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35.27

Greatly elated by his victory, Nabis felt no further apprehension of danger from the sea, and he now decided to close all access on the land side by an effective disposition of his troops. He withdrew a third of the army which was investing Gytheum and encamped at Pleiae in a position which commanded both Leucae and Acriae, as the enemy would probably advance in that direction. Only a few of the troops in this camp had tents, the mass of the soldiers constructed wattled huts with reeds and leafy branches to shelter them from the sun. Before he came within sight of the enemy Philopoemen decided to make a novel kind of attack and take him unawares. Collecting some small craft in a secluded creek on the Argive coast he manned them with light infantry, mostly caetrati, who were armed with slings and darts and other light equipment. Sailing close inshore he reached a headland near the enemy's camp, where he disembarked his men and made a night march to Patrae along paths with which he was familiar. The enemy's sentinels, fearing no immediate danger, were asleep and Philopoemen's men flung burning brands on the huts from every side of the camp. Many perished in the fire before they were aware of the enemy's presence, and those who had become aware of it were unable to render any assistance. Between fire and sword the destruction was complete, very few escaped death from the one or the other, and those who did escape fled to the camp before Gytheum. Immediately after dealing this blow to the enemy Philopoemen led his force to Tripolis in Laconia, close to the Megalopolitan territory, and before the tyrant could send troops from Gytheum to protect the fields, he succeeded in carrying off a vast quantity of booty both in men and cattle.

He then assembled the army of the league at Tegea and also convened a special meeting of the Achaeans and their allies at which the leading men from Epirus and Acarnania were present. As his troops were now sufficiently recovered from the humiliation of their naval defeat and the enemy were correspondingly depressed he decided to march on Lacedaemon, as that seemed the only means of drawing off the enemy from the siege of Gytheum. His first halt on enemy territory was at Caryae, and on the very day he encamped here Gytheum was taken. Unaware of what had happened he continued his advance as far as Barnosthenes, a mountain ten miles distant from Lacedaemon. After taking Gytheum Nabis returned with his army equipped for rapid marching, and hurrying past Lacedaemon he seized a position known as Pyrrhus' Camp, which he felt quite certain that the Achaeans were making for. From there he advanced to meet them. Owing to the narrowness of the road they extended in a column nearly five miles long. The cavalry and the greater part of the auxiliary troops were in the hinder part of the column, as Philopoemen thought that the tyrant would probably attack his rear with the mercenaries, on whom he mainly depended. Two unexpected circumstances occurred which gave Philopoemen cause for anxiety; the position he had hoped to secure was already occupied and he saw that the enemy were intending to attack the head of the column. He did not see how it was possible for his hoplites to advance in battle order over such broken ground without the support of the light troops.