7. Let us then examine briefly the different argu-
ments that have been employed in turn, during these
three centuries, in order to “legitimize” or justify the
power of the State, in order to endow its commands
with the chrism of authority. Some of these arguments
were very old, some new and original: but what links
modern political theory to the past, what indeed gives
political philosophy a peculiar degree of continuity and
makes it into a philosophia perennis, is the quest for
an answer to the query: Why should one obey the laws
of the State?—the problem we shall henceforth call
that of “political obligation.”
It is obvious enough that the problem of political
obligation is a meaningless question to those who con-
ceive the State as a pure expression of force. Should
Machiavelli be put among them? It would certainly
seem to be the case if we consider Machiavelli's endless
repetition of the need for ruthless discipline, and his
apparently unshakable conviction that consent always
follows constraint. But on closer examination it is not
altogether too difficult to find in Machiavelli a clear
awareness of bonds which prove even stronger than
the iron hand of the ruler, and make for the willing
subservience of the citizens to the State. Such are
traditional loyalties, sound institutions, love of liberty,
patriotism; and even where, as in the Italy of Machi-
avelli's days, such precious goods were irretrievably
lost or conspicuously absent, there still remained (ac-
cording to Machiavelli)—as a possible justification of
the rule of even a Caesar Borgia—the benefits which
stable power entailed: union, allegiance, and peace.
Machiavelli, the theorist of force, certainly deserves
to be remembered among the earliest “political scien-
tists” for his detached and objective analysis of political
phenomena. But he should also be given a place among
political philosophers, were it only because he was
keenly aware that force is not enough, and that how-
ever great the power of the State, it must, in order
to last, be endowed with authority (i.e., be recognized
as legitimate).
This does not seem to be the case, however, with
more recent theorists who refuse to see in the State
anything else than “the organized use of force by one
class in order to bring another into subjection.” This
well-known definition is from the Communist Mani-
festo. Indeed, Marx and Engels proclaimed that the
modern State was nothing more than the form of orga-
nization set up by the bourgeoisie for the defense and
the guarantee of their property and interests. But the
idea that the State is merely a monopoly of force is
not restricted exclusively to the Marxists. It is, in fact,
shared by many contemporary political theorists, and
has gained wide support in connection with another
theory (also of remote Marxist origin) that provides an
explanation of the fact that obedience is in most cases
the result not of force alone, but of acceptance. This
theory stresses the importance of “ideologies” in poli-
tics; and political ideologies are described as the means
by which the use of force is disguised and made
acceptable in the name of beliefs and emotions widely
shared in a given society. Political ideologies, so the
theory goes, respond to a social need, and they are,
in a way, indispensable. But at bottom and in their
essence they are deceits, and the task of the political
theorist is to “unmask” them and show them for what
they are: skillful instruments for the domination of a
particular class or a particular man; at best merely
rationalization of an existing state of affairs, where
force still remains the decisive argument. If coherently
applied, there is not one single political ideal of the
last three hundred years that would escape the stric-
tures of this theory. Individualism as well as socialism,
egalitarian as well as liberal democracy—all can be
shown to be transient ideologies, destined to be dis-
carded or rejected once they have played their part.
