26.2. 2. Of Laws divine and human.
We ought not to decide by divine laws
what should be decided by human laws; nor determine by human what should
be determined by divine laws.
These two sorts of laws differ in their origin, in their object, and
in their nature.
It is universally acknowledged, that human laws are, in their own
nature, different from those of religion; this is an important
principle: but this principle is itself subject to others, which must be
inquired into.
1. It is in the nature of human laws to be subject to all the
accidents which can happen, and to vary in proportion as the will of man
changes; on the contrary, by the nature of the laws of religion, they
are never to vary. Human laws appoint for some good; those of religion
for the best: good may have another object, because there are many kinds
of good; but the best is but one; it cannot therefore change. We may
alter laws, because they are reputed no more than good; but the
institutions of religion are always supposed to be the best.
2. There are kingdoms in which the laws are of no value as they
depend only on the capricious and fickle humour of the sovereign. If in
these kingdoms the laws of religion were of the same nature as the human
institutions, the laws of religion too would be of no value. It is
however, necessary to the society that it should have something fixed;
and it is religion that has this stability.
3. The influence of religion proceeds from its being believed; that
of human laws from their being feared. Antiquity accords with religion,
because we have frequently a firmer belief in things in proportion to
their distance; for we have no ideas annexed to them drawn from those
times which can contradict them. Human laws, on the contrary, receive
advantage from their novelty, which implies the actual and particular
attention of the legislator to put them in execution.
