University of Virginia Library

Search this document 
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  

collapse section1. 
collapse section 
collapse section 
 1. 
 2. 
collapse section 
 3. 
 4. 
 5. 
 6. 
 7. 
 8. 
 9. 
collapse section 
 10. 
 11. 
 12. 
 13. 
 14. 
 15. 
 16. 
 17. 
 18. 
 19. 
 20. 
 21. 
collapse section 
collapse section 
 22. 
 23. 
 24. 
 25. 
 26. 
 27. 
 28. 
 29. 
 30. 
 31. 
 32. 
 33. 
collapse section 
 34. 
collapse section2. 
collapse section 
collapse section 
 35. 
 36. 
 37. 
 38. 
 39. 
 40. 
 41. 
 42. 
 43. 
collapse section 
 44. 
collapse section 
 45. 
collapse section 
 46. 
 47. 
 48. 
 49. 
collapse section 
 50. 
collapse section 
 51. 
 52. 
 53. 
 54. 
 55. 
 56. 
collapse section 
 57. 
collapse section 
 58. 
collapse section 
 59. 
 60. 
 61. 
 62. 
collapse section 
collapse section 
 63. 
 64. 
 65. 
 66. 
 67. 
 68. 
 69. 
 70. 
 71. 
 72. 
 73. 
 74. 
 75. 
 76. 
Section 76. (d) Emotional Disposition and Related Subjects.
 77. 
 78. 
 79. 
 80. 
 81. 
 82. 
 83. 
 84. 
 85. 
 86. 
 87. 
 88. 
 89. 
 90. 
collapse section 
 91. 
 92. 
 93. 
 94. 
 95. 
 96. 
 97. 
collapse section 
 98. 
 99. 
 100. 
 101. 
 102. 
 103. 
 104. 
 105. 
 106. 
 107. 
 108. 
 109. 
collapse section 
 110. 
 111. 
 112. 

  
  
  

Section 76. (d) Emotional Disposition and Related Subjects.

Madame de Krüdener writes in a letter to Bernardin de St. Pierre: "Je voulais être sentie." These laconic words of this wise pietist give us an insight into the significance of emotional life of woman. Man wants to be understood, woman felt. With this emotion she spoils much that man might do because of his sense of justice. Indeed, a number of qualities which the woman uses to make herself noted are bound up with her emotional life, more or less. Compassion, self-sacrifice, religion, superstition,—all these depend on the highly developed, almost diseased formation of her emotional life. Feminine charity, feminine activity as a nurse, feminine petitions for the pardon of criminals, infinite other samples of women's kindly dispositions must convince us that these activities are an integral part of their emotional life, and that women perform them only, perhaps, in a kind of dark perception of their own helplessness. On the one side an unconscious egoism impels them to the defence of those who find themselves in a similarcondition; on the other side, it is a feminine characteristic to apply anything she is to judge to herself first, and then to make her choice. That she does this, rests on the eminent overweight of emotion. So Schopenhauer says: "Women are very sympathetic, but they are behind man in all matters of justice, probity, and scrupulous conscientiousness. Injustice is the fundamental feminine defect."[1] Schopenhauer should have added, "because they are too sympathetic, because emotion takes up so much place in their minds that they have not enough left for justice." According to Proudhon, "The conscience of woman


360

is as much weaker than man's as her intelligence is smaller. Her morality is of a different sort, her ideas of right and wrong are different, being always on this or that side of justice, and never requiring any equivalence between rights and duties which are such a painful necessity to man." Spencer says,[2] briefly, that the feminine mind shows a definite lack with regard to the sense of justice.

These assertions show that women are deficient in justice, but do not show why. The deficiency is to be explained only in the super-abundance of emotional life. This superabundance clarifies a number of facts of their daily routine. We have, of course, to make a distinction between the feeling of a gentlewoman, of a peasant woman, and of the innumerable grades between the two, but this distinction is not essential. Both noble and proletarian are equally unjust, but the rich emotion restores a thousand times what may be missing in justice, and perhaps in many cases hits better upon what is absolutely right than the bare masculine sense of justice. We are, of course, frequently mistaken by relying on the testimony of women, but only when we assume that our rigorously judicial sentence is the only correct one, and when we do not know how women judge. Hence, we interpret women's testimonies with difficulty and rarely with correctness; we forget that almost every feminine statement contains in itself much more judgment than the testimony of men; we fail to examine how much real judgment it contains; and finally, we weigh this judgment in other scales than those used by the woman. We do best, therefore, when we take the testimony of man and woman together in order to find the right average. This is not easy, for we are unable to enter properly into the emotional life of woman, and can not therefore discount that tendency of hers to drag the objective truth in some biased direction. It might be theoretically supposed that a noble, kindly, feminine feeling would tend to reflect everything as better and gentler, and would tend to excuse and conceal. If that were so we might have a definite standard of valuation, and might be able to discount the feminine bias. But that is so in perhaps no more than half the cases that come before us. In all others woman has allowed herself to be moved to displeasure, and appears as the punishing avenger. Hence, she fights with all her strength on the side that seems to her to be oppressed and innocently persecuted, irrespective of whether it is


361

the side of the accused or of his enemy. In consequence, we must first of all, when judging her statements, determine the direction in which her emotion impels her, and this can not be done with a mere knowledge of human nature. Nothing will do except a careful study of the specific feminine witness at the time she gives her evidence. And this requires the expenditure of much time, for, to plunge directly into the middle of things without having any means of comparison or relation, is to make judgment impossible or very unsafe. If you are to do it at all you must discuss other things first and even permit yourself the dishonesty of asking about matters which you already know in order to find some measure of the degree of feminine obliqueness. Of course, one discovers here only the degree of obliqueness, not its direction—in the case selected for comparison the woman might have judged too kindly, in the case in hand she may just as well be too rigorous. But all things have a definite limit, and hence, much practice and much goodwill will help us to discover the direction of obliqueness.

When we inquire into the emotional life of the simple, uneducated women, we find it to be fundamentally the same as that of women of other classes, but different in expression, and it is the expression we have to observe. Its form is often raw, therefore difficult to discover. It may express itself in cursing and swearing, but it is still an expression of emotion, just as are the mother's curses or beatings of her child because it has fallen and hurt itself. But observe that the prevalence of emotion is so thoroughly a feminine condition that it is clearly noticeable only where femininity itself is explicit— therefore, always weaker among masculine women, and in the single individual most powerful when femininity is most fully developed. It grows in the child, remains at a constant level when woman becomes completely woman, and decreases when, in advanced age, the differences in sex begin to disappear. Very old men and very old women are also in this matter very close together.

[[ id="n76.1"]]

Parerga and Paralipomena.

[[ id="n76.2"]]

Introduction to the Study of Sociology.