32.18
Though he was making no progress,
what vexed the consul most was that he was allowing a comparison to be
made between the tactics and weapons of the contending armies; he
recognised that there was no near prospect of a successful assault, and no
means of wintering so far from the sea in a country utterly wasted by the
ravages of war, and under these circumstances he raised the siege. There was
no harbour on the whole of the Acarnanian and Aetolian coast-line which
would admit all the transports employed in provisioning the troops and at the
same time furnish covered winter-quarters for the legionaries. Anticyra in
Phocis, facing the Corinthian Gulf, seemed the most suitable place, as it was
not far from Thessaly and the positions held by the enemy, and only
separated from the Peloponnese by a narrow strip of sea. There he would
have Aetolia and Acarnania behind him, and Locris and Boeotia on either
side of him. Phanotea in Phocis was taken without any fighting; Anticyra
only made a brief resistance; the captures of Ambrysus and Hyampolis
speedily followed. Owing to the position of Daulis on a lofty hill, its capture
could not be effected by escalade or direct assault. By harassing the
defending garrison with missiles and, when they made sorties, skirmishing
against them, alternately advancing and retiring without attempting anything
decisive, he brought them to such a pitch of carelessness and contempt for
their opponents that when they retired within their gates the Romans rushed
in with them and took the place by storm. Other unimportant strongholds fell
into Roman hands more through fear than through force of arms. Elatea
closed its gates against him and there seemed little probability of its
admitting either a Roman general or a Roman army unless it were compelled
to do so by force.