OBSERVATIONS ON THE SECOND ANTINOMY.
On the Thesis.
When I speak of a whole, which necessarily consists of simple parts,
I understand thereby only a substantial whole, as the true
composite; that is to say, I understand that contingent unity of the
manifold which is given as perfectly isolated (at least in thought),
placed in reciprocal connection, and thus constituted a unity. Space
ought not to be called a compositum but a totum, for its parts are
possible in the whole, and not the whole by means of the parts. It
might perhaps be called a compositum ideale, but not a compositum
reale. But this is of no importance. As space is not a composite of
substances (and not even of real accidents), if I abstract all
composition therein— nothing, not even a point, remains; for a point
is possible only as the limit of a space— consequently of a composite.
Space and time, therefore, do
not consist of simple parts. That
which belongs only to the condition or state of a substance, even
although it possesses a quantity (motion or change, for example),
likewise does not consist of simple parts. That is to say, a certain
degree of change does not originate from the addition of many simple
changes. Our inference of the simple from the composite is valid
only of self—subsisting things. But the accidents of a state are not
self—subsistent. The proof, then, for the necessity of the simple,
as the component part of all that is substantial and composite, may
prove a failure, and the whole case of this thesis be lost, if we
carry the proposition too far, and wish to make it valid of everything
that is composite without distinction— as indeed has really now and
then happened. Besides, I am here speaking only of the simple, in so
far as it is necessarily given in the composite— the latter being
capable of solution into the former as its component parts. The proper
signification of the word
monas (as employed by Leibnitz) ought to
relate to the simple, given
immediately as simple substance (for
example, in consciousness), and not as an element of the
composite. As
an clement, the term
atomus* would be more appropriate. And as I wish
to prove the existence of simple substances, only in relation to,
and as the elements of, the composite, I might term the antithesis
of the second Antinomy, transcendental
Atomistic. But as this word has
long been employed to designate a particular theory of corporeal
phenomena (
moleculæ), and thus presupposes a basis of empirical
conceptions, I prefer calling it the dialectical principle of
Monadology.
[*]
A masculine formed by Kant, instead of the common neuter atomon, which is generally
tranlated in the scholastic philosophy by the terms inseparabile, indiscernible, simplex. Kant
wished to have a term opposed to monas, and so hit upon this ... With Democritus ..., and with Cicero
atomus is feminine. — Note by Rosenkranz.
On the Antithesis.
Against the assertion of the infinite subdivisibility of matter
whose ground of proof is purely mathematical, objections have been
alleged by the Monadists. These objections lay themselves open, at
first sight, to suspicion, from the fact that they do not recognize
the clearest mathematical proofs as propositions relating to the
constitution of space, in so far as it is really the formal
condition of the possibility of all matter, but regard them merely
as inferences from abstract but arbitrary conceptions, which cannot
have any application to real things. just as if it were possible to
imagine another mode of intuition than that given in the primitive
intuition of space; and just as if its a priori determinations did not
apply to everything, the existence of which is possible, from the fact
alone of its filling space. If we listen to them, we shall find
ourselves required to cogitate, in addition to the mathematical point,
which is simple— not, however, a part, but a mere limit of space—
physical points, which are indeed likewise simple, but possess the
peculiar property, as parts of space, of filling it merely by their
aggregation. I shall not repeat here the common and clear
refutations of this absurdity, which are to be found everywhere in
numbers: every one knows that it is impossible to undermine the
evidence of mathematics by mere discursive conceptions; I shall only
remark that, if in this case philosophy endeavours to gain an
advantage over mathematics by sophistical artifices, it is because
it forgets that the discussion relates solely to
phenomena and their
conditions. It is not sufficient to find the conception of the
simple for the pure
conception of the composite, but we must
discover for the
intuition of the composite (matter), the intuition of
the simple. Now this, according to the laws of sensibility, and
consequently in the case of objects of sense, is utterly impossible.
In the case of a whole composed of substances, which is cogitated
solely by the pure understanding, it may be necessary to be
in
possession of the simple before composition is possible. But this does
not hold good of the
Totum substantiale phænomenon, which, as an
empirical intuition in space, possesses the necessary property of
containing no simple part, for the very reason that no part of space
is simple. Meanwhile, the Monadists have been subtle enough to
escape from this difficulty, by presupposing intuition and the
dynamical relation of substances as the condition of the possibility
of space, instead of regarding space as the condition of the
possibility of the objects of external intuition, that is, of
bodies. Now we have a conception of bodies only as phenomena, and,
as such, they necessarily presuppose space as the condition of all
external phenomena. The evasion is therefore in vain; as, indeed, we
have sufficiently shown in our Aesthetic. If bodies were
things in
themselves, the proof of the Monadists would be unexceptionable.
The second dialectical assertion possesses the peculiarity of having
opposed to it a dogmatical proposition, which, among all such
sophistical statements, is the only one that undertakes to prove in
the case of an object of experience,
that which is properly a
transcendental idea— the absolute simplicity of substance. The
proposition is that the object of the internal sense, the thinking
Ego, is an absolute simple substance. Without at present entering upon
this subject— as it has been considered at length in a former chapter—
I shall merely remark that, if something is cogitated merely as an
object, without the addition of any synthetical determination of its
intuition— as happens in the case of the bare representation,
I — it is
certain that no manifold and no composition can be perceived in such a
representation. As, moreover, the predicates whereby I cogitate this
object are merely intuitions of the internal sense, there cannot be
discovered in them anything to prove the existence of a manifold whose
parts are external to each other, and, consequently, nothing to
prove the existence of real composition. Consciousness, therefore,
is so constituted that, inasmuch as the thinking subject is at the
same time its own object, it cannot divide itself— although it can
divide its inhering determinations. For every object in relation to
itself is absolute unity. Nevertheless, if the subject is regarded
externally, as an object of intuition, it must, in its character of
phenomenon, possess the property of composition. And it must always be
regarded in this manner, if we wish to know whether there is or is not
contained in it a manifold whose parts are external to each other.
