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36.43

The consul was laying siege to Naupactus at the time. Livius was detained at Delos by contrary winds for several days; the seas round the Cyclades are liable to violent storms, owing to the numerous channels, some narrower, some wider, which separate the islands. Polyxenidas received intelligence through the scouting vessels which were patrolling those waters that the Roman fleet was lying at Delos, and he sent on the information to the king. Antiochus abandoned his designs in the Hellespont and returned to Ephesus with all possible speed, taking his warships with him. He at once called a council of war to decide whether he ought to risk an engagement. Polyxenidas was opposed to any delay, and said that they certainly ought to engage before Eumenes and the Rhodians joined the Roman fleet. In that case they would not be so very unequally matched in point of numbers and in everything else they would have the advantage, in the speed of their vessels and in various other respects, for the Roman ships were awkwardly built and slow, and as they were going to a hostile country they would be heavily laden with stores, whilst the king's ships, having none but friends all round them, would carry nothing but soldiers and their equipment. They would be greatly assisted, too, by their familiarity with the sea and the coasts and their knowledge of the winds; the enemy on the other hand, who was ignorant of all this, would be thrown into confusion by them. The council unanimously approved of his proposal, since the man who made it was also the one who was to carry it out.

Two days were spent in preparations, on the third day they set sail for Phocaea with a fleet of a hundred ships, seventy decked, the rest open ships, but all smaller than the corresponding vessels of the enemy fleet. On hearing that the Roman fleet was approaching, the king, who had no intention of taking part in a naval battle, withdrew to Magnesia ad Sipylum to assemble his land forces, the fleet sailing on to Cissus, the port of Erythrae, as that appeared a more suitable place in which to await the enemy. The Romans had been detained at Delos for some days by northerly winds; when these subsided they put out from Delos and steered for the harbour of Phanae, at the southern end of Chios, facing the Aegean. They then brought their ships up to the city, and after taking in supplies sailed to Phocaea. Eumenes, who had gone to his fleet at Elea, returned in a few days with twenty-four decked ships and a larger number of open ones, and sailed on to Phocaea, where he found the Romans getting their ships ready and making every preparation for the coming naval contest. From Phocaea they put to sea with one hundred and five decked ships and about fifty open ones. At first they were driven towards the land by the northerly winds which blew across their course and were forced to sail in almost a single line; when the wind became less violent they endeavoured to make the harbour of Corycus, which lies beyond Cissus.