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6.4. 5. In what Governments the Sovereign may be Judge.

Machiavel [6] attributes the loss of the liberty of Florence to the people's not judging in a body in cases of high treason against themselves, as was customary at Rome. For this purpose they had eight judges: "but the few," says Machiavel, "are corrupted by a few." I should willingly adopt the maxim of this great man. But as in those cases the political interest prevails in some measure over the civil (for it is always an inconvenience that the people should be judges in their own cause), in order to remedy this evil, the laws must provide as much as possible for the security of individuals.

With this view the Roman legislators did two things: they gave the persons accused permission to banish themselves [7] before sentence was pronounced; [8] and they ordained that the goods of those who were condemned should be sacred, to prevent their being confiscated to the people. We shall see in Book XI the other limitations that were set to the judicatory power residing in the people.

Solon knew how to prevent the abuse which the people might make of their power in criminal judgments. He ordained that the Court of Areopagus should re-examine the affair; that if they believed the party accused was unjustly acquitted [9] they should impeach him again before the people; that if they believed him unjustly condemned [10] [10] they should prevent the execution of the sentence, and make them rejudge the proceeding — an admirable law, that subjected the people to the censure of the magistracy which they most revered, and even to their own!

In affairs of this kind it is always proper to throw in some delays, especially when the party accused is under confinement; to the end that the people may grow calm and give their judgment coolly.

In despotic governments, the prince himself may be judge. But in monarchies this cannot be; the constitution by such means would be subverted, and the dependent intermediate powers annihilated; all set forms of judgment would cease; fear would take possession of the people's minds, and paleness spread itself over every countenance: the more confidence, honour, affection, and security in the subject, the more extended is the power of the monarch.

We shall give here a few more reflections on this point. In monarchies, the prince is the party that prosecutes the person accused, and causes him to be punished or acquitted. Now, were he himself to sit upon the trial, he would be both judge and party.

In this government the prince has frequently the benefit of confiscation, so that here again, by determining criminal causes, he would be both judge and party.

Further, by this method he would deprive himself of the most glorious attribute of sovereignty, namely, that of granting pardon, [11] for it would be quite ridiculous of him to make and unmake his decisions; surely he would not choose to contradict himself.

Besides, this would be confounding all ideas; it would be impossible to tell whether a man was acquitted, or received his pardon.

Louis XIII being desirous to sit in judgment upon the trial of the Duke de la Valette, [12] sent for some members of the parliament and of the privy council, to debate the matter; upon their being ordered by the king to give their opinion concerning the warrant for his arrest, the president, De Believre, said "that he found it very strange that a prince should pass sentence upon a subject; that kings had reserved to themselves the power of pardoning, and left that of condemning to their officers; that his majesty wanted to see before him at the bar a person who, by his decision, was to be hurried away into the other world! That the prince's countenance should inspire with hopes, and not confound with fears; that his presence alone removed ecclesiastic censures; and that subjects ought not to go away dissatisfied from the sovereign." When sentence was passed, the same magistrate declared, "This is an unprecedented judgment to see, contrary to the example of past ages — a king of France, in the quality of a judge, condemning a gentleman to death." [13]

Again, sentences passed by the prince would be an inexhaustible source of injustice and abuse; the courtiers by their importunity would always be able to extort his decisions. Some Roman emperors were so mad as to sit as judges themselves; the consequence was that no reigns ever so surprised the world with oppression and injustice.

"Claudius," says Tacitus, [14] "having appropriated to himself the determination of lawsuits, and the function of magistrates, gave occasion to all manner of rapine." But Nero, upon coming to the empire after Claudius, endeavoured to conciliate the minds of the people by declaring "that he would take care not to be judge himself in private causes, that the parties might not be exposed within the walls of a palace to the iniquitous influence of a few freedmen." [15]

"Under the reign of Arcadius," says Zozimus, [16] "a swarm of calumniators spread themselves on every side, and infested the court. Upon a person's decease, it was immediately supposed he had left no children; [17] and, in consequence of this, his property was given away by a rescript. For as the prince was surprisingly stupid, and the empress excessively enterprising, she was a slave to the insatiable avarice of her domestics and confidants; insomuch that to an honest man nothing could be more desirable than death."

"Formerly," says Procopius [18] "there used to be very few people at court; but in Justinian's reign, as the judges had no longer the liberty of administering justice, their tribunals were deserted, while the prince's palace resounded with the litigious clamours of the several parties." Everybody knows what a prostitution there was of public judgments, and even of the very laws themselves, at that emperor's court.

The laws are the eye of the prince; by them he sees what would otherwise escape his observation. Should he attempt the function of a judge, he would not then labour for himself, but for impostors, whose aim is to deceive him.

Footnotes

[6]

"Discourse on the First Decade of Livy," Book i., 7.

[7]

This is well explained in Cicero's oration "Pro Cæcina," towards the end, 100.

[8]

This was the law at Athens, as appears by Demosthenes. Socrates refused to make use of it.

[9]

Demosthenes, "De Corona," p. 494, Frankfort, 1604.

[10]

See Philostratus, "Lives of the Sophists," Book i., "Life of Æschines."

[11]

Plato does not think it right that kings, who, as he says, are priests, should preside at trials where people are condemned to death, to exile, or to imprisonment.

[12]

See the account of the trial of the Duke de la Valette. It is printed in the "Memoirs of Montresor," tome ii, p. 62.

[13]

It was afterwards revoked. See the same account, ii. p. 236. It was ordinarily a right of the peerage that a peer criminally accused should be judged by the king, as Francis II in the trial of the Prince of Cond, and Charles VII in the case of the Duc d'Alenon. To-day, the presence of the king at the trial of a peer, in order to condemn him would seem an act of tyranny. — Voltaire.

[14]

Annals, xi. 5.

[15]

Ibid., xiii. 4.

[16]

"Histories," v.

[17]

The same disorder happened under Theodosius the younger.

[18]

"Secret History."