2.19. CHAP. XIX
Of the Several Kinds of Commonwealth by Institution, and of Succession to
the Sovereign Power
THE difference of Commonwealths consisteth in the difference of
the sovereign, or the person representative of all and every one of
the multitude. And because the sovereignty is either in one man, or in
an assembly of more than one; and into that assembly either every
man hath right to enter, or not every one, but certain men
distinguished from the rest; it is manifest there can be but three
kinds of Commonwealth. For the representative must needs be one man,
or more; and if more, then it is the assembly of all, or but of a
part. When the representative is one man, then is the Commonwealth a
monarchy; when an assembly of all that will come together, then it
is a democracy, or popular Commonwealth; when an assembly of a part
only, then it is called an aristocracy. Other kind of Commonwealth
there can be none: for either one, or more, or all, must have the
sovereign power (which I have shown to be indivisible) entire.
There be other names of government in the histories and books of
policy; as tyranny and oligarchy; but they are not the names of
other forms of government, but of the same forms misliked. For they
that are discontented under monarchy call it tyranny; and they that
are displeased with aristocracy call it oligarchy: so also, they which
find themselves grieved under a democracy call it anarchy, which
signifies want of government; and yet I think no man believes that
want of government is any new kind of government: nor by the same
reason ought they to believe that the government is of one kind when
they like it, and another when they mislike it or are oppressed by the
governors.
It is manifest that men who are in absolute liberty may, if they
please, give authority to one man to represent them every one, as well
as give such authority to any assembly of men whatsoever; and
consequently may subject themselves, if they think good, to a
monarch as absolutely as to other representative. Therefore, where
there is already erected a sovereign power, there can be no other
representative of the same people, but only to certain particular
ends, by the sovereign limited. For that were to erect two sovereigns;
and every man to have his person represented by two actors that, by
opposing one another, must needs divide that power, which (if men will
live in peace) is indivisible; and thereby reduce the multitude into
the condition of war, contrary to the end for which all sovereignty is
instituted. And therefore as it is absurd to think that a sovereign
assembly, inviting the people of their dominion to send up their
deputies with power to make known their advice or desires should
therefore hold such deputies, rather than themselves, for the absolute
representative of the people; so it is absurd also to think the same
in a monarchy. And I know not how this so manifest a truth should of
late be so little observed: that in a monarchy he that had the
sovereignty from a descent of six hundred years was alone called
sovereign, had the title of Majesty from every one of his subjects,
and was unquestionably taken by them for their king, was
notwithstanding never considered as their representative; that name
without contradiction passing for the title of those men which at
his command were sent up by the people to carry their petitions and
give him, if he permitted it, their advice. Which may serve as an
admonition for those that are the true and absolute representative
of a people, to instruct men in the nature of that office, and to take
heed how they admit of any other general representation upon any
occasion whatsoever, if they mean to discharge the trust committed
to them.
The difference between these three kinds of Commonwealth consisteth,
not in the difference of power, but in the difference of convenience
or aptitude to produce the peace and security of the people; for which
end they were instituted. And to compare monarchy with the other
two, we may observe: first, that whosoever beareth the person of the
people, or is one of that assembly that bears it, beareth also his own
natural person. And though he be careful in his politic person to
procure the common interest, yet he is more, or no less, careful to
procure the private good of himself, his family, kindred and
friends; and for the most part, if the public interest chance to cross
the private, he prefers the private: for the passions of men are
commonly more potent than their reason. From whence it follows that
where the public and private interest are most closely united, there
is the public most advanced. Now in monarchy the private interest is
the same with the public. The riches, power, and honour of a monarch
arise only from the riches, strength, and reputation of his
subjects. For no king can be rich, nor glorious, nor secure, whose
subjects are either poor, or contemptible, or too weak through want,
or dissension, to maintain a war against their enemies; whereas in a
democracy, or aristocracy, the public prosperity confers not so much
to the private fortune of one that is corrupt, or ambitious, as doth
many times a perfidious advice, a treacherous action, or a civil war.
Secondly, that a monarch receiveth counsel of whom, when, and
where he pleaseth; and consequently may hear the opinion of men versed
in the matter about which he deliberates, of what rank or quality
soever, and as long before the time of action and with as much secrecy
as he will. But when a sovereign assembly has need of counsel, none
are admitted but such as have a right thereto from the beginning;
which for the most part are of those who have been versed more in
the acquisition of wealth than of knowledge, and are to give their
advice in long discourses which may, and do commonly, excite men to
action, but not govern them in it. For the understanding is by the
flame of the passions never enlightened, but dazzled: nor is there any
place or time wherein an assembly can receive counsel secrecy, because
of their own multitude.
Thirdly, that the resolutions of a monarch are subject to no other
inconstancy than that of human nature; but in assemblies, besides that
of nature, there ariseth an inconstancy from the number. For the
absence of a few that would have the resolution, once taken,
continue firm (which may happen by security, negligence, or private
impediments), or the diligent appearance of a few of the contrary
opinion, undoes today all that was concluded yesterday.
Fourthly, that a monarch cannot disagree with himself, out of envy
or interest; but an assembly may; and that to such a height as may
produce a civil war.
Fifthly, that in monarchy there is this inconvenience; that any
subject, by the power of one man, for the enriching of a favourite
or flatterer, may be deprived of all he possesseth; which I confess is
a great an inevitable inconvenience. But the same may as well happen
where the sovereign power is in an assembly: for their power is the
same; and they are as subject to evil counsel, and to be seduced by
orators, as a monarch by flatterers; and becoming one another's
flatterers, serve one another's covetousness and ambition by turns.
And whereas the favourites of monarchs are few, and they have none
else to advance but their own kindred; the favourites of an assembly
are many, and the kindred much more numerous than of any monarch.
Besides, there is no favourite of a monarch which cannot as well
succour his friends as hurt his enemies: but orators, that is to
say, favourites of sovereign assemblies, though they have great
power to hurt, have little to save. For to accuse requires less
eloquence (such is man's nature) than to excuse; and condemnation,
than absolution, more resembles justice.
Sixthly, that it is an inconvenience in monarchy that the
sovereignty may descend upon an infant, or one that cannot discern
between good and evil: and consisteth in this, that the use of his
power must be in the hand of another man, or of some assembly of
men, which are to govern by his right and in his name as curators
and protectors of his person and authority. But to say there is
inconvenience in putting the use of the sovereign power into the
hand of a man, or an assembly of men, is to say that all government is
more inconvenient than confusion and civil war. And therefore all
the danger that can be pretended must arise from the contention of
those that, for an office of so great honour and profit, may become
competitors. To make it appear that this inconvenience proceedeth
not from that form of government we call monarchy, we are to
consider that the precedent monarch hath appointed who shall have
the tuition of his infant successor, either expressly by testament, or
tacitly by not controlling the custom in that case received: and
then such inconvenience, if it happen, is to be attributed, not to the
monarchy, but to the ambition and injustice of the subjects, which
in all kinds of government, where the people are not well instructed
in their duty and the rights of sovereignty, is the same. Or else
the precedent monarch hath not at all taken order for such tuition;
and then the law of nature hath provided this sufficient rule, that
the tuition shall be in him that hath by nature most interest in the
preservation of the authority of the infant, and to whom least benefit
can accrue by his death or diminution. For seeing every man by
nature seeketh his own benefit and promotion, to put an infant into
the power of those that can promote themselves by his destruction or
damage is not tuition, but treachery. So that sufficient provision
being taken against all just quarrel about the government under a
child, if any contention arise to the disturbance of the public peace,
it is not to be attributed to the form of monarchy, but to the
ambition of subjects and ignorance of their duty. On the other side,
there is no great Commonwealth, the sovereignty whereof is in a
great assembly, which is not, as to consultations of peace, and war,
and making of laws, in the same condition as if the government were in
a child. For as a child wants the judgement to dissent from counsel
given him, and is thereby necessitated to take the advice of them,
or him, to whom he is committed; so an assembly wanteth the liberty to
dissent from the counsel of the major part, be it good or bad. And
as a child has need of a tutor, or protector, to preserve his person
and authority; so also in great Commonwealths the sovereign
assembly, in all great dangers and troubles, have need of
custodes libertatis; that is, of dictators, or
protectors of their authority; which are as much as temporary monarchs
to whom for a time they may commit the entire exercise of their power;
and have, at the end of that time, been oftener deprived thereof than
infant kings by their protectors, regents, or any other tutors.
Though the kinds of sovereignty be, as I have now shown, but
three; that is to say, monarchy, where one man has it; or democracy,
where the general assembly of subjects hath it; or aristocracy,
where it is in an assembly of certain persons nominated, or
otherwise distinguished from the rest: yet he that shall consider
the particular Commonwealths that have been and are in the world
will not perhaps easily reduce them to three, and may thereby be
inclined to think there be other forms arising from these mingled
together. As for example, elective kingdoms; where kings have the
sovereign power put into their hands for a time; or kingdoms wherein
the king hath a power limited: which governments are nevertheless by
most writers called monarchy. Likewise if a popular or
aristocratical Commonwealth subdue an enemy's country, and govern
the same by a president, procurator, or other magistrate, this may
seem perhaps, at first sight, to be a democratical or aristocratical
government. But it is not so. For elective kings are not sovereigns,
but ministers of the sovereign; nor limited kings sovereigns, but
ministers of them that have the sovereign power; nor are those
provinces which are in subjection to a democracy or aristocracy of
another Commonwealth democratically or aristocratically governed,
but monarchically.
And first, concerning an elective king, whose power is limited to
his life, as it is in many places of Christendom at this day; or to
certain years or months, as the dictator's power amongst the Romans;
if he have right to appoint his successor, he is no more elective
but hereditary. But if he have no power to elect his successor, then
there is some other man, or assembly known, which after his decease
may elect a new; or else the Commonwealth dieth, and dissolveth with
him, and returneth to the condition of war. If it be known who have
the power to give the sovereignty after his death, it is known also
that the sovereignty was in them before: for none have right to give
that which they have not right to possess, and keep to themselves,
if they think good. But if there be none that can give the sovereignty
after the decease of him that was first elected, then has he power,
nay he is obliged by the law of nature, to provide, by establishing
his successor, to keep to those that had trusted him with the
government from relapsing into the miserable condition of civil war.
And consequently he was, when elected, a sovereign absolute.
Secondly, that king whose power is limited is not superior to him,
or them, that have the power to limit it; and he that is not
superior is not supreme; that is to say, not sovereign. The
sovereignty therefore was always in that assembly which had the
right to limit him, and by consequence the government not monarchy,
but either democracy or aristocracy; as of old time in Sparta, where
the kings had a privilege to lead their armies, but the sovereignty
was in the Ephori.
Thirdly, whereas heretofore the Roman people governed the land of
Judea, for example, by a president; yet was not Judea therefore a
democracy, because they were not governed by any assembly into which
any of them had right to enter; nor by an aristocracy, because they
were not governed by any assembly into which any man could enter by
their election: but they were governed by one person, which though
as to the people of Rome was an assembly of the people, or
democracy; yet as to the people of Judea, which had no right at all of
participating in the government, was a monarch. For though where the
people are governed by an assembly, chosen by themselves out of
their own number, the government is called a democracy, or
aristocracy; yet when they are governed by an assembly not of their
own choosing, it is a monarchy; not of one man over another man, but
of one people over another people.
Of all these forms of government, the matter being mortal, so that
not only monarchs, but also whole assemblies die, it is necessary
for the conservation of the peace of men that as there was order taken
for an artificial man, so there be order also taken for an
artificial eternity of life; without which men that are governed by an
assembly should return into the condition of war in every age; and
they that are governed by one man, as soon as their governor dieth.
This artificial eternity is that which men call the right of
succession.
There is no perfect form of government, where the disposing of the
succession is not in the present sovereign. For if it be in any
other particular man, or private assembly, it is in a person
subject, and may be assumed by the sovereign at his pleasure; and
consequently the right is in himself. And if it be in no particular
man, but left to a new choice; then is the Commonwealth dissolved, and
the right is in him that can get it, contrary to the intention of them
that did institute the Commonwealth for their perpetual, and not
temporary, security.
In a democracy, the whole assembly cannot fail unless the
multitude that are to be governed fail. And therefore questions of the
right of succession have in that form of government no place at all.
In an aristocracy, when any of the assembly dieth, the election of
another into his room belonged to the assembly, as the sovereign, to
whom belonged the choosing of all counsellors and officers. For that
which the representative doth, as actor, every one of the subjects
doth, as author. And though the sovereign assembly may give power to
others to elect new men, for supply of their court, yet it is still by
their authority that the election is made; and by the same it may,
when the public shall require it, be recalled.
The greatest difficulty about the right of succession is in
monarchy: and the difficulty ariseth from this, that at first sight,
it is not manifest who is to appoint the successor; nor many times who
it is whom he hath appointed. For in both these cases, there is
required a more exact ratiocination than every man is accustomed to
use. As to the question who shall appoint the successor of a monarch
that hath the sovereign authority; that is to say, who shall determine
of the right of inheritance (for elective kings and princes have not
the sovereign power in propriety, but in use only), we are to consider
that either he that is in possession has right to dispose of the
succession, or else that right is again in the dissolved multitude.
For the death of him that hath the sovereign power in property
leaves the multitude without any sovereign at all; that is, without
any representative in whom they should be united, and be capable of
doing any one action at all: and therefore they are incapable of
election of any new monarch, every man having equal right to submit
himself to such as he thinks best able to protect him; or, if he
can, protect himself by his own sword; which is a return to
confusion and to the condition of a war of every man against every
man, contrary to the end for which monarchy had its first institution.
Therefore it is manifest that by the institution of monarchy, the
disposing of the successor is always left to the judgement and will of
the present possessor.
And for the question which may arise sometimes, who it is that the
monarch in possession hath designed to the succession and
inheritance of his power, it is determined by his express words and
testament; or by other tacit signs sufficient.
By express words, or testament, when it is declared by him in his
lifetime, viva voce, or by writing; as the first
emperors of Rome declared who should be their heirs. For the word heir
does not of itself imply the children or nearest kindred of a man; but
whomsoever a man shall any way declare he would have to succeed him in
his estate. If therefore a monarch declare expressly that such a man
shall be his heir, either by word or writing, then is that man
immediately after the decease of his predecessor invested in the right
of being monarch.
But where testament and express words are wanting, other natural
signs of the will are to be followed: whereof the one is custom. And
therefore where the custom is that the next of kindred absolutely
succeedeth, there also the next of kindred hath right to the
succession; for that, if the will of him that was in possession had
been otherwise, he might easily have declared the same in his
lifetime. And likewise where the custom is that the next of the male
kindred succeedeth, there also the right of succession is in the
next of the kindred male, for the same reason. And so it is if the
custom were to advance the female. For whatsoever custom a man may
by a word control, and does not, it is a natural sign he would have
that custom stand.
But where neither custom nor testament hath preceded, there it is to
he understood; first, that a monarch's will is that the government
remain monarchical, because he hath approved that government in
himself. Secondly, that a child of his own, male or female, be
preferred before any other, because men are presumed to be more
inclined by nature to advance their own children than the children
of other men; and of their own, rather a male than a female, because
men are naturally fitter than women for actions of labour and
danger. Thirdly, where his own issue faileth, rather a brother than
a stranger, and so still the nearer in blood rather than the more
remote, because it is always presumed that the nearer of kin is the
nearer in affection; and it is evident that a man receives always,
by reflection, the most honour from the greatness of his nearest
kindred.
But if it be lawful for a monarch to dispose of the succession by
words of contract, or testament, men may perhaps object a great
inconvenience: for he may sell or give his right of governing to a
stranger; which, because strangers (that is, men not used to live
under the same government, nor speaking the same language) do commonly
undervalue one another, may turn to the oppression of his subjects,
which is indeed a great inconvenience: but it proceedeth not
necessarily from the subjection to a stranger's government, but from
the unskillfulness of the governors, ignorant of the true rules of
politics. And therefore the Romans, when they had subdued many
nations, to make their government digestible were wont to take away
that grievance as much as they thought necessary by giving sometimes
to whole nations, and sometimes to principal men of every nation
they conquered, not only the privileges, but also the name of
Romans; and took many of them into the Senate, and offices of
charge, even in the Roman city. And this was it our most wise king,
King James, aimed at in endeavouring the union of his two realms of
England and Scotland. Which, if he could have obtained, had in all
likelihood prevented the civil wars which both those kingdoms, at this
present, miserable. It is not therefore any injury to the people for a
monarch to dispose of the succession by will; though by the fault of
many princes, it hath been sometimes found inconvenient. Of the
lawfulness of it, this also is an argument; that whatsoever
inconvenience can arrive by giving a kingdom to a stranger, may arrive
also by so marrying with strangers, as the right of succession may
descend upon them: yet this by all men is accounted lawful.