University of Virginia Library

BOOK FIVE

Chapter XV

PORTENTS OF RUIN[1]

1. As a rule, if the state of the lord of men is small but the
fiefs of private families are big, or if the ruler's sceptre is
insignificant but the ministers are powerful, then ruin is
possible.

2. If the ruler neglects laws and prohibitions, indulges in
plans and ideas, disregards the defence works within the
boundaries and relies on foreign friendship and support,
then ruin is possible.

3. If all officials indulge in studies, sons of the family are
fond of debate, peddlars and shopkeepers hide money in
foreign countries, and poor people suffer miseries at home,
then ruin is possible.

4. If the ruler is fond of palatial decorations, raised kiosks,
and embanked pools, is immersed in pleasures of having
chariots, clothes, and curios, and thereby tires out the
hundred surnames and exhausts public wealth, then ruin is
possible.

5. If the ruler believes in date-selecting,[2] worships devils
and deities, believes in divination and lot-casting, and likes
fêtes and celebrations, then ruin is possible.

6. If the ruler takes advice only from ministers of high
rank, refrains from comparing different opinions and
testifying to the truth, and uses only one man as a channel
of information, then ruin is possible.

7. If posts and offices can be sought through influential
personages and rank and bounties can be obtained by means
of bribes, then ruin is possible.

8. If the ruler, being easy-going, accomplishes nothing,
being tender-hearted, lacking in decision, and, wavering
between acceptance and rejection, has no settled opinion,
then ruin is possible.

9. If the ruler is greedy, insatiable, attracted to profit,
and fond of gain, then ruin is possible.

10. If the ruler enjoys inflicting unjust punishment and
does not uphold the law, likes debate and persuasion but
never sees to their practicability, and indulges in style and
wordiness but never considers their effect, then ruin is
possible.

11. If the ruler is shallow-brained and easily penetrated,
reveals everything but conceals nothing, and cannot keep
any secret but communicates the words of one minister to
another, then ruin is possible.

12. If the ruler is stubborn-minded, uncompromising,
and apt to dispute every remonstrance and fond of surpassing
everybody else, and never thinks of the welfare of the Altar
of the Spirits of Land and Grain but sticks to self-confidence
without due consideration, then ruin is possible.

13. The ruler who relies on friendship and support from
distant countries, makes light of his relations with close
neighbours, counts on the aid from big powers, and provokes
surrounding countries, is liable to ruin.

14. If foreign travellers and residents, whose property
and families are abroad, take seats in the state council and
interfere in civil affairs, then ruin is possible.

15. If the people have no[3] confidence in the premier and
the inferiors do not obey the superiors while the sovereign
loves and trusts the premier and cannot depose him, then
ruin is possible.

16. If the ruler does not take able men of the country
into service but searches after foreign gentlemen, and if he
does not make tests according to meritorious services but
would appoint and dismiss officials according to their mere
reputations till foreign residents are exalted and ennobled
to surpass his old acquaintances, then ruin is possible.

17. If the ruler disregards the matter of legitimacy and
lets bastards rival legitimate sons, or if the sovereign dies
before he inaugurates the crown prince, then ruin is possible.

18. If the ruler is boastful but never regretful, makes much
of himself despite the disorder prevailing in his country, and
insults the neighbouring enemies without estimating the
resources within the boundaries, then ruin is possible.

19. If the state is small but the ruler will not acquiesce in
a humble status; if his forces are scanty but he never fears
strong foes; if he has no manners and insults big neighbours;
or if he is greedy and obstinate but unskilful in diplomacy;
then ruin is possible.

20. If, after the inauguration of the crown prince, the
ruler take in a woman from a strong enemy state, the crown
prince will be endangered and the ministers will be worried.
Then ruin is possible.

21. If the ruler is timid and weak in self-defence and his
mind is paralysed by the signs of future events; or if he
knows what to decide on[4] but dare not take any drastic
measure; then ruin is possible.

22. If the exiled ruler is abroad but the country sets up
a new ruler, or if before the heir apparent taken abroad as
hostage returns, the ruler changes his successor, then the
state will divide. And the state divided against itself is
liable to ruin.

23. If the ruler keeps near and dear to the chief vassals
whom he has disheartened and disgraced or stands close[5]
by the petty men[6] whom he has punished, then he will
make them bear anger and feel shame. If he goes on doing
this, rebels are bound to appear. When rebels appear, ruin
is possible.

24. If chief vassals rival each other in power and uncles
and brothers are many and powerful, and if they form
juntas inside and receive support from abroad and thereby
dispute state affairs and struggle for supreme influence,
then ruin is possible.

25. If words of maids and concubines are followed and
the wisdom of favourites is used, and the ruler repeats
committing unlawful acts regardless of the grievances and
resentments inside and outside the court, then ruin is possible.

26. If the ruler is contemptuous to chief vassals and
impolite to uncles and brothers, overworks the hundred
surnames, and slaughters innocent people, then ruin is
possible.

27. If the ruler is fond of twisting laws by virtue of his
wisdom, mixes public with private[7] affairs from time to
time, alters laws and prohibitions at random, and issues
commands and orders frequently, then ruin is possible.

28. If the terrian has no stronghold,[8] the city-walls are in
bad repair, the state has no savings and hoardings, resources
and provisions are scarce, and no preparations are made for
defence and attack, but the ruler dares to attack and invade
other countries imprudently, then ruin is possible.

29. If the royal seed is short-lived, new sovereigns succeed
to each other continuously, babies become rulers, and chief
vassals have all the ruling authority to themselves and
recruit partisans from among foreign residents and maintain
inter-state friendship by frequently ceding territories, then
ruin is possible.

30. If the crown prince is esteemed and celebrated, has
numerous dependents and protégés, develops friendships
with big powers, and exercises his authority and influence
from his early years, then ruin is possible.

31. If the ruler is narrow-minded,[9] quick-tempered,
imprudent, easily affected, and, when provoked, becomes
blind with rage, then ruin is possible.

32. If the sovereign is easily provoked and fond of
resorting to arms and neglects agricultural and military
training but ventures warfare and invasion heedlessly, then
ruin is possible.

33. If nobles are jealous of one another, chief vassals are
prosperous, seeking support from enemy states and harassing

the hundred surnames at home so as to attack their wrongdoers,
but the lord of men never censures them, then ruin
is possible.

34. If the ruler is unworthy but his half-brothers are
worthy; if the heir apparent is powerless and the bastard
surpasses him; or if the magistrates are weak and the people
are fierce; then the state will be seized with a panic. And a
panic-stricken state is liable to ruin.

35. If the ruler conceals his anger, which he would never
reveal, suspends a criminal case, which he never would
censure, and thereby makes the officials hate him in secret
and increases their worries and fears, and if he never comes
to know the situation even after a long time, then ruin is
possible.

36. If the commander in the front line has too much
power, the governor on the frontier has too much nobility,
and if they have the ruling authority to themselves, issue
orders at their own will and do just as they wish without
asking permission of the ruler, then ruin is possible.

37. If the queen is adulterous, the sovereign's mother is
corrupt, attendants inside and outside the court intercommunicate,
and male and female have no distinction, such
a régime is called "bi-regal".[10] Any country having two
rulers is liable to ruin.

38. If the queen is humble but the concubine is noble,
the heir apparent is low but the bastard is high, the prime
minister is despised but the court usher is esteemed, then disobedience
will appear in and out of the court. If disobedience
appears in and out of the court, the state is liable to ruin.

39. If chief vassals are very powerful, have many strong
partisans, obstruct the sovereign's decisions, and administer
all state affairs on their own authority, then ruin is possible.

40. If vassals of private families are employed but
descendants of military officers[11] are rejected,[12] men who do
good to their village communities are promoted but those
who render distinguished services to their official posts are
discarded, self-seeking deeds are esteemed but public-spirited
works are scorned, then ruin is possible.

41. If the state treasury is empty but the chief vassals
have plenty of money, native subjects are poor but foreign
residents are rich, farmers and warriors have hard times but
people engaged in secondary professions are benefited, then
ruin is possible.

42. The ruler who sees a great advantage but does not
advance towards it, hears the outset of a calamity but does
not provide against it, thus neglecting preparations for attack
and defence and striving to embellish himself with the
practice of benevolence and righteousness, is liable to ruin.

43. If the ruler does not practise the filial piety of the
lord of men but yearns after the filial piety of the commoner,
does not regard the welfare of the Altar of the Spirits of
Land and Grain but obeys the orders of the dowager queen,
and if he allows women to administer the state affairs and
eunuchs to meddle with politics, then ruin is possible.

44. If words are eloquent but not legal, the mind is
sagacious but not tactful, the sovereign is versatile but
performs his duties not in accordance with laws and regulations,
then ruin is possible.

45. If new[13] ministers advance when old officials withdraw,
the unworthy meddle with politics when the virtuous pass
out of the limelight, and men of no merit are esteemed when
hard-working people are disdained, then the people left
behind will resent it. If the people left behind resent it,
ruin is possible.

46. If the bounties and allowances of uncles and brothers
exceed their merits, their badges and uniforms override their
grades, and their residences and provisions are too
extravagant, and if the lord of men never restrains them,
then ministers will become insatiable. If ministers are
insatiable, then ruin is possible.

47. If the ruler's sons-in-law and grandsons live behind
the same hamlet gate with the commoners and behave
unruly and arrogantly towards their neighbours, then ruin
is possible.

Thus, portents of ruin do not imply certainty of ruin but
liability to ruin.

Indeed, two Yaos[14] cannot rule side by side, nor can two
Chiehs[15] ruin each other. The secrets of rule or ruin lie in
the inclination towards order or chaos, strength or weakness.

It is true, the tree breaks down because[16] of vermin, the
fence gives way on account[17] of cracks. Yet, despite the
vermin, if no sudden gale blows, the tree will not break
down; despite the cracks, if no heavy rain falls, the fence
does not give way.

If the sovereign of ten thousand chariots can exercise
tact and enforce law and thereby function as gale and rain
to rulers having portents of ruin, his annexation of Allunder-Heaven
will have no difficulty.

Chapter XVI

THREE PRECAUTIONS[1]

The lord of men has three precautions to take. If the
three precautions are complete, the state will be safe and he
will be prosperous; if the three precautions are not complete,
the state will fall into danger and his life will become
precarious.

What are meant by the "three precautions"?

Whenever ministers memorialize the Throne the faults
of the authorities in power, the mistakes of the personnel
in charge of state affairs, and the actual conditions of the
officials,[2] if the lord of men, instead of keeping the secret,
divulges it to courtiers and favourite vassals and thereby
makes ministers, who want to speak to the Throne, please
the courtiers and favourite vassals before they submit any
instance to the lord of men, then frank and straightforward
speakers will not be able to have an audience of the ruler
and loyal and honest men will be kept farther and farther
aloof.[3]

If the ruler does not by himself benefit the men he loves

but would benefit them only after the courtiers have praised
them, and if he does not by himself hurt the men he hates
but would hurt them only after the courtiers have blamed
them, then the lord of men will lose his prestige, and his
ruling authority will fall into the hands of his attendants.[4]

If the ruler dislikes the toil of governing the state by
himself and lets the ministers group together and administer
state affairs, and if in so doing he passes his handles and
shifts his position[5] to chief vassals and places the power
over life and property in their hands, then his prerogative
will be infringed.[6]

These are called "the three precautions unaccomplished".
If the three precautions remain incomplete, the situation
portends molestation and regicide.

In general, there are three kinds of molestation: Molestation
through the formation of juntas,[7] molestation through
the dictation of state policies,[8] and molestation through the
application of penal laws.[9]

If ministers who hold the honour of chief vassals have
the key to the state government in their grip for patronizing
the officials and make the administration of foreign and
home affairs necessarily go through their approval; and,
though there are worthy and upright personages, if people
disobeying them always have bad luck and those obeying
them always have good luck; then no official would dare
to be loyal to the sovereign and worry about state welfare

and thereby dispute the advantages and disadvantages of the
Altar of the Spirits of Land and Grain. If the lord of men,
however worthy, cannot devise plans by himself, and if
there are ministers who dare not be loyal to the sovereign,
then the state must be doomed to ruin. It is then called
"a state without ministers". However, a state without
ministers does not imply the scarcity of royal guards and
the lack of ministers in the court. It really means a state
whose ministers hold to their bounties, nourish their friends,
practise their private ways of life, and never exert their
spirit of loyalty to the public. Such is called "molestation
through the formation of juntas".

Again, suppose chief vassals distribute private favours,
have all powers to themselves, overawe the country by
pretending to have influence abroad, follow the like and
hate of the sovereign with his forced interpretation of the
signs of fortune and misfortune, advantages and disadvantages.
And suppose the lord of men listens to them
and upholds their policies even by humiliating himself and
neglecting state welfare. Then, when the policies fail, the
sovereign has to share the consequent disasters with them;
when the policies succeed, they take all credit to themselves.
Finally, if all the government employees unite their
minds and identify their words to speak of their virtues,
then though others speak of their vices to the Throne, the
sovereign never will believe. Such is called "molestation
through the dictation of state policies".

Finally, in matters of court and jail administration as well
as prohibition and punishment, if ministers have powers to
themselves, their act as such is called "molestation through
the application of penal laws".

In short, if the three precautions are not complete, the
three molestations will arise; if the three precautions are
complete, the three molestations will stop. If the sovereign
succeeds in stopping and debarring these three molestations,
he will attain supremacy.

Chapter XVII

GUARDING AGAINST THE INTERIOR[1]

The difficulty of the lord of men lies in his confidence in
men. Confiding in men, he is restrained by men.

Ministers, in relation to the ruler, have no kinship, but,
solely because constrained by force of circumstances, serve
him. Therefore, those who minister to a ruler, always
watch the mental condition of their master without stopping
even for a moment; whereas the lord of men remains idle
and arrogant over them. This is the reason why the world
sees cases of ruler-molestation and regicide.

If the lord of men has much confidence in his son, then
wicked ministers will utilize his son to accomplish their
selfish purposes. For illustration, Li Tai, while assisting
the King of Chao, starved the Father Sovereign.

If the lord of men has much confidence in his spouse,
then wicked ministers will utilize his spouse to accomplish
their selfish purposes. For illustration, Actor Shih, while
assisting Princess Li,[2] murdered Shên-shêng[3] and placed
Hsi-ch`i[4] in his stead.[5]

Indeed, even the spouse who is so near and the son who
is so dear to the sovereign are not trustworthy, much less
can anybody else be trustworthy.

Besides, whether he be a ruler of ten thousand chariots
or a ruler of one thousand chariots, the queen, the concubine,
or the crown prince, even though he be the legitimate son,
might hope for his early death.

How do I know it is so? Indeed, man and wife, having
no kinship between them, are intimate when mutually in
love and distant when not in love. Hence the saying: "If
the mother is loved, the son is held in the arms." If so,
the contrary must run like this: "If the mother is unloved,
the son is cast aside." Men fifty years old are as fond of
women as usual, but women only thirty years old are falling
off in beauty. If women falling off in beauty have to serve
men still fond of the fair sex, then they will be neglected[6]
and their sons will doubt if they will remain heirs of their
fathers. This is the reason why queens, princesses, and
concubines crave the death of the rulers.

It is only when the mother is the queen dowager and the
son is the sovereign that decrees never fail to prevail and
prohibitions never fail to function. Then she finds as much
pleasure between man and woman as at the time when the
late ruler was still alive, and under no suspicion can she
have all the powers of the ruler of ten thousand chariots to
herself. For such a reason, poisoning with wine and hanging
in secret are practised.

Hence it is said in T`ao-wu's[7] Spring and Autumn Annals:
"Of the lords of men, those who died of illness were not

even half of those that died." If the ruler is ignorant of
such a danger, seeds of disorder will multiply. Hence the
saying: "If those who will profit by the ruler's death are
numerous, then the lord of men is in danger."

Thus, Wang Liang liked horses, and Kou-chien, King of
Yüeh, liked able-bodied men, merely for driving and fighting
purposes. The physician sucks patients' cuts and holds
their blood in his mouth, not because he is intimate with
them like a blood relation, but because he expects profits
from them. Likewise, when the cartwright finishes making
carriages, he wants people to be rich and noble; when the
carpenter finishes making coffins, he wants people to die
early. Not that the cartwright is benevolent and the carpenter
is cruel, but that unless people are noble, the carriages will
not sell, and unless people die, the coffins will not be bought.
Thus, the carpenter's motive is not a hatred for anybody
but his profits are due to people's death. For the same
reason, when the clique of the queen, the princess, the
concubine, or the crown prince, is formed, they want the
ruler to die early. For, unless the ruler die, their positions
will not be powerful. Their motive is not a hatred for the
ruler, but their profits are dependent on the ruler's death.
Therefore the lord of men must specially mind those who
will profit by his death.

For illustration, though the sun and the moon are
surrounded by haloes, the causes of their eclipses are inside
themselves. Similarly, though the ruler guards against what
he hates, the causes of his calamity consist in what he loves.

For this reason, the intelligent sovereign[8] would neither

carry out any untenable task,[9] nor eat any inordinate food,
but would listen from all round and observe everybody
closely in order thereby to scrutinize the faults of the interior
and the exterior,[10] and reflect on pros and cons so as to know
the line of demarcation between different factions, compare
the results of testimony, and thereby hold every utterance
responsible for an equivalent fact, hold the consequent in
correspondence with the antecedent, govern the masses in
accordance with the law, and gather causes of different
affairs for comparison and observation; so that nobody
shall receive any undue reward and overstep the limits of his
duties, and that every murderer shall be sentenced to proper
penalty and no convict shall be pardoned. If so, there will
be left no room for wicked and villainous persons to
accomplish their self-seeking purposes.

If compulsory labour service is frequent, the people will
feel afflicted; if the people are afflicted, powerful and
influential men will appear to the fore; if powerful and
influential men make their appearance, exemptions will
multiply; and if exemptions multiply, the nobles will, by
accepting bribes from the people exempted from labour
service, become wealthy. To afflict the people and thereby
enrich the nobles and to vacate the august position and let
ministers utilize it, is not a permanent advantage to the
world. Hence the saying: "If compulsory labour service
is rare, the people will feel safe; if the people are safe, the
ministers will gain no extra power; if the ministers have

no extra power, powerful and influential men will be
extinguished; and if powerful and influential men disappear,
all credit will be due to the sovereign."

Now, take for illustration the truism that water overpowers
fire. Yet, when a tripod-kettle goes between them,
then the water will be heated and boiled till it dries up over
the fire while the fire can flame with vigour and continue
burning beneath the water. Indeed, the fact that government
forbids wickedness is still clearer than this. Yet, when
ministers who ought to uphold the law play the part of the
tripod-kettle by standing between ruler and subject, then
the law, however clear in the sovereign's mind, has already
lost its reason to forbid wickedness.

According to the sayings handed down from remote
antiquity, as recorded in the Spring and Autumn Annals,
whoever violates the law, launches an insurrection, and
thereby commits high treason, comes from among the high
and noble ministers. Yet what laws and orders guard against
and penalties censure is always among the low and humble.
That being so, the people give up all hope of salvation and
find nobody to petition for relief. The chief vassals form
juntas, obscure the ruler en bloc, and maintain their intimate
relationship in secret but pretend in the open to mutual
hatred in order to prove their unselfishness, and work as
the ears and eyes of one another in order to watch for the
sovereign's unguarded moments. Thus, surrounded and
deluded, the lord of men has no way to get news from
outside and retains the sovereign's title but not the reality
while ministers have all laws to themselves and carry them
into effect at their discretion. Of such a ruler the Sons of
Heaven of Chou were good examples. In short, if the power

and influence of the Throne is deputed to any minister in
particular, high and low will displace their posts; which
amounts to saying that no minister should be allowed to
utilize the power and influence of the ruler.[11]

Chapter XVIII

FACING THE SOUTH[1]

The fault of the lord of men is: After having entrusted[2]
certain ministers with the state affairs, he guards against them
with ministers not entrusted. His reason for so doing is
that the non-entrusted and the entrusted will become enemies.
Contrary to his expectation, the sovereign will fall under the
spell of the non-entrusted. In consequence, the ministers
with whom he is now guarding against the entrusted, are
mostly those whom he used to guard against. If the lord of
men cannot make the law clear and thereby restrain the
power of chief vassals, there will be no other way to win
confidence from the petty officials.[3]

If the lord of men casts the law aside and guards against
ministers with ministers, then those who love one another
will associate for wicked purposes and speak well of one

another while those who hate one another will form cliques
and speak ill of one another. When blame and praise are
crossing each other, the sovereign will fall into bewilderment
and confusion.

Those who minister to a ruler, unless they have good
reputations and make frequent requests, cannot advance
their careers; unless they act contrary to the law and take
all powers to themselves, they cannot uplift their prestige;
and, unless they pretend to loyalty and faithfulness, they
cannot rid themselves of prohibitions. These three ways
are means of deluding the sovereign and destroying the law.

The lord of men, when employing ministers, should not
allow them, however wise and able they may be, to act
contrary to the law and take all powers to themselves;
should not allow them, however worthy and virtuous they
may be, to claim any priority among the men of merit and
take precedence of the hard-working people; and should
not discard the law and refrain from restricting them, however
loyal and faithful they may be. Such a ruler is called an
illustrator of the law.

The lord of men is sometimes tempted to tasks and
sometimes deluded by words; wherefore both tasks and
words need due consideration.

Ministers who imprudently propose tasks, usually underestimate
the expenditure and thereby deceive the sovereign
with the proposition. Deluded thereby, the sovereign does
not carefully consider the tasks but thinks much of the
ministers. If so, they will in turn restrain the sovereign with
the enterprises. Such is called "temptation to tasks".[4]
The ruler once tempted to tasks will be harassed by worries.

If the proposition purports a small task but the actual
expenses are enormous, then, though meritorious services
are performed, the proposition is not one of faith. If the
ministers whose propositions are of no faith are found
guilty, and if the tasks, though they provide results, get no
reward,[5] nobody would dare to twist his words to blind
the sovereign. The way to be a sovereign is to make the
ministers' previous words never deviate from their subsequent
sayings and the subsequent never deviate from the previous
and to find them guilty in case of any deviation, although
the tasks may have provided results. This is called "skilfully
employing subordinates".[6]

The minister, when he devises a project for his master and
fears disapproval, will make out a case and declare such a
warning as, "Whoever criticizes the project of this task
is jealous of the projector." Suppose the lord of men, keeping
it in secret, never consults any other minister. The rest of
the ministers, frightened by the premonition, dare not
criticize the project. If these two sets of circumstances[7]
prevail, loyal ministers will not be accepted but well-reputed
ministers will be employed exclusively. Such is called
"delusion by words". The ruler once deluded by words
will be restrained by ministers.

The right way to be the sovereign is to make all ministers
understand the reasons why they are blamed for giving
opinions and why they are blamed for not giving opinions.
If they utter words that have neither beginning nor ending

or an argument that has no proof, then they are blamed for
giving opinions. If they attempt to evade responsibilities
by not giving any opinion so as to maintain their high posts,
then they are blamed for not giving opinions.

The lord of men in keeping ministers in service ought to
know the motive and purpose[8] of every speaker in order to
hold his words responsible for an equivalent fact, and ask the
non-speakers to decide between the pros and cons of the
proposition so as to hold them accountable for the result of
the work. If so, nobody will dare to give any arbitrary
opinions nor to keep silent. Because both speaking and silence
equally involve accountabilities.

When the lord of men wants to accomplish a task, if he
does not understand its beginning and ending so as to
clarify the object of his desire, and then if he attempts to
accomplish it, his work will gain no advantage but will incur
disadvantage instead. If he understands this principle, he
will trust to reason and get rid of avarice. The accomplishment
of every task has its proper course. If its income is
estimated to be big and its outgo is estimated to be small,
the project is practicable.

Such is not the case with the deluded sovereign. For he
estimates the income but never estimates the outgo. As a
result, even though the outgo is twice as much as the income,
he never notices the harm. Thus in name he gains but in
fact he loses. If such is the case, the achievement will be
little while the harm is great.

In general, an achievement implies a big income and a
small outgo. Only in such a case can it be called an achievement.
Now that much waste incurs no crime and little gain

is a merit, ministers naturally waste enormous expenses and
perform small merits. As small merits are performed, so the
sovereign suffers losses.

Those who do not know the right way to political order,
always say, "Never change ancient traditions, never remove
existing institutions." Change or no change, the sage does
not mind. For he aims only at the rectification of government.
Whether or not ancient traditions should be changed,
whether or not existing institutions should be removed, all
depends upon the question whether or not such traditions
and such institutions are still useful for present-day political
purposes.

If Yi Yin had made no reform on behalf of Yin and T`aikung
Wang[9] had made no reform on behalf of Chou, neither
T`ang nor Wu could become King. If Kuan Chung had
made no reform on behalf of Ch`i and Kuo Yen[10] had made no
reform on behalf of Chin, neither Duke Huan nor Duke
Wên could have become hegemonic.

Generally speaking, men hesitate to change ancient
traditions because they are diffident about affecting the peace
of the people. Indeed, not to change ancient traditions is to
inherit the traces of disorder; to accord with the mind of the
people is to tolerate villainous deeds. If the people are stupid
and ignorant of disorder and the superior is weak-spirited
and unable to reform traditions and institutions, it is a
failure in the process of government.

The lord of men must be intelligent enough to know the

true path to order and severe enough to carry out his orders
without reserve. Therefore, though he has to act contrary
to the mind of the people, he should by all means[11] establish
an orderly government.

The basis of this argument is found in the "External and
Internal Affairs" by Lord Shang, who had iron spears and
heavy shields around him whenever going out to provide
against accidents. Likewise, when Kuo Yen began to assume
the reins of government, Duke Wên had an official bodyguard.
When Kuan Chung began to assume the reins of
government, Duke Huan had an armoured carriage. Thus
they all took precautions against mobs.

For the same reason, in dealing[12] with stupid and idle
people, if one worries himself about small expenses, then
he is forgetting big profits. For instance, Yin Hu, bullied[13]
and slandered, was very afraid[14] of even small changes and
lost his permanent advantage in consequence. Likewise, the
salesman of Tsou was not a carrier, but he was accustomed
to chaotic conditions and chary[15] of living in an orderly
world. Therefore, the man of Chêng could not go home. . . .[16]

Chapter XIX

ON PRETENSIONS AND HERESIES[1] :
A MEMORIAL

It was Chao that, after boring the tortoise-shell, counting
the bamboo slips, and finding the omen saying, "Great
luck," attacked Yen.[2] It was Yen that, after boring the
tortoise-shell, counting the bamboo slips, and finding the
omen saying, "Great luck," attacked Chao. Chü Hsin,[3]
when serving Yen, rendered no meritorious service, till
the Altar of the Spirits of Land and Grain fell into danger.
Tsou Yen,[4] when serving Yen, rendered no meritorious
service, till the course of the state policy came to a deadlock.
Chao[5] was first successful in Yen and later successful in Ch`i.
Though her state once fell into confusion, yet she always
held her prestige high and assumed herself adequate to rival
Ch`in on an equal footing. It was not because Chao's tortoiseshell
was effective and Yen's tortoise-shell was deceptive.

Chao once again bored the tortoise-shell, counted the
bamboo slips, and invaded Yen in the north with a view to
resisting Ch`in by molesting Yen.[6] The omen said, "Great
luck." No sooner had her army marched out[7] through
Ta-liang in Wey than Ch`in began to invade[8] Shang-tang in

Chao. When her troops reached Li in Yen, she had lost six
cities to Ch`in. When they reached Yang-ch`êng in Yen,
Ch`in had taken Yeh in Chao. When P`ang Yüan turned
Chao's army southward, practically all the strongholds of
Chao had fallen into Ch`in's hands.

Thy servant, therefore, says: Chao's tortoise-shell, even
though not able to foresee the outcome of her campaign in
Yen, should have been able to foretell the victory of Ch`in's
invasion at hand. Ch`in, believing in the great luck of the
expedition, expanded her territory in fact and rescued Yen
in the good cause.[9] Chao, believing in the great luck of the
campaign, had her soil dismembered and her forces
humiliated, till the sovereign, unable to realize his ambition,
passed away. Again, this was not because Ch`in's
tortoise-shell was effective and Chao's tortoise-shell was
deceptive.

At the outset of the founding of the state, Wey faced the
east for several years and completely conquered both T`ao
and Wei. Then she turned westward for several years to
cope with Ch`in and, as a result, lost land to Ch`in. This
was not because such lucky stars as Fêng-lung,[10] Wu-hsing,[11]
T`ai-yi,[12] Wang-hsiang,[13] Shê-t`i,[14] Liu-shên,[15] Wu-kua,[16]

T`ien-ho,[17] Yin-ch`iang,[18] and Sui-hsing,[19] were for so many
years[20] in the direction of Ch`in and to the west of Wey;
nor was it because such unlucky stars as T`ien-ch`üeh,[21]
Hu-ni,[22] Hsing-hsing,[23] Yung-hui,[24] and K`uei-t`ai,[25] were
for so many years[26] in the direction of Wey and to the east of
Ch`in. Hence the saying: "Tortoise-shells, bamboo slips,
devils, and deities, are not qualified to guarantee victory;
nor are the directions of the stars, whether right or
left, front or back, qualified to decide the outcome
of war." If so, to believe in them is more stupid than
anything else.

In ancient times, the early kings exerted their forces to
renovate the people and doubled their efforts to clarify the
law. As the law was made clear, loyal subjects were
encouraged. As punishment was made definite, wicked
subjects were suppressed. It was Ch`in whose loyal subjects
were encouraged and wicked ones were suppressed and
whose territory was expanded and sovereign was glorified.

It was the states to the east of Mount Hua whose officials
formed factions, associated for selfish purposes and thereby
obscured the right way of government and committed
crookedness in secret, and whose territories were dismembered
and sovereigns humiliated. That disorderly and weak states
go to ruin, is known to everybody. That orderly and strong
states attain supremacy has been the beaten track since
antiquity.

Kou-chien, King of Yüeh, believed in the Ta-p`êng
Tortoise and waged a war with Wu, but did not win, till
finally he had to surrender himself as vassal and went
personally to serve the King of Wu.[27] Upon his return, he
threw away the tortoise, clarified the law, and renovated
the people, with a view to giving Wu his revenge. In the
end Fu-ch`a, King of Wu, was taken captive.[28] Therefore,
whoever believes in devils and deities, neglects the law.

Similarly, whoever relies on other feudal lords, endangers
his native soil. For instance, Ts`ao, relying on Ch`i, turned
a deaf ear to Sung, so that when Ch`i attacked Ching, Sung
destroyed Ts`ao. Hsing,[29] relying on Wu, took no advice
from Ch`i, so that when Yüeh invaded Wu, Ch`i destroyed
Hsing. Hsü, relying on Ching, would not listen to Wey,
so that when Ching attacked Sung, Wey destroyed Hsü.
Chêng, relying on Wey, would not listen to Han, so that
when Wey attacked Ching, Han destroyed Chêng.

To-day, Han, being a small state, is relying upon big
powers. Her sovereign, paying little attention to the law,
takes every word from Ch`in. The above-mentioned small

states, having relied upon Wey, Ch`i, Ching, and Wu for
support,[30] went to ruin one after another. Thus reliance on
others is not sufficient to extend the native soil. Yet Han
never looks at these instances. Again, when Ching attacked
Wey, she sent her troops to Wey's allies, Hsü and Yen.[31]
When Ch`i attacked Jên and Hu and dismembered Wey's
territory, the combined forces of the allies were not even
sufficient to preserve Chêng.[32] Yet Han takes no notice of these
instances. All these states, indeed, never clarified laws and
prohibitions in order to govern their peoples, but relied
on foreign powers entirely, and thereby drove their Altars
of the Spirits of Land and Grain to extinction.

Thy servant, therefore, says: If measures for political
order are clarified, the state, though small in size, will
become rich. If reward and punishment are dignified and of
faith, the people, though small in number, will become
strong. If reward and punishment follow no regulations,
the state, however large in size, will have weak soldiers.
For the soil is no longer its territory, the people no longer
its subjects. Without territory and people, even Yao and
Shun never could reign supreme nor could the three
dynasties[33] ever become strong.[34]

Moreover, when the sovereign gives indiscriminately,
ministers take inconsiderately. Those who discard legal

rules, praise the early kings, and thereby illustrate the
achievements of the ancients, are entrusted by the ruler with
the state affairs. Thy servant, therefore, says: Such an act
is to hope for ancient achievements and reward modern men
with ancient rewards. In consequence, the sovereign gives
wrongly, ministers take idly. If the sovereign gives wrongly,
then ministers will expect undue rewards; if ministers take
idly, meritorious services will not be held in high esteem.
If men of no merit receive rewards, the state exchequer will
run low and the people will resent it[35] ; if the state exchequer
runs low and the people resent it, then nobody will apply
his strength to his duties. Therefore, who over-uses reward
loses the people; who over-uses penalty cannot hold the
people in awe. If reward is not sufficient to encourage, and
penalty is not sufficient to prohibit the people, then the
state, however large in size, will fall into danger.

Hence the saying: "Who knows few things, should not
be allowed to scheme for enterprises; who practises loyalty
in small ways, should not be allowed to take charge of
judicial administration."

Once King Kung of Ching and Duke Li of Chin fought
at Yen-ling. The Ching troops suffered a defeat. King Kung
was wounded. During the bloody battle, Tzŭ-fan, High
Commissioner of the Army, was thirsty and wanted some
drink. His attendant,[36] Shu Yang-ko,[37] brought a cup of wine
and presented it to him. "Get away!" exclaimed Tzŭ-fan.
"It's wine." "No," replied Yang-ko. Tzŭ-fan, accordingly,

took it and drank it. Habitually fond of wine, Tzŭ-fan felt
it so delicious that he could not keep it off his mouth till
he became drunk and lay down asleep. Thinking of having
another battle, and fixing the stratagems therefor, King Kung
sent for Tzŭ-fan, but Tzŭ-fan gave heart-aching as excuse
for his absence from the conference. Thereupon, King Kung
rode in a carriage and went to see him. As soon as he entered
the tent, he smelt wine and turned back right away, saying:
"In to-day's battle, I, the King, was wounded at my eye.
The only person I have looked to for help is the High Commissioner
of the Army. Now that the High Commissioner of
the Army is so drunk, he is certainly ruining the Altar of the
Spirits of Land and Grain of the Ching State and feeling no
concern for the welfare of my subjects. I, the King, have no
reason to have him with me on the battle-field any longer."
So he ceased hostilities and retreated. He then beheaded
Tzŭ-fan as an expiatory punishment for his disgrace of His
Majesty. Hence the saying: "The presentation of wine by
Shu Yang-ko was not out of any malice against Tzŭ-fan, but
his mind that really loved him with loyalty was only enough
to put him to death." This is to practise loyalty in small ways
and thereby betray loyalty in big ways. Hence the saying:
"Small loyalty is the betrayer of big loyalty." Thus, if the
ruler puts men loyal in small ways in charge of judicial
administration, they will pardon criminal offences. To pardon
culprits and thereby love them, is to enjoy temporary peace
with the inferiors, whereas it stands in the way of governing
the people.

At the time when Wey was clarifying and establishing laws
and upholding mandates[38] without fail, men of merit were

infallibly rewarded; men guilty of crimes were infallibly
censured; her strength was sufficient to rectify All-underHeaven
and her authority prevailed among the neighbours
on the four sides. As soon as laws came to be neglected
and rewards became arbitrary, the state was dismembered
day after day. Similarly, at the time when Chao was enacting
state laws and training a big army, she had a large population
and a strong army and extended her territory into Ch`i and
Yen. As soon as the state laws came to be neglected and the
personnel in charge of the state affairs became weak, the
state was dismembered day after day. Again, at the time
when Yen was upholding the law and scrutinizing official
decisions in detail, to the east she seized counties from the
Ch`i State and to the south occupied the whole territory of
Central Hills. When the upholders of the law died, the
official decisions became useless, the attendants disputed with
each other, and public opinion had to follow the lead of the
inferiors; then the army became weak, the soil was
dismembered, and the state fell under the spell of the
surrounding enemies. Hence the saying: "Who clarifies
the law, is strong; who neglects the law, is weak." The
causes of strength and weakness are so vivid. Yet sovereigns
of this age never attempt to foster the cause of strength.
No wonder their states are doomed to ruin.

There is an ancient proverb saying: "The family
that has a definite occupation, does not have to starve in
time of famine; the state that has definite laws, does not go
to ruin in case of emergency." Indeed, if the ruler discards
definite laws and follows private opinions, then ministers
will pretend to wisdom and ability; if ministers pretend to
wisdom and ability, then laws and prohibitions will not

hold good. In other words, when arbitrary opinions prevail,
the way of governing the state dwindles. Therefore, the
right way to govern the state is to remove the injurers of the
law. In that case, there will be neither bewilderment by
pretensions to wisdom and ability nor deception by
pretensions to name and fame.

Of yore, Shun ordered officials to drain the Great Deluge.
One official set himself to work before the order came, and
accomplished merit. However, Shun executed him. Once
Yü received the feudal lords in audience in the vicinity of
Kuei-chi. As the Ruler of Fang-fêng arrived late, Yü
beheaded him. From this viewpoint it is clear that if those
who went ahead of orders were executed and those who
lagged behind orders were beheaded, the ancients must have
held conformity to orders in high esteem.

For illustration, if the mirror keeps clean and has no
obstacle, then the beautiful and the ugly can be compared;
if the balance keeps right and has no obstacle, then the light
and the heavy can be weighed. Indeed, when you shake the
mirror, the mirror cannot keep clear; when you shake the
balance, the balance cannot keep even. The same is true
of the law. Therefore, the early kings took Tao as the
constant standard, and the law as the basis of government.
For, if the basis is orderly, the name is exalted; if the basis
is confused, the name is extinguished. In general, wisdom,
ability, cleverness, and erudition, if properly employed, take
effect; otherwise, all come to nought. Therefore, though
wisdom and ability are exerted,[39] if the exertion is not proper,
the right way of government cannot be communicated to

people. Indeed, the true path and the law are absolutely
reliable, wisdom and ability are liable to errors. Similarly,
to hang up the balance and know the plane, and to turn round
the compasses and know the circle, is an absolutely reliable
way.

The intelligent sovereign makes the people conform
to the law[40] and thereby knows[41] the true path; wherefore
with ease he harvests meritorious results. To discard
the compasses and trust to skilfulness, and to discard the law
and trust to wisdom, leads to bewilderment and confusion.
The violent sovereign lets the people pretend to wisdom
but does not know the true path; wherefore in spite
of his toil he gets no credit. If the sovereign discards
laws and prohibitions and imprudently grants requests and
audiences, then ministers will obtain posts from the sovereign
for sale and accept pay[42] from their inferiors. For this
reason, profits go to private families and authority rests with
ministers. In consequence, the people have no mind to exert
their strength to serve the sovereign but merely strive to
develop friendships with their superiors. If the people are
fond of developing friendships with their superiors, then
goods and cash will flow upwards and proficient speakers
will be taken into service. Should that be the case, men of
merit would decrease, wicked ministers would advance,
and talented ministers would withdraw, till the sovereign
falls into bewilderment and does not know what to do, and
the masses flock together but do not know whom to obey.

This is the fault of discarding laws and prohibitions, leaving
merits and services behind, exalting names and reputations,
and granting requests and audiences.

The law-breakers, on the whole, always set fabrications
and make excuses in order thereby to seek[43] intimate contact
with the sovereign, and would also speak about events of
rare occurrence in the world. This is the reason why the
outrageous rulers and violent sovereigns are bewildered, and
why able ministers and worthy counsellors are violated.
For instance, ministers who praise Yi Yin and Kuan Chung
for their rendering meritorious services and their being taken
into service,[44] will have sufficient reason to act against the
law and pretend to wisdom; those who praise Pi-kan and
Tzŭ-hsü for their being loyal but killed, will have sufficient
citations to display hasty persuasions[45] and forcible remonstrations.
Indeed, if they now praise worthy and intelligent
rulers such as the masters of Yi Yin and Kuan Chung and
then blame outrageous and violent sovereigns such as the
masters of Pi-kan and Tzŭ-hsü, then their forced analogies
are not worth taking.[46] Such men must be suppressed.[47] The
ruler makes laws so as to establish the standard of right.

Yet most ministers of to-day exalt their private wisdom.[48]
Those who condemn the law as wrong, regard heretic creeds
as wise and establish their own standards of conduct beyond
the boundary of the law.[49] To suppress such crooks, is the
duty of the sovereign.[50]

It is the duty of the sovereign[51] to make clear the distinction
between public and private interests, enact laws and statutes
openly, and forbid private favours. Indeed, to enforce
whatever is ordered and stop whatever is prohibited, is
the public justice of the lord of men. To practise personal
faith to friends, and not to be encouraged by any reward
nor to be discouraged by any punishment, is the private
righteousness of ministers. Wherever private righteousness
prevails, there is disorder; wherever public justice obtains,
there is order. Hence the necessity of distinction between
public and private interests.

Every minister cherishes both selfish motive and public
justice. To refine his personality, improve his integrity,
practise public creeds, and behave unselfish in office,[52] is the
public justice of the minister. To corrupt his conduct, follow
his desires, secure his personal interests, and benefit his
own family, is the selfish motive of the minister. If the
intelligent sovereign is on the Throne, every minister will
discard his selfish motive and practise public justice. If the
violent sovereign is on the Throne, every minister will

cast public justice aside and act on his selfish motive. Thus,
ruler and minister have different frames of mind.

The ruler keeps the minister in service with a calculating
mind. So does the minister with a calculating mind serve the
ruler. As both ruler and minister are equally calculating,
each for himself, the minister never cares to injure his body
and benefit the state, nor does the ruler want to injure the
state and benefit the minister. By nature the minister would
regard the injury of himself as unprofitable. By nature the
ruler would think the injury of the state as merciless. In
short, ruler and minister work together, each with a
calculating mind.

In the face of a crisis, the minister may sacrifice his life,
exert his wisdom, and apply his strength. He would do so
only on account of the law.

Therefore, the early kings, in order to encourage ministers,
made rewards clear, and, in order to overawe them, made
penalties severe. For, when rewards and penalties were
clarified, the people would risk their lives in the cause of
their native soil; when the people were resolved to risk
their lives, the army would become strong and the sovereign
would be honoured. When reward and penalty were not
clearly enacted, men of no merit would expect undue rewards;
when men found guilty were pardoned by grace, the army
would become weak and the sovereign would become ignoble.
Therefore, the early kings and their worthy counsellors
applied their strength and exerted their wisdom to make
laws clear and penalties severe. Hence the saying: "That
public and private interests must be clearly distinguished
and laws and prohibitions must be carefully enacted, the
early kings already understood."