University of Virginia Library

THE RICHMOND LINES.

At 12 o'clock on the day after the brigade returned to the
trenches it was hastily withdrawn and dispatched to the north of
the James, Gracie's men resuming their old station.

On the 28th, Grant had captured Fort Harrison, a strong work
on the lines of Richmond near the north bank of the river. It
was feebly held by the local militia, and was easily carried by
assault. Pressing on, the enemy essayed Fort Gilmer, but this
was held by a company of regular artillery who had nerve
enough to withstand an assault, and his career was checked. The
position gained, however, seriously threatened Richmond. Fort
Harrison was an important tactical point, and some mile or two
of the "exterior line" to the north of it had been abandoned. The
divisions of Fields and Hoke were dispatched from Petersburg
to the threatened front.

Hagood followed the other brigades of his division and arrived
in the vicinity of Fort Harrison at 9 o'clock the next morning.
General Lee was on the ground, and it was evident an effort was

to be made to recover the lost work. Towards midday it was
made. Two separate storming columns of two brigades each
(probably 6,000 men in all) were sent forward from different
directions upon the fort, their assault having been preceded by a
half-hour's heavy fire from artillery. Each column had a brigade
front. They did not move in concert and were separately and
disastrously repulsed. The column from Hoke's division was
composed of the brigades of Clingman and Colquitt, and its
casualties were about 800. Fields lost not so many. The First
South Carolina regiment, now commanded by Colonel J. R.
Hagood, composed a part of the column of Fields, and greatly
distinguished itself, but lost many of its best officers and men.
Our brigade was not engaged.

The Confederate commander now gave his attention to cutting
off by a re-trenchment the angle of his lines held by the enemy.
This was soon done, the work progressing under heavy artillery
and picket fire, but the enemy not attempting to interrupt it by
assault. As soon as the work was completed, the troops before
Fort Harrison were relieved by militia, and General Lee again
took the offensive.

The enemy had occupied the abandoned portion of the "exterior
line" north of Fort Harrison, and his front was thus considerably
stretched out from the river, his right resting between the
Charles City and Darby Town roads. Gary's brigade of cavalry
and the divisions of Fields and Hoke were available. Gary
moving down the Charles City road was to turn and drive in
the enemy's right flank, a small brigade of infantry and a strong
force of field artillery re-enforcing him for the occasion. Fields,
coming down the Darby Town road, was to take up the fight at
that point, and, conjointly with Gary, press the enemy upon the
river. Hoke was to follow as a reserve.

At daylight, on the 7th of October, the action commenced, Gary
attacking with vigor. Fields took it up with success, and in a
short time the enemy were driven across the Darby Town road
for a mile towards Fort Harrison, doubling up along the line of
the "exterior" works occupied by them. Fields now, in pursuance
of the plan arranged, followed them up, his right resting
on the line of works and taking that as a directrix, Gary on his
left, all outside the line of works. At this time Hoke's division

was moved from its position in the Darby Town road, where it
had rested during the fight, and filing to the right followed in
column behind the right of the advancing Confederate line,
moving parallel to the exterior line and about 200 yards inside of
them. Our advance soon encountered an entrenched line
strongly manned and being rapidly re-enforced. This line ran
back at right angles to the line of captured works, and had probably
been constructed by the enemy to protect their flank, when it
only extended thus far. It was, it will be perceived, parallel to
Fields' line of advance. Two courses were now open to the Confederates.
First, to make a direct assault, or second, to bring
Hoke before this line, and, feeling to the left with Gary and
Fields' commands, turn it. Hoke's relative position was such
that he could have replaced Fields in thirty minutes. The first
plan was adopted, the direct attack was made and repulsed with
some loss. This terminated the day's proceedings. General
Gregg, of the Texas brigade, was killed, and General Bratton, of
South Carolina, was wounded in the last assault. Both were of
the division of Fields. Colonel Haskell, of Gary's brigade, was
severely wounded earlier in the day, after having exhibited a personal
gallantry that attracted much commendation. Nine pieces
of artillery, 150 horses and two or three hundred prisoners were
captured. The enemy's loss in killed and wounded are unknown.
Our casualties of all kinds were about 200. Though the reserve
was not engaged, its advance attracted artillery fire, and there
were eleven casualties from shells in Hagood's brigade. The full
measure of success contemplated was not realized, and at nightfall
the ground regained was once more abandoned. Why General
Lee did not put in his reserve is not known. The position in
which Hoke was held during the fight, it will be perceived, interposed
him between the enemy and Richmond, then open to a
coup de main. Possibly it was deemed important to maintain
him in it. More probably the chances of success were not deemed
sufficient to warrant the shattering of the whole disposable force
for the defence of this front of Richmond.

For most of the foregoing details of the place and conduct of
this action, the writer is indebted to a conversation with General
Gary, since the war. From his own position with the reserve he
saw very little of it. An impression prevailed to some extent

among Fields's subordinate officers that Hoke was derelict in not
joining in the final assault. In Colonel J. R. Hagood's Memoirs
of the First South Carolina Regiment, these impressions are
expressed. The writer never talked with Hoke on the subject,
for he gave no heed to the matter though he heard rumors of it
at the time. General Lee was, however, present with the reserve
during most of the day, and just before and during the last
assault he was with us. This settles the fact that the part borne
by Hoke was under the immediate direction of the commander-in-chief.

In the evening, General Lee withdrew from the field and took
up position behind Cornelius Creek; covering the New Market
and Darby Town roads. Three days afterwards (10th October),
he advanced his line without opposition some 400 yards and commenced
another re-trenchment, cutting off the portion of the
"exterior line," now finally abandoned. It ran from Fort Gilmer
northeasterly in nearly a straight line till it ran into the "exterior
line" near the Charles City road.

On the 13th, the enemy advanced, skirmished along the whole
line, and attacked on the Darby Town road. He was repelled
with a loss estimated at 1,200; ours inconsiderable.

Again, on the 27th, he advanced at daylight, skirmished along
our whole line as before, but this time also making partial
assaults. About noon he attacked heavily on the Charles City
road, and was repulsed with a loss of 2,000 men, of whom 500
were prisoners. In both these actions, our incomplete entrenchments
were defended by a single rank deployed at intervals of
three to six feet, and no reserves. The troops manning the lines
shifted along them as the movements of the enemy required, now
closing up to repel an assault, now deploying to fill a gap, and
sometimes leaving long stretches undefended except by field guns
in battery.

On both days, too, the enemy attacked our extreme right below
Petersburg, meeting with no success. In these affairs our brigade
suffered some twenty-five or thirty casualties.

The completion of the re-trenchment was now rapidly pushed.
The plan was small redans for field guns, 300 yards apart, with
straight curtains for infantry. The parapet of curtains had a
uniform base of 20 degrees; superior slope 12 degrees; height of

interior crest 7 degrees, with a banquette; and the ditch was
exterior. Where forests occurred, they were cut down for from
five or six hundred yards in front, and abattis and palisades were
built all along the main line some sixty yards in front. A picket
line was entrenched three hundred yards in front, with small
detached works V-shaped and 36 yards apart, The point of the
V was toward the enemy; its splay about 6 feet, length of face
10 feet, height of interior crest 6 feet with banquette—all above
ground. A chain of videttes was established 100 yards in front
of picket line; they were not entrenched. As winter advanced
fires were allowed on the picket line. They were built a little in
rear of it[34] and between the detached works.

During this period, the hostile videttes were in view of each
other at distances of from two to three hundred yards. There
was, however, no picket or artillery fire; and the progress of our
work was not interrupted except, as narrated, on the 13th and
27th of October.

An ingenious arrangement of the barbette platforms in the
redans was adopted by which the advantages of this style of platform
was retained and one of its disadvantages (exposure of
the gunners) avoided. A little ditch two and a half feet wide,
with recesses (C) for ammunition chests, was allowed around the
interior slope; in it the gunners stood, and from it mostly worked
the piece. The pieces were kept by a hurter from toppling
into the ditch, when run "into battery," and the platform was
extended back, as at D. E. to give a fire along the rear of the
curtain should a lodgment be effected. Pine pole revetments were
used both here and on the infantry curtains.

Winter quarters were also constructed. A continuous line of
comfortable pine pole cabins, with clay chimneys, for the rank
and file, ran behind the works, leaving a broad street or place of
arms between it and the entrenchments.

The regimental officers had their cabins, each in the relative
place of its occupant in line of battle, and the general officers had
their's further in rear.

The fine bracing weather and cheerful labor and strict military
observances, neglected through the more stirring parts of the

campaign, had a fine effect upon the health and spirits of the
men. To this end, the return of the sick and wounded to duty
and the easy success of the last two encounters contributed. The
morale of the troops was excellent.

In Hagood's brigade, Colonel Graham (wounded at Walthal
Junction) returning from invalided leave, resumed command of
the Twenty-first. Gantt, absent on sick-leave during our service
at Petersburg, was now in command of the Eleventh, Colonel
Gaillard had been invalided. Shortly after the 21st of August,
one of his field officers was in the hands of the enemy, and the
other had been absent on wounded leave since Drury's Bluff; so
the Twenty-seventh was in charge of one of its line officers, Captain
Simons. Colonel Rion was at the head of the Seventh, and
Captain Carson, wounded at Swift Creek, had returned to duty
and commanded the Twenty-fifth. Colonel Simonton was taken
sick shortly after joining his regiment at Cold Harbor, and, on
his recovery, had obtained a detachment for post service in North
Carolina. Pressly's and Glover's places had not been filled from
the fact that a captain, senior to Carson, was in the hands of the
enemy.

On the staff, Lieutenant Moffett had, in recognition of his valuable
services, been promoted brigade aid-de-camp in place of
Moloney; and Orderly Ryan, returning to duty from a wound,
received in the trenches at Petersburg, was elected to a vacant
lieutenancy in the Eleventh regiment. Captain Stoney was still
absent with his wound, and his duties were, since Moffett's promotion,
discharged by Lieutenant Mazyck in addition to his own
as ordnance officer. Mazyck had throughout the campaign discharged
his appropriate duties with great fidelity; and had
repeatedly served in action as aide when circumstances permitted
his absence from ordnance duties. He was a very gallant and
meritorious officer.

The weather continued delightful up to the 1st of November,
and the vicinity of Richmond and the comparative quiet in our
front permitted the limited enjoyment of the society of the capital
to the divisions north of the James. The officers of Hoke's
division received upon two occasions a large and distinguished
party of ladies. A farm house, not too near the lines, would be
obtained and cleared for dancing; the walls tastefully draped

with flags and garnished with arms; the Eutaw band, of
Hagood's brigade (the best at that time in the army), be detailed
for attendance, and ambulances dispatched for the guests. This
would be the contribution on the part of the military. At an
early hour, in the forenoon, the ladies would arrive, bringing
not only themselves but the edibles of the feast, and immediately
take charge of the festivities. A ride along the lines, when the
troops were at dress parade, would complete the day. The ladies
were not only of the old residents of Richmond, but were also
from other States of the South—of the families of the civil and
military officers of the government drawn thither by the war.
It was a charming circle; refined, intelligent and accomplished,
and the times had added to it the least dash in the world of the
freedom of the bivouac. They were admirable specimens of high
bred Southern women, as the war developed them. Devoted heart
and soul to the cause, they were ready at any time to cheer their
champions in battle with brave words, or tend the sick and
wounded with gentle ministrations. Anything that wore the grey
was ennobled in their eyes, and its welfare the subject of their
prayers. They carried the refinement and delicacy of the lady
into the self-imposed duties of the sick-nurse, regardless whether
it was general officer or the humblest soldier who was the recipient
of their kindness; and enduring their own privations bravely—
banishment from home, the loss of fortune, the death of kindred
—they were the first to brighten in the intervals of good forune,
and the last to despair under the pressure of adversity.

During November the weather was good and bad by turns—
rain, snow, and fair alternated; but the roads remained entirely
practicable for military purposes. The war, however, flagged
around Richmond. The armies of Lee and Grant having
thoroughly tested each other's strength in the many desperate
combats of the campaign, stood warily watching each other, until
events transpiring elsewhere should bring new conditions into
the next collision between them. The fate of Richmond was in
fact being decided on other fields. This campaign had shown
clearly that it was impregnable to direct attack. There was but
little hope in renewed assault. Siege operations promised but
little more, because of the distance of the defenses from the body
of the plan. With such facility for retrenchment, the task would

be endless. But the place had never been invested; and in its
condition, with regard to supplies, an investment would certainly
determine its fall.

Accordingly, after the failure of the Petersburg mine, there
was no further evidence of regular approaches by the enemy; but
all his efforts seemed to be given to effecting a practical investment.
His success on the Weldon road was in that direction, but
there he was stopped. The movements and operations, narrated
north of the James, were secondary to attempts made at the same
time to extend his left around our right below Petersburg. They
were demonstrations to cover determined efforts against the
western roads into Richmond. Lee had firmly thrust him back,
and now on investment the relative proportion of Lee's and
Grant's armies remaining the same, was as clearly a futile hope
as assault or siege approaches.

It was at a greater distance from Richmond that its sources of
supply must be cut. While Grant held Lee at bay, co-operative
columns, if at all, must do the work.

The Valley Army, under General Early, after a varied experience
of invasion and retreat, victory and disaster, had accomplished
its main purpose of keeping the co-operative column
of the enemy operating from that direction off of these same
western roads. It was, however, badly shattered in discipline and
efficiency, and now a part of it was drawn to the lines before
Richmond, while its adversary was largely transferred to the
ranks of Grant. The seasons precluded further decisive effort
upon the scene of their summer operations.

In the southwestern portion of the military horizon, however,
a cloud was gathering ominous of the fate of Richmond, and of
the Confederacy. Hood had been dispatched into Tennessee, and
by carrying the war into Africa was to recall Hannibal from
Italy, but instead Hannibal had marched for Rome. While Hood
was going northward to meet at a disadvantage forces equal to
his own, Sherman cutting loose from his base at Atlanta had
marched unopposed upon the vitals of the Confederacy. The
terrible results which were to follow this ill-advised strategy of
Mr. Davis had not, however, yet developed themselves, and on
the lines before Richmond to Lee's army, erect and defiant, there

appeared no reason why the war should not last another four
years.

On the 9th December, it turned very cold and the ground
remained frozen hard all day; in the afternoon it commenced
sleeting, and at 9 o'clock at night, while the storm was still in
progress, we received orders to be ready to move at daylight, in
light marching order. Accordingly, on the 10th, the divisions of
Fields and Hoke, under Longstreet, marched upon a reconnaisance
around the enemy's right flank. We moved around it
for nearly four miles with a strong line of flankers, between
whom and the enemy there was some skirmishing. It was very
cold and the roads abominable with frozen slush. The men, notwithstanding,
stood it well, and at night we returned to our
quarters. Longstreet was probably eleven thousand strong,
including artillery and some cavalry. The object of the reconnaisance
did not transpire.

The weather continued bad, and on the 20th at dark we were
again ordered to prepare to move in heavy marching order and
with three days' rations. At 3:30 a. m., on the 21st, the brigade
started for Richmond. Kirkland's brigade had preceded it, the
other brigades of the division followed. The roads were very
muddy, and it was raining and freezing as it fell. We reached
Richmond at 7 o'clock, crossed the river, and at 11 a. m. took the
cars for Danville.

Profound secrecy as to our destination had been observed, even
brigade commanders had no intimation of it, but when the order
of preparation had been extended on the 20th, the impression in
the command became general that we were destined for the South
to meet Sherman, and every man from the sick list that could
move returned to duty, many utterly unfit to march or even
travel. The troops were saturated with the freezing rain on the
march to Richmond, and they were loaded on freight cars without
seats or fires—the men so crowded as to preclude individual
motion. The rain began to be accompanied by a high wind, and
lying motionless in their wet garments, the men were whistled
along on the train the balance of the day and all night. At daylight
we arrived at Danville. The suffering was intense. One
poor fellow, of the Seventh battalion, was found dead from the
exposure, and a dozen others had to be borne from the cars to

the wayside hospital. General Hagood had obtained in Richmond
a half-barrel of apple brandy for the brigade and caused
it to be here issued to the men. It gave the poor fellows about one
good drink apiece, and helped to thaw their half-frozen frames.
This was the second spirit ration that had been issued to the
brigade in Virginia. We had, however, during our whole connection
with Lee's army, a regular ration of genuine coffee, a luxury
that we had been strangers to for two years previous. We were
detained some hours in Danville for want of transportation, and
it was late in the day, the 22nd, before the brigade began to go
forward over the Piedmont road. The distance to Greensboro
was but forty-eight miles, and it was not until the morning of the
26th that the whole brigade was transported over it, three and a
half days to go 48 miles by rail! The road and its rolling stock
were evidently in bad condition, but the delays were so frivolous,
and the accidents so numerous that General Hagood suspected
treachery and finally got on by seizing engines and taking the
trains in his own charge. It is hard to say whether there was
design or only criminal mismanagement in the delay.

The Confederate Congress had adjourned a day or two before,
and at Danville a party of congressmen, consisting of Senators
Orr, of South Carolina, Johnson, of Georgia, a senator from
Mississippi and another (Leach, of North Carolina,) presented
to General Hagood an order from the Secretary at War addressed
to any officer using a railroad for troops to give these gentlemen
transportation homeward. They were welcomed to the "headquarters
car," and for three days enjoyed its comforts. It was
an ordinary freight boxcar, and in it was carried the staff horses,
the baggage of the staff, the staff themselves, and their guests.
From their conversation, it was evident that they were not
entitled to the thanks voted by the Roman Senate to the Consul
returning from Cannae, that he "had not despaired of the
Republic under difficult circumstances." They were, in fact,
utterly demoralized. This was the first time the writer had ever
heard any one embarked in the cause, civilian or soldier, express
doubts of its ultimate success; and prophetic, perhaps patent as
they were, they now made but little impression upon him, for he
had long looked upon the Confederate congress for the most part
in the light of the post quartermaster and commissary officers,

bomb-proofs, in which prudent men evaded the hardships and
dangers of the war. He believes now, when the history of this
great struggle is fairly written, that the record of our congress
will be that they were utterly wanting in the discharge of the
high duties of their position. They had neither the courage to
control Mr. Davis in his course nor the patriotism and magnanimity
when they differed with him to cordially support him in
his devoted exertions.

On the evening of the 26th, the larger portion of the brigade
reached Wilmington and took steamer for the neighborhood of
Fort Fisher at the mouth of the river.

A day or two before we left Richmond, a fleet of war vessels,
with transports, bearing a detachment of Grant's army, under
Butler, had sailed from Hampton Roads in Virginia to attempt
the reduction of this fort which controlled the entrance into the
Port of Wilmington. It had made its effort a feeble one, and
failed before our brigade arrived. Kirkland's brigade had got
up in time to be of some service in the repulse. On the 31st
December, we were ordered back to Wilmington to lie in reserve,
and the whole division was there concentrated.

Here ended the campaign of 1864. The field return of the day
showed of the brigade:

PRESENT FOR DUTY.

         

Officers	93
Rifles	1,298
		1,391
All others present		201
			1,592

ABSENT.

                                   

Wounded and sick, officers	31
Wounded and sick, rifles	668
		699
Missing, officers	23
Missing, rifles	554
		577
Without leave, officers	15
Without leave, rifles	514
		529
With leave, officers	4
With leave, rifles	75
		79
Detached, officers	6
Detached, rifles	122
		128
In arrest, rifles		4
		2,016
Aggregate, present and absent			3,608

Aggregate in beginning of campaign, 4,246.

The battle casualties had been up to and including the 21st of August:

                     

Killed, officers	19
Killed, rifles	250
		269
Wounded, officers	74
Wounded, rifles	1,067
		1,141
Missing, officers	28
Missing, rifles	649
		677
Casualties in later affairs		35
			2,122

In examining these tables it must be borne in mind that among
those classed as "missing" were many who filled unknown graves
upon the numerous fields of the campaign just closed, and in the
table of battle casualties, the "killed" are only those who died
upon the field; among the "wounded" in this table are included
as well as those who recovered in hospital.

Among those classed as "without leave," were many who were
only technically so, sick or wounded in hospital or at home; the
papers of extension had not been received at brigade headquarters
when their invalid leaves had expired. Still, the number "without
leave" was unduly large and was ominous of that change in
popular sentiment which now began to connive at a dereliction
of duty which in the earlier years of the war was deemed by
that same sentiment as little less shameful than desertion. There
is another class also which shows too strong—the "detached."
Of course among these were individuals who may have been best
serving the country where they were. Still, detachment was so
convenient a cloak for skulking, that among the faithful soldiers
in the ranks it was considered not much more creditable than
absence without leave.

The summer work in Virginia had been to the mere soldier an
interesting and desirable experience, and the brigade had much
of which to be proud. It had borne its share in the most desperate
campaign of the war, and had won reputation where the
standard of soldierly qualities was high.

But how stood the Cause which had summoned these men from
the pursuits of civil life; for these years had claimed and received
their devoted effort—was it approaching success or tottering to
extinction?

Events culminated so rapidly in '65, that upon looking back
to this period it is difficult to realize that but little of gloomy
anticipation clouded the close of '64 in the minds of those with
whom the writer was associated. Conscious of discharging their
duty, and with unwavering belief in the righteousness of their
cause, they looked with unreasoning certainty of faith to final
success. Thus, confident of ultimate triumph in the independence
of their country, whatever might become of themselves, and from
the position of the brigade at Wilmington certain that winter
would bring no intermission in its service in the field, they
regarded the situation more in its personal than in its general
aspects. Looking forward to the stern duties before them, each
hoped that he would continue to do "all that may become a man";
and reverting to the stirring events of the past; recalling the
maddening excitement of the charge, the sullen anger of defeat—
the thrilling triumph of victory, there came no feeling of gloom
or sadness, save in the recollection of the gallant dead. Moloney,
Dargan, Glover, Hopkins, Sellars, Nelson and others, comrades
loved and true, who had marched with us on that bright spring
day from the lines of Charleston, no longer filled our ranks.
Whatever fate the future might have in store for us, for them
the battle had been fought: