THIRD CONFLICT OF THE TRANSCENDENTAL IDEAS.
Thesis.
Causality according to the laws of nature, is not the only causality
operating to originate the phenomena of the world. A causality of
freedom is also necessary to account fully for these phenomena.
PROOF.
Let it be supposed, that there is no other kind of causality than
that according to the laws of nature. Consequently, everything that
happens presupposes a previous condition, which it follows with
absolute certainty, in conformity with a rule. But this previous
condition must itself be something that has happened (that has
arisen in time, as it did not exist before), for, if it has always
been in existence, its consequence or effect would not thus
originate for the first time, but
would likewise have always
existed. The causality, therefore, of a cause, whereby something
happens, is itself a thing that has
happened. Now this again
presupposes, in conformity with the law of nature, a previous
condition and its causality, and this another anterior to the
former, and so on. If, then, everything happens solely in accordance
with the laws of nature, there cannot be any real first beginning of
things, but only a subaltern or comparative beginning. There cannot,
therefore, be a completeness of series on the side of the causes which
originate the one from the other. But the law of nature is that
nothing can happen without a sufficient
a priori determined cause. The
proposition therefore— if all causality is possible only in accordance
with the laws of nature— is, when stated in this unlimited and general
manner, self—contradictory. It follows that this cannot be the only
kind of causality.
From what has been said, it follows that a causality must be
admitted, by means of which something happens, without its cause being
determined according to necessary laws by some other cause
preceding. That is to say, there must exist an absolute spontaneity of
cause, which of itself originates a series of phenomena which proceeds
according to natural laws— consequently transcendental freedom,
without which even in the course of nature the succession of phenomena
on the side of causes is never complete.
Antithesis.
There is no such thing as freedom, but everything in the world
happens solely according to the laws of nature.
PROOF.
Granted, that there does exist freedom in the transcendental
sense, as a peculiar kind of causality, operating to produce events in
the world— a faculty, that is to say, of originating a state, and
consequently a series of consequences from that state. In this case,
not only the series originated by this spontaneity, but the
determination of this spontaneity itself to the production of the
series, that is to say, the causality itself must have an absolute
commencement, such that nothing can precede to determine this action
according to unvarying laws. But every beginning of action
presupposes
in the acting cause a state of inaction; and a dynamically primal
beginning of action presupposes a state, which has no connection— as
regards causality— with the preceding state of the cause— which does
not, that is, in any wise result from it. Transcendental freedom is
therefore opposed to the natural law of cause and effect, and such a
conjunction of successive states in effective causes is destructive of
the possibility of unity in experience and for that reason not to be
found in experience— is consequently a mere fiction of thought.
We have, therefore, nothing but nature to which we must look for
connection and order in cosmical events. Freedom— independence of
the laws of nature— is certainly a deliverance from restraint, but
it is also a relinquishing of the guidance of law and rule. For it
cannot be alleged that, instead of the laws of nature, laws of freedom
may be introduced into the causality of the course of nature. For,
if freedom were determined according to laws, it would be no longer
freedom, but merely nature. Nature, therefore, and transcendental
freedom are distinguishable as conformity to law and lawlessness.
The former
imposes upon understanding the difficulty of seeking the
origin of events ever higher and higher in the series of causes,
inasmuch as causality is always conditioned thereby; while it
compensates this labour by the guarantee of a unity complete and in
conformity with law. The latter, on the contrary, holds out to the
understanding the promise of a point of rest in the chain of causes,
by conducting it to an unconditioned causality, which professes to
have the power of spontaneous origination, but which, in its own utter
blindness, deprives it of the guidance of rules, by which alone a
completely connected experience is possible.