Section 7. (e) Egoism.
It is possible that the inner character of egoism shall be as
profoundly
potent in legal matters as in the daily life. Goethe has
experienced its effect with unparalleled keenness. "Let me tell
you something," he writes (Conversations with Eckermann. Vol.
1). "All periods considered regressive or transitional are subjective.
Conversely all progressive periods look outward. The whole of
contemporary civilization is reactionary, because subjective....
The thing of importance is everywhere the individual who is trying
to show off his lordliness. Nowhere is any mentionable effort to
be found that subordinates itself through love of the whole."
These unmistakable terms contain a "discovery" that is applicable
to our days even better than to Goethe's. It is characteristic
of our time that each man has an exaggerated interest in himself.
Consequently, he is concerned only with himself or with his immediate
environment, he understands only what he already knows and feels,
and he works only where he can attain some personal advantage.
It is hence to be concluded that we may proceed with certainty
only when we count on this exaggerated egoism and use it as a
prime factor. The most insignificant little things attest this. A
man who gets a printed directory will look his own name up, though
he knows it is there, and contemplate it with pleasure; he does the
same with the photograph of a group of which his worthy self is
one of the immortalized. If personal qualities are under discussion,
he is happy, when he can say,—"Now I am by nature so."—
If foreign cities are under discussion, he tells stories of his native
city, or of cities that he has visited, and concerning things that can
interest only him who has been there. Everyone makes an effort
to bring something of his personal status to bear,—either the conditions
of his life, or matters concerning only him. If anybody
announces that he has had a good time, he means without exception,
absolutely without exception, that he has had an opportunity to
push his "I" very forcefully into the foreground.
Lazarus[1] has
rightly given this human quality historical significance:
"Pericles owed a considerable part of his political dictatorate
to the circumstance of knowing practically all Athenian
citizens by name. Hannibal, Wallenstein, Napoleon I, infected
their armies, thanks to ambition, with more courage than could
the deepest love of arms, country and freedom, just through knowing
and calling by name the individual soldiers."
Daily we get small examples of this egoism. The most disgusting
and boresome witness, who is perhaps angry at having been dragged
so far from his work, can be rendered valuable and useful through
the initial show of a little personal interest, of
some comprehension
of his affairs, and of some consideration, wherever possible, of his
views and efficiency. Moreover, men judge their fellows according
to their comprehension of their own particular professions. The
story of the peasant's sneer at a physician, "But what can he know
when he does not even know how to sow oats?" is more than a
story, and is true of others besides illiterate boors. Such an attitude
recurs very frequently, particularly among people of engrossing
trades that require much time,—e. g., among soldiers, horsemen,
sailors, hunters, etc. If it is not possible to understand these human
vanities and to deal with these people as one of the trade, it is wise
at least to suggest such understanding, to show interest in their
affairs and to let them believe that really you think it needful for
everybody to know how to saddle a horse correctly, or to distinguish
the German bird-dog from the English setter at a thousand paces.
What is aimed at is not personal respect for the judge, but for the
judge's function, which the witness identifies with the judge's person.
If he has such respect, he will find it worth the trouble to help us
out, to think carefully and to assist in the difficult conclusion of the
case. There is an astonishing difference between the contribution
of a sulking and contrary witness and of one who has become interested
and pleased by the affair. Not only quantity, but truth
and reliability of testimony, are immensely greater in the latter case.
Besides, the antecedent self-love goes so far that it may become
very important in the examination of the accused. Not that a trap
is to be set for him; merely that since it is our business to get at the
truth, we ought to proceed in such proper wise with a denying
accused as might bring to light facts that otherwise careful manipulation
would not have brought out. How often have anonymous or
pseudonymous criminals betrayed themselves under examination
just because they spoke of circumstances involving their
capital I,
and spoke so clearly that now the clue was found, it was no longer
difficult to follow it up. In the examination of well-known criminals,
dozens of such instances occur—the fact is not new, but it needs
to be made use of.
A similar motive belongs to subordinate forms of egoism—
the obstinacy of a man who may be so vexed by contradiction as
to drive one into despair, and who under proper treatment becomes
valuable. This I learned mainly from my old butler, a magnificent
honest soldier, a figure out of a comedy, but endowed with inexorable
obstinacy against which my skill for a long time availed nothing.
As often as I proposed something with regard to some intended
piece of work or alteration, I got the identical reply—"It won't
do, sir." Finally I got hold of a list and worked my plan—"Simon,
this will now be done as Simon recently said it should be done,—
namely." At this he looked at me, tried to think when he had
said this thing, and went and did it. And in spite of frequent application
this list has not failed once for some years. What is best
about it is that it will serve, mutatis mutandis, with criminals. As
soon as ever real balkiness is noted, it becomes necessary to avoid
the least appearance of contradictoriness, since that increases difficulties.
It is not necessary to lie or to make use of trickery. Only,
avoid direct contradiction, drop the subject in question, and return
to it indirectly when you perceive that the obstinate individual
recognizes his error. Then you may succeed in building him a
golden bridge, or at least a barely visible sidedoor where he can make
his retreat unnoticed. In that case even the most difficult of obstinates
will no longer repeat the old story. He will repeat only if he
is pressed, and this although he is repeatedly brought back to the
point. If, however, the matter is once decided, beware of returning
to it without any other reason, save to confirm the settled matter
quite completely,—that would be only to wake the sleeper to
give him a sleeping powder.
Speaking generally, the significant rule is this: Egoism, laziness
and conceit are the only human motives on which one may unconditionally
depend. Love, loyalty, honesty, religion and patriotism,
though firm as a rock, may lapse and fall. A man might have been
counted on for one of these qualities ten times with safety, and on
the eleventh, he might collapse like a house of cards. Count on
egoism and laziness a hundred or a thousand times and they are as
firm as ever. More simply, count on egoism—for laziness and conceit
are only modifications of egoism. The latter alone then should
be the one human motive to keep in mind when dealing with men.
There are cases enough when all the wheels are set in motion after
a clue to the truth, i. e., when there is danger that the person under
suspicion is innocent; appeals to honor, conscience, humanity and
religion fail;—but run the complete gamut of self-love and the
whole truth rings clear. Egoism is the best criterion of the presence
of veracity. Suppose a coherent explanation has been painfully
constructed. It is obvious that the correctness of the construction
is studied with reference to the given motive. Now, if the links in
the chain reach easily back to the motive, there is at least the
possibility that the chain is free of error. What then of the motive?
If it is noble—friendship, love, humaneness, loyalty, mercy—the
constructed chain may be correct, and happily is so oftener than is
thought; but it
need not be correct. If, however,
the structure
rests on egoism, in any of its innumerable forms? and if it is logically
sound, then the whole case is explained utterly and reliably. The
construction is indubitably correct.
[[1]]
M. Lazarus: Das Leben der Seele. Berlin 1856.