TRANSCENDENTAL DOCTRINE OF ELEMENTS.
1. FIRST PART.
TRANSCENDENTAL ÆSTHETIC.
SS 1. Introductory.
IN whatsoever mode, or by whatsoever means, our knowledge may relate
to objects, it is at least quite clear that the only manner in which
it immediately relates to them is by means of an intuition. To this as
the indispensable groundwork, all thought points. But an intuition can
take place only in so far as the object is given to us. This, again,
is only possible, to man at least, on condition that the object affect
the mind in a certain manner. The capacity for receiving
representations (receptivity) through the mode in which we are
affected by objects, objects, is called sensibility. By means of
sensibility, therefore, objects are given to us, and it alone
furnishes us with intuitions; by the understanding they are thought,
and from it arise conceptions. But an thought must directly, or
indirectly, by means of certain signs, relate ultimately to
intuitions; consequently, with us, to sensibility, because in no other
way can an object be given to us.
The effect of an object upon the faculty of representation, so far
as we are affected by the said object, is sensation. That sort of
intuition which relates to an object by means of sensation is called
an empirical intuition. The undetermined object of an empirical
intuition is called phenomenon. That which in the phenomenon
corresponds to the sensation, I term its matter; but that which
effects that the content of the phenomenon can be arranged under
certain relations, I call its form. But that in which our sensations
are merely arranged, and by which they are susceptible of assuming a
certain form, cannot be itself sensation. It is, then, the matter of
all phenomena that is given to us a posteriori; the form must lie
ready a priori for them in the mind, and consequently can be
regarded separately from all sensation.
I call all representations pure, in the transcendental meaning of
the word, wherein nothing is met with that belongs to sensation. And
accordingly we find existing in the mind a priori, the pure form of
sensuous intuitions in general, in which all the manifold content of
the phenomenal world is arranged and viewed under certain relations.
This pure form of sensibility I shall call pure intuition. Thus, if
I take away from our representation of a body all that the
understanding thinks as belonging to it, as substance, force,
divisibility, &c., and also whatever belongs to sensation, as
impenetrability, hardness, colour, &c.; yet there is still
something left us from this empirical intuition, namely, extension and
shape. These belong to pure intuition, which exists a priori in the
mind, as a mere form of sensibility, and without any real object of
the senses or any sensation.
The science of all the principles of sensibility a priori, I call
Transcendental Æsthetic.* There must, then, be such a science forming
the first part of the transcendental doctrine of elements, in
contradistinction to that part which contains the principles of pure
thought, and which is called transcendental logic.
[*]
The Germans are the only people who at present use this word to
indicate what others call the critique of taste. At the foundation
of this term lies the disappointed hope, which the eminent analyst,
Baumgarten, conceived, of subjecting the criticism of the beautiful to
principles of reason, and so of elevating its rules into a science.
But his endeavours were vain. For the said rules or criteria are, in
respect to their chief sources, merely empirical, consequently never
can serve as determinate laws a priori, by which our judgement in
matters of taste is to be directed. It is rather our judgement which
forms the proper test as to the correctness of the principles. On this
account it is advisable to give up the use of the term as
designating the critique of taste, and to apply it solely to that
doctrine, which is true science— the science of the laws of
sensibility— and thus come nearer to the language and the sense of the
ancients in their well—known work of the objects of cognition into
aiotheta kai noeta, or to share it with speculative philosophy, and
employ it partly in a transcendental, partly in a psychological
signification.
In the science of transcendental æsthetic accordingly, we shall
first isolate sensibility or the sensuous faculty, by separating
from it all that is annexed to its perceptions by the conceptions of
understanding, so that nothing be left but empirical intuition. In the
next place we shall take away from this intuition all that belongs
to sensation, so that nothing may remain but pure intuition, and the
mere form of phenomena,
which is all that the sensibility can afford a
priori. From this investigation it will be found that there are two
pure forms of sensuous intuition, as principles of knowledge
a priori,
namely, space and time. To the consideration of these we shall now
proceed.
SECTION I.
OF SPACE.
SS 2. Metaphysical Exposition of this Conception.
BY means of the external sense (a property of the mind), we
represent to ourselves objects as without us, and these all in
space. Herein alone are their shape, dimensions, and relations to each
other determined or determinable. The internal sense, by means of
which the mind contemplates itself or its internal state, gives,
indeed, no intuition of the soul as an object; yet there is
nevertheless a determinate form, under which alone the contemplation
of our internal state is possible, so that all which relates to the
inward determinations of the mind is represented in relations of time.
Of time we cannot have any external intuition, any more than we can
have an internal intuition of space. What then are time and space? Are
they real existences? Or, are they merely relations or
determinations of things, such, however, as would equally belong to
these things in themselves, though they should never become objects of
intuition; or, are they such as belong only to the form of
intuition, and consequently to the subjective constitution of the
mind, without which these predicates of time and space could not be
attached to any object? In order to become informed on these points,
we shall first give an exposition of the conception of space. By
exposition, I mean the clear, though not detailed, representation of
that which belongs to a conception; and an exposition is
metaphysical when it contains that which represents the conception
as given a priori.
1. Space is not a conception which has been derived from outward
experiences. For, in order that certain sensations may relate to
something without me (that is, to something which occupies a different
part of space from that in which I am); in like manner, in order
that I may represent them not merely as without, of, and near to
each other, but also in separate places, the representation of space
must already
exist as a foundation. Consequently, the representation
of space cannot be borrowed from the relations of external phenomena
through experience; but, on the contrary, this external experience
is itself only possible through the said antecedent representation.
2. Space then is a necessary representation a priori, which serves
for the foundation of all external intuitions. We never can imagine or
make a representation to ourselves of the non—existence of space,
though we may easily enough think that no objects are found in it.
It must, therefore, be considered as the condition of the
possibility of phenomena, and by no means as a determination dependent
on them, and is a representation a priori, which necessarily
supplies the basis for external phenomena.
3. Space is no discursive, or as we say, general conception of the
relations of things, but a pure intuition. For, in the first place, we
can only represent to ourselves one space, and, when we talk of divers
spaces, we mean only parts of one and the same space. Moreover,
these parts cannot antecede this one all—embracing space, as the
component parts from which the aggregate can be made up, but can be
cogitated only as existing in it. Space is essentially one, and
multiplicity in it, consequently the general notion of spaces, of this
or that space, depends solely upon limitations. Hence it follows
that an a priori intuition (which is not empirical) lies at the root
of all our conceptions of space. Thus, moreover, the principles of
geometry— for example, that "in a triangle, two sides together are
greater than the third," are never deduced from general conceptions of
line and triangle, but from intuition, and this a priori, with
apodeictic certainty.
4. Space is represented as an infinite given quantity. Now every
conception must indeed be considered as a representation which is
contained in an infinite multitude of different possible
representations, which, therefore, comprises these under itself; but
no conception, as such, can be so conceived, as if it contained within
itself an infinite multitude of representations. Nevertheless, space
is so conceived of, for all parts of space are equally capable of
being produced to infinity. Consequently, the original
representation of space is an intuition a priori, and not a
conception.
SS 3. Transcendental Exposition of the Conception of Space.
By a transcendental exposition, I mean the explanation of a
conception, as a principle, whence can be discerned the possibility of
other synthetical a priori cognitions. For this purpose, it is
requisite, firstly, that such cognitions do really flow from the given
conception; and, secondly, that the said cognitions are only
possible under the presupposition of a given mode of explaining this
conception.
Geometry is a science which determines the properties of space
synthetically, and yet a priori. What, then, must be our
representation of space, in order that such a cognition of it may be
possible? It must be originally intuition, for from a mere conception,
no propositions can be deduced which go out beyond the conception,* and
yet this happens in geometry. (Introd. V.) But this intuition must
be found in the mind a priori, that is, before any perception of
objects, consequently must be pure, not empirical, intuition. For
geometrical principles are always apodeictic, that is, united with the
consciousness of their necessity, as: "Space has only three
dimensions." But propositions of this kind cannot be empirical
judgements, nor conclusions from them. (Introd. II.) Now, how can an
external intuition anterior to objects themselves, and in which our
conception of objects can be determined a priori, exist in the human
mind? Obviously not otherwise than in so far as it has its seat in the
subject only, as the formal capacity of the subject's being affected
by objects, and thereby of obtaining immediate representation, that
is, intuition; consequently, only as the form of the external sense in
general.
[*]
That is, the analysis of a conception only gives you what is contained in it, and does not
add to your knowledge of the object of which you have a conception, but merely evolves it. — Tr.
Thus it is only by means of our explanation that the possibility
of geometry, as a synthetical science a priori, becomes
comprehensible. Every mode of explanation which does not show us
this possibility, although in appearance it may be similar to ours,
can with the utmost certainty be distinguished from it by these marks.
SS 4. Conclusions from the foregoing Conceptions.
(a) Space does Space does not represent any property of objects as
things in themselves, nor does it represent them in their relations to
each other; in other words, space does not represent to us any
determination of objects such as attaches to the objects themselves,
and would remain, even though all subjective conditions of the
intuition were abstracted. For neither absolute nor relative
determinations of objects can be intuited prior to the existence of
the things to which they belong, and therefore not
a priori.
(b) Space is nothing else than the form of all phenomena of the
external sense, that is, the subjective condition of the
sensibility, under which alone external intuition is possible. Now,
because the receptivity or capacity of the subject to be affected by
objects necessarily antecedes all intuitions of these objects, it is
easily understood how the form of all phenomena can be given in the
mind previous to all actual perceptions, therefore a priori, and how
it, as a pure intuition, in which all objects must be determined,
can contain principles of the relations of these objects prior to
all experience.
It is therefore from the human point of view only that we can
speak of space, extended objects, &c. If we depart from the
subjective condition, under which alone we can obtain external
intuition, or, in other words, by means of which we are affected by
objects, the representation of space has no meaning whatsoever. This
predicate is only applicable to things in so far as they appear to us,
that is, are objects of sensibility. The constant form of this
receptivity, which we call sensibility, is a necessary condition of
all relations in which objects can be intuited as existing without us,
and when abstraction of these objects is made, is a pure intuition, to
which we give the name of space. It is clear that we cannot make the
special conditions of sensibility into conditions of the possibility
of things, but only of the possibility of their existence as far as
they are phenomena. And so we may correctly say that space contains
all which can appear to us externally, but not all things considered
as things in themselves, be they intuited or not, or by whatsoever
subject one will. As to the intuitions of other thinking beings, we
cannot judge whether they are or are not bound by the same
conditions which limit our own intuition, and which for us are
universally valid. If we join the limitation of a judgement to the
conception of the subject, then the judgement will possess
unconditioned validity. For example, the proposition, "All objects are
beside each other in space," is valid only under the limitation that
these things are taken as objects of our sensuous intuition. But if
I join the condition to the conception and say, "All things, as
external phenomena, are beside each other in space," then the rule
is valid universally, and without any limitation. Our expositions,
consequently, teach the
reality (
i.e., the objective validity) of
space in regard of all which can be presented to us externally as
object, and at the same time also the
ideality of space in regard to
objects when they are considered by means of reason as things in
themselves, that is, without reference to the constitution of our
sensibility. We maintain, therefore, the
empirical reality of space in
regard to all possible external experience, although we must admit its
transcendental ideality; in other words, that it is nothing, so soon
as we withdraw the condition upon which the possibility of all
experience depends and look upon space as something that belongs to
things in themselves.
But, with the exception of space, there is no representation,
subjective and ref erring to something external to us, which could
be called objective a priori. For there are no other subjective
representations from which we can deduce synthetical propositions a
priori, as we can from the intuition of space. (See SS 3.)
Therefore, to speak accurately, no ideality whatever belongs to these,
although they agree in this respect with the representation of
space, that they belong merely to the subjective nature of the mode of
sensuous perception; such a mode, for example, as that of sight, of
hearing, and of feeling, by means of the sensations of colour,
sound, and heat, but which, because they are only sensations and not
intuitions, do not of themselves give us the cognition of any
object, least of all, an a priori cognition. My purpose, in the
above remark, is merely this: to guard any one against illustrating
the asserted ideality of space by examples quite insufficient, for
example, by colour, taste, &c.; for these must be contemplated not as
properties of things, but only as changes in the subject, changes
which may be different in different men. For, in such a case, that
which is originally a mere phenomenon, a rose, for example, is taken
by the empirical understanding for a thing in itself, though to
every different eye, in respect of its colour, it may appear
different. On the contrary, the
transcendental conception of phenomena
in space is a critical admonition, that, in general, nothing which
is intuited in space is a thing in itself, and that space is not a
form which belongs as a property to things; but that objects are quite
unknown to us in themselves, and what we call outward objects, are
nothing else but mere representations of our sensibility, whose form
is space, but whose real correlate, the thing in itself, is not
known by means of these representations, nor ever can be, but
respecting which, in experience, no inquiry is ever made.
SECTION II.
OF TIME.
SS 5 Metaphysical Exposition of this Conception.
1. TIME is not an empirical conception. For neither coexistence
nor succession would be perceived by us, if the representation of time
did not exist as a foundation a priori. Without this presupposition we
could not represent to ourselves that things exist together at one and
the same time, or at different times, that is, contemporaneously, or
in succession.
2. Time is a necessary representation, lying at the foundation of
all our intuitions. With regard to phenomena in general, we cannot
think away time from them, and represent them to ourselves as out of
and unconnected with time, but we can quite well represent to
ourselves time void of phenomena. Time is therefore given a priori. In
it alone is all reality of phenomena possible. These may all be
annihilated in thought, but time itself, as the universal condition of
their possibility, cannot be so annulled.
3. On this necessity a priori is also founded the possibility of
apodeictic principles of the relations of time, or axioms of time in
general, such as: "Time has only one dimension," "Different times
are not coexistent but successive" (as different spaces are not
successive but coexistent). These principles cannot be derived from
experience, for it would give neither strict universality, nor
apodeictic certainty. We should only be able to say, "so common
experience teaches us," but not "it must be so." They are valid as
rules, through which, in general, experience is possible; and they
instruct us respecting experience, and not by means of it.
4. Time is not a discursive, or as it is called, general conception,
but a pure form of the sensuous intuition. Different times are
merely parts of one and the same time. But the representation which
can only be given by a single object is an intuition. Besides, the
proposition that different times cannot be coexistent could not be
derived from a general conception. For this proposition is
synthetical, and therefore cannot spring out of conceptions alone.
It is therefore contained immediately in the intuition and
representation of time.
5. The infinity of time signifies nothing more than that every
determined quantity of time is possible only through limitations of
one time lying at the foundation. Consequently, the original
representation, time, must be given as unlimited. But as the
determinate representation of the parts of time and of every
quantity of an object can only be obtained by limitation, the complete
representation of time must not be furnished by means of
conceptions, for these contain only partial representations.
Conceptions, on the contrary, must have immediate intuition for
their basis.
SS 6 Transcendental Exposition of the Conception of Time.
I may here refer to what is said above (SS 5, 3), where, for or sake
of brevity, I have placed under the head of metaphysical exposition,
that which is properly transcendental. Here I shall add that the
conception of change, and with it the conception of motion, as
change of place, is possible only through and in the representation of
time; that if this representation were not an intuition (internal) a
priori, no conception, of whatever kind, could render comprehensible
the possibility of change, in other words, of a conjunction of
contradictorily opposed predicates in one and the same object, for
example, the presence of a thing in a place and the non—presence of
the same thing in the same place. It is only in time that it is
possible to meet with two contradictorily opposed determinations in
one thing, that is, after each other.* Thus our conception of time
explains the possibility of so much synthetical
knowledge
a priori, as
is exhibited in the general doctrine of motion, which is not a
little fruitful.
[*]
Kant's meaning is: You cannot affirm and deny the same thing of a subject, except by means of the representation,
time. No other idea, intuition, or conception, or whatever other form of thought there be, can mediate
the connection of such predicates. — Tr.
SS 7. Conclusions from the above Conceptions.
(a) Time is not something which subsists of itself, or which inheres
in things as an objective determination, and therefore remains, when
abstraction is made of the subjective conditions of the intuition of
things. For in the former case, it would be something real, yet
without presenting to any power of perception any real object. In
the latter case, as an order or determination inherent in things
themselves, it could not be antecedent to things, as their
condition, nor discerned or intuited by means of synthetical
propositions a priori. But all this is quite possible when we regard
time as merely the subjective condition under which all our intuitions
take place. For in that case, this form of the inward intuition can be
represented prior to the objects, and consequently a priori.
(b) Time is nothing else than the form of the internal sense, that
is, of the intuitions of self and of our internal state. For time
cannot be any determination of outward phenomena. It has to do neither
with shape nor position; on the contrary, it determines the relation
of representations in our internal state. And precisely because this
internal intuition presents to us no shape or form, we endeavour to
supply this want by analogies, and represent the course of time by a
line progressing to infinity, the content of which constitutes a
series which is only of one dimension; and we conclude from the
properties of this line as to all the properties of time, with this
single exception, that the parts of the line are coexistent, whilst
those of time are successive. From this it is clear also that the
representation of time is itself an intuition, because all its
relations can be expressed in an external intuition.
(c) Time is the formal condition a priori of all phenomena
whatsoever. Space, as the pure form of external intuition, is
limited as a condition a priori to external phenomena alone. On the
other hand, because all representations, whether they have or have not
external things for their objects, still in themselves, as
determinations of the mind, belong to our internal state; and
because this internal state is subject to the formal condition of
the internal intuition, that is,
to time— time is a condition
a priori
of all phenomena whatsoever— the
immediate condition of all
internal, and thereby the
mediate condition of all external phenomena.
If I can say
a priori, "All outward phenomena are in space, and
determined
a priori according to the relations of space," I can
also, from the principle of the internal sense, affirm universally,
"All phenomena in general, that is, all objects of the senses, are
in time and stand necessarily in relations of time."
If we abstract our internal intuition of ourselves and all
external intuitions, possible only by virtue of this internal
intuition and presented to us by our faculty of representation, and
consequently take objects as they are in themselves, then time is
nothing. It is only of objective validity in regard to phenomena,
because these are things which we regard as objects of our senses.
It no longer objective we, make abstraction of the sensuousness of our
intuition, in other words, of that mode of representation which is
peculiar to us, and speak of things in general. Time is therefore
merely a subjective condition of our (human) intuition (which is
always sensuous, that is, so far as we are affected by objects), and
in itself, independently of the mind or subject, is nothing.
Nevertheless, in respect of all phenomena, consequently of all
things which come within the sphere of our experience, it is
necessarily objective. We cannot say, "All things are in time,"
because in this conception of things in general, we abstract and
make no mention of any sort of intuition of things. But this is the
proper condition under which time belongs to our representation of
objects. If we add the condition to the conception, and say, "All
things, as phenomena, that is, objects of sensuous intuition, are in
time," then the proposition has its sound objective validity and
universality a priori.
What we have now set forth teaches, therefore, the empirical reality
of time; that is, its objective validity in reference to all objects
which can ever be presented to our senses. And as our intuition is
always sensuous, no object ever can be presented to us in
experience, which does not come under the conditions of time. On the
other hand, we deny to time all claim to absolute reality; that is, we
deny that it, without having regard to the form of our sensuous
intuition, absolutely inheres in things as a condition or property.
Such properties
as belong to objects as things in themselves never can
be presented to us through the medium of the senses. Herein
consists, therefore, the transcendental ideality of time, according to
which, if we abstract the subjective conditions of sensuous intuition,
it is nothing, and cannot be reckoned as subsisting or inhering in
objects as things in themselves, independently of its relation to
our intuition. this ideality, like that of space, is not to be
proved or illustrated by fallacious analogies with sensations, for
this reason— that in such arguments or illustrations, we make the
presupposition that the phenomenon, in which such and such
predicates inhere, has objective reality, while in this case we can
only find such an objective reality as is itself empirical, that is,
regards the object as a mere phenomenon. In reference to this subject,
see the remark in Section I. (p. 27).
SS 8. Elucidation.
Against this theory, which grants empirical reality to time, but
denies to it absolute and transcendental reality, I have heard from
intelligent men an objection so unanimously urged that I conclude that
it must naturally present itself to every reader to whom these
considerations are novel. It runs thus: "Changes are real" (this the
continual change in our own representations demonstrates, even
though the existence of all external phenomena, together with their
changes, is denied). Now, changes are only possible in time, and
therefore time must be something real. But there is no difficulty in
answering this. I grant the whole argument. Time, no doubt, is
something real, that is, it is the real form of our internal
intuition. It therefore has subjective reality, in reference to our
internal experience, that is, I have really the representation of time
and of my determinations therein. Time, therefore, is not to be
regarded as an object, but as the mode of representation of myself
as an object. But if I could intuite myself, or be intuited by another
being, without this condition of sensibility, then those very
determinations which we now represent to ourselves as changes, would
present to us a knowledge in which the representation of time, and
consequently of change, would not appear. The empirical reality of
time, therefore, remains, as the condition of all our experience.
But absolute reality, according to what has been
said above, cannot be
granted it. Time is nothing but the form of our internal intuition.
*
If we take away from it the special condition of our sensibility,
the conception of time also vanishes; and it inheres not in the
objects themselves, but solely in the subject (or mind) which intuites
them.
[*]
I can indeed say "my representations follow one another, or are
successive"; but this means only that we are conscious of them as in a
succession, that is, according to the form of the internal sense.
Time, therefore, is not a thing in itself, nor is it any objective
determination pertaining to, or inherent in things.
But the reason why this objection is so unanimously brought
against our doctrine of time, and that too by disputants who cannot
start any intelligible arguments against the doctrine of the
ideality of space, is this— they have no hope of demonstrating
apodeictically the absolute reality of space, because the doctrine
of idealism is against them, according to which the reality of
external objects is not capable of any strict proof. On the other
hand, the reality of the object of our internal sense (that is, myself
and my internal state) is clear immediately through consciousness. The
former— external objects in space— might be a mere delusion, but the
latter— the object of my internal perception— is undeniably real. They
do not, however, reflect that both, without question of their
reality as representations, belong only to the genus phenomenon, which
has always two aspects, the one, the object considered as a thing in
itself, without regard to the mode of intuiting it, and the nature
of which remains for this very reason problematical, the other, the
form of our intuition of the object, which must be sought not in the
object as a thing in itself, but in the subject to which it appears—
which form of intuition nevertheless belongs really and necessarily to
the phenomenal object.
Time and space are, therefore, two sources of knowledge, from which,
a priori, various synthetical cognitions can be drawn. Of this we find
a striking example in the cognitions of space and its relations, which
form the foundation of pure mathematics. They are the two pure forms
of all intuitions, and thereby make synthetical propositions a
priori possible. But these sources of knowledge being merely
conditions of our sensibility, do therefore, and as such, strictly
determine their own range and purpose, in that they do not and
cannot present
objects as things in themselves, but are applicable
to them solely in so far as they are considered as sensuous phenomena.
The sphere of phenomena is the only sphere of their validity, and if
we venture out of this, no further objective use can be made of
them. For the rest, this formal reality of time and space leaves the
validity of our empirical knowledge unshaken; for our certainty in
that respect is equally firm, whether these forms necessarily inhere
in the things themselves, or only in our intuitions of them. On the
other hand, those who maintain the absolute reality of time and space,
whether as essentially subsisting, or only inhering, as modifications,
in things, must find themselves at utter variance with the
principles of experience itself. For, if they decide for the first
view, and make space and time into substances, this being the side
taken by mathematical natural philosophers, they must admit two
self—subsisting nonentities, infinite and eternal, which exist (yet
without there being anything real) for the purpose of containing in
themselves everything that is real. If they adopt the second view of
inherence, which is preferred by some metaphysical natural
philosophers, and regard space and time as relations (contiguity in
space or succession in time), abstracted from experience, though
represented confusedly in this state of separation, they find
themselves in that case necessitated to deny the validity of
mathematical doctrines
a priori in reference to real things (for
example, in space)— at all events their apodeictic certainty. For such
certainty cannot be found in an
a posteriori proposition; and the
conceptions
a priori of space and time are, according to this opinion,
mere creations of the imagination,
* having their source really in
experience, inasmuch as, out of relations abstracted from
experience, imagination has made up something which contains,
indeed, general statements of these relations, yet of which no
application can be made without the restrictions attached thereto by
nature. The former of these parties gains this advantage, that they
keep the sphere of phenomena free for mathematical science. On the
other hand, these very conditions (space and time) embarrass them
greatly, when the understanding endeavours
to pass the limits of
that sphere. The latter has, indeed, this advantage, that the
representations of space and time do not come in their way when they
wish to judge of objects, not as phenomena, but merely in their
relation to the understanding. Devoid, however, of a true and
objectively valid
a priori intuition, they can neither furnish any
basis for the possibility of mathematical cognitions
a priori, nor
bring the propositions of experience into necessary accordance with
those of mathematics. In our theory of the true nature of these two
original forms of the sensibility, both difficulties are surmounted.
[*]
This word is here used, and will be hereafter always used, in it primitive sense.
That meaning of it which denotes a poetical inventive power, is a secondary one. — Tr.
In conclusion, that transcendental æsthetic cannot contain any more
than these two elements— space and time, is sufficiently obvious
from the fact that all other conceptions appertaining to
sensibility, even that of motion, which unites in itself both
elements, presuppose something empirical. Motion, for example,
presupposes the perception of something movable. But space
considered in itself contains nothing movable, consequently motion
must be something which is found in space only through experience—
in other words, an empirical datum. In like manner, transcendental
Æsthetic cannot number the conception of change among its data a
priori; for time itself does not change, but only something which is
in time. To acquire the conception of change, therefore, the
perception of some existing object and of the succession of its
determinations, in one word, experience, is necessary.
SS 9. General Remarks on Transcendental Aesthetic.
I. In order to prevent any misunderstanding, it will be requisite,
in the first place, to recapitulate, as clearly as possible, what
our opinion is with respect to the fundamental nature of our
sensuous cognition in general. We have intended, then, to say that all
our intuition is nothing but the representation of phenomena; that the
things which we intuite, are not in themselves the same as our
representations of them in intuition, nor are their relations in
themselves so constituted as they appear to us; and that if we take
away the subject, or even only the subjective constitution of our
senses in general, then not only the nature and relations of objects
in space and time, but even space and time themselves disappear; and
that these, as phenomena, cannot exist in themselves, but only in
us. What may be the nature of objects considered as things in
themselves and without reference to the receptivity of our sensibility
is quite unknown to us. We know nothing more than our mode of
perceiving them, which is peculiar to us, and which, though not of
necessity pertaining to every animated being, is so to the whole human
race. With this alone we have to do. Space and time are the pure forms
thereof; sensation the matter. The former alone can we cognize
a
priori, that is, antecedent to all actual perception; and for this
reason such cognition is called pure intuition. The latter is that
in our cognition which is called cognition
a posteriori, that is,
empirical intuition. The former appertain absolutely and necessarily
to our sensibility, of whatsoever kind our sensations may be; the
latter may be of very diversified character. Supposing that we
should carry our empirical intuition even to the very highest degree
of clearness, we should not thereby advance one step nearer to a
knowledge of the constitution of objects as things in themselves.
For we could only, at best, arrive at a complete cognition of our
own mode of intuition, that is of our sensibility, and this always
under the conditions originally attaching to the subject, namely,
the conditions of space and time; while the question: "What are
objects considered as things in themselves?" remains unanswerable even
after the most thorough examination of the phenomenal world.
To say, then, that all our sensibility is nothing but the confused
representation of things containing exclusively that which belongs
to them as things in themselves, and this under an accumulation of
characteristic marks and partial representations which we cannot
distinguish in consciousness, is a falsification of the conception
of sensibility and phenomenization, which renders our whole doctrine
thereof empty and useless. The difference between a confused and a
clear representation is merely logical and has nothing to do with
content. No doubt the conception of right, as employed by a sound
understanding, contains all that the most subtle investigation could
unfold from it, although, in the ordinary practical use of the word,
we are not conscious of the manifold representations comprised in
the conception. But we cannot for this reason assert that the ordinary
conception is a sensuous one containing
a mere phenomenon, for
right cannot appear as a phenomenon; but the conception of it lies
in the understanding, and represents a property (the moral property)
of actions, which belongs to them in themselves. On the other hand,
the representation in intuition of a body contains nothing which could
belong to an object considered as a thing in itself, but merely the
phenomenon or appearance of something, and the mode in which we are
affected by that appearance; and this receptivity of our faculty of
cognition is called sensibility, and remains
toto cælo different from
the cognition of an object in itself, even though we should examine
the content of the phenomenon to the very bottom.
It must be admitted that the Leibnitz—Wolfian philosophy has
assigned an entirely erroneous point of view to all investigations
into the nature and origin of our cognitions, inasmuch as it regards
the distinction between the sensuous and the intellectual as merely
logical, whereas it is plainly transcendental, and concerns not merely
the clearness or obscurity, but the content and origin of both. For
the faculty of sensibility not only does not present us with an
indistinct and confused cognition of objects as things in
themselves, but, in fact, gives us no knowledge of these at all. On
the contrary, so soon as we abstract in thought our own subjective
nature, the object represented, with the properties ascribed to it
by sensuous intuition, entirely disappears, because it was only this
subjective nature that determined the form of the object as a
phenomenon.
In phenomena, we commonly, indeed, distinguish that which
essentially belongs to the intuition of them, and is valid for the
sensuous faculty of every human being, from that which belongs to
the same intuition accidentally, as valid not for the sensuous faculty
in general, but for a particular state or organization of this or that
sense. Accordingly, we are accustomed to say that the former is a
cognition which represents the object itself, whilst the latter
presents only a particular appearance or phenomenon thereof. This
distinction, however, is only empirical. If we stop here (as is
usual), and do not regard the empirical intuition as itself a mere
phenomenon (as we ought to do), in which nothing that can appertain to
a thing in itself is to be found, our transcendental distinction is
lost, and we believe that we cognize objects as things in
themselves,
although in the whole range of the sensuous world,
investigate the nature of its objects as profoundly as we may, we have
to do with nothing but phenomena. Thus, we call the rainbow a mere
appearance of phenomenon in a sunny shower, and the rain, the
reality or thing in itself; and this is right enough, if we understand
the latter conception in a merely physical sense, that is, as that
which in universal experience, and under whatever conditions of
sensuous perception, is known in intuition to be so and so determined,
and not otherwise. But if we consider this empirical datum
generally, and inquire, without reference to its accordance with all
our senses, whether there can be discovered in it aught which
represents an object as a thing in itself (the raindrops of course are
not such, for they are, as phenomena, empirical objects), the question
of the relation of the representation to the object is transcendental;
and not only are the raindrops mere phenomena, but even their circular
form, nay, the space itself through which they fall, is nothing in
itself, but both are mere modifications or fundamental dispositions of
our sensuous intuition, whilst the transcendental object remains for
us utterly unknown.
The second important concern of our Æsthetic is that it does not
obtain favour merely as a plausible hypothesis, but possess as
undoubted a character of certainty as can be demanded of any theory
which is to serve for an organon. In order fully to convince the
reader of this certainty, we shall select a case which will serve to
make its validity apparent, and also to illustrate what has been
said in SS 3.
Suppose, then, that space and time are in themselves objective,
and conditions of the— possibility of objects as things in themselves.
In the first place, it is evident that both present us, with very many
apodeictic and synthetic propositions a priori, but especially
space— and for this reason we shall prefer it for investigation at
present. As the propositions of geometry are cognized synthetically
a priori, and with apodeictic certainty, I inquire: Whence do you
obtain propositions of this kind, and on what basis does the
understanding rest, in order to arrive at such absolutely necessary
and universally valid truths?
There is no other way than through intuitions or conceptions, as
such; and these are given either a priori or a posteriori. The latter,
namely, empirical conceptions, together with the
empirical intuition
on which they are founded, cannot afford any synthetical
proposition, except such as is itself also empirical, that is, a
proposition of experience. But an empirical proposition cannot possess
the qualities of necessity and absolute universality, which,
nevertheless, are the characteristics of all geometrical propositions.
As to the first and only means to arrive at such cognitions, namely,
through mere conceptions or intuitions
a priori, it is quite clear
that from mere conceptions no synthetical cognitions, but only
analytical ones, can be obtained. Take, for example, the
proposition: "Two straight lines cannot enclose a space, and with
these alone no figure is possible," and try to deduce it from the
conception of a straight line and the number two; or take the
proposition: "It is possible to construct a figure with three straight
lines," and endeavour, in like manner, to deduce it from the mere
conception of a straight line and the number three. All your
endeavours are in vain, and you find yourself forced to have
recourse to intuition, as, in fact, geometry always does. You
therefore give yourself an object in intuition. But of what kind is
this intuition? Is it a pure
a priori, or is it an empirical
intuition? If the latter, then neither an universally valid, much less
an apodeictic proposition can arise from it, for experience never
can give us any such proposition. You must, therefore, give yourself
an object
a priori in intuition, and upon that ground your synthetical
proposition. Now if there did not exist within you a faculty of
intuition
a priori; if this subjective condition were not in respect
to its form also the universal condition
a priori under which alone
the object of this external intuition is itself possible; if the
object (that is, the triangle) were something in itself, without
relation to you the subject; how could you affirm that that which lies
necessarily in your subjective conditions in order to construct a
triangle, must also necessarily belong to the triangle in itself?
For to your conceptions of three lines, you could not add anything new
(that is, the figure); which, therefore, must necessarily be found
in the object, because the object is given before your cognition,
and not by means of it. If, therefore, space (and time also) were
not a mere form of your intuition, which contains conditions
a priori,
under which alone things can become external objects for you, and
without which subjective conditions the objects are in themselves
nothing, you could not construct any synthetical proposition
whatsoever regarding external objects. It is therefore not merely
possible or probable, but indubitably certain, that space and time, as
the necessary conditions of all our external and internal
experience, are merely subjective conditions of all our intuitions, in
relation to which all objects are therefore mere phenomena, and not
things in themselves, presented to us in this particular manner. And
for this reason, in respect to the form of phenomena, much may be said
a priori, whilst of the thing in itself, which may lie at the
foundation of these phenomena, it is impossible to say anything.
II. In confirmation of this theory of the ideality of the external
as well as internal sense, consequently of all objects of sense, as
mere phenomena, we may especially remark that all in our cognition
that belongs to intuition contains nothing more than mere relations.
(The feelings of pain and pleasure, and the will, which are not
cognitions, are excepted.) The relations, to wit, of place in an
intuition (extension), change of place (motion), and laws according to
which this change is determined (moving forces). That, however,
which is present in this or that place, or any operation going on,
or result taking place in the things themselves, with the exception of
change of place, is not given to us by intuition. Now by means of mere
relations, a thing cannot be known in itself; and it may therefore
be fairly concluded, that, as through the external sense nothing but
mere representations of relations are given us, the said external
sense in its representation can contain only the relation of the
object to the subject, but not the essential nature of the object as a
thing in itself.
The same is the case with the internal intuition, not only
because, in the internal intuition, the representation of the external
senses constitutes the material with which the mind is occupied; but
because time, in which we place, and which itself antecedes the
consciousness of, these representations in experience, and which, as
the formal condition of the mode according to which objects are placed
in the mind, lies at the foundation of them, contains relations of the
successive, the coexistent, and of that which always must be
coexistent with succession, the permanent. Now that which, as
representation, can antecede every exercise of thought (of an object),
is intuition; and when it contains nothing but relations, it is the
form of the intuition, which, as it presents us with no
representation, except in so far as something is placed in the mind,
can be nothing else than the mode in which the mind is affected by its
own activity, to wit— its presenting to itself representations,
consequently the mode in which the mind is affected by itself; that
is, it can be nothing but an internal sense in respect to its form.
Everything that is represented through the medium of sense is so far
phenomenal; consequently, we must either refuse altogether to admit an
internal sense, or the subject, which is the object of that sense,
could only be represented by it as phenomenon, and not as it would
judge of itself, if its intuition were pure spontaneous activity, that
is, were intellectual. The difficulty here lies wholly in the
question: How can the subject have an internal intuition of itself?
But this difficulty is common to every theory. The consciousness of
self (apperception) is the simple representation of the "ego"; and
if by means of that representation alone, all the manifold
representations in the subject were spontaneously given, then our
internal intuition would be intellectual. This consciousness in man
requires an internal perception of the manifold representations
which are previously given in the subject; and the manner in which
these representations are given in the mind without spontaneity, must,
on account of this difference (the want of spontaneity), be called
sensibility. If the faculty of self—consciousness is to apprehend what
lies in the mind, it must all act that and can in this way alone
produce an intuition of self. But the form of this intuition, which
lies in the original constitution of the mind, determines, in the
representation of time, the manner in which the manifold
representations are to combine themselves in the mind; since the
subject intuites itself, not as it would represent itself
immediately and spontaneously, but according to the manner in which
the mind is internally affected, consequently, as it appears, and
not as it is.
III. When we say that the intuition of external objects, and also
the self—intuition of the subject, represent both, objects and
subject, in space and time, as they affect our senses, that is, as
they appear— this is by no means equivalent to asserting that these
objects are mere illusory appearances. For when we speak of things
as phenomena, the objects, nay, even the properties which we ascribe
to them, are looked upon as really
given; only that, in so far as this
or that property depends upon the mode of intuition of the subject, in
the relation of the given object to the subject, the object as
phenomenon is to be distinguished from the object as a thing in
itself. Thus I do not say that bodies seem or appear to be external to
me, or that my soul seems merely to be given in my self—consciousness,
although I maintain that the properties of space and time, in
conformity to which I set both, as the condition of their existence,
abide in my mode of intuition, and not in the objects in themselves.
It would be my own fault, if out of that which I should reckon as
phenomenon, I made mere illusory appearance.
* But this will not
happen, because of our principle of the ideality of all sensuous
intuitions. On the contrary, if we ascribe objective reality to
these forms of representation, it becomes impossible to avoid changing
everything into mere appearance. For if we regard space and time as
properties, which must be found in objects as things in themselves, as
sine quibus non of the possibility of their existence, and reflect
on the absurdities in which we then find ourselves involved,
inasmuch as we are compelled to admit the existence of two infinite
things, which are nevertheless not substances, nor anything really
inhering in substances, nay, to admit that they are the necessary
conditions of the existence of all things, and moreover, that they
must continue to exist, although all existing things were annihilated—
we cannot blame the good Berkeley for degrading bodies to mere
illusory appearances. Nay, even our own existence, which
would in this
case depend upon the self—existent reality of such a mere nonentity as
time, would necessarily be changed with it into mere appearance— an
absurdity which no one has as yet been guilty of.
[*]
The predicates of the phenomenon can be affixed to the object
itself in relation to our sensuous faculty; for example, the red
colour or the perfume to the rose. But (illusory) appearance never can
be attributed as a predicate to an object, for this very reason,
that it attributes to this object in itself that which belongs to it
only in relation to our sensuous faculty, or to the subject in
general, e.g., the two handles which were formerly ascribed to Saturn.
That which is never to be found in the object itself, but always in
the relation of the object to the subject, and which moreover is
inseparable from our representation of the object, we denominate
phenomenon. Thus the predicates of space and time are rightly
attributed to objects of the senses as such, and in this there is no
illusion. On the contrary, if I ascribe redness of the rose as a thing
in itself, or to Saturn his handles, or extension to all external
objects, considered as things in themselves, without regarding the
determinate relation of these objects to the subject, and without
limiting my judgement to that relation— then, and then only, arises
illusion.
IV. In natural theology, where we think of an object— God— which
never can be an object of intuition to us, and even to himself can
never be an object of sensuous intuition, we carefully avoid
attributing to his intuition the conditions of space and time— and
intuition all his cognition must be, and not thought, which always
includes limitation. But with what right can we do this if we make
them forms of objects as things in themselves, and such, moreover,
as would continue to exist as a priori conditions of the existence
of things, even though the things themselves were annihilated? For
as conditions of all existence in general, space and time must be
conditions of the existence of the Supreme Being also. But if we do
not thus make them objective forms of all things, there is no other
way left than to make them subjective forms of our mode of
intuition— external and internal; which is called sensuous, because it
is not primitive, that is, is not such as gives in itself the
existence of the object of the intuition (a mode of intuition which,
so far as we can judge, can belong only to the Creator), but is
dependent on the existence of the object, is possible, therefore, only
on condition that the representative faculty of the subject is
affected by the object.
It is, moreover, not necessary that we should limit the mode of
intuition in space and time to the sensuous faculty of man. It may
well be that all finite thinking beings must necessarily in this
respect agree with man (though as to this we cannot decide), but
sensibility does not on account of this universality cease to be
sensibility, for this very reason, that it is a deduced (intuitus
derivativus), and not an original (intuitus originarius), consequently
not an intellectual intuition, and this intuition, as such, for
reasons above mentioned, seems to belong solely to the Supreme
Being, but never to a being dependent, quoad its existence, as well as
its intuition (which its existence determines and limits relatively to
given objects). This latter remark, however, must be taken only as
an illustration, and not as any proof of the truth of our
æsthetical theory.
SS 10 Conclusion of the Transcendental Aesthetic.
We have now completely before us one part of the solution of the
grand general problem of transcendental philosophy, namely, the
question: "How are synthetical propositions a priori possible?" That
is to say, we have shown that we are in possession of pure a priori
intuitions, namely, space and time, in which we find, when in a
judgement a priori we pass out beyond the given conception,
something which is not discoverable in that conception, but is
certainly found a priori in the intuition which corresponds to the
conception, and can be united synthetically with it. But the
judgements which these pure intuitions enable us to make, never
reach farther than to objects of the senses, and are valid only for
objects of possible experience.
PART SECOND.
TRANSCENDENTAL LOGIC.
INTRODUCTION.
IDEA OF A TRANSCENDENTAL LOGIC.
I.
Of Logic in General.
OUR knowledge springs from two main sources in the mind, first of
which is the faculty or power of receiving representations
(receptivity for impressions); the second is the power of cognizing by
means of these representations (spontaneity in the production of
conceptions). Through the first an object is given to us; through
the second, it is, in relation to the representation (which is a
mere determination of the mind), thought. Intuition and conceptions
constitute, therefore, the elements of all our knowledge, so that
neither conceptions without an intuition in some way corresponding
to them, nor intuition without conceptions, can afford us a cognition.
Both are either pure or empirical. They are. empirical, when sensation
(which presupposes the actual presence of the object) is contained
in them; and pure, when no sensation is mixed with the representation.
Sensations we may call the matter of sensuous cognition. Pure
intuition consequently contains merely the form under which
something is intuited, and pure conception only the form of the
thought of an object. Only pure intuitions and pure conceptions are
possible a priori; the empirical only a posteriori.
We apply the term sensibility to the receptivity of the mind for
impressions, in so far as it is in some way affected; and, on the
other hand, we call the faculty of spontaneously producing
representations, or the spontaneity of cognition, understanding. Our
nature is so constituted that intuition with us never can be other
than sensuous, that is, it contains
only the mode in which we are
affected by objects. On the other hand, the faculty of thinking the
object of sensuous intuition is the understanding. Neither of these
faculties has a preference over the other. Without the sensuous
faculty no object would be given to us, and without the
understanding no object would be thought. Thoughts without content are
void; intuitions without conceptions, blind. Hence it is as
necessary for the mind to make its conceptions sensuous (that is, to
join to them the object in intuition), as to make its intuitions
intelligible (that is, to bring them under conceptions). Neither of
these faculties can exchange its proper function. Understanding cannot
intuite, and the sensuous faculty cannot think. in no other way than
from the united operation of both, can knowledge arise. But no one
ought, on this account, to overlook the difference of the elements
contributed by each; we have rather great reason carefully to separate
and distinguish them. We therefore distinguish the science of the laws
of sensibility, that is, æsthetic, from the science of the laws of
the understanding, that is, logic.
Now, logic in its turn may be considered as twofold— namely, as
logic of the general [universal],* or of the particular
use of the understanding.
The first contains the absolutely necessary laws of thought, without
which no use whatsoever of the understanding is possible, and gives
laws therefore to the understanding, without regard to the
difference of objects on which it may be employed. The logic of the
particular use of the understanding contains the laws of correct
thinking upon a particular class of objects. The former may be
called elemental logic— the latter, the organon of this or that
particular science. The latter is for the most part employed in the
schools, as a propædeutic to the sciences, although, indeed,
according to the course of human reason, it is the last thing we
arrive at, when the science has been already matured, and needs only
the finishing touches towards its correction and completion; for our
knowledge of the objects of our attempted science must be tolerably
extensive and complete before we can indicate the laws by which a
science of these objects can be established.
[_]
* Logic is nothing but the science of the laws of thought, as thought. It concerns itself only with the form
of thought, and takes no cognizance of the matter — that is, of the infinitude of the objects to which thought is applied.
Now Kant was wrong, when he divides logic into logic of the general and of the particular use of the understanding.
He says the logic of the particular use of the understanding contains the laws of right thinking upon any particular set of objects.
This sort of logic he calls the organon of this or that science. It is difficult to discover what he means by his
logic of the particular use of the understanding. From his description, we are left in doubt whether he means by this logic
induction, that is, the organon of science in general, or the laws which regulate the objects, a science of which he seeks to establish. —
In either case, the application of the term logic is inadmissible. To regard logic as the organon of science, is
absurd, as indeed Kant himself afterwards shows (p.51). It knows nothing of this or that object. That matter
employed in syllogisms is used for the sake of example only; all forms of syllogisms might be expressed in signs.
Logicians have never been able clearly to see this. They have never been able clearly to define the extent of their science,
to know, in fact, what their science really treated of. They have never seen that it has to do only with the
formal, and never with the material in thought. The science has broken down its proper barriers to let in contributions
from metaphysics, psychology, &c. It is common enough, for example, to say that Bacon's Novum Organum
entirely superseded the Organon of Aristotle. But the one states the laws under which a knowledge of objects
is possible; the other the subjective laws of thought. The spheres of the two are utterly distinct.
Kant very properly states that pure logic is alone properly science. Strictly speaking, applied logic cannot be a work
of general logic. It is more correctly applied psychology; — psychology treating in a practical manner of the conditions under which
thought is employed.
It may be noted here, that what Kant calls Transcendental Logic is properly not logic at all, but a work
of metaphysics. For his Categories contain matter — as regards thought at least. Take, for example, the category
of Existence. These categories, no doubt, are the forms of the matter given to us by experience. They are, according
to Kant, not derived from experience, but purely a priori. But logic is concerned exclusively about the form
of thought, and has nothing to do with this or that conception, whether a priori or a posteriori.
See Sir William Hamilton's Edition of Reid's Works, passim. It is to Sir William Hamilton, one of the
greatest logicians, perhaps the greatest, since Aristotle, and certainly one of the acutest thinkers of
any time, that the Translator is indebted for the above view of the subject of logic. — Tr.
General logic is again either pure or applied. In the former, we
abstract all the empirical conditions under which the understanding is
exercised; for example, the influence of the senses, the play of the
fantasy or imagination, the laws of the memory, the force of habit, of
inclination, &c., consequently also, the sources of prejudice— in a
word, we abstract all causes from which particular cognitions arise,
because these causes regard the understanding under certain
circumstances
of its application, and, to the knowledge of them
experience is required. Pure general logic has to do, therefore,
merely with pure
a priori principles, and is a canon of
understanding and reason, but only in respect of the formal part of
their use, be the content what it may, empirical or transcendental.
General logic is called applied, when it is directed to the laws of
the use of the understanding, under the subjective empirical
conditions which psychology teaches us. It has therefore empirical
principles, although, at the same time, it is in so far general,
that it applies to the exercise of the understanding, without regard
to the difference of objects. On this account, moreover, it is neither
a canon of the understanding in general, nor an organon of a
particular science, but merely a cathartic of the human understanding.
In general logic, therefore, that part which constitutes pure
logic must be carefully distinguished from that which constitutes
applied (though still general) logic. The former alone is properly
science, although short and dry, as the methodical exposition of an
elemental doctrine of the understanding ought to be. In this,
therefore, logicians must always bear in mind two rules:
1. As general logic, it makes abstraction of all content of the
cognition of the understanding, and of the difference of objects,
and has to do with nothing but the mere form of thought.
2. As pure logic, it has no empirical principles, and consequently
draws nothing (contrary to the common persuasion) from psychology,
which therefore has no influence on the canon of the understanding. It
is a demonstrated doctrine, and everything in it must be certain
completely a priori.
What I called applied logic (contrary to the common acceptation of
this term, according to which it should contain certain exercises
for the scholar, for which pure logic gives the rules), is a
representation of the understanding, and of the rules of its necessary
employment in concreto, that is to say, under the accidental
conditions of the subject, which may either hinder or promote this
employment, and which are all given only empirically. Thus applied
logic treats of attention, its impediments and consequences, of the
origin of error, of the state of doubt, hesitation, conviction,
&c., and to it is related pure general logic in the same way that
pure morality, which contains only the necessary moral laws of a
free will, is related to practical ethics, which considers these
laws under all the impediments of feelings, inclinations, and passions
to which men are more or less subjected, and which never can furnish
us with a true and demonstrated science, because it, as well as
applied logic, requires empirical and psychological principles.
II.
Of Transcendental Logic.
General logic, as we have seen, makes abstraction of all content
of cognition, that is, of all relation of cognition to its object, and
regards only the logical form in the relation of cognitions to each
other, that is, the form of thought in general. But as we have both
pure and empirical intuitions (as transcendental æsthetic proves), in
like manner a distinction might be drawn between pure and empirical
thought (of objects). In this case, there would exist a kind of logic,
in which we should not make abstraction of all content of cognition;
for or logic which should comprise merely the laws of pure thought (of
an object), would of course exclude all those cognitions which were of
empirical content. This kind of logic would also examine the origin of
our cognitions of objects, so far as that origin cannot be ascribed to
the objects themselves; while, on the contrary, general logic has
nothing to do with the origin of our cognitions, but contemplates
our representations, be they given primitively a priori in
ourselves, or be they only of empirical origin, solely according to
the laws which the understanding observes in employing them in the
process of thought, in relation to each other. Consequently, general
logic treats of the form of the understanding only, which can be
applied to representations, from whatever source they may have arisen.
And here I shall make a remark, which the reader must bear well in
mind in the course of the following considerations, to wit, that not
every cognition a priori, but only those through which we cognize that
and how certain representations (intuitions or conceptions) are
applied or are possible only a priori; that is to say, the a priori
possibility of cognition and the a priori use of it are
transcendental. Therefore neither is space, nor any a priori
geometrical
determination of space, a transcendental Representation,
but only the knowledge that such a representation is not of
empirical origin, and the possibility of its relating to objects of
experience, although itself
a priori, can be called transcendental. So
also, the application of space to objects in general would be
transcendental; but if it be limited to objects of sense it is
empirical. Thus, the distinction of the transcendental and empirical
belongs only to the critique of cognitions, and does not concern the
relation of these to their object.
Accordingly, in the expectation that there may perhaps be
conceptions which relate a priori to objects, not as pure or
sensuous intuitions, but merely as acts of pure thought (which are
therefore conceptions, but neither of empirical nor æsthetical
origin)— in this expectation, I say, we form to ourselves, by
anticipation, the idea of a science of pure understanding and rational*
cognition, by means of which we may cogitate objects entirely a
priori. A science of this kind, which should determine the origin, the
extent, and the objective validity of such cognitions, must be
called Transcendental Logic, because it has not, like general logic,
to do with the laws of understanding and reason in relation to
empirical as well as pure rational cognitions without distinction, but
concerns itself with these only in an a priori relation to objects.
[*]
Vernunfterkenntnisses. The word reason, rational, will always be confined in this
translation to the rendering of Vernunft and its derivatives. — Tr.
III. Of the work of General Logic into Analytic and Dialectic.
The old question with which people sought to push logicians into a
corner, so that they must either have recourse to pitiful sophisms
or confess their ignorance, and consequently the vanity of their whole
art, is this: "What is truth?" The definition of the word truth, to
wit, "the accordance of the cognition with its object," is presupposed
in the question; but we desire to be told, in the answer to it, what
is the universal and secure criterion of the truth of every cognition.
To know what questions we may reasonably propose is in itself a
strong evidence of sagacity and intelligence. For if a question be
in itself absurd and unsusceptible of a rational answer, it is
attended with the danger— not to
mention the shame that falls upon the
person who proposes it— of seducing the unguarded listener into making
absurd answers, and we are presented with the ridiculous spectacle
of one (as the ancients said) "milking the he—goat, and the other
holding a sieve."
If truth consists in the accordance of a cognition with its
object, this object must be, ipso facto, distinguished from all
others; for a cognition is false if it does not accord with the object
to which it relates, although it contains something which may be
affirmed of other objects. Now an universal criterion of truth would
be that which is valid for all cognitions, without distinction of
their objects. But it is evident that since, in the case of such a
criterion, we make abstraction of all the content of a cognition (that
is, of all relation to its object), and truth relates precisely to
this content, it must be utterly absurd to ask for a mark of the truth
of this content of cognition; and that, accordingly, a sufficient, and
at the same time universal, test of truth cannot possibly be found. As
we have already termed the content of a cognition its matter, we shall
say: "Of the truth of our cognitions in respect of their matter, no
universal test can be demanded, because such a demand is
self—contradictory."
On the other hand, with regard to our cognition in respect of its
mere form (excluding all content), it is equally manifest that
logic, in so far as it exhibits the universal and necessary laws of
the understanding, must in these very laws present us with criteria of
truth. Whatever contradicts these rules is false, because thereby
the understanding is made to contradict its own universal laws of
thought; that is, to contradict itself. These criteria, however, apply
solely to the form of truth, that is, of thought in general, and in so
far they are perfectly accurate, yet not sufficient. For although a
cognition may be perfectly accurate as to logical form, that is, not
self—contradictory, it is notwithstanding quite possible that it may
not stand in agreement with its object. Consequently, the merely
logical criterion of truth, namely, the accordance of a cognition with
the universal and formal laws of understanding and reason, is
nothing more than the conditio sine qua non, or negative condition
of all truth. Farther than this logic cannot go, and the error which
depends not on the form, but on the content of the cognition, it has
no test to discover.
General logic, then, resolves the whole formal business of
understanding and reason into its elements, and exhibits them as
principles of all logical judging of our cognitions. This part of
logic may, therefore, be called Analytic, and is at least the negative
test of truth, because all cognitions must first of an be estimated
and tried according to these laws before we proceed to investigate
them in respect of their content, in order to discover whether they
contain positive truth in regard to their object. Because, however,
the mere form of a cognition, accurately as it may accord with logical
laws, is insufficient to supply us with material (objective) truth, no
one, by means of logic alone, can venture to predicate anything of
or decide concerning objects, unless he has obtained, independently of
logic, well—grounded information about them, in order afterwards to
examine, according to logical laws, into the use and connection, in
a cohering whole, of that information, or, what is still better,
merely to test it by them. Notwithstanding, there lies so seductive
a charm in the possession of a specious art like this— an art which
gives to all our cognitions the form of the understanding, although
with respect to the content thereof we may be sadly deficient— that
general logic, which is merely a canon of judgement, has been employed
as an organon for the actual production, or rather for the semblance
of production, of objective assertions, and has thus been grossly
misapplied. Now general logic, in its assumed character of organon, is
called Dialectic.
Different as are the significations in which the ancients used
this term for a science or an art, we may safely infer, from their
actual employment of it, that with them it was nothing else than a
logic of illusion— a sophistical art for giving ignorance, nay, even
intentional sophistries, the colouring of truth, in which the
thoroughness of procedure which logic requires was imitated, and their
topic* employed to cloak the empty pretensions. Now it may be taken
as a safe and useful warning, that general logic, considered as an
organon,
must always be a logic of illusion, that is, be
dialectical, for, as it teaches us nothing whatever respecting the
content of our cognitions, but merely the formal conditions of their
accordance with the understanding, which do not relate to and are
quite indifferent in respect of objects, any attempt to employ it as
an instrument (organon) in order to extend and enlarge the range of
our knowledge must end in mere prating; any one being able to maintain
or oppose, with some appearance of truth, any single assertion
whatever.
[*]
The Topic (Topica) of the ancients was a work of the intellectual instruction
then prevalent, with the design of setting forth the proper method of reasoning on any given
proposition — according to certain distinctions of genus, the species, &c. of the subject and
predicate; of words, analogies, and the like. It of course contained also a code of laws for
syllogistical disputation. It was not necessarily an aid to sophistry. — Tr.
Such instruction is quite unbecoming the dignity of philosophy.
For these reasons we have chosen to denominate this part of logic
Dialectic, in the sense of a critique of dialectical illusion, and
we wish the term to be so understood in this place.
IV. Of the work of Transcendental Logic into Transcendental
Analytic and Dialectic.
In transcendental logic we isolate the understanding (as in
transcendental æsthetic the sensibility) and select from our
cognition merely that part of thought which has its origin in the
understanding alone. The exercise of this pure cognition, however,
depends upon this as its condition, that objects to which it may be
applied be given to us in intuition, for without intuition the whole
of our cognition is without objects, and is therefore quite void. That
part of transcendental logic, then, which treats of the elements of
pure cognition of the understanding, and of the principles without
which no object at all can be thought, is transcendental analytic, and
at the same time a logic of truth. For no cognition can contradict it,
without losing at the same time all content, that is, losing all
reference to an object, and therefore all truth. But because we are
very easily seduced into employing these pure cognitions and
principles of the understanding by themselves, and that even beyond
the boundaries of experience, which yet is the only source whence we
can obtain matter (objects) on which those pure conceptions may be
employed— understanding runs the risk of making, by means of empty
sophisms, a material and objective use of the mere formal principles
of the pure understanding, and of passing judgements on objects
without distinction— objects
which are not given to us, nay, perhaps
cannot be given to us in any way. Now, as it ought properly to be only
a canon for judging of the empirical use of the understanding, this
kind of logic is misused when we seek to employ it as an organon of
the universal and unlimited exercise of the understanding, and attempt
with the pure understanding alone to judge synthetically, affirm,
and determine respecting objects in general. In this case the exercise
of the pure understanding becomes dialectical. The second part of
our transcendental logic must therefore be a critique of dialectical
illusion, and this critique we shall term Transcendental Dialectic—
not meaning it as an art of producing dogmatically such illusion (an
art which is unfortunately too current among the practitioners of
metaphysical juggling), but as a critique of understanding and
reason in regard to their hyperphysical use. This critique will expose
the groundless nature of the pretensions of these two faculties, and
invalidate their claims to the discovery and enlargement of our
cognitions merely by means of transcendental principles, and show that
the proper employment of these faculties is to test the judgements
made by the pure understanding, and to guard it from sophistical
delusion.