SECTION SECOND.
Of the Transcendental Ideal.
(Prototypon Trancendentale).
Every conception is, in relation to that which is not contained in
it, undetermined and subject to the principle of determinability. This
principle is that, of every two contradictorily opposed predicates,
only one can belong to a conception. It is a purely logical principle,
itself based upon the principle of contradiction; inasmuch as it makes
complete abstraction of the content and attends merely to the
logical form of the cognition.
But again, everything, as regards its possibility, is also subject
to the principle* of complete determination, according to which one
of all the possible contradictory predicates of things must belong
to it. This principle is not based merely
upon that of
contradiction; for, in addition to the relation between two
contradictory predicates, it regards everything as standing in a
relation to the
sum of possibilities, as the sum total of all
predicates of things, and, while presupposing this sum as an
a priori
condition, presents to the mind everything as receiving the
possibility of its individual existence from the relation it bears to,
and the share it possesses in, the aforesaid sum of possibilities.
*
The principle of complete determination relates the content and not to
the logical form. It is the principle of the synthesis of all the
predicates which are required to constitute the complete conception of
a thing, and not a mere principle analytical representation, which
enounces that one of two contradictory predicates must belong to a
conception. It contains, moreover, a transcendental presupposition—
that, namely, of the material for
all possibility, which must
contain
a priori the data for this or that
particular possibility.
[*]
Principium determinationis omnimodæ. — Tr.
[*]
Thus this principle declares everything to possess a relation to
a common correlate— the sum—total of possibility, which, if discovered
to exist in the idea of one individual thing, would establish the
affinity of all possible things, from the identity of the ground of
their complete determination. The determinability of every
conception is subordinate to the universality (Allgemeinheit,
universalitas) of the principle of excluded middle; the
determination of a thing to the totality (Allheit, universitas) of all
possible predicates.
The proposition, everything which exists is completely determined,
means not only that one of every pair of given contradictory
attributes, but that one of all possible attributes, is always
predicable of the thing; in it the predicates are not merely
compared logically with each other, but the thing itself is
transcendentally compared with the sum—total of all possible
predicates. The proposition is equivalent to saying: — to attain to a
complete knowledge of a thing, it is necessary to possess a
knowledge of everything that is possible, and to determine it
thereby in a positive or negative manner. The conception of
complete determination is consequently a conception which cannot be
presented in its totality in concreto, and is therefore based upon
an idea, which has its seat in the reason— the faculty which
prescribes to the understanding the laws of its harmonious and perfect
exercise relates
Now, although this idea of the sum—total of all possibility, in so
far as it forms the condition of the complete determination
of
everything, is itself undetermined in relation to the predicates which
may constitute this sum—total, and we cogitate in it merely the
sum—total of all possible predicates— we nevertheless find, upon
closer examination, that this idea, as a primitive conception of the
mind, excludes a large number of predicates— those deduced and those
irreconcilable with others, and that it is evolved as a conception
completely determined
a priori. Thus it becomes the conception of an
individual object, which is completely determined by and through the
mere idea, and must consequently be termed an ideal of pure reason.
When we consider all possible predicates, not merely logically,
but transcendentally, that is to say, with reference to the content
which may be cogitated as existing in them a priori, we shall find
that some indicate a being, others merely a non—being. The logical
negation expressed in the word not, does not properly belong to a
conception, but only to the relation of one conception to another in a
judgement, and is consequently quite insufficient to present to the
mind the content of a conception. The expression not mortal does not
indicate that a non—being is cogitated in the object; it does not
concern the content at all. A transcendental negation, on the
contrary, indicates non—being in itself, and is opposed to
transcendental affirmation, the conception of which of itself
expresses a being. Hence this affirmation indicates a reality, because
in and through it objects are considered to be something— to be
things; while the opposite negation, on the other band, indicates a
mere want, or privation, or absence, and, where such negations alone
are attached to a representation, the non—existence of anything
corresponding to the representation.
Now a negation cannot be cogitated as determined, without cogitating
at the same time the opposite affirmation. The man born blind has
not the least notion of darkness, because he has none of light; the
vagabond knows nothing of poverty, because he has never known what
it is to be in comfort;* the ignorant man has no conception of his
ignorance,
because he has no conception of knowledge. All
conceptions of negatives are accordingly derived or deduced
conceptions; and realities contain the
data, and, so to speak, the
material or transcendental content of the possibility and complete
determination of all things.
[*]
The investigations and calculations of astronomers have taught us
much that is wonderful; but the most important lesson we have received
from them is the discovery of the abyss of our ignorance in relation
to the universe— an ignorance the magnitude of which reason, without
the information thus derived, could never have conceived. This
discovery of our deficiencies must produce a great change in the
determination of the aims of human reason.
If, therefore, a transcendental substratum lies at the foundation of
the complete determination of things— a substratum which is to form
the fund from which all possible predicates of things are to be
supplied, this substratum cannot be anything else than the idea of a
sum—total of reality (omnitudo realitatis). In this view, negations
are nothing but limitations — a term which could not, with propriety,
be applied to them, if the unlimited (the all) did not form the true
basis of our conception.
This conception of a sum—total of reality is the conception of a
thing in itself, regarded as completely determined; and the conception
of an ens realissimum is the conception of an individual being,
inasmuch as it is determined by that predicate of all possible
contradictory predicates, which indicates and belongs to being. It is,
therefore, a transcendental ideal which forms the basis of the
complete determination of everything that exists, and is the highest
material condition of its possibility— a condition on which must
rest the cogitation of all objects with respect to their content. Nay,
more, this ideal is the only proper ideal of which the human mind is
capable; because in this case alone a general conception of a thing is
completely determined by and through itself, and cognized as the
representation of an individuum.
The logical determination of a conception is based upon a
disjunctive syllogism, the major of which contains the logical
work of the extent of a general conception, the minor limits
this extent to a certain part, while the conclusion determines the
conception by this part. The general conception of a reality cannot be
divided a priori, because, without the aid of experience, we cannot
know any determinate kinds of reality, standing under the former as
the genus. The transcendental principle of the complete
determination of all things is therefore merely the representation
of the sum—total
of all reality; it is not a conception which is the
genus of all predicates
under itself, but one which comprehends them
all
within itself. The complete determination of a thing is
consequently based upon the limitation of this
total of reality, so
much being predicated of the thing, while all that remains over is
excluded— a procedure which is in exact agreement with that of the
disjunctive syllogism and the determination of the objects in the
conclusion by one of the members of the work. It follows that
reason, in laying the transcendental ideal at the foundation of its
determination of all possible things, takes a course in exact
analogy with that which it pursues in disjunctive syllogisms— a
proposition which formed the basis of the systematic work of all
transcendental ideas, according to which they are produced in complete
parallelism with the three modes of syllogistic reasoning employed
by the human mind.
*
[*]
See pages 225 and 236.
It is self—evident that reason, in cogitating the necessary complete
determination of things, does not presuppose the existence of a
being corresponding to its ideal, but merely the idea of the ideal—
for the purpose of deducing from the unconditional totality of
complete determination, The ideal is therefore the prototype of all
things, which, as defective copies (ectypa), receive from it the
material of their possibility, and approximate to it more or less,
though it is impossible that they can ever attain to its perfection.
The possibility of things must therefore be regarded as derived—
except that of the thing which contains in itself all reality, which
must be considered to be primitive and original. For all negations—
and they are the only predicates by means of which all other things
can be distinguished from the ens realissimum — are mere limitations of
a greater and a higher— nay, the highest reality; and they
consequently presuppose this reality, and are, as regards their
content, derived from it. The manifold nature of things is only an
infinitely various mode of limiting the conception of the highest
reality, which is their common substratum; just as all figures are
possible only as different modes of limiting infinite space. The
object of the ideal of reason— an object existing only in reason
itself— is also termed the primal being (ens originarium); as
having
no existence superior to him, the
supreme being (
ens summum); and as
being the condition of all other beings, which rank under it, the
being of all beings (
ens entium). But none of these terms indicate the
objective relation of an actually existing object to other things, but
merely that of an
idea to conceptions; and all our investigations into
this subject still leave us in perfect uncertainty with regard to
the existence of this being.
A primal being cannot be said to consist of many other beings with
an existence which is derivative, for the latter presuppose the
former, and therefore cannot be constitutive parts of it. It follows
that the ideal of the primal being must be cogitated as simple.
The deduction of the possibility of all other things from this
primal being cannot, strictly speaking, be considered as a limitation,
or as a kind of work of its reality; for this would be regarding
the primal being as a mere aggregate— which has been shown to be
impossible, although it was so represented in our first rough
sk&ch. The highest reality must be regarded rather as the ground than
as the sum—total of the possibility of all things, and the manifold
nature of things be based, not upon the limitation of the primal being
itself, but upon the complete series of effects which flow from it.
And thus all our powers of sense, as well as all phenomenal reality,
phenomenal reality, may be with propriety regarded as belonging to
this series of effects, while they could not have formed parts of
the idea, considered as an aggregate. Pursuing this track, and
hypostatizing this idea, we shall find ourselves authorized to
determine our notion of the Supreme Being by means of the mere
conception of a highest reality, as one, simple, all—sufficient,
eternal, and so on— in one word, to determine it in its
unconditioned completeness by the aid of every possible predicate. The
conception of such a being is the conception of God in its
transcendental sense, and thus the ideal of pure reason is the
object—matter of a transcendental Theology.
But, by such an employment of the transcendental idea, we should
be over stepping the limits of its validity and purpose. For reason
placed it, as the conception of all reality, at the basis of the
complete determination of things, without requiring that this
conception be regarded as the conception of an objective existence.
Such an existence would be purely
fictitious, and the hypostatizing of
the content of the idea into an ideal, as an individual being, is a
step perfectly unauthorized. Nay, more, we are not even called upon to
assume the possibility of such an hypothesis, as none of the
deductions drawn from such an ideal would affect the complete
determination of things in general— for the sake of which alone is the
idea necessary.
It is not sufficient to circumscribe the procedure and the dialectic
of reason; we must also endeavour to discover the sources of this
dialectic, that we may have it in our power to give a rational
explanation of this illusion, as a phenomenon of the human mind. For
the ideal, of which we are at present speaking, is based, not upon
an arbitrary, but upon a natural, idea. The question hence arises: How
happens it that reason regards the possibility of all things as
deduced from a single possibility, that, to wit, of the highest
reality, and presupposes this as existing in an individual and
primal being?
The answer is ready; it is at once presented by the procedure of
transcendental analytic. The possibility of sensuous objects is a
relation of these objects to thought, in which something (the
empirical form) may be cogitated a priori; while that which
constitutes the matter— the reality of the phenomenon (that element
which corresponds to sensation)— must be given from without, as
otherwise it could not even be cogitated by, nor could its possibility
be presentable to the mind. Now, a sensuous object is completely
determined, when it has been compared with all phenomenal
predicates, and represented by means of these either positively or
negatively. But, as that which constitutes the thing itself— the
real in a phenomenon, must be given, and that, in which the real of
all phenomena is given, is experience, one, sole, and all—embracing—
the material of the possibility of all sensuous objects must be
presupposed as given in a whole, and it is upon the limitation of this
whole that the possibility of all empirical objects, their distinction
from each other and their complete determination, are based. Now, no
other objects are presented to us besides sensuous objects, and
these can be given only in connection with a possible experience; it
follows that a thing is not an object to us, unless it presupposes the
whole or sum—total of empirical reality as the
condition of its
possibility. Now, a natural illusion leads us to consider this
principle, which is valid only of sensuous objects, as valid with
regard to things in general. And thus we are induced to hold the
empirical principle of our conceptions of the possibility of things,
as phenomena, by leaving out this limitative condition, to be a
transcendental principle of the possibility of things in general.
We proceed afterwards to hypostatize this idea of the sum—total of
all reality, by changing the distributive unity of the empirical
exercise of the understanding into the collective unity of an
empirical whole— a dialectical illusion, and by cogitating this
whole or sum of experience as an individual thing, containing in
itself all empirical reality. This individual thing or being is
then, by means of the above—mentioned transcendental subreption,
substituted for our notion of a thing which stands at the head of
the possibility of all things, the real conditions of whose complete
determination it presents.*
[*]
This ideal of the ens realissimum — although merely a mental
representation— is first objectivized, that is, has an objective
existence attributed to it, then hypostatized, and finally, by the
natural progress of reason to the completion of unity, personified, as
we shall show presently. For the regulative unity of experience is not
based upon phenomena themselves, but upon the connection of the
variety of phenomena by the understanding in a consciousness, and thus
the unity of the supreme reality and the complete determinability of
all things, seem to reside in a supreme understanding, and,
consequently, in a conscious intelligence.
