SS 6.
General logic, as has been repeatedly said, makes abstraction of all
content of cognition, and expects to receive representations from some
other quarter, in order, by means of analysis, to convert them into
conceptions. On the contrary, transcendental logic has lying before it
the manifold content of a priori sensibility, which transcendental
æsthetic presents to it in order to give matter to the pure
conceptions of the understanding, without which transcendental logic
would have no content, and be therefore utterly void. Now space and
time contain an infinite diversity of determinations* of pure a
priori intuition, but are nevertheless the condition of the mind's
receptivity, under which alone it can obtain representations of
objects, and which, consequently, must always affect the conception of
these objects. But the spontaneity of thought requires that this
diversity be examined after a certain manner, received into the
mind, and connected, in order afterwards to form a cognition out of
it. This Process I call synthesis.
[*]
Kant employs the words Mannigfaltiges, Mannigfaltigkeit, indifferently, for the infinitude
of the possible determination of matter, of an intuition (such as that of space), &c. — Tr.
By the word synthesis, in its most general signification, I
understand the process of joining different representations to each
other and of comprehending their diversity in one cognition. This
synthesis is pure when the diversity is not given empirically but a
priori (as that in space and time). Our representations must be
given previously to any analysis of them; and no conceptions can
arise, quoad their content, analytically. But the synthesis of a
diversity (be it given a priori or empirically) is the first requisite
for the production of a cognition, which in its beginning, indeed, may
be crude and confused, and therefore in need of analysis— still,
synthesis is that by which alone the elements of our cognitions are
collected and united into a certain content, consequently it is the
first thing on which we must fix our attention, if we wish to
investigate the origin of our knowledge.
Synthesis, generally speaking, is, as we shall afterwards see, the
mere operation of the imagination— a blind but indispensable
function of the soul, without which we should have no cognition
whatever, but of the working of which we are seldom even conscious.
But to reduce this synthesis to conceptions is a function of the
understanding, by means of which we attain to cognition, in the proper
meaning of the term.
Pure synthesis, represented generally, gives us the pure
conception of the understanding. But by this pure synthesis, I mean
that which rests upon a basis of a priori synthetical unity. Thus, our
numeration (and this is more observable in large numbers) is a
synthesis according to conceptions, because it takes place according
to a common basis of unity (for example, the decade). By means of this
conception, therefore, the unity in the synthesis of the manifold
becomes necessary.
By means of analysis different representations are brought under one
conception— an operation of which general logic treats. On the other
hand, the duty of transcendental logic is to reduce to conceptions,
not representations, but the pure synthesis of representations. The
first thing which must be given to us for the sake of the a priori
cognition of all objects, is the diversity of the pure intuition;
the synthesis of this diversity by means of the imagination is the
second; but this gives, as yet, no cognition. The conceptions which
give unity to this pure synthesis, and which consist solely in the
representation of this necessary synthetical unity, furnish the
third requisite for the cognition of an object, and these
conceptions are given by the understanding.
The same function which gives unity to the different
representation in a judgement, gives also unity to the mere
synthesis of different representations in an intuition; and this unity
we call the pure conception of the understanding. Thus, the same
understanding, and by the same operations, whereby in conceptions,
by means of analytical unity, it produced the logical form of a
judgement, introduces, by means of the synthetical unity of the
manifold in intuition, a transcendental content into its
representations, on which account they are called pure conceptions
of the understanding, and they apply a priori to objects, a result not
within the power of general logic.*
[*]
Only because this is beyond the sphere of logic proper. Kant's remark is unnecessary. — Tr.
In this manner, there arise exactly so many pure conceptions of
the understanding, applying a priori to objects of intuition in
general, as there are logical functions in all possible judgements.
For there is no other function or faculty existing in the
understanding besides those enumerated in that table. These
conceptions we shall, with Aristotle, call categories, our purpose
being originally identical with his, notwithstanding the great
difference in the execution.
This, then, is a catalogue of all the originally pure conceptions of
the synthesis which the understanding contains a priori, and these
conceptions alone entitle it to be called a pure understanding;
inasmuch as only by them it can render the manifold of intuition
conceivable, in other words, think an object of intuition. This
work is made systematically from a common principle, namely the
faculty of judgement (which is just the same as the power of thought),
and has not arisen rhapsodically from a search at haphazard after pure
conceptions, respecting the full number of which we never could be
certain, inasmuch as we employ induction alone in our search,
without considering that in this way we can never understand
wherefore
precisely these conceptions, and none others, abide in the pure
understanding. It was a design worthy of an acute thinker like
Aristotle, to search for these fundamental conceptions.
* Destitute,
however, of any guiding principle, he picked them up just as they
occurred to him, and at first hunted out ten, which he called
categories (
predicaments). Afterwards be believed that he had
discovered five others, which were added under the name of
post
predicaments. But his catalogue still remained defective. Besides,
there are to be found among them some of the modes of pure sensibility
(
quando, ubi, situs, also prius, simul), and likewise an empirical
conception (
motus)— which can by no means belong to this
genealogical register of the pure understanding. Moreover, there are
deduced conceptions (
actio, passio) enumerated among the original
conceptions, and, of the latter, some are entirely wanting.
[*]
"It is a serious error to imagine that, in his Categories, Aristotle proposed, like Kant,
'an analysis of the elements of human reason.' The ends proposed by the two philosophers were different,
even opposed. In their several Categories, Aristotle attempted a synthesis of things in their multiplicity, —
a classification of objects real, but in relation to thought; Kant, an analysis of mind in its unity, — a
dissection of thought, pure, but in relation to its objects. The predicaments of Aristotle are thus objective,
of things as understood; those of Kant subjective, of the mind as understanding. The former are results a
posteriori — the creations of abstraction and generalisation; the latter, anticipations a priori — the
conditions of those acts themselves. It is true, that as the one scheme exhibits the unity of thought
diverging into plurality, in appliance to its objects, and as the other exhibits the multiplicity of these
objects converging towards unity by the collective determination of thought; while, at the same time, language
usually confounds the subjective and objective under a common term; — it is certainly true, that some
elements in the one table coincide in name with some elements in the other. This coincidence is, however,
only equivocal. In reality, the whole Kantian categories must be excluded from the Aristotelic list, as
entia rationis, as notiones secundæ — in short, as determinations of thought, and not genera of real things;
while the several elements would be specially excluded, as partial, privative, transcendent," &c. —
Hamilton's (Sir W.) Essays and Discussions
With regard to these, it is to be remarked, that the categories,
as the true primitive conceptions of the pure understanding, have also
their pure deduced conceptions, which, in a complete system of
transcendental philosophy, must by no means be
passed over; though
in a merely critical essay we must be contented with the simple
mention of the fact.
Let it be allowed me to call these pure, but deduced conceptions
of the understanding, the predicables* of the pure understanding, in
contradistinction to predicaments. If we are in possession of the
original and primitive, the deduced and subsidiary conceptions can
easily be added, and the genealogical tree of the understanding
completely delineated. As my present aim is not to set forth a
complete system, but merely the principles of one, I reserve this task
for another time. It may be easily executed by any one who will
refer to the ontological manuals, and subordinate to the category of
causality, for example, the predicables of force, action, passion;
to that of community, those of presence and resistance; to the
categories of modality, those of origination, extinction, change;
and so with the rest. The categories combined with the modes of pure
sensibility, or with one another, afford a great number of deduced a
priori conceptions; a complete enumeration of which would be a
useful and not unpleasant, but in this place a perfectly
dispensable, occupation.
[*]
The predicables of Kant are quite different from those of Aristotle and ancient and
modern logicians. The five predicables are of a logical, and not, like those of Kant, of a metaphysico—ontological
import. They were enounced as a complete enumeration of all the possible modes of predication. Kant's predicables,
on the contrary, do not possess this merely formal and logical character, but have a real or metaphysical
content. — Tr.
I purposely omit the definitions of the categories in this treatise.
I shall analyse these conceptions only so far as is necessary for
the doctrine of method, which is to form a part of this critique. In a
system of pure reason, definitions of them would be with justice
demanded of me, but to give them here would only bide from our view
the main aim of our investigation, at the same time raising doubts and
objections, the consideration of which, without injustice to our
main purpose, may be very well postponed till another opportunity.
Meanwhile, it ought to be sufficiently clear, from the little we
have already said on this subject, that the formation of a complete
vocabulary of pure conceptions, accompanied by all the requisite
explanations, is not only a possible, but an easy undertaking. The
compartments already exist; it is only necessary to fill them up;
and a systematic topic like the
present, indicates with perfect
precision the proper place to which each conception belongs, while
it readily points out any that have not yet been filled up.
