CHAP. II. — The Antinomy of Pure Reason. Critique of Pure Reason | ||
PROOF.
Granted, that there does exist freedom in the transcendental sense, as a peculiar kind of causality, operating to produce events in the world— a faculty, that is to say, of originating a state, and consequently a series of consequences from that state. In this case, not only the series originated by this spontaneity, but the determination of this spontaneity itself to the production of the series, that is to say, the causality itself must have an absolute commencement, such that nothing can precede to determine this action according to unvarying laws. But every beginning of action
We have, therefore, nothing but nature to which we must look for connection and order in cosmical events. Freedom— independence of the laws of nature— is certainly a deliverance from restraint, but it is also a relinquishing of the guidance of law and rule. For it cannot be alleged that, instead of the laws of nature, laws of freedom may be introduced into the causality of the course of nature. For, if freedom were determined according to laws, it would be no longer freedom, but merely nature. Nature, therefore, and transcendental freedom are distinguishable as conformity to law and lawlessness. The former
CHAP. II. — The Antinomy of Pure Reason. Critique of Pure Reason | ||