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 31.1. 
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31.33
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31.33

Philip was making vigorous preparations both by land and sea. He concentrated his naval strength at Demetrias in Thessaly, as he expected that Attalus and the Roman fleet would move from Aegina at the beginning of the spring. Heraclides was continued in command of the fleet and coast-line. The gathering of his land forces he conducted in person, encouraged by the belief that he had deprived the Romans of two important auxiliaries, the Aetolians on the one side and the Dardanians on the other, as the pass at Pelagonia was closed by his son Perseus. By this time the consul was not preparing for war but actually engaged in it. He led his army through the country of the Dessaretii, and the corn which they had brought from their winter quarters they were carrying with them untouched, as the fields through which they marched supplied all that they wanted. Some of the towns and villages on his route surrendered voluntarily, others through fear, some were taken by storm, others were found to be abandoned, the inhabitants having fled to the neighbouring mountains. He formed a standing camp at Lyncus near the river Bevus, and from there he sent parties to collect corn from the granaries of the Dessaretii.

Philip saw that there was consternation everywhere and that the population were in a state of panic, but he did not know what part the consul was making for, and accordingly he sent a cavalry detachment to reconnoitre and find out in what direction the enemy were marching. The consul was equally in the dark, he knew that the king had moved out of his winter quarters, but was ignorant of his whereabouts, so he too sent out cavalry to reconnoitre. After each party had wandered for a considerable time along unknown roads amongst the Dassaretii, they at last took the same road. When the noise of men and horses was heard in the distance, they both became aware that an enemy was approaching. So before they came in sight of one another they put their horses and weapons in readiness, and as soon as they saw their enemy they charged. They were not unfairly matched in numbers and courage, for each corps consisted of picked men, and for some hours they kept up an even fight, until the exhaustion of men and horses put a stop to the battle without either side gaining the victory. Forty of the Macedonians fell and thirty-five of the Romans. Neither side gained any information as to the whereabouts of their opponents' camp, which they could carry back either to the consul or to the king. This information was ultimately conveyed by deserters, a class of persons whom want of principle renders useful in all wars for finding out things about the enemy.