SS 6 Transcendental Exposition of the Conception of Time.
I may here refer to what is said above (SS 5, 3), where, for or sake
of brevity, I have placed under the head of metaphysical exposition,
that which is properly transcendental. Here I shall add that the
conception of change, and with it the conception of motion, as
change of place, is possible only through and in the representation of
time; that if this representation were not an intuition (internal) a
priori, no conception, of whatever kind, could render comprehensible
the possibility of change, in other words, of a conjunction of
contradictorily opposed predicates in one and the same object, for
example, the presence of a thing in a place and the non—presence of
the same thing in the same place. It is only in time that it is
possible to meet with two contradictorily opposed determinations in
one thing, that is, after each other.* Thus our conception of time
explains the possibility of so much synthetical
knowledge
a priori, as
is exhibited in the general doctrine of motion, which is not a
little fruitful.
[*]
Kant's meaning is: You cannot affirm and deny the same thing of a subject, except by means of the representation,
time. No other idea, intuition, or conception, or whatever other form of thought there be, can mediate
the connection of such predicates. — Tr.
