University of Virginia Library

"Captain: In obedience to orders from department headquarters (Beauregard's),
I respectfully report that a plan of attack upon the enemy was
settled upon on 23d June, 1864, to take place on the following morning,
which plan is fully known to the commanding general. On the night of
the 23d General Hagood was made familiar with the mode of attack
sufficiently to make the necessary arrangements. No other officer of my
command was aware of the intended advance. This precaution was taken,
fearing that by some means the enemy might learn our intentions and prepare
for us.

"In accordance with the plan, my arrangements were made which are
fully and properly given in the enclosed report of Brigadier-General
Hagood. Dividing my forces on the left of the City Point Road into two
heavy skirmish lines, one to be supported by the other, and the whole to
be supported by Brigadier-General Anderson's brigade of Fields's division,
formed in line of battle behind the hill in rear of the entrenchments then
occupied by Hagood's left. As was directed, the artillery from the batteries
on the north side of the river opened fire upon the entrenchments of
the enemy as soon as the morning mists had cleared away, and continued
its fire with great accuracy but no execution for half an hour. After the
lapse of five minutes the fire of these guns was directed upon the batteries
of the enemy, drawing in a great degree their fire from the advancing
infantry which, as far as I could see, was the only service rendered by our
guns. Indeed, I fear we were injured more than we gained by the use of
our guns, as it notified the enemy of our intended attack. My intention
was to attack immediately after our guns opened upon the enemy's batteries,
but as General Anderson had not reported, I delayed, and immediately
one of his staff officers appeared by whom General Anderson was
informed that in fifteen minutes the advance would certainly take place,
which would give him time to reach the entrenchments then occupied by
General Hagood. At the appointed time the advance was ordered, and
immediately the second line followed. The first line gallantly entered the
entrenchments of the enemy and did their duty nobly, and (as was witnessed
by General Lee himself) succeeded not only in breaking the enemy,
but drove them from their works.

"It was never expected that the entrenchments of the enemy could be
held by these two lines of skirmishers, but that they should occupy them
till the line of battle could reach them. I asked Major-General Fields, who
was on the ground, to order Anderson forward, as a moment's delay would
be fatal. He immediately sent the order, which had been previously sent,
to General Anderson to go forward. It is proper here for me to state that
this was my third effort to get General Anderson forward after my first
notice to him that `in fifteen minutes I would certainly move forward.'
Some time after General Fields's second order was sent to General Anderson,
he received a note from him saying that the entrenchments were still
occupied by General Hagood's troops. In this he was greatly mistaken, as
will be seen by General Hagood's report, and, if necessary to prove this

mistake, Colonel DuBose, commanding Benning's brigade, will corroborate
the fact that the entrenchments were then free of troops, except some
stragglers, of whom I am sure no command is exempt. Colonel DuBose
had by this time moved up in line of battle on the right of General Anderson's
position, and, after reaching the trenches, moved by a left flank down
them and occupied the position which Anderson was to have taken.

"After some time, I suppose an hour, General Fields put another brigade[26]
in the trenches on the left of the City Point Road, with a view to attack,
and seemed anxious to do so, but I advised against it, as the enemy had had
time and had made all preparation for us, and I felt assured he would
sustain a heavy loss and accomplish nothing. At this time orders were
received from General Lee for me to report to him in company with General
Fields, and, on hearing the position of affairs, he directed the attack
abandoned.

"I was much troubled at the loss of my men, who did their duty truly
and well, without results which to me appeared certain and surely ought
to have been reaped.

"It is not my desire to place blame or responsibility upon others. I fear
neither. In making the foregoing statements I merely give facts to the
best of my knowledge, and the commanding general can draw his own conclusions.
I have unofficially heard that both I and my command were
censured by the commanding general. My regret is in attempting this
attack without full command of all the forces which were to participate.
Both the plan of battle and of attack were good, but failed in the execution.
The enemy became extremely uneasy along his entire line, when
the attack was made, and, had we been successful at that point, our results
would have been such as have not heretofore been equalled. General
Hagood did everything in his power to give us success, and desired to push
forward when, in my judgment, it appeared hazardous.