University of Virginia Library

GENERAL BEAUREGARD'S REPORT.

Headquarters
Department Georgia, South Carolina and Florida.

General: I arrived in Charleston on the 13th September, 1862,
and assumed command on the 24th. In the interval I was
engaged in ascertaining the plans and measures of Major-General
Pemberton, my predecessor, for the defense, particularly of
Charleston and Savannah, and in a rapid inspection of the condition
and defensive resources of the department, the results of
which were communicated to the War Department in two papers,
dated the one relative to Charleston on the 3rd, and the other
chiefly concerning Savannah on the 10th of October, 1862.

At the time the troops in this department as organized consisted:

           

In South Carolina—
Infantry	6,564
Artillery in position	1,787
Artillery in field	1,379
Cavalry	2,817
		12,547

Note.—See Publications by U. S. Government of Official Records of the War of
the Rebellion, Series I, Vol. XXVIII, Parts 1 and 2.

             

In Georgia—
Infantry	3,834
Artillery in position	1,330
Artillery in field	445
Cavalry	1,580
		7,189
Total of all arms		19,736

Of this force 1,787 artillery in position, 727 light artillerists,
4,139 infantry and 410 cavalry were assembled in the First Military
District for the defense of Charleston; and 1,330 artillery
in position, 445 light artillery, 3,834 infantry and 1,580 cavalry
for the defense of Savannah. My predecessor before being
relieved furnished me with his estimate of the smallest number
of troops which he regarded as essential for the defense of
Charleston and Savannah, to-wit:

                             

For the defense of Charleston—
Infantry	15,600
Artillery in position	2,850
Cavalry	1,000
		19,450
and 9 light batteries.
For the defense of R. R. (Charleston & Savannah) land approaches—
Of all arms		11,000
For defense of Savannah—
Infantry	10,000
Artillery in position	1,200
Cavalry	2,000
		13,200
and 8 light batteries.
Total exclusive of light battery		43,650

Hence a total of 25,216 troops of all arms additional to those
in the department were needed to meet this estimate.

On the 7th April, 1863, the day of the ironclad attack on Fort
Sumter, the troops at my disposal in South Carolina and Georgia
gave an effective total of 30,040, distributed as follows:

         

In the First Military District	11,229
In the Second Military District	2,849
In the Third Military District	5,837
Georgia	10,125
	30,040

But the withdrawal of Cook's Brigade to North Carolina,
immediately after the repulse of the ironclad fleet, of Brigadier-General
S. R. Gist's and W. H. T. Walker's brigades and light
batteries about the 4th May, reduced my force materially. The
Department is aware of the circumstances under which this
reduction took place, and in this connection I beg to refer to my
letter to the Honorable Secretary of War of the 10th May and
to General S. Cooper, Adjutant and Inspector General, of June
15th and July 20th, 1863.

The force in the First Military District on the 10th July was:

               

Infantry	2,462
Artillery, heavy and light	2,839
Cavalry	560
		5,861
In Second Military District, of all arms		1,398
In Third Military District, of all arms		2,517
In District of Georgia of all arms		5,542
Grand total[29]		15,318

Meanwhile, as in duty bound by numerous telegrams and letters
during the month of April, May, June and July, I kept the
War Department advised both through yourself and directly of
the threatening nature of the enemy's preparations upon the
coast of my department and of my own fears concerning the
imminence of an attack. On the 25th of April, however, in
answer to my telegram of the preceding day asking for heavy
guns for Morris Island and other points, the Secretary of War
telegraphs:

"I regret to be unable to spare the guns even for the object
mentioned. The claims of Wilmington and of the Mississippi are
now regarded as paramount."

On the 1st May I was directed to send a full brigade to North
Carolina to report to General Hill, and in compliance General
Clingman's Brigade was dispatched. The following day the
Secretary of War telegraphed, "Advices show the enemy abandoning
their attack on the eastern coasts, and concentrating great
forces on the Mississippi River. Send with the utmost dispatch
eight or ten thousand men, including those heretofore ordered to
Tullahoma, to General Pemberton's relief."

My answer was: "No orders sending troops to Tullahoma have
been received. Cook's and Clingman's brigades have been
returned to North Carolina. Have ordered 5,000 infantry and
two batteries to report forthwith to General Pemberton, leaving
only 10,000 infantry available for the whole of South Carolina
and Georgia. Cannot send more without abandoning Charleston
and Savannah Railroad. Shall await further orders. Enemy
still occupy in force Folley and Seabrooks Islands and Port
Royal. To reduce this command further might become disastrous."

On the 4th May I sent the following dispatch to Secretary of
War: "Enemy's fleet reported at Hilton's Head and Port Royal
yesterday is four steam frigates, five wooden gunboats, six ships,
four barges, three brigs, five ocean steamers, six river steamers,
five tugs, eighty-seven transports and fifty-eight schooners, being
one hundred and eighty-three in all—a very remarkable increase
since last report."

Hon. Mr. Sedden, Secretary of War, telegraphed on 9th May:
"Foster, with his own and part of Hunter's forces, is believed to
have returned to North Carolina. More re-enforcements to General
Pemberton are indispensable. If General Evans's brigade
has returned to you send 5,000 men; if not, with a number which
with that will make 5,000 men." On the following day I telegraphed
in reply: "To the Secretary of War: The order sending
additional troops to Pemberton will be executed. Evans's Brigade
included have but 1,000 infantry to support extensive lines
and batteries at Savannah, but 750 infantry to hold line of railroad
to Savannah, virtually yielding up that country and large
stores of rice to the enemy, as well as opening even Charleston
and Augusta and Columbia Railroads to attack at Branchville,
leaving here 1,500 infantry at most, all of which will be known

to the enemy in a few days. Meantime General W. S. Walker
reports increased strength of enemy's outposts in his vicinity.
Hagood reports 2,500 infantry on Seabrooks Island fortifying,
five monitors still there. Enemy in force on Folley Island,
actively erecting batteries there yesterday. Season favorable for
enemy's operations for quite a month."

On the 12th, I telegraphed to the Honorable Secretary of War
as follows:

"Have ordered to General Pemberton (contrary to my opinion)
Evans's Brigade and one regiment amounting to 2,700 men,
leaving only 6,000 infantry available in the whole of South Carolina
and Georgia. The other 1,000 will await further orders of
Department. General Evans reports two brigades of the enemy
on Folley Island yesterday. Please answer." A letter to the
same address on the 11th May exhibited certain conditions and
explanations, being more fully my views on the subject of an
attack, with the object of showing to the War Department the
actual menacing aspect of the enemy on the coast of my department.
I transcribe an extract from that letter. . . .

"A week ago, under your orders, I put in motion for Jackson,
Miss., two brigades under Generals Gist and W. H. T. Walker,
the former commanding South Carolina, and the latter Georgia
troops,—somewhat over 5,000 infantry in all, and two light batteries
of the best class in the department. Your orders have been
based apparently upon the conviction that the troops of the
enemy assembled in this department for operations against
Charleston have been mainly withdrawn and directed to other
expeditions in North Carolina and the Valley of the Mississippi.
This conviction I regret I cannot share, as I am satisfied from
the reports of the district commanders, and from other reasons,
that there has been really but little reduction of the command
of Major-General Hunter. General Walker, commanding at
Pocotaligo, reports that on yesterday the outposts of the enemy
in his front had been much increased in strength. General
Hagood reports them to be occupying Seabrooks Island with at
least 2,500 infantry. They are erecting fortifications at that
point, as well as on Folley Island, which is likewise still occupied
in force. Five of the monitors remain in North Edisto with some
twenty gunboats and transports. With these and the transports

still in the waters of Port Royal, and the forces which I am
unable to doubt are still at the disposal of the enemy, he may
renew the attack by land and water on Charleston at any moment.
Acting on the offensive and commanding the time of attack, he
could simultaneously call troops here from North Carolina, and
sooner than my command could be re-enforced from any quarter
out of the department. . . . A letter to you of the 20th May
further calls attention to the fact that important changes are
reported to be on foot in the armament of the monitors and
urges strenuously that Fort Sumter be armed comformably with
the original plan, with the heaviest guns, rifled or smooth bore,
which could be obtained, in anticipation of a renewal of the
attack of the 7th April. I was informed, however, through your
letter of 10th June, that Northern papers report the reduction
of Hunter's force by sending troops to the gulf. If this be true,
you will with such force as you can properly withdraw from your
defensive lines proceed to Mobile to resist an attack if one be
designed at that place, but if the purpose of the enemy be to send
his forces to the Mississippi, you will go on and co-operate with
General Johnston in that quarter."

This I answered by telegram on the 13th of same month as follows:
"Enemy's ironclads and forces still as heretofore reported
to department, except a gunboat expedition reported in Altamaha,
and one preparing for St. John's River, Fla. I will prepare
as far as practicable for contingencies referred to in Department
letter of the 10th inst. Please send me any positive information
relative to movements or intentions of enemy. But in order that
the War Department should be thoroughly cognizant of the state
of affairs in my department, I further addressed to you on the
13th June a letter in which I pointed out how utterly insufficient
were the forces at my command to resist those of the enemy and
that on my responsibility I could not further deplete the force in
the department. I drew your attention in the same letter to the
danger of an attack by way of Morris Island—indeed, to the very
route which General Gilmore has since operated. I take the following
extracts from that letter:

". . . Thus it will be seen that the force in this department
is already at the minimum necessary to hold the works around
Charleston and Savannah constantly menaced by the proximity

of the enemy's ironclads. The garrison of no work in this harbor
can be withdrawn or diminished, as they are all necessary links
in the chain of defense. Reduce the command on James Island,
and the enemy may readily penetrate by such a coup de main as
was attempted last year at the weakened point. James Island
would then fall, and despite our harbor defenses the City of
Charleston would be thrown open to bombardment. It is not safe
to have less than a regiment of infantry on Morris Island, which,
if once carried by the enemy, would expose Fort Sumter to be
taken in reverse and demolished. . . . Late Northern papers
say Admiral Du Pont has been relieved of the command of the
fleet on this coast by Admiral Foot, an officer whose operations
in the west evinced much activity and enterprising spirit. And
even were considerable reductions made in the enemy's forces,
the valuable coast districts would be left a prey to such destructive
raids as devastated the Combahee a few days ago. Thus far,
however, I can see no reduction. General Hunter was at Hilton
Head on the 8th July; his troops hold the same positions as heretofore
and apparently in the same force—a brigade on Folley, one
on Seabrooks Island and the balance on the islands about Port
Royal. One of these monitors is at Hilton Head and five in the
North Edisto. Nor has the number of their gunboats and transports
diminished or at any time recently been increased, as must
have been the case had a material removal of troops taken place."

On the 25th June his Excellency, President Davis, telegraphed
the following: "From causes into which it is needless to enter,
the control of the Mississippi connection between the States east
and west of it will be lost unless Johnston is strongly and
promptly re-enforced within the next sixty days. Can you give
him further aid without the probable loss of Charleston and
Savannah? I need not state to you that the issue is vital to the
Confederacy." My answer was: "Telegram received. No more
troops can be spared from this department without losing railroad
and country between here and Savannah. Georgetown District
will also have to be abandoned. See my letter to General
Cooper of the 15th inst."

Thus on the 10th July, 1863, I had but 5,861 men in the First
Military District guarding the fortifications around Charleston
(or more than one-third the troops in my department) with an

enemy whose base of operations threatened Savannah, the line
of coast, and the important railroad connecting the latter city
with the former, with such immense transportation resources at
his command as to enable him to concentrate and strike at will
at any selected point before I could gather my troops to oppose.

In attacking Charleston itself five different routes of approach
present themselves to an enemy. First, by landing a large force
to the northward, say, at Bulls Bay, marching across the country
and seizing Mt. Pleasant and the northern shores of the inner
harbor. Second, by landing a large force to the southward,
cutting the line of the Charleston and Savannah Railroad and
taking Charleston in rear. Neither of these routes did I consider
practicable or likely to be adopted by the enemy, as his numerical
force would not have allowed him to cope with us, unless under
the shelter of his gunboats and ironclads, a fact which General
Gilmore has always carefully recognized. Before he adopts the
overland approaches he will require a large addition to his land
forces. The third, fourth and fifth approaches by James Island,
Sullivan's Island and Morris Island, respectively, permitted the
co-operation of the navy; and I always believed, as experience
has demonstrated, that of the three immediate routes to Charleston,
that by James Island was the most dangerous to us and the
one which should be defended at all hazards; that by Sullivan's
Island ranking next; and that by Morris Island last in importance
for the following reasons: An enemy, who could gain a
firm foothold on James Island and overpower its garrison (at
that time having to defend a long, defective and irregular line
of works), could have erected batteries commanding the Inner
Harbor, at once taking in rear our outer line of defenses, and by a
direct fire on Charleston compel its evacuation in a short period;
because in such case it would have become of no value as a strategic
position, and prudence and humanity would alike revolt at
the sacrifice of life necessary to enable us to retain possession of
its ruins. The route by Sullivan's Island was also of great
importance, for the occupation of that island would not only
have enabled the enemy to reduce Fort Sumter, as an artillery
fortress, but would also have given entire control of the entrance
to the inner harbor to his ironclad fleet. At that time, owing to
the want of labor and of heavy guns, the important works which

now line the shores of the inner harbor had not been erected and
armed, and the enemy's fleet would have been able to shell the city
comparatively unmolested, and by controlling and cutting off
our communication with Fort Sumter and Morris Island would
have soon necessitated their surrender or evacuation.

The remaining route by Morris Island was certainly the least
injurious to us; for the occupation of that island by the enemy
neither involved the evacuation of Fort Sumter, the destruction
of the city by a direct fire as from James Island, nor the command
by the ironclad fleet of movements in the inner harbor.
The James Island route I had long thought the most likely to be
attempted by the enemy, as its proximity to Folley Island (for
many months back in their possession) gave them facilities for the
execution of a coup de main, whilst the neighboring harbor of
North Edisto gave their fleet a convenient shelter from bad
weather, which they could not have had on the long island coast
had their attack been by way of Sullivan's Island. Moreover the
seizure of the island would have given the Federal Government
opportunity of making capital with its own people and with
foreign powers.[30]

To counteract these very apparent advantages of the enemy, I
had several months previously planned and ordered to be erected
on the south end of Morris Island suitable works. On Black
Island, which lies between James and Morris Islands and from
its position enfilades Light House Inlet, between Morris and
Folley Islands, I had determined to build two batteries for two
guns each. This island was further to have been connected with
the mainland by a branch from the bridge, planned to connect
James and Morris Islands, and nearly completed when the enemy
made their attack in July.[31] At Vincent's Creek a battery had
been commenced and had it been completed would have played
effectively upon the sand hills on the south end of Morris Island.
Battery Wagner was substantially strengthened and arranged
for these guns on the sea face, but owing to the scarcity of labor

and the want of the necessary ordnance to put in the works on
the south end of Morris Island, they were not, on the 10th July,
in that condition which would have characterized them had I
had sufficient labor, transportation and ordnance at my disposal.
Labor and transportation have always been serious drawbacks,
not only to the defense of Charleston, but of the whole
department. In reference to the labor question, I may here
state that no subject relative to the defense of this department
has engrossed more of my attention. Constant appeals were made
to the Governors and Legislature of South Carolina and to eminent
citizens since my first arrival, but few seemed to appreciate
the vital necessity of securing the proper amount of slave labor
for the fortifications of Charleston, and instead of the State providing
2,500 negroes monthly, as desired by me for Charleston,
I received for the first six months of 1863 the following number
of negroes from the State authorities, viz.: In January, 196;
in February, 261; March, 864; April, 491; May, 107, and June,
60, being 1,979 in all, and an average of 350 monthly. Consequently,
I had to detain these hands longer than 30 days, which
was the original term of service required for each negro. This
step caused considerable discontent among the owners of slaves,
and in the month of July, 1863, the number of negro hands in
the employ of the engineer department, provided under my call
on the State, amounted to only 299 hands. In the meanwhile
the troops of the command, in addition to their regular duties,
were employed in erecting fortifications, nearly the whole of the
works on the south end of Morris Island having been thrown up
by its garrison. The engineer department used every exertion to
hire labor, but their efforts were not crowned with appreciable
success.

In the middle of June the batteries on the south end of Morris
Island were engaged with the enemy on Folley Island, and
undoubtedly retarded the progress of their operations, as the
following extract from the reports of Brigadier-General Ripley
will show:

". . . June 12th, 1863.—The enemy having advanced light guns
to the extremity of Folley Island (Little Folley) yesterday to
shell the wreck of the steamer `Ruby' now ashore at Light House
Inlet, in accordance with directions, Captain Mitchel, commanding

the batteries on south end of Morris Island, opened fire,
silencing them at the second shot. This morning I gave instructions
to open fire in case he observed any indications of work
on Little Folley on the part of the enemy; and this afternoon.
about 5 o'clock, seeing parties apparently at work, he commenced
shelling. About fifty men left Little Folley for the main island.
The enemy replied from his batteries on Big Folley, and from his
light guns." Again, on the 14th June, the same officer reports:
". . . The enemy having appeared to be at work on Little Folley,
Lieutenant-Colonel Yates opened fire upon them, shelling them for
about three-quarters of an hour, and putting a stop to their operations,
which appeared to be erecting a shelter or battery near
the inlet.[32] " At the time of the attack on Charleston in the beginning
of April the enemy occupied Big Folley[33] and Seabrooks
Island in force estimated at one or two brigades. This force was
increased to about four brigades before July 10th, a considerable
number of troops landing on Coles and James Islands. During
the latter part of June and up to the first week in July, no extraordinary
activity was manifested by the enemy. On Big Folley
Island they were occupied as usual in fortifying the neck,
strongly picketing Little Folley and interfering with wrecking
parties on the steamer Ruby. On the morning of the 7th July, four
monitors appeared off the bar, but no other increase of the fleet in
that direction was observable. On the night of the 8th of July, a
scouting party under Captain Charles Haskell, visited Little
Folley and discovered the enemy's barges collected in the creeks
approaching Morris Island. Commencing on the 7th July, and for
the three succeeding days, working parties of the enemy were seen
engaged on Little Folley, supposed to be in erecting light works
for guns. The wood on the island, but more especially the configuration
of the ground which consists of sand hills, gave the
enemy every facility for the concealment of his designs. On the
night of the 8th July, considerable noise from chopping was
heard, and in the morning some works were discernible, the wood
and brush having been cleared away from their front. On the
night of the 9th July, an immediate attack being anticipated, the
whole of the infantry force on the island was kept under arms at
the south end.

At 5 o'clock on the morning of the 10th July, the enemy's
attack commenced by a heavy fire from a great number of light
guns, apparently placed during the last forty-eight hours in the
works lately thrown up on Little Folley Island. Their monitors
about the same time crossed the bar and brought their formidable
armament to bear upon the left flank of our position, while
several howitzers on barges on Light House Inlet flanked our
right. For two hours the enemy kept up their fire from these
three different points, our batteries replying vigorously. The
barges of the enemy having been seen in Light House Inlet in the
direction of Black Island, and Oyster Point being the most
accessible point for debarkation for them, it was justly considered
the one most necessary to protect, and, therefore, the infantry,
consisting of the Twenty-first South Carolina, about 350 men,
were stationed by Colonel R. F. Graham, the immediate commander
of the island, on the peninsular leading to that point. In
this position the infantry were unavoidably exposed to the fire
of the boat howitzers, but sheltered by the nature of the ground
from that of the guns on Little Folley.

About 7 o'clock the enemy advanced on Oyster Point in a
flotilla of boats, containing between two and three thousand men,
a considerable portion of whom endeavored to effect a landing,
in which they were opposed by the infantry until 8 o'clock, when
another force of two or three regiments made good a landing in
front of our batteries on the south end of Morris Island proper.
These formed a line of battle on the beach and advanced directly
upon our works, throwing out on east flank numerous skirmishers
who very soon succeeded in flanking and taking in reverse the
batteries. After an obstinate resistance, our artillerists had to
abandon their pieces and fall back, leaving in possession of the
enemy three 8-inch navy guns (shells), two 8-inch seacoast howitzers,
one rifle 24 dr., one 30 dr. Parrott, one 12 dr. Whitworth,
and three 10-inch seacoast mortars—eleven pieces in all. Two

companies of the Seventh South Carolina Battalion, which
arrived about this time, were ordered to the support of the batteries,
but they could not make head against the overwhelming
numbers of the enemy. This success of the enemy threatened to
cut off our infantry engaged at Oyster Point from their line of
retreat, and, consequently, about 9 o'clock, Colonel Graham gave
the order to fall back on Battery Wagner, which was accomplished
under a severe flanking fire from the monitor.

The enemy thus gained possession of the south end of Morris
Island by rapidly throwing across the inlet a large number of
troops, which it was impossible for the available infantry on the
spot, about four hundred men, to resist. It was not the erection
of the works on Little Folley that caused the abandonment of our
position. It was clearly the want on our side of infantry supports,
and the enemy's superior number and weight of guns. The
woods that remained unfelled on Little Folley were of no
material use to the enemy, for, even had there been labor to
remove them (which I never had), the formation of the ground
being a series of ridges of sand hills formed a screen which hid
the enemy's movements completely from us, and afforded all
the concealment he could desire. The attack was not a surprise;
neither was the erection of works on Little Folley unknown to
the local commander of these headquarters. The enemy, indeed,
made little effort to conceal them. With a sufficient infantry
support on Morris Island, the result of the attack on the 10th
July, I am confident, would have been different; but, as I have
already explained, the threatening position of the enemy on
James Island entirely precluded the withdrawal of a single
soldier from its defense until the point of attack had been fully
developed, and the only re-enforcements that could be sent to
Morris Island (the Seventh South Carolina Battalion, some 300
men,) arrived too late to be of any material service on the morning
of the 10th July. The long protracted defense of Battery
Wagner must not be compared with the evacuation of the south
end of Morris Island to the discredit of the latter movement.
The two defenses are not analogous. In the one a large extent
of exposed ground had to be guarded by an entirely inadequate
force; in the other a strong earthwork with a narrow line of
approach could be held successfully by a body of men numerically

quite insufficient to have opposed the landing of an enemy
on the south end of Morris Island.

Whilst the enemy on the 9th July was threatening Morris
Island, he also made a strong demonstration against James
Island by the Stono River. At 12 m. on that day, Colonel Simonton,
commanding at Secessionville, telegraphed: "The enemy are
landing on Battery Island. Their advanced pickets and our's are
firing. Pickets from Grimballs (on the Stono higher up)
report the enemy landing at that point." Their gunboats and a
monitor proceeded up the river as far as the obstructions. On
the morning of the 10th July, whilst the attack was progressing
on Morris Island, Colonel Simonton telegraphed that the main
body of the enemy were moving in force from Battery Island to
Legare's house. Later in the day, however, he telegraphed that the
reported advance was premature—"They are in force on Battery
Island." Though the demonstration of the enemy on Stono and
on James Island was made to distract our attention from Morris
Island, yet it was made in such force that at any moment it
could have been converted into a real attack of the most disastrous
kind to us had the garrison been weakened to support
Morris Island.

On the afternoon of the 10th July, detachments of the First,
Twelfth, Eighteenth and Sixty-third Georgia, under Colonel
Ormstead, arrived from the District of Georgia, and with the
Twenty-first South Carolina and Nelson's Seventh South Carolina
Battalion became the garrison of Battery Wagner. At daylight
on the 11th July the enemy assaulted Battery Wagner and
were repulsed with much loss, two officers and ninety-five men
being left dead in front of our works, and six officers and one
hundred and thirteen rank and file taken prisoners, about forty
of the latter being wounded. Our loss was one officer and five
privates wounded. During the day three monitors and three
wooden gunboats shelled Battery Wagner, and in the evening a
fifth monitor crossed the bar. From James Island, at 7 a. m., the
report was no forward movement on that front, two gunboats
and several transports off Battery Island. At 9 p. m., the enemy
were reported advancing in force both towards Legare's house
and Grimball's, our pickets falling back before him.

On the 12th July, the Marion Artillery, four guns and thirty-nine

effectives, arrived from the Second Military District and
was placed on James Island, as well as the Eleventh South Carolina,
from the Third Military District, four hundred effectives,
but these last soon had to be returned to guard our communication
with Savannah. A portion of General Clingman's Brigade,
550 men of the Fifty-first North Carolina, and 50 men of the
Thirty-first North Carolina, arrived from Wilmington about the
same time in consequence of my urgent call for re-enforcements.

The enemy was occupied during the day in erecting works on
the middle of Morris Island, whilst five monitors and three
wooden gunboats shelled Battery Wagner. The armament of
Battery Wagner was increased by four 12 dr. howitzers, two
32 dr. carronades on siege carriages.

On the 13th July, the enemy was actively engaged in throwing
up works on the middle of Morris Island, but was interrupted
by the fire of Gregg and Sumter. During the day four monitors,
three gunboats and two mortar vessels shelled Gregg and Wagner,
but with light effect and slight casualty. Four monitors only
were seen with the fleet, the fifth was observed going to the south
without a smokestack on the evening of the 12th. Orders were
issued this day for the construction of a new battery on Shell
Point (Battery Simkins) in advance of Fort Johnson for one
10-inch columbiad, one 6.40 Brooke gun and three 10-inch
mortars. The armament of Fort Moultrie was ordered to be
increased by guns taken from Sumter. An appeal was made to
his Excellency Governor Bonham for slave labor to work on the
fortification.

The arrival of Clingman's Brigade and re-enforcements from
other quarters having increased to some extent my available
force, the consideration arose whether or not the expulsion of the
enemy from Morris Island could yet be attempted. The number
of men required for such an attempt would have been 4,000, the
surface of Morris Island not permitting the manœuvering of a
larger force. The only hope of success lay in the possibility of our
troops carrying the enemy's works before daylight, otherwise the
advance and attack would necessarily have been made under the
fire of the enemy's fleet, in which case it must have ended disastrously
for us. After a consultation with my general officers,
the idea of this attack was abandoned from the consideration

that our means of transportation was so limited as to make it
impossible to throw sufficient re-enforcements on Morris Island
in one night and in time to allow the advance of our troops to
the south end before daylight.[34]

Two regiments under Brigadier-General Colquitt arrived on
the 14th and were sent to James Island. During the day the
enemy's gunboats and mortar vessels shelled Wagner at long
ranges, doing but little damage. The enemy worked hard on his
Morris Island works, making considerable progress, though the
fire from Fort Sumter and Batteries Gregg and Wagner annoyed
him much.

The impossibility of expelling the enemy from Morris Island
being fully recognized, I was reluctantly compelled to adopt the
defensive. Orders were issued for closing the gateway in the
gorge of Fort Sumter and removing a portion of the guns also
for the construction of a covered way from Fort Moultrie to
Battery Bee. During the night Brigadier-General Taliaferro,
commanding at Morris Island, sent out a party of 150 men under
Major Rion, of the Seventh South Carolina Battalion, who drove
the enemy's pickets from the rifle pits across the island some
three-quarters of a mile in front of Battery Wagner. On the 15th
the enemy on Morris Island appeared to be largely re-enforced,
and during the night of the 14th the frigate "Ironsides" had
crossed the bar.

The enemy was busy on his works, and our men employed in
repairing damages in Battery Wagner, and answering the fire of
the monitors and gunboats. The following instructions were
given the engineer department: To have Shell Point Battery
constructed for three guns instead of two; the mortar batteries
at Fort Johnson to be converted into gun batteries for one heavy
rifled gun, or 10-inch columbiad each; to strengthen the gorge
wall of Fort Sumter by means of wet cotton bales filled in
between with sand and kept moist by means of tubes or hose from
upper turpline. General Ripley was also instructed to reduce
the force on Morris Island to a command simply competent to
hold the works against a coup de main, also to furnish the troops
on that island with several hundred empty rice casks for the construction

of "rat holes" in the sand hills in rear of Battery Wagner.[35]
Instructions were given to the chief of subsistence to keep
rations on Morris Island for five thousand men for thirty days
and on James Island for five thousand men for fifteen days, with
a reserve supply in the city. On the same day the enemy's pickets
along the Stono on James Island were observed to be increased
by negro troops. Brigadier-General Hagood made a reconnoisance
of the enemy in his front on James Island. At daybreak on the
morning of the 16th July Brigadier-General Hagood, in accordance
with instructions, attacked the enemy on James Island,
driving them to Battery Island under shelter of their gunboats.
The loss was small on both sides; three men killed, twelve
wounded and three missing on our side. The enemy left forty
killed on the field and fourteen prisoners (negroes) taken by us
prisoners. This retreat of the enemy was followed by the
advance of our troops who have occupied the ground ever since.
In the engagement the gunboat Pawnee was forced to retire
down the Stono under fire of our light artillery.[36] During the
day the monitors, gunboats and mortar vessels shelled Battery
Wagner. The enemy worked diligently on their batteries. In
the evening large bodies of infantry were landed on the south
end of Morris Island.

Colonel Harris, chief of engineers, was directed to increase the
batteries on James Island bearing on Morris Island by at least
twenty guns on siege carriages, so as to envelope in a circle of
fire the enemy whenever he should gain possession of the north
end of Morris Island; all works to be pushed on night and day.

On the morning of the 17th the enemy's fleet left the Stono
River after embarking his forces at Battery Island, and appeared
to concentrate them on Little Folley and Morris Islands. Both
the fleet and land batteries shelled Wagner throughout the day,
answered vigorously by our guns. The construction by the enemy
of batteries on Morris Island proceeded rapidly. In a telegraphic
dispatch today, I pointed out that the contest had passed
into one of engineering skill, where, with sufficient time, labor
and long-range guns, our success was very probable, owing to the

plan of defense adopted; otherwise it was doubtful in proportion
to the lack of these elements of success.

The fire of the enemy's batteries from this date prevented communication
with Cummings Point during daylight, and henceforth
it had to be effected at night; the very limited transportation
at my command added considerably to the difficulty of
relieving the garrison at Battery Wagner as often as I could have
wished. The time of service was at first limited to forty-eight
hours, but owing to this difficulty it was now extended to three
days.

On the morning of the 18th July it became evident that the
enemy were about to attempt serious operations against Wagner.
The south end of Morris Island was crowded with troops, and in
their batteries and advanced works great activity was apparent,
large bodies of men being engaged in pushing them rapidly to
completion. Troops from Folley were being continually landed
on Morris Island; these advanced and took up position in line
of battle behind their breastworks. At 8:10 a. m. Battery
Wagner opened; five minutes afterward Battery Gregg joined.
At 10 a. m. four of the enemy's vessels were in action. At 11:30
Fort Sumter opened on the enemy's rifle pits on Morris Island.
The guns of Wagner about this time seemed to harass the enemy's
working parties extremely. At 12:10 the frigate "Ironsides" and
one monitor moved up abreast of Wagner, and at 12:30 were
joined by two other monitors, when they opened fire on the work.
At 1 p. m. the Ironsides, five monitors, a large wooden frigate, six
mortar boats (these last could get the range without exposing
themselves) and the land batteries mounting five guns, concentrated
their fire on Battery Wagner and continued it till dark.
The enemy's fire throughout the day was very rapid, averaging
fourteen shots per minute, and unparelleled until this epoch
of the siege in the weight of the projectiles thrown. Brigadier-General
Taliaferro, commanding at Battery Wagner, estimated
that there were nine thousand shot and shell thrown in and
against the battery in the eleven and a half hours that the
bombardment lasted. During that time our casualties in the
work were four killed and eleven wounded. During the day the
garrison replied slowly to the terrific fire to which it was exposed,
whilst Fort Sumter and Battery Gregg fired rapidly. Circumstances

indicating an attack at dark, Brigadier-General Hagood
was relieved from the command of James Island, and, with
Colonel Harrison's Thirty-second Georgia Regiment, was ordered
to the re-enforcement of Morris Island. During the passage of
these troops the assault was made and repulsed; but they arrived
in time to dislodge a portion of the enemy who had gained a footing
in the southeastern salient of Battery Wagner.

The garrison of Battery Wagner consisted of the Charleston
Battalion, the Fifty-first North Carolina and the Thirty-first
North Carolina, two companies of the Sixty-third Georgia Heavy
Artillery and two companies of the First South Carolina
Infantry, acting as heavy artillery. During the bombardment
the garrison were kept under the shelter of the bomb-proofs,
with the exception of the Charleston Battalion, which was stationed
along the parapet of the work, a position which they
gallantly maintained throughout the day, exposed to a free
d'enfre. At a quarter past 8 p. m. the assaulting lines of the
enemy were seen advancing from their works, and the bombardment
from the fleet and land batteries subsided. The garrison
were quickly called to their allotted positions and with the exception
of one regiment responded manfully to the summons? The
Charleston Battalion guarded the right of the work and the
Fifty-first North Carolina the center. These two regiments drove
back the enemy opposed to them with frightful slaughter, whilst
our guns discharging grape and cannister into their shattered
ranks completed their discomfiture. On the left of the work,
however, the Thirty-first North Carolina disgracefully abandoned
their position, and no resistance being offered at that point the
enemy succeeded in crossing the ditch and gaining a footing upon
the rampart. The main body of the enemy, after vainly endeavoring
to gain a position on the parapet, retreated in disorder
under a destructive fire from our guns, including those of Fort
Sumter. The ditch and slope of the southeastern salient was
then swept with a fire of grape and musketry to prevent the
enemy lodged there from retiring, and after a brief resistance
they surrendered.[37]

The assault was terribly destructive to the enemy; his loss in
killed and wounded and prisoners must have been three thousand,
as eight hundred bodies were buried in front of Battery Wagner
next day.

The enemy's forces on this occasion consisted of troops from
Connecticut, Pennsylvania, New Hampshire and the Fifty-fourth
Massachusetts (negro) regiments—the whole said to have been
under command of General Seymour, with Brigadier-General
Strong and Colonel Putnam commanding brigades. General
Seymour is said to have been wounded, and Brigadier-General
Strong and Colonel Putnam killed. General Taliaferro reported
that his troops, with the exception of the Thirty-first North Carolina,
behaved throughout with the utmost gallantry. The heroic
conduct of the Fifty-first North Carolina counterbalanced the
unworthy behavior of the Thirty-first and retrieved the honor of
the State. Our loss during the bombardment and assault was
174 killed and wounded.[38]

At 1 a. m. on the morning of the 19th, during the engagements,
I telegraphed General Ripley at Fort Sumter that Morris Island
must be held at all costs for the present, and re-enforcements must
be thrown there to push any advantage possible before daylight.
The 19th passed in comparative quiet. The enemy sent in a flag
of truce to arrange for the burial of the dead. Brigadier-General
Hagood reported that 600 of the enemy's dead in and around our
works were buried by our troops and at least 200 more were by the
enemy.[39]

The strengthening of the gorge wall of Sumter by cotton bales
and sand proceeded rapidly. On the 20th the enemy opened fire
from two new batteries. Throughout the day the fleet joined
in the bombardment and were answered by Sumter, Gregg and
Wagner. At 3 p. m. information was received that a 10-inch gun
at Battery Wagner was dismounted. I impressed upon General

Hagood, commanding the work, that I did not consider a 10-inch
columbiad essential to the defense of the position for which siege
guns, musketry, stout arms and hearts, and the strength of sand
parapets must be relied on.[40] Orders were, however, issued for the
remounting of the 10-inch gun if practicable.

The enemy's fleet this morning consisted of four monitors, the
Ironsides, and seventeen vessels inside the bar; fourteen vessels
outside; thirty vessels in Folley River; one gunboat and four
vessels in North Edisto, and one steam frigate, one sloop of war,
one gunboat and thirty-four transports at Hilton Head.

General Ripley was instructed to have the guns for Battery
Haskell mounted immediately, and to open fire with them as soon
as practicable. Brigadier-General Mercer was telegraphed to
send on, if practicable, another 10-inch columbiad from the
Savannah works. At 2 p. m. a shell struck Fort Sumter, and
some eight or ten 80 dr. Parrott shot were fired at the fort from
a distance of 3,500 yards. Five casualties in Wagner today and
one in Sumter.

On the 21st a flag of truce was sent in with a communication
from General Gilmore requesting an interview between General
Vogdes and the officer commanding Battery Wagner. The proposal
was agreed to and the flag of truce was met by an officer
from that work. While the conference was proceeding the fleet
opened a bombardment on Wagner. This gross violation of the
usages of war was responded to by General Hagood by an abrupt
termination of the interview. During the day the enemy's gunboats
and land batteries shelled Battery Wagner. The enemy
had apparently mounted eight new guns in their batteries.
Colonel Rhett reported that from the want of proper appliances
he had been unable to dismount the guns in Fort Sumter which
I had ordered to be removed. The bombardment continued
throughout the day of the 22nd, with an interval, when General
Vogdes, U. S. A., requested, under a flag of truce, another interview
with Brigadier-General Hagood. This was refused until
an apology should be made for the breach of truce the day
before. This having been given and deemed satisfactory, General
Vogdes verbally proposed an exchange of prisoners, mentioning
that they had but a few of ours, all except those recently captured

having been sent north; that as we had the excess "of
course we could select whom to exchange." He abstained from
any reference to negroes, whilst intimating that a mutual parole
of prisoners without regard to excess would be agreeable.[41]

The following instructions were given to Brigadier-General
Ripley: Not to open from the new James Island batteries until
their completion; then to carry on a vigorous fire on the enemy's
works, sorties to be made at night whenever practicable.[42]

In my telegram to you of this date, I mentioned the continued
re-enforcement of the enemy; that I had to guard these important
lines of approach, James, Morris and Sullivan's Islands, and
requested the balance of Colquitt's Brigade with more troops as
soon as practicable.

No gun was fired on either side during the 23rd. Our men
were engaged in repairing damages and the enemy in erecting
batteries and throwing up traverses to protect them from the
James Island batteries.

On the morning of the 24th a heavy bombardment was opened
on Battery Wagner from five monitors, two gunboats, two mortar
vessels, the Ironsides and land batteries, which continued till
9:30 a. m., when the steamer with prisoners on board proceeded
to the fleet and the exchange was effected as previously agreed
on. "Upon the arrival of the boat in the neighborhood of the
place appointed, the fire of the enemy, which for a portion of the
time had been very heavy, ceased. The 10-inch gun on the sea
face was dismounted and one of the magazines so much exposed
as to require the removal of the ammunition. General Taliaferro,
who had previously relieved General Hagood in command, anticipating
a renewal of the bombardment upon the completion of
the exchange of prisoners, as a matter of prudent precaution
requested that all necessary arrangements should be made for
the transfer of the troops from the island in case of necessity.
The enemy, however, did not renew his attack and the time thus
allowed was improved in repairing damages. . . . Instructions
were sent General Taliaferro not to abandon the works without

express orders to that effect."[43] Colonel Harris, chief engineer,
having inspected Battery Wagner, reported no material damage
to the work; the guns on the sea face unserviceable; those on the
land face in good order; the enemy's stockade within 700 yards of
the work. Brigadier-General Taliaferro came to the city to confer
with me personally regarding the condition of his garrison, the
officers having reported their men as much dispirited. After a
conference with him, I communicated my views as follows:

The position must be held if possible until the guns en route
from Richmond be received and put in position. No idea of
evacuation must be entertained if there is a chance at night to
repair the damages done in the day. Every night preparations
will be made to remove troops from Morris Island in case of
need. Battery Wagner must be held and fought to the last
extremity. The garrison might rest assured that every preparation
will be made for their withdrawal in case of necessity.[44]

My telegram to you of this date was: "The enemy shelled Battery
Wagner heavily this morning. Our loss one killed and seven
wounded. Am anxiously waiting for heavy guns promised from
Richmond. Hope to repair damages during the night."

On the 25th the enemy's fleet remained quiet on account of the
high seas, and his land battery fired but little. Fort Sumter,
Battery Gregg and the James Island batteries answered. A
30 dr. Parrott was again brought to bear on Fort Sumter from
the same battery as on the 20th. During the day several of my
new batteries were ready for their armament. The strengthening
of Fort Sumter proceeded day and night; and in anticipation of
the damaging effect which the enemy's rifled guns from stationary
batteries would produce on this work, a partial disarmament
was carried on nightly.

On Sunday, the 26th, the bombardment of the enemy slackened.
During the night shelling of the enemy's works was carried

on from Fort Sumter. Re-enforcements were seen throughout
the day debarking from Morris Island. I telegraphed on this
day: "Have nine positions for heavy guns ready. Not one
promised from Richmond has arrived. Cannot their transportation
be expedited?"

The weather on the 27th was too windy for the co-operation
of the fleet, which had been increased by the addition of another
monitor. During today the bombardment from the land batteries
slackened. Our defenses were pushed on vigorously, whilst
the strengthening of Fort Sumter and the withdrawal of guns
from that work proceeded. The enemy showed great activity in
advancing their works, though harassed by the fire of our batteries.

On the 28th, Battery Wagner had another very severe bombardment
from the enemy's land and naval batteries, but no
great damage was done. Two men were killed and five wounded.
My telegraphic dispatch on the evening of the 28th was: "Many
transports of the enemy are arriving with troops. At least 2,500
men are required at present for James Island. Cannot they be
ordered here immediately? Enemy's land and naval batteries are
now playing on Wagner, which she answers bravely, assisted by
Gregg and Sumter."

On the 29th, Battery Wagner was heavily bombarded throughout
the day. In a telegram to you of this date notified the
arrival from Richmond of some of the promised guns: "Have
received four 10-inch columbiads and four 10-inch mortars.
Regret to say that by order of the Secretary of the Navy two
Brooke guns have been taken from me to be shut up in a new
gunboat so pierced as only to give a range of a mile and a half
at most."

Throughout the 30th Batteries Wagner and Gregg were subjected
to a furious fire from both land batteries and fleet. As an
example of the rapidity of the enemy's fire, I may mention that
between the hours of 10:30 a. m. and 1 p. m. five hundred and
ninety-nine shots were fired at our different batteries—principally
Gregg and Wagner. During the same time one hundred and ten
shots were fired from our works. Our loss was two killed and
seven wounded in Battery Wagner—no damage of any consequence
to the works. Brigadier-General Ripley was instructed

to transport as early as possible one of the 10-inch columbiads
recently arrived from Richmond to Battery Wagner, which was
accomplished on the night of the 30th.

The enemy fired heavily on Wagner throughout the 31st. Our
loss was seven wounded. Our new works progressed very satisfactorily,
and the strengthening of Sumter and the removal of its
guns went on rapidly.

The enemy's fire on the 1st of August was slack and did but
little execution, save to the front traverse of the 8-inch shell
gun at Wagner, which did not, however, disable it. The casualties
today were only two wounded. The enemy was industriously
engaged in throwing up new batteries and advancing
his trenches. Every endeavor was made by firing from Sumter,
Gregg, Wagner and the James Island batteries to annoy and
delay his approaches.

Throughout the morning of the 2nd August the enemy did not
answer our fire, but about 2 o'clock they opened vigorously on
Wagner. The damage, however, done to the work was comparatively
small. In my telegram of that date I mentioned that
"Transports going south from Stono, filled with troops, are
reported, probably intended to operate against Savannah. Cannot
some of my troops sent to General Johnston be ordered back
for the defense of that city?"

Orders were given to the chief quartermaster to have trains in
waiting sufficient to transport two regiments of infantry to
Savannah. The difficulties attending the defense of Charleston
were greatly increased by the celerity with which the enemy could
remove his operations from one point to another and from the
paucity of troops in my command. Savannah and the coast line
were nearly denuded. All these places had to be guarded.

Instructions were given for increasing the armament of Fort
Johnson by two 6-40 Brooke guns, turned over by the Navy
Department, and to place floating torpedoes in certain localities.
Brigadier-General Mercer was instructed to forward a detachment
of artillerists to relieve that from the Sixty-third Georgia
which had become reduced by casualties and sickness. The
ordnance department in Richmond was applied to for Coehorn
mortars.

The fire of the enemy on the 3rd was not heavy, but his sharpshooting

annoyed the garrison of Wagner considerably. No
casualties. Brigadier-General Mercer, at Savannah, was informed
that transports were moving south from here with troops and
that two regiments were held in readiness to move at a moment's
notice. I was informed that Evans's Brigade was ordered
to Savannah from Mississippi. In a personal visit paid to
Morris Island that evening I found Battery Wagner in a very
serviceable condition. The work was more solidly constructed
than when the attack commenced; the garrison appeared to be in
fine spirits and ready to defend the work to the last. At Fort
Sumter the filling of the officers' quarters and the casemates was
rapidly approaching completion. An exterior sand-bag revetment
was ordered for the gorge wall, as well as a series of traverses
in barbette on the east, south and northeast faces, and
many changes and removals in the armament.

During the 4th August but little firing occurred upon either
side. Orders were given to rearrange certain guns on the batteries
of James Island. Major Trezvant, commanding Charleston
Arsenal, was requested to collect all of the old iron in the
burnt district to cast into projectiles. Orders were given to
General Ripley to arrange with Captain Tucker of the navy an
attempt to capture the enemy's picket in the marsh battery near
Vincent's Creek.

On the 5th, the guns in Battery Wagner were all in fighting
order. Our sharpshooters, armed with Whitworth rifles, seemed
to annoy the enemy greatly, who endeavored to silence their fire
with Coehorn mortars. About 9 o'clock that night a picket of
the enemy, which had taken possession of our unfinished battery
on Vincent's Creek and, by signalling the arrival of our steamers
at Cummings Point, interfered materially with our operations,
was attacked by a party from the Twenty-fifth South Carolina.[45]
The result was satisfactory. One captain and ten enlisted men
were captured. Our loss one man killed. Our defensive works
at Fort Sumter and elsewhere proceeded satisfactorily. The telegram
of this day was: "Enemy still being largely re-enforced
from the northward. Cannot General Colquitt's other regiments
be ordered here at once? Other troops are absolutely needed."

Throughout the 6th the enemy fired occasional shots from his

land batteries and fleet, without material result. One casualty
occurred. Our batteries fired at intervals throughout the day.
Brigadier-General Cobb was ordered by telegraph to send 500
infantry and one light battery to report to Brigadier-General
Mercer at Savannah. The enemy on Morris Island worked laboriously
on his trenches, whilst strong re-enforcements of troops
were daily seen arriving.

On the 7th, I received a telegram from you, informing me that
the balance of Colquitt's Brigade was ordered to Charleston.
There was little firing throughout the day and two casualties
occurred on Morris Island.

On the 8th, Brigadier-General Evans reported his arrival at
Savannah. A large increase was visible in the enemy's fleet in
the Stono. During the day the firing from our batteries was
carried on at intervals, but the enemy remained quiet until
evening, when they opened on Battery Wagner and continued the
fire throughout the night. Instructions were issued to the chief
engineer to expedite the putting up in Fort Sumter of the sandbag
"chemise" to the gorge wall, the interior traverses and
merlons, and to erect a covered way from Gregg to Battery
Wagner.

The firing of the enemy during the morning of the 9th was
heavy and rapid from his land batteries. The officer in command
of the advanced pickets reported that the enemy worked industriously
in his trenches till 2 a. m. The fire of our sharpshooters
evidently annoyed the enemy much, as he occasionally fired with
great spirit but ineffectually to dislodge them.[46] The effective
force on Morris Island was 663 infantry, 248 artillery and 11
cavalry—total 922. During the day I received the following
telegram from Brigadier-General M. Jenkins, dated Petersburg,
Va.: "My scouts report shipment of troops, both infantry and
cavalry, from Norfolk, supposed to be for Charleston; large
quantities of forage shipped. Cavalry left 6th inst."

The chief engineer was instructed to lay out and erect a line
of works on James Island, from Secessionville to Dills's house
on the Stono, in lieu of the present defensive lines; to consist of
lunettes with closed gorges; disposed at one-half to three-quarters
of a mile apart and connected by cumulative infantry lines.

Captain Tucker, Confederate States Navy, was informed of the
practice of the enemy of putting out boat pickets at night to
observe the movement of our transportation to Morris Island;
and it was suggested to him that steps should be taken by the
navy to break up these pickets. Upon the approach of our
steamers signals would be exchanged between the enemy's boats
and their land batteries, and immediately a heavy fire upon Cummings'
Point rendered our communication extremely dangerous
and difficult. At times also the enemy illuminated the landing
with a powerful light, so as to prevent the approach of steamers
and forcing us to transport our supplies of men and munitions
in small boats.

During the 10th the enemy remained comparatively quiet until
about 8 p. m., when he opened briskly on Wagner. On our
side fire was kept up from Battery Simkins (Shell Point) with
columbiads from 11 a. m. to 11 p. m., when mortar firing was
resumed and continued until morning. The enemy was busy
during the night and his advanced works were now about 600
yards from Wagner, though no guns were yet in that position.
My telegram to you of this date was: "Nothing of importance
has occurred since yesterday. Evans's Brigade is arriving in
Savannah and Colquitt's Regiment arriving here."

About 7 o'clock, on the morning of the 11th, the fleet and land
batteries opened heavily on Wagner and were replied to by
Sumter, Gregg and Simkins.[47] One casualty occurred during the
day, the enemy as well as ourselves working persistently in spite
of the heat which was excessive. Our garrison of Morris Island
consisted of 1,245 of all arms.

At 5:45 a. m. on the 12th, the enemy opened on Fort Sumter
with an 8-inch Parrott gun, firing from a battery to the north
and west of Craig's Hill on Morris Island, the distance estimated
to be at least 4,400 yards. Eleven shots in all were fired at the

fort. Four missed, three struck outside, and four struck within
the fort. Again, at 5:30 p. m., the enemy opened from the same
battery on Fort Sumter, firing at intervals of ten minutes till
dark. Eleven 8-inch rifled shot struck the fort. Heavy firing
was carried on throughout the day against Battery Wagner.
Fort Sumter and Battery Gregg as well as Simkins directed their
fire throughout the day against the enemy's working parties on
the left of his approach and dispersed them, stopping the work
they were engaged on. At dark, Battery Wagner opened with
eight guns on the enemy's advanced trenches, and in conjunction
with Sumter and Simkins prevented any progress on the part
of the enemy.[48] His batteries in rear replied to the fire of Wagner
and interrupted our communications with Cumming's Point.

On the 13th, the enemy endeavored several times to repair the
damage done to his advanced works, but well directed shots from
Wagner as often drove him back. The batteries in rear of the
fleet then opened on Wagner and Gregg, and were answered by
Sumter and Simkins.

At 5:30 a. m., the enemy opened with 8-inch Parrotts from the
same battery as the day before, firing two or three hours only.
At 11 a. m., three or four wooden gunboats approached within
4,000 and 5,000 yards of Sumter and opened slow fire. They were
armed with heavy rifled guns. Some fifteen shots were fired at this
great range; three only struck the fort; one shot passed over at
great elevation and dropped a mile to the westward. At 5 p. m.,
the enemy opened again on the fort with the 8-inch Parrotts; no
great damage was done, the farthest penetration into the brickwork
was four feet.

On the 14th, the land batteries opened on Sumter, firing three
shots; two struck. About 11 a. m. the wooden gunboats shelled
the fort at long range; and at 5:15 p. m. the land batteries again
opened on the fort. Throughout the day the enemy remained
quiet, firing occasionally, and were replied to by our batteries. The
sharpshooters on both sides kept up an incessant fire. During
the night the fire of Battery Wagner put a stop to the operations
on its front. The strengthening of Fort Sumter advanced rapidly

[ILLUSTRATION]

SKETCH OF BATTERY WAGNER, 1863.—J. H.

1. Fieldpiece. 2. 10″ Mortar. 3 and 4. Carronades. 5. 32 dr. 6. 8″ Navy.
7. 32 dr. 8. 8″ Navy. 9. 32 dr. 10. 8″ Howitzer. 12. 32 dr. Rifled.
13. 10″ Columbiad. 14. 8″ Gun. 15 and 16. 12 dr. Field Howitzers.

both day and night. Brigadier-General Ripley was instructed
as to the armament of a certain position of the new lines on James
Island and of a new battery thrown up near Fort Johnson.

During the greater part of the 15th the enemy, both on land
and sea, were unusually quiet, only occasionally firing at Battery
Wagner. Later in the day they opened with some vigor on
Battery Gregg. The enemy's fleet consisted this morning of the
Ironsides, six monitors, eight gunboats, three mortar vessels, with
thirteen other vessels inside and seven outside the bar. At Hilton
Head, fifty-two vessels, including gunboats and ironclads. My
telegram of this date was: "No change worth recording since
yesterday. . . . Sand bag revetment of gorge wall of Sumter and
traverses inside of fort progressing as rapidly as means of transportation
will admit."

On the 16th, the enemy's batteries fired but little on Gregg and
Wagner, but during the afternoon the two 8-inch Parrots opened
on Sumter, throwing forty-eight shell. Four passed over, four
fell short, two struck inside the parade and thirty-two hit in
various places, exterior and interior. At this date, the armament
of the fort consisted of thirty-eight guns and two mortars; at
least twenty guns having been withdrawn since the landing of the
enemy on Morris Island. Orders were given to Brigadier-General
Ripley to remove to Battery Gregg the two mortars in Sumter as
soon as it should become impossible to use them to advantage in
the latter work, and to transport to other points every gun in
Sumter not actually required for its defence and the new relations
of that work to the defence of the harbor. The chief engineer
was instructed to strengthen Castle Pinckney with sand bags;
Fort Johnson to be arranged for two additional 10-inch guns;
and positions to be arranged for three 10-inch guns to be placed
on the James Island shore of the harbor.

Battery Wagner was bombarded heavily by the enemy about
daylight on the 17th, their guns were then turned on Sumter and
a heavy cannonade was directed against that work. About 9
o'clock the Ironsides and six monitors joined in the action.
During the engagements Captain Rodgers, commanding the
Weehawken, was killed in the pilot house of his ship. In the
twenty-four hours 948 shot were fired against Fort Sumter; 448

struck outside, 233 inside, and 270 passed over. The casualties
in the fort amounted to fourteen.

On the 18th, 19th, 20th, 21st, 22nd, 23rd of August the fierce
bombardment of Fort Sumter by the enemy continued both from
his land and naval batteries. From the 17th to the 23rd inclusive
he fired against the fort a total of 5,643 shot, of which 2,643
struck inside, 1,699 outside and 1,301 missed. These projectiles
were fired from 30 dr. and 300 dr. Parrotts and from 15-inch
smooth bore guns. An average of 150 pounds per shot would
give a weight of nearly 385 tons discharged against the walls
of Fort Sumter during this period of seven days. At the end of
this time nearly all the guns remaining in the fort were unserviceable
and the damage to the gorge wall and the northwest face
by the severe fire great; but the sand that had been placed upon
the outside of the gorge wall, in conjunction with the filling up
of the barracks and casemates with cotton bales, and above all
the crumbling under the enemy's fire of the masonry converted
this portion of Fort Sumter into a mass of debris and rubbish
on which the enemy's powerful artillery could make but little
impression. Throughout the siege the unremitting exertions of
the engineer corps hourly increased the defensive power of the
work.

The following extract from the journal of the engineer officer
at Fort Sumter for August 23rd will show the condition of the
work at that date: ". . . The northwest front has now five
arches with ramparts fallen in; northeast barbette battery
unserviceable; east front scarp much scaled by slant fire, with
large craters under traverses; principal injury at level of arches
and terreplein; two-thirds of southern wall east of magazine
damaged; stone abutment unhurt and protected by rubbish; gorge
not damaged since yesterday. Another shot has penetrated above
sand filling of second-story rooms, making three since the attack
began. East barbette parapets much loosened and undermined,
though not displaced. One 10-inch and one 11-inch gun
untouched. Brooke gun carriage shattered, but can easily be
remounted on 10-inch columbiad carriage."

During the seven days that the enemy so vigorously bombarded
Sumter his approaches to Wagner were slowly pushed
forward under the fire of our guns and sharpshooters. On the

21st he made an unsuccessful attack on our rifle pits directly in
front of that battery. The same day General Gilmore sent a
demand, under flag of truce, for the surrender of Fort Sumter
and Morris Island, with the threat that in the case of non-compliance
he would open fire on the city; four hours were allowed
for a reply. This communication was received at the headquarters
of the department at 10:45 p. m.; the enemy carried his
threat into execution by throwing several shells into the city on
the morning of the 23rd, at about 1:30 a. m.

On the 24th, the fire against Fort Sumter lessened considerably;
not more than 150 shot were thrown against it in the course of
the day.

Every endeavor was made to retard the approach of the enemy
to Battery Wagner. His working parties were fired upon by
the guns of the battery during the night, but during the day
this had to be discontinued and the embrasures closed to prevent
our guns from being dismounted. Until 3 o'clock of the 25th,
enemy's fire was principally directed against Sumter. After that
time Wagner was fiercely bombarded, as well as the space
between that work and the rifle pits. At dark the enemy endeavored
to carry these pits but were repulsed. Our loss was five
killed and nineteen wounded.

A very large amount of ammunition and ordnance stores were
removed from Fort Sumter during the night.

On the 26th, 630 shot were fired at Sumter; Wagner and Gregg
received the bulk of the fire. At 5 o'clock in the evening the
enemy concentrated his fire on the rifle pits in front of Wagner.
Between 7 and 8 p. m. the rifle pits were carried by an overwhelming
force and seventy-six out of the eighty-nine men of the
Sixty-first North Carolina, who formed the picket, were captured.[49]

The firing on the 27th against Sumter was limited to four
shots. In front of Wagner the enemy had advanced his trenches
to within 300 yards of the work, whilst the number of his guns
and the accuracy of his fire prevented the opening of its
embrasures except during the night. The Honorable Secretary
of War informed me by telegraph, in answer to a request that I
made for the services of some of the sailors stationed in Savannah,

that the Secretary of the Navy declined sending sailors from
Savannah and urged a detail of men. I replied by letter setting
forth the fact that the army was depleted already by details for
the navy, and that no more can be spared. The importance of
keeping our water transportation to Morris Island in an efficient
condition was represented, and that without an additional force
of boatmen it could not be preserved. Further, that our ironclads
at Savannah were safely sheltered behind obstructions, and
were a portion of their crews sent to Charleston they could be
returned in case of an emergency there.

On the 28th, the enemy were extremely quiet, firing only six
shots at Sumter; but his approach as to Wagner advanced
rapidly notwithstanding the fire from Gregg, the James Island
batteries and the sharpshooters in Wagner. The enemy did not
fire at Sumter during the 29th, but worked industriously upon
his approaches to Wagner. His advanced works were shelled
throughout the day by Wagner, Moultrie and the James Island
batteries. During the night the enemy's guns were silent in front
of Wagner, but they renewed the bombardment of Sumter before
daylight.

During the day of the 30th they threw 634 shot against Sumter.
The enemy was also busy completing his advanced works,
though greatly disturbed by the fire from Wagner and the James
Island batteries, which compelled them to desist from the work
of advancing a sap to the left of Battery Wagner. In the evening
the enemy opened a brisk fire on Wagner, both with monitors and
Parrott guns. No serious damage was done the work, but several
casualties occurred. During the night Wagner kept up a steady
and effective fire on the enemy's advanced works.

Early on the morning of the 31st, as the steamer Sumter was
returning from Morris Island with troops on board, she was
unfortunately fired into from the Sullivan's Island batteries and
sunk. Four men were killed or drowned, and the greater portion
of the arms lost. Between 11 and 12 m. one of the monitors
approached Fort Moultrie, and when within range was opened
upon by that work. The enemy replied with schrapnell, all of
which fell short; and after about an hour's engagement the monitor
withdrew. About 2 p. m. the enemy again approached with
four monitors and engaged the fort for four hours. A steady

fire was kept up on them from Fort Moultrie and other Sullivan's
fire was kept up on them from Fort Moultrie and other Sullivan
Island batteries. During the engagement the enemy fired sixty
shot, striking Moultrie fifteen times but doing no damage. The
fort fired 132 shot. The enemy's fire on Sumter was slack
throughout the day.

Captain Leroy Hammond, Twenty-fifth South Carolina Volunteers,
reported today that in obedience to instructions he had
made a reconnoisance of Light House Inlet on the south side of
Black Island. On the island he saw pickets and bivouac fires, but
discovered no entrenchments. During the night the enemy succeeded
in advancing their sap a short distance towards Wagner,
notwithstanding the heavy fire that was kept up on them from
that work.

At daylight, the 1st September, the enemy opened on Wagner
with mortars and continued at intervals during the entire day.
The two 32 dr. howitzers in the salient of the work were disabled.
From early morning their land batteries kept up a heavy fire on
Fort Sumter, firing throughout the day 382 shot; 166 struck
outside, 95 inside and 121 missed. This fire was very destructive,
disabling the remaining guns en barbette and damaging the fort
considerably. An extract from the report of the engineer in
charge gives the following account of its condition: ". . .
Towards noon the effect of the fire was to carry away at one fall
four rampart arches on the northeast front with terreplein platform
and guns, thus leaving on this front only one arch and a
half which are adjacent to the east spiral stair. Some of the
lower casemate piers of the same front have been seriously
damaged, rendering unsafe the service of two guns hitherto
available in that quarter. On the exterior, the chief injury done
is to be noticed on the southeast pan coupiè and two next upper
casemates on east front. From these localities the scarp has
fallen away completely and left the arches exposed, as well as
the sand filling half down to the floor of second tier."

At 11:40 a. m., on the 2nd September, six monitors opened on
Sumter at distances of 800 to 1,000 yards. They were joined at
1 p. m. by the Ironsides, and together fired 185 shot, of which
116 struck outside, 35 inside and 34 passed over. The projectiles
used were 8-inch Parrott rifle shell and 11- and 15-inch smoothbore

shot and shell. Fort Sumter was unable to answer, not
having a gun in working order, but a heavy fire was kept up
on the fleet by Fort Moultrie with good effect, two of the monitors
being apparently injured and requiring assistance when they
retired. The effect of this fire on Sumter is thus described by
the engineer officer in charge: ". . . The chief external injury
has been done on the east scarp, which now has lost its integrity
and hangs upon the arches apparently in blocks and detached
masses."

The remainder of the day was passed in comparative quiet.
The fleet was occupied in placing sand bags on the decks of the
monitors. The enemy's land batteries fired but 148 shot, of which
38 were directed against Sumter. In the same period our batteries
fired 66 times. During the night the enemy was engaged
in front of Wagner in strengthening his advanced position,
which was then within 80 to 100 yards of the salient. Owing to
the difficulty of transporting ammunition to Wagner the fire of
that work was slack.

Early on the morning of the 3rd, the enemy opened on Wagner
with mortars and continued it throughout the day. Fort Sumter
was not fired at. In that work all hands were busy in repairing
damages. During the past night, as usual, large quantities of
ordnance stores and several guns were removed. The condition
of the fort of this date was as follows: The northeast and northwest
terrepleins had fallen in, and the western wall had a crack
entirely through from parapet to beam. The greater portion of
the southern wall was down, the upper east magazine penetrated,
and lower east magazine wall cracked. The eastern wall itself
nearly shot away and large portions down, ramparts gone, and
nearly every casemate breached. The casemates on the eastern
face were still filled with sand and gave some protection to the
garrison from shell. Not a single gun remained en barbette, and
but a single casemate gun that could be fired—a 32 dr. smoothbore
on the west face.

During the night of the 3rd, Wagner fired steadily and the
James Island batteries occasionally. Throughout the 4th the
enemy confined themselves to shelling Wagner and were answered
by the James Island guns. During the night of the 4th their
approach was pushed close to Wagner.

At 12 m., on the 5th, the Federal flag was abreast of the south
angle of the work. Throughout the day a very heavy fire was
concentrated on Wagner from the Ironsides, monitors and land
batteries, which severely injured the work; our casualties were
also greatly increased, some forty occurring during the day.
Large bodies of troops were transferred from Folley to Morris
Island, and other indications pointed to an early assault. There
is good reason to believe that the enemy's plan was to carry Battery
Gregg by a boat attack on the night of the 5th, or early on
the morning of the 6th; that the fleet should prevent the landing
of re-enforcements at Cummings Point; that Wagner should be
heavily shelled by ironclads, and on the morning of the 6th, on a
given signal, Battery Wagner should be assailed.

This plan was frustrated, however, by the repulse of the attacking
party on Battery Gregg. About 1:30 a. m., on the 6th, they
were seen approaching in from fifteen to twenty barges from the
passages leading from Vincent and Schooner Creeks that lie
between James and Morris Islands. The garrison of Gregg[50]
was on the alert and received them with a brisk fire of grape
and musketry. The enemy was evidently disconcerted and, after
discharging their boat howitzers, retired.

On the 4th September, I had convened a meeting of general
officers and the chief engineer of the department to assist me in
determining how much longer the Confederate forces should
attempt to hold Morris Island. The rapid advance of the
enemy's trenches to Battery Wagner having made it evident that
before many days that work must become untenable, the following
questions were propounded to the council:

"1. How long do you think Battery Wagner can be held without
regard to the safety of the garrison?

"2. How long can it be held with a fair prospect of saving its
garrison with the means of transportation at our command and
circumstances relative thereto as heretofore indicated by actual
experience?

"3. How long, after the loss or evacuation of Wagner, could
Battery Gregg be held?

"4. Can the heavy guns (two in Wagner and three in Gregg)

in those works be removed before the evacuation without endangering
the safety of the works and their garrisons?

"5. Can we take the offensive suddenly with a fair prospect of
success by throwing during the night 3,000 men on the north end
of Morris Island, making in all 4,000 available men, bearing
in mind that no re-enforcements could be sent them until night,
and probably for several nights, according to the movements of
the enemy's ironclads and the fire of his land batteries?"

These questions were thoroughly discussed, as well as the probable
plan of attack by the enemy, our means of defense, transportation,
and reasons for prolonging our possession of the
north end of Morris Island. It was agreed that the holding of
Morris Island as long as possible was most important to the
safety and free use of Charleston harbor; and our ability to keep
up easy communication with the works on Sullivan and James
Islands, in view of which I deemed it proper to renew application
to the secretaries of war and of the navy, by telegraph, for some
200 sailors for oarsmen.

It was further decided that the five heavy guns at Morris
Island were necessary morally and physically for the defense, to
the last extremity, of the position; and such being the difficulty,
if not indeed the insurmountable obstacles to their removal at
this time, that no effort should be made to save them, and consequently
that they should be ultimately destroyed with as much of
the works as possible when further defense was abandoned.

The result was my determination to hold Morris Island as long
as communication with it could be maintained at night by means
of rowboats, but for which purpose sailors or men able to handle
oars with efficiency were essential.

On the 5th inst., Brigadier-General Ripley prepared by my
order a confidential letter to the officer commanding Battery
Wagner, pointing out that it might be necessary to evacuate Morris
Island, and giving full instructions for destroying the magazines
and rendering the guns useless in that event.

Early on the morning of the 6th, a dispatch was received from
Colonel L. M. Keitt, commanding Battery Wagner, to the following
effect: ". . . The parapet of the salient is badly breached;
the whole fort is much weakened. A repetition of today's fire
(alluding to the 5th inst.) will make the work almost a ruin.

The mortar fire is still very heavy and fatal and no important
work can be done. Is it deemed advisable to sacrifice the garrison?
To continue to hold it is to do so. Captain Lee, the
engineer, has read this and agrees." The casualties in Wagner on
the 5th were 100 out of 900.

Another dispatch, dated 8:45 a. m., was received from Colonel
Keitt: "Incessant fire from Yankee mortars and Parrott battery;
can't work negroes, better look after them promptly. Had thirty
or forty soldiers wounded in an attempt to work. Will do all I
can, but fear the garrison will be destroyed without injuring the
enemy. The fleet is opening, but I hope that we may hold till
night." Again, at 10:30 a. m., Colonel Keitt signalled, "Boats must
be at Cummings Point without fail." During the day a letter was
received from the same officer as follows: ". . . The enemy will
tonight advance their parallel to the moat of this battery. The
garrison must be taken away immediately after dark, or it will
be destroyed or captured. It is idle to deny that the heavy Parrott
guns have breached the walls and are knocking away the
bomb-proofs. Pray have boats at Cummings Point immediately
after dark to take away the men. I say deliberately that this
must be done or the garrison must be sacrificed. I am sending
the wounded and sick to Cummings Point now, and will, if possible,
continue to do so until all are gone. I have a number of
them now here. I have not in the garrison 400 effective men,
excluding artillery. The engineers agree with me in opinion,
or rather shape my opinion. . . ."

Colonel Keitt's last dispatch was as follows: "The enemy's
sap has reached the moat and his bombardment has shattered
large parts of the parapet. The retention of this post after
tonight involves the loss of the garrison. If the necessities of
the service require their sacrifice, the men will cheerfully make
it, and I will cheerfully lead them. I prefer to assail the enemy
to awaiting his assault, and I will at 4 o'clock in the morning
assail his works."

Things being in this condition, it became evident that an
attempt to longer retain possession of Batteries Gregg and Wagner
must of necessity involve the loss of the garrisons. But
before giving the final order for the evacuation, I directed
Colonel D. B. Harris, my chief engineer, to proceed to Morris

Island and to examine into and report upon the condition of
affairs. His opinion was as follows:

". . . I visited our works on Morris Island today, and in
consideration of their condition, of our inability to repair damages
to Wagner as heretofore, of the dispirited state of the
garrison, and of the progress of the enemy's sap, am constrained
to recommend an immediate evacuation of both Batteries Gregg
and Wagner. . . . In consequence of the accuracy of the fire
from the enemy's land batteries which are now in close proximity
(say from 500 to 800 yards) to Wagner, aided by reverse
fire from his fleet, it is impossible, in the opinion of the officer
commanding the fort, to keep up a fire either of artillery or small
arms, and the enemy are thus left free to work in the trenches
which he is rapidly pushing forward. The head of the sap is
within forty yards of the salient, which is so badly damaged by
a Parrott battery kept constantly playing upon it as to render it
untenable. . . ."

Under these circumstances, I concluded the period had arrived
when it would be judicious to evacuate Morris Island, and in the
following special order detailed the manner in which I desired
the movement to be accomplished:

"Battery Wagner, Morris Island, being no longer tenable, without
undue loss of life and the risk of final capture of the entire
garrison, that position and Battery Gregg will be evacuated as
soon as practicable, to which end the following arrangements
will be made by the district commander:

"I. Two of the Confederate States ironclads should take up
position near Fort Sumter with their guns bearing on Cummings
Point and to the eastward of it. At the same time, all our land
batteries will be held prepared to sweep the water face of Battery
Gregg. Transport steamers will take position within the harbor,
but as near to Cummings Point as practicable, to receive the men
from the row boats by which the embarkation of the men from
Morris Island will be effected. As many row boats as are necessary,
or which can be provided with efficient oarsmen, will be kept
in readiness at once to proceed to and reach Cummings Point or
that vicinity as soon after dark as may be prudent. Having
reached Morris Island a courier or relay of footmen will be dispatched
by the naval officer in charge with notice of the fact to

the officer in command of Battery Wagner, and of the exact
transport capacity of the boats. A naval officer with proper
assistants will have exclusive charge of the boats and their movements.

"II. The commanding officer of Wagner having made during
the day all arrangements for the evacuation and destruction of
the work and armament, will, when informed of the arrival of
the boats, direct first the removal and embarkation of all wounded
men, and thereafter, according to the capacity of the boats at
hand, will withdraw his command by companies with soldierly
silence and deliberation. Two companies will remain in any
event to preserve a show of occupation and repair and to defend
from assault during the embarkation; and it is strictly enjoined
that no more men shall quit the work and go to the landing than
can be safely embarked. The embarkation will be superintended
by the field officers or regimental or battalion commanders, who
will halt and keep their commands about 100 yards from the
boats, divide them into suitable squads for assignment to the boats
in exact conformity with the directions of the naval officer in
charge of the embarkation; and then superintend the disposition
of the men accordingly, impressing upon all the vital necessity of
silence, obedience to orders and coolness.

"III. The companies left to occupy Wagner will be under
charge of a firm and intelligent field officer, who will not withdraw
his command until assured that there is sufficient transportation
for all the remaining garrisons of the island, including
that of Battery Gregg.

"IV. The final evacuation will depend for success on the utmost
coolness and quiet on the part of every man. At least two officers
previously selected will be left to light the fuses already arranged
and timed to about fifteen minutes to blow up the magazine and
bomb-proof, and to destroy the armament in the manner already
indicated in special instructions from district headquarters. But
the fuses must not be lighted until it is certain there is sufficient
transportation for the removal of all the garrison, or except the
enemy become aware of the evacuation and are evidently about to
storm and enter the work. The men must be embarked with arms
loaded ready to repel an attack from the boat parties of the
enemy.

"V. The garrison of Battery Gregg will stand staunchly to
their posts until the last company from Wagner shall be
embarked. It will then take the boats in silence and with deliberation,
provision having been made as at Wagner for the
destruction of the work and its ordnance. Both explosions will
be as nearly simultaneous as possible; and the complete success
of the evacuation will probably be in the hands of those whose
high duty it will be to apply the match to the fuses at Wagner.
The garrison of Gregg will be embarked with the same precautions
and regulations as prescribed for that of Wagner. In case
the enemy should carry Wagner immediately after the garrison
shall have evacuated it, or in any way the explosion of the magazine
should be prevented, a signal of three (3) rockets in rapid
succession shall be made from Battery Gregg, when the naval
vessels in position and our land batteries bearing on Wagner will
be opened with a steady fire on the site of that work, as will be
done likewise immediately after an explosion shall have taken
place, and this fire shall be maintained slowly during the night.

"VI. Brigadier-General Ripley will give such additional
orders as will be calculated to secure the successful evacuation of
Morris Island, or to meet emergencies. He will confer with Flag
Officer Tucker and procure all necessary assistance. The operation
is one of the most delicate that can be attempted in war.
Coolness, resolute courage, judgment and inflexibility on the part
of officers—obedience to orders and a constant sense of the
necessity for silence on the part of the men, are essential for
complete success, and the credit which must attach to those who
achieve it."

The evacuation began at 9 p. m. on the night of the 6th September.
According to instructions a guard of 35 men, under Captain
T. A. Hugenin, had been left to bring up the extreme rear and
to fire the only magazine which contained powder. The necessary
arrangements having been completed, and Colonel Keitt having
been informed that the transportation was ready, the embarkation
commenced and was continued with the utmost quietness and
dispatch. The wounded were first embarked and were followed
by the remnants of the infantry garrison. Captain Kanapaux,
commanding light artillery, was then ordered to spike his guns
and embark his command. Captain Lesesne, commanding Gregg,

spiked the guns of that battery and followed with his command;
and the rear guard from Wagner, coming up at that time in pursuance
of orders from Colonel Keitt, the fuses communicating
with the magazines were lighted, that at Wagner by Captain
Hugenin, and that at Gregg by Major Holcombe, commissary of
subsistence, and the remainder of the command was safely and
expeditiously embarked. Owing to defects in the fuses themselves,
they failed to accomplish the purpose designed, though
their lighting was superintended by careful and reliable officers.
The magazines were, therefore, not destroyed. The guns in the
batteries were spiked as far as their condition allowed, and the
implements and equipments generally destroyed or carried off.
The evacuation was concluded about 1:30 a. m., on the 7th September.
The boats containing the portion of the garrison last
embarked were fired upon by the enemy's barges, but without
effect. Two of our boats containing crews of 19 sailors and 27
soldiers were captured by the enemy's armed barges between
Cummings Point and Sumter.

Thus Morris Island was abandoned to the enemy on the 7th
September with but little loss on the part of the garrison, either
in men or material. The total loss in killed and wounded on Morris
Island, from July 10th to September 7th, was only 641 men;
and deducting the casualties due to the landing on the 10th July
and to the assaults of the 11th and 18th July, the killed and
wounded by the terrible bombardment, which lasted almost uninterruptedly
night and day during fifty-eight days, amounted only
to 296 men, many of whom were only slightly wounded. It is
still more remarkable that during the same time when the enemy
fired 6,202 shot at Sumter, varying in weight from 30 to 300
pounds, only three men were killed and forty-nine wounded in
that work.

It is difficult to arrive at the loss of the enemy during these
operations, but judging from the slaughter made in their ranks
on the 11th and 18th July, it will be within the mark to say that
his casualties were in the ratio of ten for our one.

It may be well to remark that the capture of Morris Island
resulted in but a barren victory to the enemy, if his only object
was to gain a position from which to hurl his missiles and Greek
fire into the City of Charleston. A reference to the map will

show that the possession of Cummings Point placed him no
nearer the city than he was when he held part of James Island,
from whence he was driven by the Battle of Secessionville in
June, 1862, and again in July, 1863, when he was driven from
the same island on the 16th of the same month.[51]

In conclusion, I cannot express in too strong terms my admiration
of the bravery, endurance and patriotism displayed by the
officers and men engaged in these operations, who during so
many days and nights withstood unflinchingly the extraordinary
fire from the enemy's land and naval batteries, and repulsed with
heroic gallantry every effort to surprise or carry the works by
storm.[52]

I have particularly to commend the gallantry, coolness and zeal
of Brigadier-General W. B. Taliaferro, Brigadier-General Johnson
Hagood, Brigadier-General A. H. Colquitt, Colonel L. M.
Keitt and Colonel G. P. Harrison, who at different periods had
immediate command of the defenses of Morris Island. To particularize
would be invidious; they one and all on every occasion
did their duty nobly.

I have to express my acknowledgment of the valuable services
rendered by Brigadier-General R. S. Ripley, in command of the
First Military District, which included the City of Charleston
and its outworks. He was invariably active, industrious and
intelligent, and carried out his important duties to my entire
satisfaction. Although Major-General J. T. Gilmer arrived in
Charleston a few days before the evacuation of Morris Island, he
was nevertheless active, zealous and of great assistance to me in
holding the island to the last moment.

I also take pleasure in recording the services of Colonel Alfred
Rhett, who during the siege of Wagner had command of Fort
Sumter, and with his brave garrison endured a long and terrific
bombardment. His conduct throughout met my entire approval
and satisfaction.

To Colonel D. B. Harris, chief engineer of the department, I
have to return my most sincere thanks. He was ever cool, gallant
and indefatigable in the performance of his arduous duties
during the whole period of the operations on Morris Island.

Always present in the hour of need, he exposed himself when
necessary to the hottest fire and the greatest danger in the most
reckless manner.[53]