an effort, on the 21st of August, to carry it by assault with the
One Hundredth New York Volunteers, but failed. Again, on the 25th, a
more determined effort was made. "Experience," says Major Brooks'
journal, "had now proved that the sap cannot proceed unless the artillery
fire of Wagner be subdued, or the enemy driven out of the ridge. . . . At
5:30 p. m., four 8-in. mortars and three Coehorn mortars opened on the
ridge. At the same time the navy howitzers and Requa Battery fired to
enfilade the reverse of the ridge. . . . The two Requa Batteries in the
fourth parallel also took part."

An Infantry Assault and Repulse Followed.

Both these efforts were made during General Hagood's last tour of
duty in Wagner. Upon relieving Colonel Keitt, on the 21st, he discovered
after daylight that, in accordance with the practice established by the
colonel on his recent tour, but 19 men were left in the pits for the day,
instead of the heretofore usual number of seventy-five or eighty. They
could not be re-enforced until night, and the enemy were greatly nearer
them for attack than we were for support. To add to the general's anxiety,
a flag of truce came in during the day, and the bearer was imprudently
allowed to come near enough to observe the weakness of the force in the
pits. When, therefore, in the evening a heavy and continuous bombardment
of the pits and the space intervening between them and the fort commenced,
it was evident what was coming, and the general drew out four
companies (about 175 men) from the bomb-proofs and formed them behind
the breastheight of the land force ready to go out of the right sally port
by a flank when required. Having fully explained to the senior captain
his anxieties and anticipations, he took his place, sheltered as best he
could, to watch from the parapet the time to start this re-enforcement.

To start them too soon, before the fading light would obscure them, was
to send them to butchery under the fire of artillery that could be concentrated
on the intervening space; to send them too late was to lose the
pits, for the enemy, once in them, would be as hard from their construction
to drive out as the original occupants were. Deeming the time to have
arrived, the general gave the word, "Now, captain, go." "General, I wish
you would detail some other man to take this command. I don't feel
competent to it."

Fortunately, General Hagood saw just then Lieutenant-Colonel Dantzler,
of the Twentieth South Carolina, standing in the door of the bomb-proof
opening on the parade, and, beckoning to him, he came at double quick
under the shelling going on. Explaining hastily the situation, the general
put him in command, and, as he moved off, the assault commenced. Going
at a run, Dantzler reached the pits after three on the right had been captured.
The fight continued obstinately till 10 o'clock at night, when, forced
out of the captured pits, the enemy gave over his efforts. After putting
out his advanced videttes, who were required to crawl forward and lie on
their stomachs during the night some twenty paces in front of the pits,
the enemy's videttes in like position facing them some twenty paces
beyond, Dantzler was going on his hands and knees down the line, inspecting
them, when he discovered one post vacant. The heart of the occupant
had failed him and he had slunk back into the pits. Jerking him forward
into his place, with some harsh words, the attention of the opposite videttes
was attracted and his fire drawn. The bullet struck the colonel, as he
stood upon his hands and knees, in the breast of his coat and passed down
the length of his body between his clothing and skin and out over his hip
without other injury than a decided wheal. Poor Dantzler! Few braver
men shed their blood in this war. At Wauboteam Church, in Virginia, in
'64, he threw away his life in the effort, by a deed of "derring do," to make
something of a worthless regiment to which he had been promoted. And
the captain so inopportunely modest! In December, '64, on the lines before
Richmond, when, in the current slang of the soldiers, chaplains were
"played out," General Hagood was invited by the commanding officer of
one of his regiments to attend divine service to be conducted by one of his
line officers. After listening to an excellent sermon from an officer whom
he had noticed during the past campaign always at his post and doing
his duty well, his aide, Ben Martin, asked him if he remembered his first
interview with the preacher. It was the modest Battery Wagner captain!

In the second attack (on the 23th) upon the pits, a full force was in
them during the day from the Fifty-fourth Georgia, Captain Roberts commanding;
and they were re-enforced at dark by Colonel Devorne's Sixty-first
North Carolina. The fight was gallantly and obstinately maintained,
the enemy giving over without success about 9 p. m. Captain Roberts was
mortally wounded before sundown, but could not be brought into the fort
before dark. When the fort had been arranged for the night, the commanding
officer went into the hospital bomb-proof to enquire after him.
Having expressed the hope that he was not seriously wounded, he replied

that his injuries were mortal. Taking him by the hand his commander
spoke of his gallant bearing in the fight, when the brave fellow half rose
from his litter and said, "Thank you, general," and fell back exhausted. He
asked for a chaplain, but there was none in the fort—no

A layman, a member of Parker's Light Battery (the Marions), a section
of which was on duty in the fort, visited him at the request of the commanding
officer, and spent the time, until his removal to the city, in administering
to him the consolations of religion.

On the 18th of July, a Catholic clergyman was in the fort and administered
the rites of his church in the bomb-proof just before the troops were
drawn out to meet the assault. The chaplain of Ormstead's Georgia command
and Mr. Dickson, chaplain of the Twenty-fifth South Carolina, each
accompanied his regiment on its tour of duty in the fort. The writer heard
of no others.

Upon being relieved before day, on the 26th, by Colonel Harrison, General
Hagood called his attention specially to the critical condition of the rifle
pits. They were carried by an infantry assault that night. The special
circumstances the writer never learned. But the trouble was in re-enforcing
them at the right time; for a sufficient force could not with safety be
kept in them during the day, nor could they be re-enforced while there was
light, and, as before remarked, the enemy could mass for attack closer
than we were for support. Ripley's report says: "Just before dark the
enemy threw forward an overwhelming force on the advanced pickets and
succeeded in overpowering them before they could be supported."

NOTE H.

Incidents of Service at Wagner.

First Sergeant Tines, of Captain John A. Gary's company, Lucas's battalion,
a plain man from one of the mountain districts of South Carolina,
but a true patriot and good soldier, was mortally wounded at his gun. To
Gary's expression of sympathy he replied: "I am glad it is I and not you,
captain; the country can better spare me." General Beauregard, on being
informed of this incident, ordered one of the best of his new James Island
batteries to be called "Battery Tines" in honor of the noble fellow.

Gary himself was killed a few days afterwards. He was a younger
brother of Captain M. W. Gary, a generous and spirited officer, and much
beloved by his comrades.[61]

On the 24th of August, Captain Robert Pringle, of the same battalion,
was commanding a gun replying to the fire of a monitor. Three shells
fired at a low elevation would richochet twice upon the water, the last time
close to the beach and then explode just over the parapet of the fort. The
practice was extremely accurate; and, although bright daylight, the huge
projectiles coming straight for the spectator could be seen from the time
they left the gun—presenting the appearance of a rapidly enlarging disk as
they approached. One of these shells struck a school of mullet at its last
rebound on the water and knocked one of the fish at least 100 yards into
the gun chamber. Pringle picked it up and gaily remarked that he "had
made his dinner." At the next fire from the monitor he was killed. The
writer had been a good deal thrown with this young officer, and had been
much pleased with his fine social traits and soldierly qualities. He was a
descendant of the Mrs. Motte of Revolutionary fame.

Extracts from the diary of Lieutenant-Colonel Pressley, Twenty-fifth
South Carolina:

"1st September. Ordered to Wagner. . . . Embarked from Fort Johnson
all of the regiment except Company A, in a light draft steamer. Company
A went in a rowboat. The steamer stopped near Sumter; harbor very
rough. I got in the only boat the steamer had for debarking us, with
about fifty officers and men. When we had got half way from the steamer
to Cummings Point, a bombardment of Sumter by monitors commenced and
the steamer returned to Fort Johnson with the balance of the regiment.
At Cummings Point I found Company A, making with the men I brought,
eighty or ninety men of my command, and no prospect of getting the others
till next night. Reported to General Colquitt, in command, and was
ordered to the sand hills in rear of Wagner. So we spent the balance of
the night in what the soldiers called "private bomb-proofs"—holes in the
sand. Not finding these comfortable, I myself spread my blanket between
two sand hillocks. Fort Wagner and the enemy exchanged shots slowly all
night.

"2nd September. Went into Wagner at daylight. Found the enemy's
sap within about 120 yards of the salient; enemy working industriously.
Garrison busy repairing damages and keeping up a slow fire. My
command detailed as a working party for Battery Gregg. Enemy shelling
Wagner, Gregg and Sumter all day. Transferred to Wagner at night, and
by 11 p. m. the balance of my regiment arrived and reported to me. My
companies, as they arrived, were stationed around the parapet, relieving
the North Carolina regiment.

"We occupied from the extreme left along the sea face around the left
salient and part of the land force; the Twenty-fifth Georgia the rest. These
two regiments, with the artillerists, occupied the fort; another regiment, the
Twenty-seventh Georgia, was in the sand hills in the rear. Enemy fired
very little tonight. I was up most of the night posting and visiting my
men; towards morning I took a nap in the left salient, resting my head
against the parapet.

"3rd September. One or two of our guns and one mortar keep up a fire
against the enemy's approaching sap.

"My command in high spirits,—a great many building loopholes with
sand bags for sharpshooting. This has become very dangerous work; as
soon as a hole is darkened on either side, a shot from the opposite sharpshooter
follows, and with frequent success. Not much artillery fire by
or at Wagner, but the enemy are hard at work and approaching. Our
James Island batteries are firing briskly on the enemy's trenches. During
the day from one-third to one-fourth the garrison are kept at the parapet,
the rest in the bomb-proof—at night all are turned out. The Yankees are
so near they can hear when we turn out, and quicken their fire. The garrison
is heavily worked repairing damages.

"Colonel Keitt, Twentieth South Carolina, relieved General Colquitt last
night in command of Morris Island. I was up nearly all night, slept a
little before day in the same salient as last night.

"4th September. Quite a lively bombardment from the enemy today, number
of the sand bag covers for sharpshooters knocked away. Sharpshooting
still very brisk, however. . . . Batteries on James Island do good shooting,
particularly Battery Simkins. Major Warley, chief of artillery, wounded;
Captain Hugenin replaces him. Our parties very hard at work repairing
damages. A corporal of Company A and several men wounded in my
regiment. Several killed and a good many wounded in the balance of
garrison. The enemy's fire slacked after dark. They display a calcium
light tonight upon Vincent's creek. Towards day I tried to get a little
sleep in my old place in the left salient. The shells from Fort Moultrie
were passing immediately over it. A fragment from one of our own mortar
shells came back into the fort and nearly struck me. This has been happening
for some time, the enemy were so close. . . .

"5th September. The fleet early this morning opened upon the fort, the
land batteries also cannonading with great fury—200 and 100-pound Parrotts,
8 and 10-inch mortar shells and 15-inch shell from the navy pouring
into us. The shells are exploding so fast they cannot be counted. All our
guns are silenced. Working them under such a fire is out of the question.
The men are being wounded and killed in every direction. I have been
around amongst my men a good many times and am covered with sand when
I return. The three-fourths of the garrison are still kept in the bomb-proofs.
The suffering of these from the heat and want of water is intolerable.
The supply of water brought from the city is very inadequate; that from
the shallow wells dug in the sand in and adjacent to the fort is horrible.
Famishing thirst alone enables the men to drink it. . . . I have seen some
horrible sights—men mangled in almost every manner. I saw a sharpshooter
knocked from the parapet to the middle of the parade, some forty
or fifty feet, and going fully twenty feet in the air. This was Rawlinson,
of Company G, and the brave fellow clutched his rifle to the last. Of course,
he lived but a short time. Lieutenant Montgomery, of Company C, was
killed this morning—his head taken off by a shell.

"An attack upon Battery Gregg is expected tonight; a detachment of my

regiment, under Captain Sellars, and of the Twenty-eighth Georgia, under
Captain Hayne, are to be sent to re-enforce it. As they march out Captain
Hayne enquires of Lieutenant Blum for Captain Sellars; a shell kills
both. . . . It is apparent that our force manning the parapet tonight must
be as small as possible. . . . In making our arrangements for the night
there are many casualties in our detachment, commanded by Lieutenant
Ramsey, Company Twenty-fifth. In a short time after it was posted every
man but one was killed or wounded. The fleet has withdrawn and the land
batteries slacked their fire, save the mortars, which are as active as ever.
I have seen four shells start from the same battery at the same time. . . .

"There was an alarm of an assault tonight. It was felt to be a relief—
the prospect of changing this passive endurance of artillery into the hot
blood of an infantry fight. The enemy's calcium light illuminated the
whole fort, and the sharpshooters, contrary to custom, were at work all
night. The enemy attacked Gregg and were repulsed. . . . Wells dug in the
bomb-proofs give some relief in better water, but not enough. . . ."

Lieutenant-Colonel Pressley served until the evacuation; but the foregoing
extracts from his diary are sufficient to give a picture of life in
Wagner.