Of the Regulative Employment of the Ideas of Pure Reason.
THE result of all the dialectical attempts of pure reason not only
confirms the truth of what we have already proved in our
Transcendental Analytic, namely, that all inferences which would
lead us beyond the limits of experience are fallacious and groundless,
but it at the same time teaches us this important lesson, that human
reason has a natural inclination to overstep these limits, and that
transcendental ideas are as much the natural property of the reason as
categories are of the understanding. There exists this difference,
however, that while the categories never mislead us, outward objects
being always in perfect harmony therewith, ideas are the parents of
irresistible illusions, the severest and most subtle criticism being
required to save us from the fallacies which they induce.
Whatever is grounded in the nature of our powers will be found to be
in harmony with the final purpose and proper employment of these
powers, when once we have discovered their true direction and aim.
We are entitled to suppose, therefore, that there exists a mode of
employing transcendental ideas which is proper and immanent; although,
when we mistake their meaning, and regard them as conceptions of
actual things, their mode of application is transcendent and delusive.
For it is not the idea itself, but only the employment of the idea
in relation to possible experience, that is transcendent or
immanent. An idea is employed transcendently, when it is applied to an
object falsely believed to be adequate with and to correspond to it;
imminently, when it is applied solely to the employment of the
understanding in the sphere of experience. Thus all errors of
subreptio — of misapplication, are to be ascribed to defects of
judgement, and not to understanding or reason.
Reason never has an immediate relation to an object; it relates
immediately to the understanding alone. It is only through the
understanding that it can be employed in the field of experience. It
does not form conceptions of objects, it merely arranges them and
gives to them
that unity which they are capable of possessing when the
sphere of their application has been extended as widely as possible.
Reason avails itself of the conception of the understanding for the
sole purpose of producing totality in the different series. This
totality the understanding does not concern itself with; its only
occupation is the connection of experiences, by which
series of
conditions in accordance with conceptions are established. The
object of reason is, therefore, the understanding and its proper
destination. As the latter brings unity into the diversity of
objects by means of its conceptions, so the former brings unity into
the diversity of conceptions by means of ideas; as it sets the final
aim of a collective unity to the operations of the understanding,
which without this occupies itself with a distributive unity alone.
I accordingly maintain that transcendental ideas can never be
employed as constitutive ideas, that they cannot be conceptions of
objects, and that, when thus considered, they assume a fallacious
and dialectical character. But, on the other hand, they are capable of
an admirable and indispensably necessary application to objects— as
regulative ideas, directing the understanding to a certain aim, the
guiding lines towards which all its laws follow, and in which they all
meet in one point. This point— though a mere idea (focus imaginarius),
that is, not a point from which the conceptions of the understanding
do really proceed, for it lies beyond the sphere of possible
experience— serves, notwithstanding, to give to these conceptions
the greatest possible unity combined with the greatest possible
extension. Hence arises the natural illusion which induces us to
believe that these lines proceed from an object which lies out of
the sphere of empirical cognition, just as objects reflected in a
mirror appear to be behind it. But this illusion— which we may
hinder from imposing upon us— is necessary and unavoidable, if we
desire to see, not only those objects which lie before us, but those
which are at a great distance behind us; that is to say, when, in
the present case, we direct the aims of the understanding, beyond
every given experience, towards an extension as great as can
possibly be attained.
If we review our cognitions in their entire extent, we shall find
that the peculiar business of reason is to arrange them into a system,
that is to say, to give them connection according
to a principle. This
unity presupposes an idea— the idea of the form of a whole (of
cognition), preceding the determinate cognition of the parts, and
containing the conditions which determine
a priori to every part its
place and relation to the other parts of the whole system. This
idea, accordingly, demands complete unity in the cognition of the
understanding— not the unity of a contingent aggregate, but that of
a system connected according to necessary laws. It cannot be
affirmed with propriety that this idea is a conception of an object;
it is merely a conception of the complete unity of the conceptions
of objects, in so far as this unity is available to the
understanding as a rule. Such conceptions of reason are not derived
from nature; on the contrary, we employ them for the interrogation and
investigation of nature, and regard our cognition as defective so long
as it is not adequate to them. We admit that such a thing as
pure
earth,
pure water, or
pure air, is not to be discovered. And yet we
require these conceptions (which have their origin in the reason, so
far as regards their absolute purity and completeness) for the purpose
of determining the share which each of these natural causes has in
every phenomenon. Thus the different kinds of matter are all ref erred
to earths, as mere weight; to salts and inflammable bodies, as pure
force; and finally, to water and air, as the
vehicula of the former,
or the machines employed by them in their operations— for the
purpose of explaining the chemical action and reaction of bodies in
accordance with the idea of a mechanism. For, although not actually so
expressed, the influence of such ideas of reason is very observable in
the procedure of natural philosophers.
If reason is the faculty of deducing the particular from the
general, and if the general be certain in se and given, it is only
necessary that the judgement should subsume the particular under the
general, the particular being thus necessarily determined. I shall
term this the demonstrative or apodeictic employment of reason. If,
however, the general is admitted as problematical only, and is a
mere idea, the particular case is certain, but the universality of the
rule which applies to this particular case remains a problem.
Several particular cases, the certainty of which is beyond doubt,
are then taken and examined, for the purpose of discovering whether
the rule is
applicable to them; and if it appears that all the
particular cases which can be collected follow from the rule, its
universality is inferred, and at the same time, all the causes which
have not, or cannot be presented to our observation, are concluded
to be of the same character with those which we have observed. This
I shall term the hypothetical employment of the reason.
The hypothetical exercise of reason by the aid of ideas employed
as problematical conceptions is properly not constitutive. That is
to say, if we consider the subject strictly, the truth of the rule,
which has been employed as an hypothesis, does not follow from the use
that is made of it by reason. For how can we know all the possible
cases that may arise? some of which may, however, prove exceptions
to the universality of the rule. This employment of reason is merely
regulative, and its sole aim is the introduction of unity into the
aggregate of our particular cognitions, and thereby the
approximating of the rule to universality.
The object of the hypothetical employment of reason is therefore the
systematic unity of cognitions; and this unity is the criterion of the
truth of a rule. On the other hand, this systematic unity— as a mere
idea— is in fact merely a unity projected, not to be regarded as
given, but only in the light of a problem— a problem which serves,
however, as a principle for the various and particular exercise of the
understanding in experience, directs it with regard to those cases
which are not presented to our observation, and introduces harmony and
consistency into all its operations.
All that we can be certain of from the above considerations is
that this systematic unity is a logical principle, whose aim is to
assist the understanding, where it cannot of itself attain to rules,
by means of ideas, to bring all these various rules under one
principle, and thus to ensure the most complete consistency and
connection that can be attained. But the assertion that objects and
the understanding by which they are cognized are so constituted as
to be determined to systematic unity, that this may be postulated a priori
, without any reference to the interest of reason, and that we
are justified in declaring all possible cognitions— empirical and
others— to possess systematic unity, and to be subject to general
principles from which, notwithstanding their various character, they
are
all derivable such an assertion can be founded only upon a
transcendental principle of reason, which would render this systematic
unity not subjectively and logically— in its character of a method,
but objectively necessary.
We shall illustrate this by an example. The conceptions of the
understanding make us acquainted, among many other kinds of unity,
with that of the causality of a substance, which is termed power.
The different phenomenal manifestations of the same substance appear
at first view to be so very dissimilar that we are inclined to
assume the existence of just as many different powers as there are
different effects— as, in the case of the human mind, we have feeling,
consciousness, imagination, memory, wit, analysis, pleasure, desire
and so on. Now we are required by a logical maxim to reduce these
differences to as small a number as possible, by comparing them and
discovering the hidden identity which exists. We must inquire, for
example, whether or not imagination (connected with consciousness),
memory, wit, and analysis are not merely different forms of
understanding and reason. The idea of a fundamental power, the
existence of which no effort of logic can assure us of, is the problem
to be solved, for the systematic representation of the existing
variety of powers. The logical principle of reason requires us to
produce as great a unity as is possible in the system of our
cognitions; and the more the phenomena of this and the other power are
found to be identical, the more probable does it become, that they are
nothing but different manifestations of one and the same power,
which may be called, relatively speaking, a fundamental power. And
so with other cases.
These relatively fundamental powers must again be compared with each
other, to discover, if possible, the one radical and absolutely
fundamental power of which they are but the manifestations. But this
unity is purely hypothetical. It is not maintained, that this unity
does really exist, but that we must, in the interest of reason, that
is, for the establishment of principles for the various rules
presented by experience, try to discover and introduce it, so far as
is practicable, into the sphere of our cognitions.
But the transcendental employment of the understanding would lead us
to believe that this idea of a fundamental power is not problematical,
but that it possesses objective reality,
and thus the systematic unity
of the various powers or forces in a substance is demanded by the
understanding and erected into an apodeictic or necessary principle.
For, without having attempted to discover the unity of the various
powers existing in nature, nay, even after all our attempts have
failed, we notwithstanding presuppose that it does exist, and may
be, sooner or later, discovered. And this reason does, not only, as in
the case above adduced, with regard to the unity of substance, but
where many substances, although all to a certain extent homogeneous,
are discoverable, as in the case of matter in general. Here also
does reason presuppose the existence of the systematic unity of
various powers— inasmuch as particular laws of nature are
subordinate to general laws; and parsimony in principles is not merely
an economical principle of reason, but an essential law of nature.
We cannot understand, in fact, how a logical principle of unity
can of right exist, unless we presuppose a transcendental principle,
by which such a systematic unit— as a property of objects
themselves— is regarded as necessary a priori. For with what right can
reason, in its logical exercise, require us to regard the variety of
forces which nature displays, as in effect a disguised unity, and to
deduce them from one fundamental force or power, when she is free to
admit that it is just as possible that all forces should be
different in kind, and that a systematic unity is not conformable to
the design of nature? In this view of the case, reason would be
proceeding in direct opposition to her own destination, by setting
as an aim an idea which entirely conflicts with the procedure and
arrangement of nature. Neither can we assert that reason has
previously inferred this unity from the contingent nature of
phenomena. For the law of reason which requires us to seek for this
unity is a necessary law, inasmuch as without it we should not possess
a faculty of reason, nor without reason a consistent and
self—accordant mode of employing the understanding, nor, in the
absence of this, any proper and sufficient criterion of empirical
truth. In relation to this criterion, therefore, we must suppose the
idea of the systematic unity of nature to possess objective validity
and necessity.
We find this transcendental presupposition lurking in different
forms in the principles of philosophers, although they have neither
recognized it nor confessed to themselves its presence.
That the
diversities of individual things do not exclude identity of species,
that the various species must be considered as merely different
determinations of a few
genera, and these again as works of
still higher
races, and so on— that, accordingly, a certain systematic
unity of all possible empirical conceptions, in so far as they can
be deduced from higher and more general conceptions, must be sought
for, is a scholastic maxim or logical principle, without which
reason could not be employed by us. For we can infer the particular
from the general, only in so far as general properties of things
constitute the foundation upon which the particular rest.
That the same unity exists in nature is presupposed by
philosophers in the well—known scholastic maxim, which forbids us
unnecessarily to augment the number of entities or principles (entia
præter necessitatem non esse multiplicanda). This maxim asserts
that nature herself assists in the establishment of this unity of
reason, and that the seemingly infinite diversity of phenomena
should not deter us from the expectation of discovering beneath this
diversity a unity of fundamental properties, of which the aforesaid
variety is but a more or less determined form. This unity, although
a mere idea, thinkers have found it necessary rather to moderate the
desire than to encourage it. It was considered a great step when
chemists were able to reduce all salts to two main genera— acids and
alkalis; and they regard this difference as itself a mere variety,
or different manifestation of one and the same fundamental material.
The different kinds of earths (stones and even metals) chemists have
endeavoured to reduce to three, and afterwards to two; but still,
not content with this advance, they cannot but think that behind these
diversities there lurks but one genus— nay, that even salts and earths
have a common principle. It might be conjectured that this is merely
an economical plan of reason, for the purpose of sparing itself
trouble, and an attempt of a purely hypothetical character, which,
when successful, gives an appearance of probability to the principle
of explanation employed by the reason. But a selfish purpose of this
kind is easily to be distinguished from the idea, according to which
every one presupposes that this unity is in accordance with the laws
of nature, and that reason does not in this case request, but
requires,
although we are quite unable to determine the proper
limits of this unity.
If the diversity existing in phenomena— a diversity not of form (for
in this they may be similar) but of content— were so great that the
subtlest human reason could never by comparison discover in them the
least similarity (which is not impossible), in this case the logical
law of genera would be without foundation, the conception of a
genus, nay, all general conceptions would be impossible, and the
faculty of the understanding, the exercise of which is restricted to
the world of conceptions, could not exist. The logical principle of
genera, accordingly, if it is to be applied to nature (by which I mean
objects presented to our senses), presupposes a transcendental
principle. In accordance with this principle, homogeneity is
necessarily presupposed in the variety of phenomena (although we are
unable to determine a priori the degree of this homogeneity),
because without it no empirical conceptions, and consequently no
experience, would be possible.
The logical principle of genera, which demands identity in
phenomena, is balanced by another principle— that of species, which
requires variety and diversity in things, notwithstanding their
accordance in the same genus, and directs the understanding to
attend to the one no less than to the other. This principle (of the
faculty of distinction) acts as a check upon the levity of the former (the faculty of wit*); and reason
exhibits in this respect a double and conflicting interest— on the one
hand, the interest in the extent (the interest of generality) in
relation to genera; on the other, that of the content (the interest of
individuality) in relation to the variety of species. In the former
case, the understanding cogitates more under its conceptions, in the
latter it cogitates more in them. This distinction manifests itself
likewise in the habits of thought peculiar to natural philosophers,
some of whom— the remarkably speculative heads— may be said to be
hostile to heterogeneity in phenomena, and have their eyes always
fixed on the unity of genera, while others— with a strong empirical
tendency— aim unceasingly at the analysis of phenomena, and
almost
destroy in us the hope of ever being able to estimate the character of
these according to general principles.
[*]
Wit is defined by Kant as the faculty which discovers the general in the
particular. Vid. Anthropologie, p. 123. — Tr.
The latter mode of thought is evidently based upon a logical
principle, the aim of which is the systematic completeness of all
cognitions. This principle authorizes me, beginning at the genus, to
descend to the various and diverse contained under it; and in this way
extension, as in the former case unity, is assured to the system.
For if we merely examine the sphere of the conception which
indicates a genus, we cannot discover how far it is possible to
proceed in the work of that sphere; just as it is impossible, from
the consideration of the space occupied by matter, to determine how
far we can proceed in the work of it. Hence every genus must
contain different species, and these again different sub—species; and
as each of the latter must itself contain a sphere (must be of a
certain extent, as a conceptus communis), reason demands that no
species or sub—species is to be considered as the lowest possible. For
a species or sub—species, being always a conception, which contains
only what is common to a number of different things, does not
completely determine any individual thing, or relate immediately to
it, and must consequently contain other conceptions, that is, other
sub—species under it. This law of specification may be thus expressed:
— Entium varietates non temere sunt minuendæ.
But it is easy to see that this logical law would likewise be
without sense or application, were it not based upon a
transcendental law of specification, which certainly does not
require that the differences existing phenomena should be infinite
in number, for the logical principle, which merely maintains the
indeterminateness of the logical sphere of a conception, in relation
to its possible work, does not authorize this statement; while
it does impose upon the understanding the duty of searching for
subspecies to every species, and minor differences in every
difference. For, were there no lower conceptions, neither could
there be any higher. Now the understanding cognizes only by means of
conceptions; consequently, how far soever it may proceed in
work, never by mere intuition, but always by lower and lower
conceptions. The cognition of phenomena in their complete
determination (which is possible only by means of the understanding)
requires an unceasingly continued specification of conceptions, and
a progression
to ever smaller differences, of which abstraction bad
been made in the conception of the species, and still more in that
of the genus.
This law of specification cannot be deduced from experience; it
can never present us with a principle of so universal an
application. Empirical specification very soon stops in its
distinction of diversities, and requires the guidance of the
transcendental law, as a principle of the reason— a law which
imposes on us the necessity of never ceasing in our search for
differences, even although these may not present themselves to the
senses. That absorbent earths are of different kinds could only be
discovered by obeying the anticipatory law of reason, which imposes
upon the understanding the task of discovering the differences
existing between these earths, and supposes that nature is richer in
substances than our senses would indicate. The faculty of the
understanding belongs to us just as much under the presupposition of
differences in the objects of nature, as under the condition that
these objects are homogeneous, because we could not possess
conceptions, nor make any use of our understanding, were not the
phenomena included under these conceptions in some respects
dissimilar, as well as similar, in their character.
Reason thus prepares the sphere of the understanding for the
operations of this faculty: 1. By the principle of the homogeneity
of the diverse in higher genera; 2. By the principle of the variety of
the homogeneous in lower species; and, to complete the systematic
unity, it adds, 3. A law of the affinity of all conceptions which
prescribes a continuous transition from one species to every other
by the gradual increase of diversity. We may term these the principles
of the homogeneity, the specification, and the continuity of forms.
The latter results from the union of the two former, inasmuch as we
regard the systematic connection as complete in thought, in the ascent
to higher genera, as well as in the descent to lower species. For
all diversities must be related to each other, as they all spring from
one highest genus, descending through the different gradations of a
more and more extended determination.
We may illustrate the systematic unity produced by the three logical
principles in the following manner. Every conception may be regarded
as a point, which, as the stand—point
of a spectator, has a certain
horizon, which may be said to enclose a number of things that may be
viewed, so to speak, from that centre. Within this horizon there
must be an infinite number of other points, each of which has its
own horizon, smaller and more circumscribed; in other words, every
species contains sub—species, according to the principle of
specification, and the logical horizon consists of smaller horizons
(subspecies), but not of points (individuals), which possess no
extent. But different horizons or genera, which include under them
so many conceptions, may have one common horizon, from which, as
from a mid—point, they may be surveyed; and we may proceed thus,
till we arrive at the highest genus, or universal and true horizon,
which is determined by the highest conception, and which contains
under itself all differences and varieties, as genera, species, and
subspecies.
To this highest standpoint I am conducted by the law of homogeneity,
as to all lower and more variously—determined conceptions by the law
of specification. Now as in this way there exists no void in the whole
extent of all possible conceptions, and as out of the sphere of
these the mind can discover nothing, there arises from the
presupposition of the universal horizon above mentioned, and its
complete work, the principle: Non datur vacuum formarum. This
principle asserts that there are not different primitive and highest
genera, which stand isolated, so to speak, from each other, but all
the various genera are mere works and limitations of one highest
and universal genus; and hence follows immediately the principle:
Datur continuum formarum. This principle indicates that all
differences of species limit each other, and do not admit of
transition from one to another by a saltus, but only through smaller
degrees of the difference between the one species and the other. In
one word, there are no species or sub—species which (in the view of
reason) are the nearest possible to each other; intermediate species
or sub—species being always possible, the difference of which from
each of the former is always smaller than the difference existing
between these.
The first law, therefore, directs us to avoid the notion that
there exist different primal genera, and enounces the fact of
perfect homogeneity; the second imposes a check upon this
tendency
to unity and prescribes the distinction of sub—species, before
proceeding to apply our general conceptions to individuals. The
third unites both the former, by enouncing the fact of homogeneity
as existing even in the most various diversity, by means of the
gradual transition from one species to another. Thus it indicates a
relationship between the different branches or species, in so far as
they all spring from the same stem.
But this logical law of the continuum specierum (formarum logicarum)
presupposes a transcendental principle (lex continui in natura),
without which the understanding might be led into error, by
following the guidance of the former, and thus perhaps pursuing a path
contrary to that prescribed by nature. This law must, consequently, be
based upon pure transcendental, and not upon empirical,
considerations. For, in the latter case, it would come later than
the system; whereas it is really itself the parent of all that is
systematic in our cognition of nature. These principles are not mere
hypotheses employed for the purpose of experimenting upon nature;
although when any such connection is discovered, it forms a solid
ground for regarding the hypothetical unity as valid in the sphere
of nature— and thus they are in this respect not without their use.
But we go farther, and maintain that it is manifest that these
principles of parsimony in fundamental causes, variety in effects, and
affinity in phenomena, are in accordance both with reason and
nature, and that they are not mere methods or plans devised for the
purpose of assisting us in our observation of the external world.
But it is plain that this continuity of forms is a mere idea, to
which no adequate object can be discovered in experience. And this for
two reasons. First, because the species in nature are really
divided, and hence form quanta discreta;* and, if the gradual
progression through their affinity were continuous, the intermediate
members lying between two given species must be infinite in number,
which is impossible. Secondly, because we cannot make any
determinate empirical use of this law, inasmuch as it does not present
us with any criterion of affinity which could aid us in determining
how far we ought to pursue the graduation of differences: it merely
contains a
general indication that it is our duty to seek for and,
if possible, to discover them.
[*]
Not quanta continua, like space or a line. See page 128, et seqq. — Tr.
When we arrange these principles of systematic unity in the order
conformable to their employment in experience, they will stand thus:
Variety, Affinity, Unity, each of them, as ideas, being taken in the
highest degree of their completeness. Reason presupposes the existence
of cognitions of the understanding, which have a direct relation to
experience, and aims at the ideal unity of these cognitions— a unity
which far transcends all experience or empirical notions. The affinity
of the diverse, notwithstanding the differences existing between its
parts, has a relation to things, but a still closer one to the mere
properties and powers of things. For example, imperfect experience may
represent the orbits of the planets as circular. But we discover
variations from this course, and we proceed to suppose that the
planets revolve in a path which, if not a circle, is of a character
very similar to it. That is to say, the movements of those planets
which do not form a circle will approximate more or less to the
properties of a circle, and probably form an ellipse. The paths of
comets exhibit still greater variations, for, so far as our
observation extends, they do not return upon their own course in a
circle or ellipse. But we proceed to the conjecture that comets
describe a parabola, a figure which is closely allied to the
ellipse. In fact, a parabola is merely an ellipse, with its longer
axis produced to an indefinite extent. Thus these principles conduct
us to a unity in the genera of the forms of these orbits, and,
proceeding farther, to a unity as regards the cause of the motions
of the heavenly bodies— that is, gravitation. But we go on extending
our conquests over nature, and endeavour to explain all seeming
deviations from these rules, and even make additions to our system
which no experience can ever substantiate— for example, the theory, in
affinity with that of ellipses, of hyperbolic paths of comets,
pursuing which, these bodies leave our solar system and, passing
from sun to sun, unite the most distant parts of the infinite
universe, which is held together by the same moving power.
The most remarkable circumstance connected with these principles
is that they seem to be transcendental, and, although only
containing ideas for the guidance of the empirical exercise of reason,
and although this empirical employment stands
to these ideas in an
asymptotic relation alone (to use a mathematical term), that is,
continually approximate, without ever being able to attain to them,
they possess, notwithstanding, as
a priori synthetical propositions,
objective though undetermined validity, and are available as rules for
possible experience. In the elaboration of our experience, they may
also be employed with great advantage, as heuristic
* principles. A
transcendental deduction of them cannot be made; such a deduction
being always impossible in the case of ideas, as has been already
shown.
[*]
From the Greek, eurhioko.
We distinguished, in the Transcendental Analytic, the dynamical
principles of the understanding, which are regulative principles of
intuition, from the mathematical, which are constitutive principles of
intuition. These dynamical laws are, however, constitutive in relation
to experience, inasmuch as they render the conceptions without which
experience could not exist possible a priori. But the principles of
pure reason cannot be constitutive even in regard to empirical
conceptions, because no sensuous schema corresponding to them can be
discovered, and they cannot therefore have an object in concreto. Now,
if I grant that they cannot be employed in the sphere of experience,
as constitutive principles, how shall I secure for them employment and
objective validity as regulative principles, and in what way can
they be so employed?
The understanding is the object of reason, as sensibility is the
object of the understanding. The production of systematic unity in all
the empirical operations of the understanding is the proper occupation
of reason; just as it is the business of the understanding to
connect the various content of phenomena by means of conceptions,
and subject them to empirical laws. But the operations of the
understanding are, without the schemata of sensibility,
undetermined; and, in the same manner, the unity of reason is
perfectly undetermined as regards the conditions under which, and
the extent to which, the understanding ought to carry the systematic
connection of its conceptions. But, although it is impossible to
discover in intuition a schema for the complete systematic unity of
all the conceptions of the understanding, there must be some
analogon of this schema. This analogon is the idea of the maximum of
the work and the connection of our cognition
in one principle. For
we may have a determinate notion of a
maximum and an absolutely
perfect, all the restrictive conditions which are connected with an
indeterminate and various content having been abstracted. Thus the
idea of reason is analogous with a sensuous schema, with this
difference, that the application of the categories to the schema of
reason does not present a cognition of any object (as is the case with
the application of the categories to sensuous schemata), but merely
provides us with a rule or principle for the systematic unity of the
exercise of the understanding. Now, as every principle which imposes
upon the exercise of the understanding
a priori compliance with the
rule of systematic unity also relates, although only in an indirect
manner, to an object of experience, the principles of pure reason will
also possess objective reality and validity in relation to experience.
But they will not aim at
determining our knowledge in regard to any
empirical object; they will merely indicate the procedure, following
which the empirical and determinate exercise of the understanding
may be in complete harmony and connection with itself— a result
which is produced by its being brought into harmony with the principle
of systematic unity, so far as that is possible, and deduced from it.
I term all subjective principles, which are not derived from
observation of the constitution of an object, but from the interest
which Reason has in producing a certain completeness in her
cognition of that object, maxims of reason. Thus there are maxims of
speculative reason, which are based solely upon its speculative
interest, although they appear to be objective principles.
When principles which are really regulative are regarded as
constitutive, and employed as objective principles, contradictions
must arise; but if they are considered as mere maxims, there is no
room for contradictions of any kind, as they then merely indicate
the different interests of reason, which occasion differences in the
mode of thought. In effect, Reason has only one single interest, and
the seeming contradiction existing between her maxims merely indicates
a difference in, and a reciprocal limitation of, the methods by
which this interest is satisfied.
This reasoner has at heart the interest of diversity — in
accordance with the principle of specification; another, the
interest of
unity — in accordance with the principle of aggregation.
Each believes that his judgement rests upon a thorough insight into
the subject he is examining, and yet it has been influenced solely
by a greater or less degree of adherence to some one of the two
principles, neither of which are objective, but originate solely
from the interest of reason, and on this account to be termed maxims
rather than principles. When I observe intelligent men disputing about
the distinctive characteristics of men, animals, or plants, and even
of minerals, those on the one side assuming the existence of certain
national characteristics, certain well—defined and hereditary
distinctions of family, race, and so on, while the other side maintain
that nature has endowed all races of men with the same faculties and
dispositions, and that all differences are but the result of
external and accidental circumstances— I have only to consider for a
moment the real nature of the subject of discussion, to arrive at
the conclusion that it is a subject far too deep for us to judge of,
and that there is little probability of either party being able to
speak from a perfect insight into and understanding of the nature of
the subject itself. Both have, in reality, been struggling for the
twofold interest of reason; the one maintaining the one interest,
the other the other. But this difference between the maxims of
diversity and unity may easily be reconciled and adjusted; although,
so long as they are regarded as objective principles, they must
occasion not only contradictions and polemic, but place hinderances in
the way of the advancement of truth, until some means is discovered of
reconciling these conflicting interests, and bringing reason into
union and harmony with itself.
The same is the case with the so—called law discovered by
Leibnitz,* and supported with remarkable ability by Bonnet* — the law
of the continuous gradation of created beings, which is nothing more
than an inference from the principle of affinity; for observation
and study of the order of nature could never present it to the mind as
an objective truth. The steps of this ladder, as they appear in
experience, are too far apart from each other, and the so—called petty
differences between different kinds of animals are in nature
commonly so
wide separations that no confidence can be placed in
such views (particularly when we reflect on the great variety of
things, and the ease with which we can discover resemblances), and
no faith in the laws which are said to express the aims and purposes
of nature. On the other hand, the method of investigating the order of
nature in the light of this principle, and the maxim which requires us
to regard this order— it being still undetermined how far it
extends— as really existing in nature, is beyond doubt a legitimate
and excellent principle of reason— a principle which extends farther
than any experience or observation of ours and which, without giving
us any positive knowledge of anything in the region of experience,
guides us to the goal of systematic unity.
[*]
Leibnitz, Nouveaux Essais, Liv. iii. ch. 6.
[*]
Bonnet, Betrachtungen uber die Natur, pp. 29—85.