Section 34.
Criminal law, like all other disciplines, must ask under what
conditions and when we are entitled to say "we know." The answer
is far from being perennially identical, though it might have been
expected that the conviction of knowledge would be ever united
with identical conditions. The strange and significant difference
is determined by the question whether the verdict, "we know,"
will or will not have practical consequences. When we discuss
some question like the place of a certain battle, the temperature
of the moon, or the appearance of a certain animal in the Pliocene,
we first assume that there is a true answer;
reasons for and against
will appear, the former increase in number, and suddenly we discover
in some book the assurance that, "We know the fact." That
assurance passes into so and so many other books; and if it is untrue,
no essential harm can be done.
But when science is trying to determine the quality of some
substance, the therapeutic efficiency of some poison, the possibilities
of some medium of communication, the applicability of
some great national economic principle like free trade, then it takes
much more time to announce, "We know that this is so and not
otherwise." In this case one sees clearly that tremendous consequences
follow on the practical interpretation of "we know," and
therefore there is in these cases quite a different taxation of knowledge
from that in cases where the practical consequences are comparatively
negligible.
Our work is obviously one of concrete practical consequences. It
contains, moreover, conditions that make imperfect knowledge
equivalent to complete ignorance, for in delivering sentence every
"no" may each time mean, "We know that he has not done it"
or again, "We know that it is not altogether certain that he has
done it." Our knowledge in such cases is limited to the recognition
of the confusion of the subject, and knowledge in its widest sense
is the consciousness of some definite content; in this case, confusion.
Here, as everywhere, knowledge is not identical with truth;
knowledge is only subjective truth. Whoever knows, has reasons
for considering things true and none against so considering them.
Here, he is entitled to assume that all who recognize his knowledge
will justify it. But, when even everybody justifies his knowledge,
it can be justified only in its immediacy; to-morrow the whole affair
may look different. For this reason we criminalists assert much
less than other investigators that we seek the truth; if we presume
to such an assertion, we should not have the institutions of equity,
revision, and, in criminal procedure, retrial. Our knowledge, when
named modestly, is only the innermost conviction that some matter
is so and so according to human capacity, and "such and such a
condition of things." Parenthetically, we agree that "such and such
a condition of things" may alter with every instant and we declare
ourselves ready to study the matter anew if the conditions change.
We demand material, but relative truth.
One of the acutest thinkers, J. R. von Mayer, the discoverer of
the working principle of "conservation of energy," says, "the most
important, if not the only rule for real natural science is this: Always
to believe that it is our task to know the phenomena before we seek
explanation of higher causes. If a fact is once known in all its aspects,
it is thereby explained and the duty of science fulfilled." The
author did not have us dry-souled lawyers in mind when he made
this assertion, but we who modestly seek to subordinate our discipline
to that of the correct one of natural science, must take
this doctrine absolutely to heart. Every crime we study is a
fact, and once we know it in all its aspects and have accounted
for every little detail, we have explained it and have done our
duty.
But the word explain does not lead us very far. It is mainly a
matter of reducing the mass of the inexplicable to a minimum and
the whole to its simplest terms. If only we succeed in this reduction!
In most cases we substitute for one well-known term, not
another still better one, but a strange one which may mean different
things to different people. So again, we explain one event by
means of another more difficult one. It is unfortunate that we
lawyers are more than all others inclined to make unnecessary
explanations, because our criminal law has accustomed us to silly
definitions which rarely bring us closer to the issue and which supply
us only with a lot of words difficult to understand instead of easily
comprehensible ones. Hence we reach explanations both impossible
and hard to make, explanations which we ourselves are often
unwilling to believe. And again we try to explain and to define
events which otherwise would have been understood by everybody
and which become doubtful and uncertain because of the attempt.
The matter becomes especially difficult when we feel ourselves
unsure, or when we have discovered or expect contradiction. Then
we try to convince ourselves that we know something, although at
the beginning we were clearly enough aware that we knew nothing.
We must not forget that our knowledge can attain only to ideas of
things. It consists alone in the perception of the relation and
agreement, or in the incompatibility and contradiction of some of our
ideas. Our task lies exactly in the explication of these impressions,
and the more thoroughly that is done the greater and more certain
is the result. But we must never trust our own impressions merely.
"When the theologian, who deals with the supersensible, has said
all that, from his point of view, he can say, when the jurist, who
represents those fundamental laws which are the result of social
experience, has considered all reasons from his own point of view,
the final authority in certain cases must be the physician who is
engaged in studying the life of the body."
I get this from
Maudsley,[1] and it leads
us to keep in mind that
our knowledge is very one-sided and limited, and that an event is
known only when all have spoken who possess especial knowledge
of its type. Hence, every criminalist is required to found his
knowledge upon that of the largest possible number of experts
and not to judge or discuss any matter which requires especial
information without having first consulted an expert with regard
to it. Only the sham knows everything; the trained man
understands how little the mind of any individual may grasp,
and how many must coöperate in order to explain the very simplest
things.
The complexity of the matter lies in the essence of the concept
"to be." We use the word "to be" to indicate the intent of all
perceived and perceivable. " `To be' and `to know' are identical
in so far as they have identical content, and the content may
be known?"
[2]
[[ id="n34.1"]]
Henry Maudsley: Physiology and Pathology of the Mind.
[[ id="n34.2"]]
Jessen: Versuch einer wissenschaftlichen Begründung der Psychologie.
Berlin 1855.