University of Virginia Library

FORT FISHER.

This work, situated at the mouth of Cape Fear river, was the
key to the defenses of the Port of Wilmington. There were other
works auxiliary to it on both sides of the river, but they were
secondary in their nature; and with the enemy in possession of
Fort Fisher, backed by his large naval force, Wilmington was
no longer a port of either entry or departure for the Confederates.

The Cape Fear, flowing southeasterly, enters the sea at a very
acute angle, leaving between itself and the sea but a narrow strip
of land for several miles before its debouchment; and this slip
finally narrows to a point. The main channel turns around this
point on entering the sea and leads northward for two or three
miles up the ocean front of this peninsular before an outgoing
vessel can depart from, or one incoming can approach the coast.
The usual bar lying off the mouth of our river-made Southern
harbors is the cause.

About a mile from the extremity of the peninsular, where it
was quite narrow, was placed Fort Fisher, looking seaward and
with its back on the river. Its trace was in general terms a redan,
with one long face and one short face, meeting at a right angle.
The long face conformed to the ocean front; and a detached work,
Battery Buchanan, continued the defensive arrangements southward
toward the point of the peninsular. The short face ran
back to the river, and looked northward with a view to land
attack. The line of interior crest of Fort Fisher was over a
thousand yards—Pollard says 1,780 yards. The sally port on the
northern or land face was upon the river bank, and was strangely
weak. As remembered by the writer, it was a simple palisade and
gate with no ditch in its front, and something like a causeway
along the river bank leading up to it. The work elsewhere had a
deep and wide ditch, except just on the seabeach. Along the land
face and extending to the beach were palisades. Its parapet and
traverses, which were numerous, were of extraordinary strength.

It had the greatest profile, and was altogether perhaps the most
elaborate work built by the Confederates on the coast. On the
northern front, upon which only a land attack was probable, the
fort had an armament of nineteen guns. The balance of its armament
was for naval encounter, and of the best the Confederate
arsenals could furnish. The defects of the work were its sally
port and the want of sufficient flanking arrangements for sweeping
the ditch with fire.

The garrison of heavy artillerists showed well in drill and
dress; had lived high and fought little during the war; and had
not been benefited by the contact with blockade running speculations
which their position and duties had brought about.

The Federal expedition in December against this work had
been under command of General B. F. Butler and Admiral
Porter. Grant had intended, it appears, another leader, General
Weitzel, for the land forces, but as the troops for the expedition
were drawn from Butler's "army of the James," and Wilmington
was also in the limits of his department, this enterprising warrior
had managed to foist himself into it when by virtue of his commission
he assumed command. The effort to take the fort was
embodied in a heavy bombardment of two days (intermitting at
night) by the navy, when Admiral Porter pronounced the work
reduced and desired the land forces previously debarked to go in
and take possession. Butler declined, and for once was probably
right, notwithstanding the ridicule that has since been heaped
upon him in this connection. The bombardment had been heavy
but diffuse, and the defensive strength of the work was substantially
intact. There had been but seven guns rendered unserviceable
in the whole fort, two by navy fire and five by their own
imperfections. Had the garrison made but the most commonplace
defense, the assault would have been a bloody failure. Butler's
Federal critics, however, claimed that there would have been little
or no resistance by the garrison of nine hundred men holding the
work, that they were demoralized by the bombardment and cowering
in the bomb-proofs. Certain it is that his skirmishers had
been pushed to within 150 yards of the ditch, not only without
drawing the fire of the fort, but without developing to view a
defender on the walls. Indeed, one individual had even gone into
the ditch and brought off a garrison flag which had fallen from

the rampart, without being molested or apparently observed. Be
it as it may, as to the morale of the garrison, Butler's refusal to
assail terminated the expedition. The force composing it retired
to Beaufort Harbor in North Carolina, where the land troops
were debarked and appeared to await orders.

On the 4th January, General Hagood went upon a twenty-day
leave to his home in South Carolina, leaving his brigade under
command of Colonel Graham, encamped with the division upon
the plank road some three miles east of Wilmington. On his
return, on the 25th January, he found his brigade detached from
the division and at Fort Anderson, fifteen miles below the town,
on the right bank of the Cape Fear. During this time Grant had
relieved Butler and sent General Terry to command the land
troops of the expeditionary force at Beaufort, giving him the
addition of a brigade of infantry and a siege train. This raised
the force to about 8,000 men. An immediate renewal of the
attempt against Fort Fisher was ordered.

On the 12th of January, a Mr. McMillan, near Topsail Sound,
was said to have discovered the approach of the flotilla and
sought to communicate the fact to General Bragg by telegraph.
The operator was not in condition to send the dispatch. It had,
therefore, to be forwarded by courier. In two hours after it was
received General Hoke with his division was on the march to
confront the enemy upon his landing. On the next day, the 13th,
the enemy landed upon the narrow spit between the head of
Masonboro Sound and the sea, near Battery Gatlin, nine miles
above Fort Fisher. This he was enabled to do under cover of his
fleet, which could here lie very close in shore; an assault upon his
first position was difficult. Hoke deemed it very injudicious to
attack and contented himself with taking up a line parallel to
the beach under cover of the sand hills and scrub forest, with a
view to giving battle upon any attempt of the enemy to advance.
A regiment of cavalry prolonged his right flank, and watched
the space thence to the beach at a point intermediate between the
landing and Fort Fisher. During the night the enemy passed
between or around the cavalry, without their observing it, and
when day broke Hoke discovered them on his right flank securely
entrenched from the ocean beach to the river and facing Wilmington.
He took position in the lines previously prepared from

Sugar Loaf to the head of Masonboro Sound. Bragg now
ordered Hoke to assail the enemy's newly entrenched line. Hoke
reconnoitered it in person and, deeming it unadvisable, requested
Bragg himself to examine the present condition of affairs on his
front. This General Bragg proceeded to do, and the result was
to countermand the order of assault and the determination to
re-enforce the fort, accepting practically the condition that it
must stand or fall upon its own resources.

Accordingly, in the afternoon of the same day (the 14th),
Colonel Graham was directed to move to Gander Hall landing on
the river with four regiments of Hagood's brigade and to proceed
that night by steamer to Battery Buchanan, whence they were to
be thrown into Fort Fisher. Graham marched with the Eleventh,
Twenty-first and Twenty-fifth regiments, and the Seventh battalion.
The Twenty-seventh regiment remaining, reported temporarily
with Kirkland's brigade. He made a report to General
Hagood upon the resumption of command by the latter, from
which the following is extracted: "Shortly after arriving at
Gander Hall, I received a dispatch from Colonel Anderson
(Bragg's A. A. G.), directing me to embark my men on the
`Sampson' and `Harlee' steamers, which had not as yet arrived at
Gander Hall. At 7 p. m. I received another dispatch from
Colonel Anderson, that the `Sampson' would be at Gander Hall
at 7:30, and that I must use her as a lighter to load and unload
the `Harlee,' as the latter drew too much water to approach either
Gander Hall or Battery Buchanan. The `Sampson' got to Gander
Hall an hour later (8:30 p. m.) and was immediately loaded with
troops, but got aground and did not get off till 9:30 p. m. She
proceeded to the `Harlee' with the Twenty-fifth regiment.
Another steamer, the `Pettiway,' now arrived, was loaded, got
aground, and remained so. Upon the return of the `Sampson,' I
transferred part of the troops from the `Pettiway' to her, and
both boats proceeded to the `Harlee'; found the `Harlee' aground;
tried to pull her off with the other two boats, and failed. I then
had the troops on the `Harlee' transferred to the `Pettiway,' and
ordered her and the `Sampson' to proceed at once to Battery
Buchanan. The `Sampson' left at once with the Twenty-first
regiment; but the captain of the `Pettiway' said he had not wood
enough to take her there. I directed him to take wood from the

`Harlee,' and by the time he got it aboard the `Pettiway' was also
aground, and I was informed by her captain that she would not
float again before eight o'clock next morning. . . . At 2:30
a. m., the `Sampson' returned from Battery Buchanan, having
landed the Twenty-first regiment,[35] and I again dispatched her to
the same point with the Twenty-fifth regiment under Captain
Carson. . . ."

Having reported the facts by telegraph, Graham was directed
to get the remainder of his men to Battery Buchanan as soon
next day as the tide would float his transports, and land if the
enemy's fire would permit, if not, to wait till night. He made
the effort, was driven off, and crossed to Smithville as the nearest
point from which to start at nightfall. Having notified General
Bragg of his arrival at Smithville, he was directed to retain his
command at that point.

This closed the effort to re-enforce Fort Fisher, but the garrison,
with the addition of Hagood's two regiments, about 2,300
strong, was abundantly large for defense, and further transfer
of troops was only necessary when those already there would need
relief from arduous service. The facilities which the locality
gave for this were probably about the same as those had for
communication with Morris Island during the siege of Charleston.

Carson had landed at Battery Buchanan about sunrise on the
15th with the Twenty-fifth regiment and had to throw his men
into Fisher under a heavy naval fire.

The bombardment which had commenced in the afternoon of
the 13th, after the landing had been effected, was continuously
kept up—heavily by day, and slower at night. It was somewhat
heavier than the first bombardment. Admiral Porter, before the
committee of the Federal Congress on the conduct of the war,
seems to say, as well as his loose and bombastic statements can
be reconciled (Fort Fisher Expedition, pp. 100 and 191), that in
the first bombardment the navy expended 45,000 rounds of
ammunition, and in the second 50,000 rounds. The naval fire
(there were no batteries established on land) was directed chiefly
upon the land face, and Brigadier-General Comstock of Grant's
staff, who accompanied the expedition, speaking from personal
inspection, said before the same committee that at the close of

the bombardment, "so far as the earthwork was concerned, it was
just as efficient as before a shot was fired." And in reference to
the armament, the same officer stated that six guns and three
mortars remained serviceable on the land face while "very few
on the sea face were injured." These results will astonish no one
who has had experience of the resisting power of earthworks and
the difficulty of dismantling embrasured and traversed guns by
long range shell fire. The power of artillery upon earthwork of
proper slopes is little more than to deface it; and when the lines
and angles of its profile are gone, and its guns disabled as they
may be by concentrated fire at close range, well sustained
musketry can and should hold it against assault. Whenever
properly constructed and with a profile approaching permanent
work, such a fort if taken, save by regular approaches, the fault
is prima facie and almost certainly with the garrison or commander.
Such has been the teaching of experience since the days
of Vauban, and the lessons of this war confirm it. The bombproof
is a protection complete for the bulk of the garrison against
the preliminary bombardment; a sufficient number can find
shelter on the lines behind parapet and traverse to act as sentries
and guard against sudden assault; and with an entrenched picket
line two hundred yards in front (each pair of men in a detached
circular pit no larger than will contain them), to keep the enemy
from massing for assault too close to the work and to give warning
of an advance, an assault can never succeed while the garrison
retain heart of grace. When by regular approaches the besieger
can mass in safety for assault, in point of time nearer to the crest
of the parapet than on the besieged in the bomb-proofs, then the
conditions are changed.

Admiral Porter, whose dispatches are in the "furioso" vein,
asserted that he had "reduced the fort to a pulp and every gun
was so injured or covered with dirt that they would not work."
This is on a par with his assertion that had the 400 marines
whom he sent to cover a "boarding party" of sailors in the subsequent
assault, by deploying in front of the sea face and opening
fire, `performed their duty,' every one of the rebels would have
been killed."[36]

At 3 p. m., on the 15th, the assault was given. The garrison,
cowering in their bomb-proofs from the naval fire, had permitted
the enemy to approach the work very nearly. A force of sailors
and marines, 2,000 strong, were massed close upon the sea face,
and three brigades of infantry had obtained similar position on
the land face. Upon the signal given the fleet changed its fire
to other parts of the work, and the storming columns advanced.
The garrison hastily and imperfectly manned the parapet. The
first advance of the infantry was feeble, and apparently they
recoiled. The sailors rushed on boldly and were bloodily and completely
repulsed in fifteen minutes from first to last—they taking
no further part in the fighting. Here the old Confederate shout
of victory was being lustily given by the two regiments of
Hagood's brigade[37] and other troops manning the sea face, when
a fire in their rear called their attention to the land face. The
enemy were in the fort. A detachment of the infantry column of
assault rushing upon the sally port at which four uninjured field
pieces remained for defense, the portion of the garrison at that
point commanded by one Captain Brady, of a North Carolina
regiment, cravenly surrendered without firing gun or musket.[38]
The enemy poured in, and thenceforward on the part of the Confederates
the fight was against overpowering odds with the
advantage of their defensive works gone. The majority of the
garrison did their duty well, and undoubtedly made as stubborn
a defence as was possible under the circumstances. It was, however,
more a vindication of personal pluck and character than an
organized resistance. The enemy slowly won his way from gun
chamber to gun chamber, the fleet firing ahead of them, and at
10 o'clock at night, after seven hours of fighting, re-enforcements
brought from the lines facing Wilmington completed the work
in the capture of the fort and garrison.[39]

The enemy's loss in killed and wounded exceeded a thousand;
the Confederate was some 400.

The advance of the assailing columns was witnessed from
Sugar Loaf on the Confederate lines. No serious demonstration
was at any time during the assault made in aid of the fort.

Such, probably, is a correct account of the fall of Fort Fisher.
It is made up from such information as could be obtained after
the event from the Confederates on the spot, from a study of the
elaborate publications of the Federals on the subject, and from
information derived since the close of the war from members of
the Twenty-first and Twenty-fifth regiments engaged.

The defence is a page in the history of the war that redounds
but little to our credit. Without the fort, there was inefficiency
and indecision, and as a result a strong supporting force did
nothing from first to last commensurate with its strength. Within
the work, at the most critical point and time, there was a
dastardly exhibition of cowardice, and there seemed to be but
little of the careful provision of command. The absence of a
picket line, in pits, upon the land front, the almost open gateway,
the insufficiency in the number of men kept out of the bombproofs
and on the lines, look like absolute military fatuity. Crimination
and recrimination was rife among the Confederates after
the disaster, but it is useless to perpetuate it here. Poor Whiting
laid down his life in atonement of any errors he may have committed
in the defence, and it is certain that in the hour of trial
he personally bore himself with knightly valor. And as for
Bragg, disaster had already so linked itself with his fortunes,
that when a few months before Mr. Davis had assigned him to
the command of this department, a Richmond paper had given
expression to the feeling of both army and people in the curt
paragraph,—"Bragg has been sent to Wilmington, good-bye
Wilmington."

Hagood's brigade suffered a loss of thirty-one officers and four
hundred and forty-four enlisted men in the fort, being all of the
Twenty-first and Twenty-fifth regiments then present for duty
with the brigade, and a few individuals from the Eleventh regiment.
But three of its officers were wounded slightly, and none
killed. It is believed that the casualties among the enlisted men
were in proportion equally few.