PROOF.
Let it be supposed that a composite thing (as substance) consists of
simple parts. Inasmuch
as all external relation, consequently all
composition of substances, is possible only in space; the space,
occupied by that which is composite, must consist of the same number
of parts as is contained in the composite. But space does not
consist of simple parts, but of spaces. Therefore, every part of the
composite must occupy a space. But the absolutely primary parts of
what is composite are simple. It follows that what is simple
occupies a space. Now, as everything real that occupies a space,
contains a manifold the parts of which are external to each other, and
is consequently composite— and a real composite, not of accidents (for
these cannot exist external to each other apart from substance), but
of substances— it follows that the simple must be a substantial
composite, which is self—contradictory.
The second proposition of the antithesis— that there exists in the
world nothing that is simple— is here equivalent to the following: The
existence of the absolutely simple cannot be demonstrated from any
experience or perception either external or internal; and the
absolutely simple is a mere idea, the objective reality of which
cannot be demonstrated
in any possible experience; it is consequently,
in the exposition of phenomena, without application and object. For,
let us take for granted that an object may be found in experience
for this transcendental idea; the empirical intuition of such an
object must then be recognized to contain absolutely no manifold
with its parts external to each other, and connected into unity.
Now, as we cannot reason from the non—consciousness of such a manifold
to the impossibility of its existence in the intuition of an object,
and as the proof of this impossibility is necessary for the
establishment and proof of absolute simplicity; it follows that this
simplicity cannot be inferred from any perception whatever. As,
therefore, an absolutely simple object cannot be given in any
experience, and the world of sense must be considered as the sum total
of all possible experiences: nothing simple exists in the world.
This second proposition in the antithesis has a more extended aim
than the first. The first merely banishes the simple from the
intuition of the composite; while the second drives it entirely out of
nature. Hence we were unable to demonstrate it from the
conception
of a given object of external intuition (of the composite), but we
were obliged to prove it from the relation of a given object to a
possible experience in general.