A REVIEW AND CONCLUSION
FROM the contrariety of some of the natural faculties of the mind,
one to another, as also of one passion to another, and from their
reference to conversation, there has been an argument taken to infer
an impossibility that any one man should be sufficiently disposed to
all sorts of civil duty. The severity of judgement, they say, makes
men censorious and unapt to pardon the errors and infirmities of other
men: and on the other side, celerity of fancy makes the thoughts
less steady than is necessary to discern exactly between right and
wrong. Again, in all deliberations, and in all pleadings, the
faculty of solid reasoning is necessary: for without it, the
resolutions of men are rash, and their sentences unjust: and yet if
there be not powerful eloquence, which procureth attention and
consent, the effect of reason will be little. But these are contrary
faculties; the former being grounded upon principles of truth; the
other upon opinions already received, true or false; and upon the
passions and interests of men, which are different and mutable.
And amongst the passions, courage (by which I mean the contempt of
wounds and violent death) inclineth men to private revenges, and
sometimes to endeavour the unsettling of the public peace: and
timorousness many times disposeth to the desertion of the public
defence. Both these, they say, cannot stand together in the same
person.
And to consider the contrariety of men's opinions and manners in
general, it is, they say, impossible to entertain a constant civil
amity with all those with whom the business of the world constrains us
to converse: which business consisteth almost in nothing else but a
perpetual contention for honour, riches, and authority.
To which I answer that these are indeed great difficulties, but
not impossibilities: for by education and discipline, they may be, and
are sometimes, reconciled. Judgement and fancy may have place in the
same man; but by turns; as the end which he aimeth at requireth. As
the Israelites in Egypt were sometimes fastened to their labour of
making bricks, and other times were ranging abroad to gather straw: so
also may the judgement sometimes be fixed upon one certain
consideration, and the fancy at another time wandering about the
world. So also reason and eloquence (though not perhaps in the natural
sciences, yet in the moral) may stand very well together. For
wheresoever there is place for adorning and preferring of error, there
is much more place for adorning and preferring of truth, if they
have it to adorn. Nor is there any repugnancy between fearing the
laws, and not fearing a public enemy; nor between abstaining from
injury, and pardoning it in others. There is therefore no such
inconsistence of human nature with civil duties, as some think. I have
known clearness of judgement, and largeness of fancy; strength of
reason, and graceful elocution; a courage for the war, and a fear
for the laws, and all eminently in one man; and that was my most noble
and honoured friend, Mr. Sidney Godolphin; who, hating no man, nor
hated of any, was unfortunately slain in the beginning of the late
civil war, in the public quarrel, by an undiscerned and an
undiscerning hand.
To the Laws of Nature declared in the fifteenth Chapter, I would
have this added: that every man is bound by nature, as much as in
him lieth, to protect in war the authority by which he is himself
protected in time of peace. For he that pretendeth a right of nature
to preserve his own body, cannot pretend a right of nature to
destroy him by whose strength he is preserved: it is a manifest
contradiction of himself. And though this law may be drawn by
consequence from some of those that are there already mentioned, yet
the times require to have it inculcated and remembered.
And because I find by diverse English books lately printed that
the civil wars have not yet sufficiently taught men in what point of
time it is that a subject becomes obliged to the conqueror; nor what
is conquest; nor how it comes about that it obliges men to obey his
laws: therefore for further satisfaction of men therein, I say, the
point of time wherein a man becomes subject to a conqueror is that
point wherein, having liberty to submit to him, he consenteth,
either by express words or by other sufficient sign, to be his
subject. When it is that a man hath the liberty to submit, I have
shown before in the end of the twenty-first Chapter; namely, that
for him that hath no obligation to his former sovereign but that of an
ordinary subject, it is then when the means of his life is within
the guards and garrisons of the enemy; for it is then that he hath
no longer protection from him, but is protected by the adverse party
for his contribution. Seeing therefore such contribution is
everywhere, as a thing inevitable, notwithstanding it be an assistance
to the enemy, esteemed lawful; a total submission, which is but an
assistance to the enemy, cannot be esteemed unlawful. Besides, if a
man consider that they submit, assist the enemy but with part of their
estates, whereas they that refuse, assist him with the whole, there is
no reason to call their submission or composition an assistance, but
rather a detriment, to the enemy. But if a man, besides the obligation
of a subject, hath taken upon him a new obligation of a soldier,
then he hath not the liberty to submit to a new power, as long as
the old one keeps the field and giveth him means of subsistence,
either in his armies or garrisons: for in this case, he cannot
complain of want of protection and means to live as a soldier. But
when that also fails, a soldier also may seek his protection
wheresoever he has most hope to have it, and may lawfully submit
himself to his new master. And so much for the time when he may do
it lawfully, if he will. It therefore he do it, he is undoubtedly
bound to be a true subject: for a contract lawfully made cannot
lawfully be broken.
By this also a man may understand when it is that men may be said to
be conquered; and in what the nature of conquest, and the right of a
conqueror consisteth: for this submission is it implieth them all.
Conquest is not the victory itself; but the acquisition, by victory,
of a right over the persons of men. He therefore that is slain is
overcome, but not conquered: he that is taken and put into prison or
chains is not conquered, though overcome; for he is still an enemy,
and may save himself if he can: but he that upon promise of
obedience hath his life and liberty allowed him, is then conquered and
a subject; and not before. The Romans used to say that their general
had pacified such a province, that is to say, in English, conquered
it; and that the country was pacified by victory when the people of it
had promised imperata facere, that is, to do what the Roman people
commanded them: this was to be conquered. But this promise may be
either express or tacit: express, by promise; tacit, by other signs.
As, for example, a man that hath not been called to make such an
express promise, because he is one whose power perhaps is not
considerable; yet if he live under their protection openly, he is
understood to submit himself to the government: but if he live there
secretly, he is liable to anything that may be done to a spy and enemy
of the state. I say not, he does any injustice (for acts of open
hostility bear not that name); but that he may be justly put to death.
Likewise, if a man, when his country is conquered, be out of it, he is
not conquered, nor subject: but if at his return he submit to the
government, he is bound to obey it. So that conquest, to define it, is
the acquiring of the right of sovereignty by victory. Which right is
acquired in the people's submission, by which they contract with the
victor, promising obedience, for life and liberty.
In the twenty-ninth Chapter I have set down for one of the causes of
the dissolutions of Commonwealths their imperfect generation,
consisting in the want of an absolute and arbitrary legislative power;
for want whereof, the civil sovereign is fain to handle the sword of
justice unconstantly, and as if it were too hot for him to hold: one
reason whereof (which I have not there mentioned) is this, that they
will all of them justify the war by which their power was at first
gotten, and whereon, as they think, their right dependeth, and not
on the possession. As if, for example, the right of the kings of
England did depend on the goodness of the cause of William the
Conqueror, and upon their lineal and directest descent from him; by
which means, there would perhaps be no tie of the subjects'
obedience to their sovereign at this day in all the world: wherein
whilst they needlessly think to justify themselves, they justify all
the successful rebellions that ambition shall at any time raise
against them and their successors. Therefore I put down for one of the
most effectual seeds of the death of any state, that the conquerors
require not only a submission of men's actions to them for the future,
but also an approbation of all their actions past; when there is
scarce a Commonwealth in the world whose beginnings can in
conscience be justified.
And because the name of tyranny signifieth nothing more nor less
than the name of sovereignty, be it in one or many men, saving that
they that use the former word are understood to be angry with them
they call tyrants; I think the toleration of a professed hatred of
tyranny is a toleration of hatred to Commonwealth in general, and
another evil seed, not differing much from the former. For to the
justification of the cause of a conqueror, the reproach of the cause
of the conquered is for the most part necessary: but neither of them
necessary for the obligation of the conquered. And thus much I have
thought fit to say upon the review of the first and second part of
this discourse.
In the thirty-fifth Chapter, I have sufficiently declared out of the
Scripture that in the Commonwealth of the Jews, God Himself was made
the Sovereign, by pact with the people; who were therefore called
His "peculiar people," to distinguish them from the rest of the world,
over whom God reigned, not by their consent, but by His own power: and
that in this kingdom Moses was God's lieutenant on earth; and that
it was he that told them what laws God appointed them to be ruled
by. But I have omitted to set down who were the officers appointed
to do execution; especially in capital punishments; not then
thinking it a matter of so necessary consideration as I find it since.
We know that generally in all Commonwealths, the execution of
corporeal punishments was either put upon the guards, or other
soldiers of the sovereign power, or given to those in whom want of
means, contempt of honour, and hardness of heart concurred to make
them sue for such an office. But amongst the Israelites it was a
positive law of God their Sovereign that he that was convicted of a
capital crime should be stoned to death by the people; and that the
witnesses should cast the first stone, and after the witnesses, then
the rest of the people. This was a law that designed who were to be
the executioners; but not that any one should throw a stone at him
before conviction and sentence, where the congregation was judge.
The witnesses were nevertheless to be heard before they proceeded to
execution, unless the fact were committed in the presence of the
congregation itself, or in sight of the lawful judges; for then
there needed no other witnesses but the judges themselves.
Nevertheless, this manner of proceeding, being not thoroughly
understood, hath given occasion to a dangerous opinion, that any man
may kill another, in some cases, by a right of zeal; as if the
executions done upon offenders in the kingdom of God in old time
proceeded not from the sovereign command, but from the authority of
private zeal: which, if we consider the texts that seem to favour
it, is quite contrary.
First, where the Levites fell upon the people that had made and
worshipped the golden calf, and slew three thousand of them, it was by
the commandment of Moses from the mouth of God; as is manifest,
Exodus, 32.27. And when the son of a woman of Israel had blasphemed
God, they that heard it did not kill him, but brought him before
Moses, who put him under custody, till God should give sentence
against him; as appears, Leviticus, 24.11, 12. Again, when Phinehas
killed Zimri and Cozbi,(1) it was not by right of private zeal: their crime was committed in the sight of the assembly; there needed no
witness; the law was known, and he the heir apparent to the
sovereignty; and, which is the principal point, the lawfulness of
his act depended wholly upon a subsequent ratification by Moses,
whereof he had no cause to doubt. And this presumption of a future
ratification is sometimes necessary to the safety of a Commonwealth;
as in a sudden rebellion any man that can suppress it by his own power
in the country where it begins, without express law or commission, may
lawfully do it, and provide to have it ratified, or pardoned, whilst
it is in doing, or after it is done. Also, it is expressly said,
"Whosoever shall kill the murderer shall kill him upon the word of
witnesses":(2) but witnesses suppose a formal judicature, and
consequently condemn that pretence of jus zelotarum. The Law of
Moses concerning him that enticeth to idolatry, that is to say, in the
kingdom of God to a renouncing of his allegiance, forbids to conceal
him, and commands the accuser to cause him to be put to death, and
to cast the first stone at him;(3) but not to kill him before he be
condemned. And the process against idolatry is exactly set down: for
God there speaketh to the people as Judge, and commandeth them, when a
man is accused of idolatry, to enquire diligently of the fact, and
finding it true, then to stone him; but still the hand of the
witness throweth the first stone.(4) This is not private zeal, but
public condemnation. In like manner when a father hath a rebellious
son, the law is that he shall bring him before the judges of the town,
and all the people of the town shall stone him.(5) Lastly, by
pretence of these laws it was that St. Stephen was stoned, and not
by pretence of private zeal: for before he was carried away to
execution, he had pleaded his cause before the high priest. There is
nothing in all this, nor in any other part of the Bible, to
countenance executions by private zeal; which, being oftentimes but
a conjunction of ignorance and passion, is against both the justice
and peace of a Commonwealth.
In the thirty-sixth Chapter I have said that it is not declared in
what manner God spoke supernaturally to Moses: not that He spoke not
to him sometimes by dreams and visions, and by a supernatural voice,
as to other prophets; for the manner how He spoke unto him from the
mercy seat is expressly set down in these words, "From that time
forward, when Moses entered into Tabernacle of the congregation to
speak with God, he heard a voice which spake unto him from over the
mercy seat, which is over the Ark of the testimony; from between the
cherubims he spake unto him."(6) But it is not declared in what
consisted the pre-eminence of the manner of God's speaking to Moses,
above that of His speaking to other prophets, as to Samuel and to
Abraham, to whom He also spoke by a voice (that is, by vision), unless
the difference consist in the clearness of the vision. For "face to
face," and "mouth to mouth," cannot be literally understood of the
infiniteness and incomprehensibility of the Divine Nature.
And as to the whole doctrine, I see not yet, but the principles of
it are true and proper, and the ratiocination solid. For I ground
the civil right of sovereigns, and both the duty and liberty of
subjects, upon the known natural inclinations of mankind, and upon the
articles of the law of nature; of which no man, that pretends but
reason enough to govern his private family, ought to be ignorant.
And for the power ecclesiastical of the same sovereigns, I ground it
on such texts as are both evident in themselves and consonant to the
scope of the whole Scripture, and therefore am persuaded that he
that shall read it with a purpose only to be informed, shall be
informed by it. But for those that by writing or public discourse,
or by their eminent actions, have already engaged themselves to the
maintaining of contrary opinions, they will not be so easily
satisfied. For in such cases, it is natural for men, at one and the
same time, both to proceed in reading and to lose their attention in
the search of objections to that they had read before: of which, in
a time wherein the interests of men are changed (seeing much of that
doctrine which serveth to the establishing of a new government must
needs be contrary to that which conduced to the dissolution of the
old), there cannot choose but be very many.
In that part which treateth of a Christian Commonwealth, there are
some new doctrines which, it may be, in a state where the contrary
were already fully determined, were a fault for a subject without
leave to divulge, as being a usurpation of the place of a teacher. But
in this time that men call not only for peace, but also for truth,
to offer such doctrines as I think true, and that manifestly tend to
peace and loyalty, to the consideration of those that are yet in
deliberation, is no more but to offer new wine, to be put into new
casks, that both may be preserved together. And I suppose that then,
when novelty can breed no trouble nor disorder in a state, men are not
generally so much inclined to the reverence of antiquity as to
prefer ancient errors before new and well-proved truth.
There is nothing I distrust more than my elocution, which
nevertheless I am confident (excepting the mischances of the press) is
not obscure. That I have neglected the ornament of quoting ancient
poets, orators, and philosophers, contrary to the custom of late time,
whether I have done well or ill in it, proceedeth from my judgement,
grounded on many reasons. For first, all truth of doctrine dependeth
either upon reason or upon Scripture; both which give credit to
many, but never receive it from any writer. Secondly, the matters in
question are not of fact, but of right, wherein there is no place
for witnesses. There is scarce any of those old writers that
contradicteth not sometimes both himself and others; which makes their
testimonies insufficient. Fourthly, such opinions as are taken only
upon credit of antiquity are not intrinsically the judgement of
those that cite them, but words that pass, like gaping, from mouth
to mouth. Fifthly, it is many times with a fraudulent design that
men stick their corrupt doctrine with the cloves of other men's wit.
Sixthly, I find not that the ancients they cite took it for an
ornament to do the like with those that wrote before them.
Seventhly, it is an argument of indigestion, when Greek and Latin
sentences unchewed come up again, as they use to do, unchanged.
Lastly, though I reverence those men of ancient time that either
have written truth perspicuously, or set us in a better way to find it
out ourselves; yet to the antiquity itself I think nothing due. For if
we will reverence the age, the present is the oldest: if the antiquity
of the writer, I am not sure that generally they to whom such honour
is given, were more ancient when they wrote than I am that am writing:
but if it be well considered, the praise of ancient authors proceeds
not from the reverence of the dead, but from the competition and
mutual envy of the living.
To conclude, there is nothing in this whole discourse, nor in that I
wrote before of the same subject in Latin, as far as I can perceive,
contrary either to the word of God or to good manners; or to the
disturbance of the public tranquillity. Therefore I think it may be
profitably printed, and more profitably taught in the Universities, in
case they also think so, whom the judgement of the same belongeth. For
seeing the Universities are the fountains of civil and moral doctrine,
from whence the preachers and the gentry, drawing such water as they
find, use to sprinkle the same (both from the pulpit and in their
conversation) upon the people, there ought certainly to be great
care taken, to have it pure, both from the venom of heathen
politicians, and from the incantation of deceiving spirits. And by
that means the most men, knowing their duties, will be the less
subject to serve the ambition of a few discontented persons in their
purposes against the state, and be the less grieved with the
contributions necessary for their peace and defence; and the governors
themselves have the less cause to maintain at the common charge any
greater army than is necessary to make good the public liberty against
the invasions and encroachments of foreign enemies.
And thus I have brought to an end my discourse of civil and
ecclesiastical government, occasioned by the disorders of the
present time, without partiality, without application, and without
other design than to set before men's eyes the mutual relation between
protection and obedience; of which the condition of human nature,
and the laws divine, both natural and positive, require an
inviolable observation. And though in the revolution of states there
can be no very good constellation for truths of this nature to be born
under (as having an angry aspect from the dissolvers of an old
government, and seeing but the backs of them that erect a new); yet
I cannot think it will be condemned at this time, either by the public
judge of doctrine, or by any that desires the continuance of public
peace. And in this hope I return to my interrupted speculation of
bodies natural; wherein, if God give me health to finish it, I hope
the novelty will as much please as in the doctrine of this
artificial body it useth to offend. For such truth as opposeth no
man's profit nor pleasure is to all men welcome.