32.21
Then
Aristaenus resumed: "Leaders of the Achaeans, you are not lacking in
counsel any more than you are in the power of speech, but each of you is
unwilling to endanger his own safety in consulting for the safety of all.
Possibly I, too, should keep silence, were I only a private citizen, but as it is,
I see that either the president ought not to have introduced the envoys into
the council, or after he had introduced them they ought not to be dismissed
without some reply being made to them. But how can I give them any reply
except in accordance with the decree which you make? And since none of
you who have been summoned to this council is willing or has the courage to
express his opinion, let us examine the speeches which the envoys delivered
yesterday as though they were made by members of this council, let us
regard them not as making selfish demands in their own interest, but as
recommending a policy which they believe to be advantageous to us. The
Romans, the Rhodians and Attalus all ask for our alliance and friendship and
consider that it is only just and right that we should give them assistance in
the war they are waging against Philip. Philip, on the other hand, reminds us
of the fact that we are his allies and have pledged our oath to him. At one
time he demands our active support, at another he assures us that he is
content for us to remain neutral. Has it not occurred to any one why those
who are not yet our allies ask more from us than those who are our allies?
This is not due to excess of modesty in Philip or to the lack of it in the
Romans. It is the fortune of war which imparts confidence to the demands of
one side and takes it away from those of the other. As far as Philip is
concerned we see nothing belonging to him except his envoy. As for the
Romans, their fleet lies at Cenchreae, laden with the spoils of the cities of
Euboea, and we see the consul with his legions overrunning Phocis and
Locris which are only separated from us by a narrow strip of sea. Do you
wonder why Philip's envoy, Cleomedon, spoke in so diffident a tone when he
urged us to take up arms against the Romans on behalf of his king? He
impressed upon us the sanctity of the same treaty and oath, but if we were to
ask of him, by virtue of the same treaty and oath, that Philip should defend
us from Nabis and the Lacedaemonians, he would not be able to find a force
adequate for our protection or even an answer to our request, any more than
Philip himself could have done last year. For when he attempted to draw our
fighting-men away into Euboea by promising that he would make war on
Nabis, and saw that we would not sanction such an employment of our
soldiers or allow ourselves to be involved in a war with Rome, he forgot all
about the treaty which he is now making so much of, and left us to be
despoiled and wasted by Nabis and the Lacedaemonians.
To me, indeed, the arguments that Cleomedon used appeared
inconsistent with each other. He made light of a war with Rome and said that
the issue would be the same as that of the former war. If so, then why does
Philip keep away and ask for our assistance instead of coming in person and
protecting us from Nabis and the Romans? 'Us,' do I say? Why, if this be so,
did he allow Eretria and Carystus to be taken? why, all those cities in
Thessaly? why, Locris and Phocis? Why is he allowing Elatea to be attacked
now? Why did he evacuate the passes leading into Epirus and the
unsurmountable barriers commanding the river Aous? And when he had
abandoned them, why did he march off into the heart of his kingdom? If he
deliberately left his allies to the mercies of their enemies how can he object
to these allies taking measures for their own safety? If his action was
dictated by fear he must pardon us for our fears. If he retreated because he
was worsted shall we Achaeans, Cleomedon, withstand the arms of Rome
when you Macedonians could not withstand them? You tell us that the
Romans are not in greater strength or employing greater forces in this war
than in the last one; are we to take your word for it, rather than look at the
actual facts? On that occasion they only sent their fleet to help the Aetolians;
they did not put a consul in command nor did they employ a consular army.
The maritime cities belonging to Philip's allies were in a state of
consternation and alarm, but the inland districts were so safe from the arms
of Rome that Philip laid waste the land of the Aetolians while they were
vainly imploring the Romans for help. Now, however, the Romans have
brought the war with Carthage to a close, that war which for sixteen years
they have had to endure, whilst it preyed, so to speak, on the vitals of Italy,
and they have not simply sent a detachment to aid the Aetolians, they have
themselves assumed command of the war and are attacking Macedonia by
land and sea. Their third consul is now conducting operations with the
utmost energy. Sulpicius met the king in Macedonia itself, routed him, put
him to flight, and ravaged the richest part of his realm, and now, when he
was holding the passes which form the key of Epirus, secured as he thought
by his positions, his fortified lines and his army, Quinctius has deprived him
of his camp, pursued him as he fled into Thessaly, stormed the cities of his
allies and driven out his garrisons almost within sight of Philip himself.
Suppose there is no truth in what the Athenian delegate has said
about the king's brutality and greed and lust, suppose that the crimes
committed in Attica against all the gods, supernal and infernal, do not
concern us, still less the sufferings of Chios and Abydos, which are a long
way off; let us forget our own wounds, the robberies and murders at
Messene in the heart of the Peloponnesus, the king's assassination of his host
almost at the banquet-table, the deaths of the two Arati of Sicyon, father and
son -the king was in the habit of speaking of the hapless old man as though
he were his father -the abduction of the son's wife into Macedonia as a
victim to Philip's lusts, and all the other outrages on matrons and maids -let
all these be consigned to oblivion. Let us even imagine that we have not to
do with Philip whose cruelty has struck you dumb (for what other reason can
there be for you who have been summoned to the council keeping silence?),
but with Antigonus, a gentle and just-minded monarch who has been the
greatest benefactor to us all. Do you suppose that he would demand of us
that we should do what cannot possibly be done? The Peloponnesus,
remember, is a peninsula connected with the mainland by the narrow strip of
land called the Isthmus, open and exposed above all to a naval attack. If a
fleet of 100 decked ships and 50 undecked ships with lighter draught, and 30
Isaean cutters should begin to ravage our coast and attack the cities which
stand exposed almost on the shore, we should, I suppose, withdraw into the
inland cities just as if we were not caught by the flames of a war within our
frontiers which is fastening upon our vitals. When Nabis and the
Lacedaemonians are pressing us by land and the Roman fleet by sea, from
what quarter am I to appeal to our alliance with the king and implore the
Macedonians to help us? Shall we protect with our own arms the threatened
cities against the Romans? How splendidly we protected Dymae in the last
war! The disasters of others afford ample warning to us, let us not seek how
we may become a warning to others.
Because the Romans are asking for your friendship voluntarily, take
care that you do not disdain what you ought to have desired and done your
best to obtain. Do you imagine that they are entrapped in a strange land and
driven by their fears into wishing to lurk under the shadow of your assistance
and seek the refuge of an alliance with you in order that they may have the
entry of your harbours and make use of your supplies? The sea is under their
control, whatever shores they visit they at once bring under their dominion,
what they deign to ask for they can obtain by force. It is because they wish
to spare you that they do not allow you to take a step which would destroy
you. As to the middle course which Cleomedon pointed out as the safest,
namely, that you should keep quiet and abstain from hostilities, that is not a
middle course, it is no course at all. We have either to accept or reject the
proferred alliance with Rome; otherwise we shall win the gratitude of neither
side, but like men who wait upon the event, leave our policy at the mercy of
Fortune, and what is this but to become a prey of the conqueror? What you
ought to have sought with the utmost solicitude is now spontaneously
offered; beware lest you scorn the offer. Either alternative is open to you
today, it will not be open always. The opportunity will not long remain, nor
will it often recur. For a long time you have wished rather than ventured to
free yourselves from Philip. The men who would win your liberty for you
without any risk or effort on your part have crossed the seas with mighty
fleets and armies. If you reject their alliance you are hardly in your right
senses, but you will be compelled to have them as either friends or enemies."