University of Virginia Library

OPERATIONS AT MONMOUTH.

In June, 1777, the American army was still encamped at Valley Forge. Instructions had been sent from England to Sir Henry Clinton, who replaced Howe as commander-in-chief, to evacuate Philadelphia, and make New York the centre of his operations. So prudently did he prepare for this step that Washington knew nothing of his intention until the British army was actually over the Delaware. A council of war held at Valley Forge decided adversely to an attack upon the enemy, but Washington took up the pursuit, determined to act according to circumstances. He sent Arnold, who was incapacitated for action in the field, with a small detachment to take possession of Philadelphia, while he crossed the river at Coryell's Ferry, above Trenton. Clinton, who had to build bridges all along his route, and who was encumbered with baggage and stores, so that on the single effective road he found his train was twelve miles long, was slow in his movements. This, somehow, produced an impression that he meant to draw on a general engagement. An American council of war was called at Hopewell, which still opposed a battle, but recommended harassing the enemy by detachments. Washington ordered Morgan's corps to the British right flank, Maxwell's brigade to the left, and Scott's picked corps, with some forces under Dickinson and Cadwallader, to annoy them on flanks and rear.

Clinton's first plan was to strike New Brunswick and embark at the Raritan; but at Allentown, finding Washington in his way, and disinclined to a general engagement under the circumstances, he moved to the right, intending to pass Monmouth Court-house and embark at Sandy Hook. The Americans were now at Kingston. Lee and all the general officers, except La Fayette, Greene, and Wayne, were in favor of continuing the system of annoyance; but Washington at last made ready for a battle. He ordered forward Wayne with a thousand men to support the troops most in advance, giving La Fayette the command of the advanced force—about four thousand in all—while he moved the main body towards Cranberry. On the morning of the 27th, La Fayette arrived at Englishtown. By this time Clinton had made a different disposition of his forces, throwing his grenadiers to his rear, and placing the encumbrances in front under charge of Knyphausen. He made his camp in a strong position near the court-house, in a line three miles in length, protected by woods and marshes. This forced Washington to support his advance strongly, and he sent Lee forward to join La Fayette with two brigades at Englishtown, which placed Lee in command then as senior officer. The corps of Morgan still threatened the enemy's right, and Dickinson's force his left. Washington, fearing the enemy would take post on Middletown Heights, determined to attack the rear on a movement in that direction, and sent orders to Lee to prepare for an assault.

The next day, the 28th, was Sunday, and bade fair to be, as it became, one of the hottest days of the season. An hour after midnight, Lee ordered Dickinson forward with a strong party of observation, and directed Morgan to attack the British as soon as they moved. The rest of the troops were ordered to prepare to march, and before dawn, Scott and Varnum's brigades were moving slowly towards the court-house; at daybreak, Knyphausen, with his Hessians and loyalists; and at eight o'clock Clinton followed with the main body. The whole American army was put in motion, and Lee received orders to attack, unless he saw very powerful reasons otherwise. This discretionary clause had like to have resulted in defeat. Dickinson having received word that the British were about to attack with the main force, which was incorrect, sent the news to Lee, who believed it. He pushed forward across the morass to a narrow road near the parsonage, and joined Dickinson on the heights. Here the news brought was conflicting, and while Lee was trying to get it correctly, Lafayette came up with the rest of the advanced corps. Learning that the enemy was not in force on either flank, he marched on. He had between five and six thousand men, including those under Morgan and Dickinson. He pressed forward, under cover of the woods, formed a part of his line for action, and rode forward with Wayne far enough to see that the British deploying on the left were merely a heavy covering party. Hoping to cut them off from the main army, he detached Wayne with seven hundred men and two field-pieces to make a feint in the rear.

About nine o'clock, the Queen's Dragoons being observed on a height, apparently preparing to attack, Lee ordered the light-horse to let them nearly approach, and then to fall back on Wayne. This manœuvre would have succeeded, had not a small party under Butler fired at them from ambush, which caused them to fall back. Wayne ordered the artillery to open on them, and then charged, Oswald opening fire from an eminence in the morass. Wayne was attacking with vigor, when to his chagrin he received an order from Lee to move less vigorously, lest he might prevent the latter from cutting off the covering party. Wayne obeyed, but Lee brought his forces from under cover in detachments only. Sir Henry Clinton, fearing that the Americans were massing on both flanks for the purpose of capturing his baggage, faced about to attack Lee, and force those threatening his flanks to come to the latter's aid. Lafayette seeing this, asked permission of Lee to attempt gaining the

rear of the enemy. Lee refused at first, but finally agreed to let him attack the enemy's left; but weakened Lafayette by withdrawing three regiments to the support of the right. Riding forward to reconnoitre, Lee saw, or thought he saw, a heavy force marching on the Middletown road towards the court-house. He ordered the right to fall back. The British were advancing with the apparent design of gaining the American rear, just as Scott and Maxwell's brigades were approaching the enemy's right, the former forming for action. Lee ordered both to fall back, arrange their line in the woods, and await orders. Mistaking the nature of the order, they retreated through the woods towards Freehold meeting-house. As soon as Lee learned this, instead of recalling them, he sent word to Lafayette to fall back on the court-house, which he obeyed, the enemy pursuing him as far as the latter place, where they halted. Both parties suffered from the extreme heat, their men in some instances dropping exhausted. Lee made one stand, and then resumed his retreat. It degenerated into a panic. Numbers were lost in the morass—few perished by ball. There was little firing on either side.

During this time Washington was moving to Lee's support. For Lee, when he discovered the large covering party in the enemy's rear, and had planned to cut them off, sent word to the commander-in-chief of his purpose. On the receipt of this message, Washington had despatched Greene with the right wing by Freehold Meeting-house, to prevent the enemy turning that flank, while he prepared to move the left in the rear of Lee, in support. Suddenly came the news that Lee was retreating, with Clinton in pursuit. Washington was astounded. There had been little firing to indicate battle, and, riding forward, he met the head of the retreating force. Halting it, he pushed on and found Lee at the head of the second column. He demanded in an angry way the meaning of the confusion, and Lee, who also lost his temper, replied harshly. A few hasty and bitter words passed, when Washington rode on, stayed the troops, and ordered Oswald to check the progress of the enemy with his cannon. The men under Stewart and Ramsay were formed in battle order. Then Washington turned to the chafed Lee, and said, “Will you command in that place, sir?” Lee replied in the affirmative. “Then,” said Washington, “I expect you to attack the enemy immediately.” “Your command shall be obeyed, sir,” replied Lee, “and I will not be the first to leave the field.”

While Washington was bringing order out of the confusion elsewhere, and disposing properly of Greene's forces, and the left wing under Stirling, Lee vigorously carried out his orders; but the force of the enemy was too overwhelming. After a vigorous fight, he brought them under cover of a fire by Ogden, detailed for that purpose, he being “the last to leave the field,” and forming them in line on the slope, reported to Washington for further orders. Washington seeing the men were worn out, ordered him to arrange them at Englishtown, while he attacked with the main body. The action now became hot all along the line, and was pursued with varying success, until at length, towards sunset, the British army, badly worsted, fell back upon the heights held by Lee in the morning. It was a strong position, flanked by forest and morass, but Washington

prepared to attack it. The darkness coming on, the men were ordered to sleep on their arms, and to move at daylight.

But this was unneeded. At midnight, Clinton silently stole off; and when dawn came he was so far away towards New Brunswick, that pursuit was useless. The Americans lost in the battle sixty-seven killed, one hundred and sixty wounded, and one hundred and thirty missing; but a number of the last had been merely prostrated by the extreme heat, and afterward rejoined their commands. There were two hundred and forty-nine of the British left dead on the field, of whom fifty-nine died of sunstroke. The number of their wounded is unknown.