FOURTH CONFLICT OF THE TRANSCENDENTAL IDEAS.
Thesis.
There exists either in, or in connection with the world— either as a
part of it, or as the cause of it—an absolutely necessary being.
PROOF.
The world of sense, as the sum total of all phenomena, contains a
series of changes. For, without such a series, the mental
representation of the series of time itself, as the condition of the
possibility of the sensuous world, could not be presented to us.*
But every change stands under its condition, which precedes it in time
and renders it necessary. Now the existence of a given condition
presupposes a complete series of conditions up to the absolutely
unconditioned, which alone is absolutely necessary. It follows that
something that is absolutely necessary must exist, if change exists as
its consequence. But this necessary
thing itself belongs to the
sensuous world. For suppose it to exist out of and apart from it,
the series of cosmical changes would receive from it a beginning,
and yet this necessary cause would not itself belong to the world of
sense. But this is impossible. For, as the beginning of a series in
time is determined only by that which precedes it in time, the supreme
condition of the beginning of a series of changes must exist in the
time in which this series itself did not exist; for a beginning
supposes a time preceding, in which the thing that begins to be was
not in existence. The causality of the necessary cause of changes, and
consequently the cause itself, must for these reasons belong to
time— and to phenomena, time being possible only as the form of
phenomena. Consequently, it cannot be cogitated as separated from
the world of sense— the sum total of all phenomena. There is,
therefore, contained in the world, something that is absolutely
necessary— whether it be the whole cosmical series itself, or only a
part of it.
[*]
Objectively, time, as the formal condition of the possibility of
change, precedes all changes; but subjectively, and in
consciousness, the representation of time, like every other, is
given solely by occasion of perception.
Antithesis.
An absolutely necessary being does not exist, either in the world,
or out of it— as its cause.
PROOF.
Grant that either the world itself is necessary, or that there is
contained in it a necessary existence. Two cases are possible.
First, there must either be in the series of cosmical changes a
beginning, which is unconditionally necessary, and therefore uncaused—
which is at variance with the dynamical law of the determination of
all phenomena in time; or, secondly, the series itself is without
beginning, and, although contingent and conditioned in all its
parts, is nevertheless absolutely necessary and unconditioned as a
whole— which is self—contradictory. For the existence of an
aggregate cannot be necessary, if no single part of it possesses
necessary existence.
Grant, on the other band, that an absolutely necessary cause
exists out of and apart from the world. This cause, as the highest
member in the series of the causes of cosmical changes, must originate
or begin*
the existence of the latter and their series. In this case
it must also begin to act, and its causality would therefore belong to
time, and consequently to the sum total of phenomena, that is, to
the world. It follows that the cause cannot be out of the world; which
is contradictory to the hypothesis. Therefore, neither in the world,
nor out of it (but in causal connection with it), does there exist any
absolutely necessary being.
[*]
The word begin is taken in two senses. The first is active— the
cause being regarded as beginning a series of conditions as its effect
(infit).* The second is passive— the causality in the cause itself
beginning to operate (fit). I reason here from the first to the
second.
[*]
It may be doubted whether there is any passage to be found in the Latin Classics
where infit is employed in any other than a neuter sense, as in Plautus, "Infit me
percontarier." The second signification of begin (anfangen) we should rather term neuter. — Tr.