IN the political organizations of the international proletariat, the highest order of the
leaders consists chiefly of members of parliament. In proof of this it suffices to
mention the names of a few men who were or are the most distinguished socialist
leaders of their day, at the same time men of note as parliamentarians: Bebel, Jaurés,
Guesde, Adler, Vandervelde, Troelstra, Turati, Keir Hardie, Macdonald, Pablo
Iglesias. Hyndman is an exception only because he has never succeeded in winning
an election. The section of the English party to which he belongs is unrepresented
in parliament.
The fact here noted indicates the essentially parliamentary character of the modern
socialist parties. The socialist members of parliament are those who have especially
distinguished themselves in the party by their competence and by their capacity. But
in addition to this superiority, recognized and consecrated by the party itself, there
are two reasons for the great authority exercised by the socialist parliamentarian. In
the first place, in virtue of his position, he largely escapes the supervision of the rank
and file of the party, and even the control of its executive committee. He owes his
comparative independence to the fact that the parliamentary representative is elected
for a considerable term of years, and can be dispossessed by no one so long as he
retains the confidence of the electors. In the second place, and even at the moment
of his election, his dependence on the party is but indirect, for his power is derived
from the electoral masses, that is to say, in ultimate analysis from an unorganized
body. It is true that in certain countries the independence of the party organization
thus enjoyed by the parliamentary deputies is subject to limits more or less strict
according to the degree of organization and cohesion of the party. But even then the
respect and the power enjoyed by the parliamentarians remains unquestioned, since
it is they who within the party fill the principal offices, and whose power predominates
to a notable degree in the party executive. This is true, above all, of Germany. Where the rules torbid the deputy to function also as a member of the executive
committee (in Italy, for example, only one deputy, chosen by the parliamentary
group, can sit on the party executive), much friction is apt to arise between the two
groups of leaders, impairing the authority of both. But, for the reasons expounded
above, the influence of the parliamentary group commonly predominates.
The influence of parliamentarism is particularly great in the German social
democracy. This is clearly shown by the attitude towards the party commonly
assumed by the socialists in parliament. There is no other socialist party in the world
in which the conduct of its representatives in parliament is subject to so little
criticism. The socialist members of the Reichstag , frequently make speeches in that
body which might be expected to give rise to the liveliest recriminations, and yet
neither in the party press nor at the congresses is to be heard a word of criticism or
of disapproval. During the discussions in the Reichstag concerning the miners' strike
in the basin of the Ruhr (1905), the deputy Hue spoke at the maximum program of
the party as “Utopian,” and in the socialist press there was manifested no single
symptom of revolt. On the first occasion on which the party departed from its
principle of unconditional opposition to all military expenditure, contenting itself
with simple absention when the first credit of 1,500,000 marks was voted for the war
against the Hereros, this remarkable innovation, which in every other socialist party
would have unquestionably evoked a storm from one section of the members, even
if there might have been manifested cheerful approval by another, aroused among
the German socialists no more than a few dispersed and timid protests. Subsequently,
at the Bremen congress of 1904, when the deputies had to give an account of their
conduct, very few delegates were found to express disapproval. It is, further,
remarkable to what a degree the power of the parliamentary group becomes
consolidated as the party increases throughout the country. In earlier days, far less
important questions aroused much more acute struggles between the party and the
parliamentary group. Today, the socialist masses in Germany have accustomed
themselves to the idea that the decisive struggle on behalf of the aims they have at
heart will be carried out in parliament, and for this reason they scrupulously avoid
doing anything which might make difficulties for their parliamentary representatives.
This conviction constantly determines the conduct of the masses in relation to their
leaders. Hence in many questions the conduct of the parliamentary group is really
decisive, suprema lex. All vigourous criticism, though made in accordance with the
basic principles of socialism, is at once repudiated by the rank and file if it tend to
weaken the position of the parliamentary group. Those who, notwithstanding this,
venture to voice such criticism are immediately put to silence and are severely
stigmatized by the leaders. Two examples may be given in illustration, The
“Leipziger Volkszeitung,” in the year 1904, in a leading article entitled The Usury
of Bread, vented its anger in somewhat violent terms upon the political leaders of the
capitalist parties. Thereupon in the Reichstag certain orators of the right and of the
center, when Prince Bülow had himself read this article to the house, adducing it as
an evil example of journalistic methods, made a great display of indignation against
the socialists. When this happened, Bebel, who had hitherto been a declared friend
of the “Leipziger Volkszeitung,” did not hesitate to repudiate the article in open
parliament, though his conduct was here in flagrant contradiction with the best
established traditions of democracy, and with the essential principle of party
solidarity. At the congress of Bremen in 1904, Georg von Vollmar openly
condemned the first attempts at anti-militarism made in Germany by certain
members of the party. He did this with the express approval of most of the delegates
and without arousing any disapproval from the others. Yet antimilitarism is a logical
consequence of socialism, and for such a party as the socialist, anti-militarist
propaganda must surely be a matter of primary importance. Vollmar, however,
justified his attitude by remarking that if a systematic anti-militarist propaganda were
to be undertaken, the Minister of War would have a pretext ready to his hand for
disregarding all the protests and complaints which might be made by the socialist
deputies on account of the differential treatment of soldiers known to hold socialist
views. If, for example, the party representatives in parliament were to take action
against the secret inquiries which the authorities are accustomed to make and to
transmit to the district commanders, sending the names of recruits who before
enlistment have been in the habit of frequenting socialist meetings and have even
been known as local leaders, the minister could readily reply, and with effect, that
socialists, being antimilitarists, are enemies of their country and as such deserve to
be handled with all possible rigor. Vollmar concluded by saying: “Antimilitarist
propaganda will make it impossible for the socialist in parliament to continue to
assert that socialists fulfil their military duties no less patriotically than nonsocialists,
and that for this reason it is unjust to subject them to exceptional treatment.”
[103]
It is well known that great efforts have been made by the parliamentary socialist
groups in every country to secure for their members ex-officio the right to vote at the
party congresses. In Germany this right was recognized in 1890 by the congress of
Berlin, with the unimportant restriction that in questions concerning their parliamentary
activities the rights of the members of the group in congress should be purely
deliberative. Despite some opposition, this right was confirmed in the new rules of
the party which were passed at the Jena congress in 1905. It is obvious that the
deputy, even if he does not as such possess the right to vote, will not find much
difficulty in securing delegation to the congress. Auer once said that those deputies
who are not thus delegated must be poor fellows indeed.
[104]
Nevertheless they have
been saved this trifling trouble. Thus the members of the parliamentary group are
admitted to an active participation in the most intimate deliberations of the party, not
as delegates approved by a vote of the branch to which they belong, but as
representatives of the entire electorate of their constituency for the whole period for
which they are elected to the legislature. This involves an express recognition of their
position as leaders (and a further admission that this leadership owes its origin in part
to nonparty sources), and obviously raises them to the position of super-comrades
independent of the rank and file of the party, or makes them irremovable delegates
for so long as they may remain members of the Reichstag. This institution is
certainly peculiar to Germany. In other countries identical rules apply for the
appointment of all delegates to the congress, whether these may happen to be
parliamentary representatives or not.
[105]
In France and Holland, for instance, the
deputies can take part in the congresses, and are able to vote in these only if they are
specially delegated for the purpose. In Italy, the members of the executive committee
and the members of the parliamentary group cannot speak in the congress unless they
are charged by the executive committee to present a report of some kind In Italy, as
in France and Holland, they can vote only when regularly delegated.
Yet in view of their greater competence in various questions, the socialist
parliamentary groups consider themselves superior even to the congresses, which are
in theory the supreme courts of the party, and they claim an effective autonomy. The
members of the parliamentary group obey a natural tendency to restrict more and
more the circle of questions which must be submitted to the congress for decision,
and to make themselves the sole arbiters of the party destinies. In Germany, many
of the socialist deputies put forward a claim in 1903 to decide for themselves,
independently of the party congresses, whether the parliamentary group should or
should not accept the vicepresidency of the Reichstag for one of its members, and
whether, if this post were accepted, the socialist vice-president should conform to the
usage attaching to his office, and put in appearances at court. In Italy, the socialist
and the republican parliamentary groups have secured complete independence of the
executives of their respective parties. The socialist group has even been accused at
times of accepting deputies who, are not even regular members of the party, men
who contend that their electors would look askance should they adhere officially to
the local socialist organization.
The parliamentary leaders of the socialist as well as those of the capitalist parties
assume the right to constitute a closed corporation, cut off from the rest of their
party. The parliamentary group of the German socialists has on more than one
occasion, and of its own initiative, disavowed the actions of considerable sections of
the party. The most notable of such disavowals have been those of the article The
Usury of Bread, in the “Leipziger Volkszeitung” (1904),106 and that of the antimilitarist
agitation of Karl Liebknecht (1907). In the former instance, the “Leipziger
Volkszeitung” could very well console itself for the disapproval of the “fifty-seven
comrades” (i.e., the members of the parliamentary group) as that of an infinitesimal
minority of the party—in accordance with the historic and typically democratic
utterance of the Abbé Sieyès on the eve of the French Revolution, when he said that
the rights of the king bore to those of his subjects the ratio of 1:30,000,000. As a
matter of pure theory, and considering the democratic principles of the party, the
paper here hit the right nail on the head; but in practice its contention had no
significance, for to the ineffective right of principle there was opposed the right of
the stronger, immanent in the leadership.
The local branches of the party follow their deputies. In the congresses the great majority of the delegates accept as a matter of
habit the guidance of the men of note. At the Bremen congress in 1904 the German
socialists rejected the idea of the general strike as a general absurdity; at Jena, in
1905, they acclaimed it as an official weapon of the party; at Mannheim,, in 1906,
they declared it to be Utopian. All the individual phases of this zigzag progress were
hailed with the conscientious applause of the mass of the delegates in the congress
and of the comrades throughout the country, who exhibited on each occasion the
same lack of critical faculty and the same unthinking enthusiasm. In France, the little
handful of men who constituted the general staff of the French Marxists when these
still formed a separate party under the leadership of Jules Guesde was so permeated
with the authoritarian spirit that at the party congresses the executive committee
(Comité National) was not elected in due form, but was appointed en bloc by
acclamation; it was impossible for the chiefs to conceive that the rank and file of the
party could dream of refusing to follow their leaders. Moreover, the congresses were
conducted in camera. Reports were published in an extremely condensed form so
that no one could check the speakers. In the German Socialist Congresses, and in the
reports of these assemblies, it is easy to distinguish between a higher and a lower
circle of delegates. The report of what is said by the “ordinary” delegates is greatly
abbreviated, whilst the speeches of the big guns are reproduced verbatim. In the
party press, too, different measures are applied to the comrades. In the year 1904,
when “Vorwarts,” then edited by Eisner, did not publish a letter sent by Bebel, the
latter moved heaven and earth with his complaints, saying that freedom of opinion
was being suppressed in the party and that it was “the most elementary right” for all
the comrades to have their letters printed in the party organs. Yet it is hardly possible
to ignore that the “right” which Bebel thus invoked is in practice proportional to a
comrade's degree of elevation in the party. The excitement over the non-appearance
of Bebel's letter shows that his case was an exceptional one.
In the trade-union movement, the authoritative character of the leader's and their
tendency to rule democratic organizations on oligarchic lines, are even more
pronounced than in the political organizations.
[107]
Innumerable facts recorded in the history of trade-union organizations show to
what an extent centralized bureaucracy can divert from democracy a primarily
democratic working-class movement. In the trade union, it is even easier than in the
political labour organization, for the officials to initiate and to pursue a course of
action disapproved of by the majority of the workers they are supposed to represent.
It suffices here to refer to the two famous decisions of the trade-union congress at
Cologne in 1905. In one of these the leaders declared themselves to be opposed (in
opposition to the views of the majority) to the continued observance of the 1st of
May as a general labour demonstration of protest. In the second, the discussion of the
general strike was absolutely forbidden. By these and similar occurrences the
oligarchical practices of the leaders are sufficiently proved, although some of writers
continue to dispute the fact.
[108]
For a good many years now, the executive committees of the trade-union
federations have endeavoured to usurp the exclusive right to decide on behalf of the
rank and file the rhythm of the movement for better wages, and consequently the
right to decide whether a strike is or is not “legitimate.” Since the leaders of the
federation are in charge of the funds, which often amount to a considerable sum, the
dispute reduces itself in practice to a question as to who is to decide whether a strike
shall or shall not be subsidized. This question is one which involves the very life of
the democratic right of the organized masses in the trade unions to regulate their own
affairs. When the leaders claim that they alone have a right to decide in a matter of
such importance, and still more when they already largely possess this right, it is
obvious that the most essential democratic principles are gravely infringed. The
leaders have openly converted themselves into an oligarchy, leaving to the masses
who provide the funds no more than the duty of accepting the decisions of that
oligarchy. This abuse of power may perhaps find justification on tactical grounds,
the leaders alleging in defense of their procedure the supreme need that a strike
should be declared cautiously and in unison. They claim the right to decide the
merits of the question on the sole ground that they know better than the workers
themselves the conditions of the labour market throughout the country and are
consequently more competent to judge the chances of success in the struggle. The
trade-union leaders add that since the stoppage of work in a town necessarily impairs
the financial strength of the union in that town, and sometimes disturbs the
conditions of work of a whole series of organized workers, it is for the leaders to
decide when and where a strike should be declared. Thus they consider that their
action is justified by the democratic aim of safeguarding the interests of the majority
against the impulsive actions of the minority.
We are not here concerned, however, with the causation of the oligarchy which
prevails in the trade unions. It suffices to point out how little difference exists
between the tendencies of proletarian oligarchies and those of such oligarchies as
prevail in the life of the state—governments, courts, etc. It is interesting to note that
in Germany, as elsewhere, the socialist leaders do not hesitate to admit the existence
of a well-developed oligarchy in the trade-union movement; while the leaders of the
trade unions, in their turn, draw attention to the existence of an oligarchy in the
socialist party; both groups of leaders unite however in declaring that as far as their
own organizations are concerned these are quite immune to oligarchical infection.
Nevertheless, the trade-union leaders and the leaders of the Socialist Party
sometimes combine upon a course of action which, were it undertaken by either
group of leaders alone, those of the other group would not fail to stigmatize as
grossly undemocratic. For example, in the serious question of the 1st of May
demonstration, one of primary democratic importance in the year 1908, the executive
committee of the Socialist Party and the general committee of the trade unions issued
by common accord an announcement definitely decreeing from above the conduct
of the separate political and trade-union organizations. In a question thus profoundly
affecting the individual trade unions and local socialist committees, the executives
regarded it as quite unnecessary to ask these for their opinion. Such conduct shows
how much justification there is for the criticism which each of the two branches of
the working-class movement directs against the other. Moreover, the question which
has been debated whether the local trades councils might not be directly represented
at the trade-union congresses is after all merely one of the enlargement of the
oligarchical circle.
Let us next briefly consider the third form of the working-class movement,
cooperative organizations, and in particular the organizations for cooperative
production, as those which in their very nature should incorporate most perfectly the
democratic principle.
As far as concerns distributive cooperative societies, it is easy to understand that
these cannot be directly governed by the mass of the members. As Kautsky has
shown, we are here concerned with an enterprise whose functions are essentially
commercial, and therefore outside the competence of the rank and file. For this
reason, the principal business activities of these societies must be entrusted to the
employees and to a few experts. “Unless we consider buying as cooperation, in
which case the customers of an ordinary shopman are also cooperators with the
shopman, the members of a cooperative society have nothing more to do with the
management than have the shareholders of a limited company; they choose their
managing committee, and then leave the machine to run itself, waiting till the end
of the year to express their approval or disapproval of the management, and to pocket
their dividends.
[109]
In actual fact, the distributive cooperative societies present in
general a monarchical aspect. Read, for example, what was written by a welldisposed
critic concerning the cooperative society “Vooruit” of Ghent, which is led
by Edouard Anseele, the socialist, and which is definitely socialist in its tendency:
“Cette prospérité et cette bonne administration ne vont pas
sans quelques sacrifices à la sacrosainte liberté
ouvrière. Le 'Vooruit' tout entier porte l'empreinte de la
forte personalité qui l'a créé.... Une
volonté puissante, avide à revendiquer des responsabilités,
alors que d'autres reculent sans cesse devant les responsabilités,
s'enivre presque toujours d'elle-même. M. Anseele, grand
industriel de fait, a volontiers les manières impétueuses,
impérieuses et brusques des capitaines d'industrie les plus
bourgeois, et le 'Vooruit' n'est rien moins qu'une république
anarchique. Il repose plutôt sur le principe d'autorité.”
[110]
Societies for cooperative production, on the other hand, and especially the smaller
of these, offer in theory the best imaginable field for democratic collabouration. They
consist of homogeneous elements belonging to the same stratum of the working
class, of persons following the same trade, and accustomed to the same manner of
life. In so far as the society needs a management, this management can readily be
effected by all the members in common, since all possess the same professional
competence, and all can lend a hand as advisers and coadjutors. In a political party
it is impossible that every member should be engaged in important political work,
and it is for this reason that in the political party there necessarily exists a great gulf
between the leaders and the rank and file. But in a society for cooperative production,
for bootmaking for example, all the members are equally competent in the
making of boots, the use of tools, and knowledge of the quality of leather. There do
not exist among them any essential differences in matters of technical knowledge.
Yet despite the fact that the circumstances are thus exceptionally favorable for the
constitution of a democratic organism, we cannot as a general rule regard productive
cooperatives as models of democratic auto-administration. Rodbertus said on one
occasion that when he imagined productive associations to have extended their
activities to include all manufacture, commerce, and agriculture, when he conceived
all social work to be effected by small cooperative societies in whose management
every member had an equal voice, he was unable to avoid the conviction that the
economic system would succumb to the cumbrousness of its own machinery.
[111]
The
history of productive cooperation shows that all the societies have been faced with
the following dilemma: either they succumb rapidly owing to discord and powerlessness
resulting from the fact that too many individuals have the right to interfere in
their administration; or else they end by submitting to the will of one or of a few
persons, and thus lose their truly cooperative character. In almost all cases such
enterprises owe their origin to the personal initiative of one or a few members. They
are sometimes miniature monarchies, being under the dictatorship of the manager,
who represents them in all internal and external relations, and upon whose will they
depend so absolutely that if he dies or resigns his post they run the risk of perishing.
This tendency on the part of the productive cooperative societies is further
accentuated by their character as aggregates of individuals whose personal
advantages decrease in proportion as the number of the members increases. Thus
from their very nature they are subject to the same immutable psychological laws
which governed the evolution of the medieval guilds. As they become more
prosperous, they become also more exclusive, and tend always to monopolize for the
benefit of the existing members the advantages they have been able to secure. For
example, by imposing a high entrance fee they put indirect obstacles in the way of
the entry of new members. In some cases they simply refuse to accept new members,
or pass a rule establishing a maximum membership. When they have need of more
labour-power they supply this need by engaging ordinary wagelabourers. Thus we not
infrequently find that a society for cooperative production becomes gradually
transformed into a jointstock company. It even happens occasionally that the
cooperative society becomes the private enterprise of the manager. In both these
cases Kautsky is right in saying that the social value of the working-class cooperative
is then limited to the provision of means for certain proletarians which will enable
them to climb out of their own class into a higher. Rodbertus described labour
associations as a school for the education of the working class, in which the manual
workers could learn administration, discussion, and within limits the art of
government.
[112]
We have seen to how small an extent this statement is applicable.
In the democratic movement the personal factor thus plays a very considerable part.
In the smaller associations it is often predominant. In the larger organizations, larger
questions commonly lose the personal and petty characteristics which they originally
possessed, but all the same the individuals who bring these questions forward, and
who in a sense come to personify them, retain their influence and importance. In
England, three or four men, Macdonald, Keir Hardie, Henderson, and Clynes, for
instance, enjoy the confidence of the socialist masses so unrestrictedly that, as an
able observer declares, it is impossible to exercise an influence upon the rank and file
except by influencing these leaders.
[113]
In Italy, the first among the leaders of the
trade-union organizations has affirmed that those only which are headed by a good
organizer can continue in existence. “Categories of the most various trades, found
in the most diverse environments, have been unable to secure organization and to
live through crises, except in so far as they have been able to find first-class men to
manage their affairs. Those which have had bad leaders have not succeeded in
establishing organizations; or the organizations if formed have proved defective.”
[114]
In Germany, the supreme authority of Bebel was manifested by a thousand signs,
[115]
from the joy with which he was hailed wherever he went, to the efforts always made
in the various congresses by the representatives of different tendencies to win him
over to their side. Moreover, the working-class leaders are well aware of their
ascendancy over the masses. Sometimes political opportunism leads them to deny
it, but more commonly they are extremely proud of it and boast of it. In Italy, and in
other countries as well, the socialist leaders have always claimed that the bourgeoisie
and the government are greatly indebted to them for having held the masses in check,
and as having acted as moderators to the impulsive crowd. This amounts to saying
that the socialist leaders claim the merit, and consequently the power, of preventing
the social revolution, which, according to them, would, in default of their intervention,
have long ago taken place. Disunion in parties, although often evoked by
objective necessities, is almost always the work of the leaders. The masses never
oppose the reconciliation of their chiefs, partly, no doubt, because the differences
between the leaders, in so far as they are of an objective character, are for the most
part outside the narrow circle of interests and the limited understanding of the rank
and file.
The esteem of the leaders for the masses is not as a rule very profound, even though
there are some among them who profess great enthusiasm for the masses and repay
with interest the honor which these render. In the majority of cases the veneration is
a one-sided affair, if only for the reason that the leaders have had an opportunity of
learning the miseries of the crowd by first-hand experience. Fournière said that the
socialist leaders regarded the crowd, which had entrusted them with the fulfilment
of its own aspirations and which consisted of devoted followers, as a passive
instrument in their own hands, as a series of ciphers whose only purpose was to
increase the value of the little figure standing to the left.
“N'en a-t-il qu'un à sa droite, il ne vaut que pour dix; en
a-t-il six, il vaut pour un million.”
[116]
The differences in education and competence which actually exist among the
members of the party are reflected in the differences in their functions. It is on the
ground of the incompetence of the masses that the leaders justify the exclusion of
these from the conduct of affairs. They contend that it would be contrary to the
interests of the party if the minority of the comrades who have closely followed and
attentively studied the questions under consideration should be overruled by the
majority which does not really possess any reasoned opinion of its own upon the
matters at issue. This is why the chiefs are opposed to the referendum, at any rate as
far as concerns its introduction into party life. “The choice of the right moment for
action demands a comprehensive view which only a few individuals in the mass can
ever possess, whilst the majority are guided by momentary impressions and currents
of feeling. A limited body of officials and confidential advisers, in closed session,
where they are removed from the influence of colored press reports, and where every
one can speak without fearing that his words will be bruited in the enemy's camp, is
especially likely to attain to an objective judgment.”
[117]
To justify the substitution of the indirect vote for the direct vote, the leaders invoke,
in addition to political motives, the complicated structure of the party organization.
Yet for the state organization, which is infinitely more complicated, direct legislation
by means of the initiative and the referendum is an integral part of the socialist
programme. The antinomy which underlies these different ways of looking at the same
thing according as it presents itself in the politics of the state or in those of the party
pervades the whole life of the latter.
The working-class leaders sometimes openly avow, with a sincerity verging on
cynicism, their own superiority over the troops they command, and may go so far as
to declare their firm intention to refuse to these latter any facility for dictating the
leaders' conduct. The leaders even reserve to themselves the right of rebelling against
the orders they receive. A typical example, among many, is the opinion expressed
on this subject by Filippo Turati, an exceptionally intelligent and well-informed man
and one of the most influential members of the Italian Socialist Party, in a labour
congress held at Rome in 1908. Referring to the position of the socialist deputy in
relation to the socialist masses, he said: “The socialist parliamentary group is always
at the disposal of the proletariat, as long as the group is not asked to undertake
absurdities.”118 It need hardly be said that in each particular case it is the deputies
who have to decide whether the things they are asked to do are or are not “absurd.”2
The accumulation of power in the hands of a restricted number of persons, such as
ensues in the labour movement to-day, necessarily gives rise to numerous abuses. The
“representative,” proud of his indispensability, readily becomes transformed from
a servitor of the people into their master. The leaders, who have begun by being
under obligations to their subordinates, become in the long run the lords of these:
such is the ancient truth which was recognized by Goethe when he made Mephistopheles
say that man always allows himself to be ruled by his own creatures. The
very party which fights against the usurpations of the constituted authority of the
state submits as by natural necessity to the usurpations effected by its own
constituted authorities. The masses are far more subject to their leaders than to their
governments and they bear from the former abuses of power which they would never
tolerate from the latter. The lower classes sometimes react forcibly against
oppression from above, and take bloody reprisals, as happened in the French
Jacqueries, in the German Peasants' Wars, in the English revolts under Wat Tyler and
Jack Cade, and more recently in the revolts of the Sicilian Fasci in 1893; whereas
they do not perceive the tyranny of the leaders they have themselves chosen. If at
length the eyes of the masses are opened to the crimes against the democratic ideal
which are committed by their party leaders, their astonishment and their stupor are
unbounded. If, however, they then rise in rebellion, the nature of their criticisms
shows how little they have understood the true character of the problem. Far from
recognizing the real fount of the oligarchical evil in the centralization of power
within the party, they often consider that the best means of counteracting oligarchy
is to intensify this very centralization.
