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CHAPTER III THE MODERN DEMOCRATIC PARTY AS A FIGHTING PARTY, DOMINATED BY MILITARIST IDEAS AND METHODS
  
  
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3. CHAPTER III
THE MODERN DEMOCRATIC PARTY AS A FIGHTING PARTY, DOMINATED BY MILITARIST IDEAS AND METHODS

Louis XIV understood the art of government as have few princes either before or since, and this was the case, above all in the first half of his reign, when his spirit was still young and fresh. In his memoirs of the year 1666, he lays down for every branch of the adminstration, and more especially for the conduct of military affairs, the following essential rules: “que les résolutions doivent être promptes, la discipline exacte, les commandements absolus, l'obéissance ponctuelle.” [44] The essentials thus enumerated by the Roi Soleil (promptness of decision, unity of command, and strictness of discipline) are equally applicable, mutatis mutandis, to the various aggregates of modern political life, for these are in a perpetual condition of latent warfare.

The modern party is a fighting organization in the political sense of the term, and must as such conform to the laws of tactics. Now the first article of these laws is facility of mobilization. Ferdinand Lassalle, the founder of a revolutionary labour party, recognized this long ago, contending that the dictatorship which existed in fact in the society over which he presided was as thoroughly justified in theory as it was indispensable in practice. The rank and file, he said, must follow their chief blindly, and the whole organization must be like a hammer in the hands of its president.

This view of the matter was in correspondence with political necessity, especially in Lassalle's day, when the labour movement was in its infancy, and when it was only by a rigorous discipline that this movement could hope to obtain respect and consideration from the bourgeois parties. Centralization guaranteed, and always guarantees, the rapid formation of resolutions. An extensive organization is per se a heavy piece of mechanism, and one difficult to put in operation. When we have to do with a mass distributed over a considerable area, to consult the rank and file upon every question would involve an enormous loss of time, and the opinion thus obtained would moreover be summary and vague. But the problems of the hour need a speedy decision, and this is why democracy can no longer function in its primitive and genuine form, unless the policy pursued is to be temporizing, involving the loss of the most favorable opportunities for action. Under such guidance, the party becomes incapable of acting in alliance with others, and loses its political elasticity. A fighting party needs a hierarchical structure. In the absence of such a structure, the party will be comparable to a savage and shapeless Negro army, which is unable to withstand a single well-disciplined and welldrilled battalion of European soldiers.

In the daily struggle, nothing but a certain degree of caesarism will ensure the rapid transmission and the precise execution of orders. The Dutch socialist, van Kol, frankly declares that true democracy cannot be installed until the fight is over. Meanwhile, even a socialist leadership must possess authority, and sufficient force to maintain itself in power. A provisional despotism is, he contends, essential, and liberty itself must yield to the need for prompt action. Thus the submission of the masses to the will of a few individuals comes to be considered one of the highest of democratic virtues. “A ceux que sont appelés à nous conduire, nous promettons fidélité et soumission et nous leur disons: Hommes ennoblis par le choix du peuple, montrez nous le chemin, nous vous suivrons.” [45] It is such utterances as this which reveal to us the true nature of the modern party. In a party, and above all in a fighting political party, democracy is not for home consumption, but is rather an article made for export. Every political organization has need of “a light equipment which will not hamper its movements.” Democracy is utterly incompatible with strategic promptness, and the forces of democracy do not lend themselves to the rapid opening of a campaign. This is why political parties, even when democratic, exhibit so much hostility to the referendum and to all other measures for the safeguard of real democracy; and this is why in their constitution these parties exhibit, if not unconditional caesarism, at least extremely strong centralizing and oligarchical tendencies. Lagardelle puts the finishing touches to the picture in the following words: “Et ils ont reproduit à l'usage des prolétaires les moyens de domination des capitalistes; ils ont constitué un gouvernement ouvrier aussi dur que le gouvernement bourgeois, une bureaucratie ouvrière aussi lourde que la bureaucratie bourgeoise, un pouvoir central qui dit aux ouvriers ce qu'ils peuvent et ce qu'ils ne peuvent pas faire, qui brisent dans les syndicats et chez les syndiqués toute indépendance et toute initiative et qui doit parfois inspirer à ses victimes le regret des modes capitalistes de l'autorité.” [46]

The close resemblance between a fighting democratic party and a military organization is reflected in socialist terminology, which is largely borrowed, and especially in Germany, from military science. There is hardly one expression of military tactics and strategy, hardly even a phrase of barrack slang, which does not recur again and again in the leading articles of the socialist press. In the daily practice of the socialist struggle it is true that preference is almost invariably given to the temporizing tactics of Fabius Cunctator, but this depends upon special circumstances, which will be subsequently discussed (Part 6, Chap. 1). The intimate association between party life and military life is manifested also by the passionate interest which some of the most distinguished leaders of German socialism take in military affairs. During his residence in England, the German merchant Frederick Engels, who had once served in the Guards as a volunteer, devoted his leisure to the simultaneous exposition of socialist and of militarist theory. [47] To Bebel, the son of a Prussian non-commissioned officer, the world is indebted for a number of ideas of reform in matters of military technique which have nothing in common with the theoretical socialist anti-militarism. [48] Bebel and Engels, and especially the latter, may even be considered as essentially military writers. This tendency on the part of socialist leaders is not the outcome of mere chance, but depends upon an instinct of elective affinity.

[[44]]

Trans. from Mémoires de Louis XIV pour I'instruction du Dauphin, annotées par Charles Deyss, Paris, 1860, vol. ii, p. 123.

[[45]]

Trans. from Rienzi [van Kol], Socialisme et Liberti, Giard et Brière, Paris, 1898, pp. 243-53.

[[46]]

Trans. from Hubert Lagardelle, Le Parti Socialiste et la Confédération du Travail, Discussion with J. Guesde, Riviere, Paris, 1907, p. 24.

[[47]]

See in particular Engels' works: Po und Rhein (1859); Savoy en, Nizza und der Rhein (1860); Die preussische Militärfrage und die deutsche Arbeiterpartei (1865); Der deutsche Bauernkrieg (1875, Vorwarts-Verlag, Berlin, 1909, 3rd ed. edited by Mehring); Kann Europa abrüsten? (Nuremberg, 1893).

[[48]]

Cf., for example, the pamphlet Nicht stehendes Heer, sondern Volksvehr, Dietz, Stuttgart, 1908, p. 80; also a large number of speeches in the Reichstag on the military estimates, in which he is never tired of discussing the minutiae of army reform, and in which in especial he advocates changes in military equipment to render the army more efficient.