Section 72. 2. Judgment.
Avenarius tells of an English couple who were speaking about
angels' wings. It was the man's opinion that this angelic possession
was doubtful, the woman's that it could not be. Many a woman
witness has reminded me of this story, and I have been able to
explain by use of it many an event. Woman says, "that must be"
when she knows of no reason; "that must be" when her own
arguments bore her; "that must be" when she is confused; when
she does not understand the evidence of her opponent, and particularly
when she desires something. Unfortunately, she hides this
attitude under many words, and one often wishes for the simple
assertion of the English woman, "that must be." In consequence,
when we want to learn their ratio sciendi from women, we get into
difficulties. They offer us a collection of frequently astonishing and
important things, but when we ask for the source of this collection
we get "that must be," in variations, from a shrug of the shoulders
to a flood of words. The inexperienced judge may be deceived by the
positiveness of such expressions and believe that such certainty must
be based on something which the witness can not utter through lack
of skill. If, now, the judge is going to help the "unaided" witness
with "of course you mean because," or "perhaps because," etc.,
the witness, if she is not a fool, will say "yes." Thus we get apparently
well-founded assertions which are really founded on nothing
more than "that must be."
Cases dealing with divisions, distinctions and analysis rarely
contain ungrounded assertions by women. Women are well able to
analyse and explain data, and what one is capable of and understands,
one succeeds in justifying. Their difficulty is in synthetic work,
in progressive movement, and there they simply assert. The few
observations of this characteristic confirm this statement. For
example, Lafitte says that at medical examinations women are
unable to do anything which requires synthetic power. Women's
judgments of men further confirm this position, for they are said
to be more impressed with a minimal success, than with a most
magnificent effort. Now there is no injustice, no superficiality in
this observation; its object is simply parallel to their incapacity
for synthesis. Inasmuch as they are able to follow particular things
they will understand a single success, but the growth of efficiency
toward the future requires composition and wide horizon, hence
they can not understand it. Hence, also, the curious contradictions
in women's statements as suspicion rises and falls. A woman, who
to-day knows of a hundred reasons for the guilt of some
much-compromised prisoner, tries to turn everything the other way when
she later learns that the prisoner has succeeded in producing some
apparent alibi. So again, if the prosecution seems to be successful,
the women witnesses for the defence often become the most dangerous
for the defenders.
But here, also, women find a limit, perhaps because like all weaklings
they are afraid to draw the ultimate conclusions. As Leroux
says in "De l'Humanité," "If criminals were left to women they
would kill them all in the first burst of anger, and if one waited until
this burst had subsided they would release them all." The killing
points to the easy excitability, the passionateness, and the instinctive
sense of justice in women which demands immediate revenge for
evil deeds. The liberation points to the fact that women are afraid
of every energetic deduction of ultimate consequences, i. e., they
have no knowledge of real justice. "Men look for reasons, women
judge by love; women can love and hate, but they can not be just
without loving, nor can they ever learn to value justice." So says
Schiller, and how frequently do we not hear the woman's question
whether the accused's fate is going to depend on her evidence. If
we say yes, there is as a rule a restriction of testimony, a titillation
and twisting of consequences, and this circumstance must always be
remembered. If you want to get truth from a woman you must
know the proper time to begin, and what is more important, when
to stop. As the old proverb says, and it is one to take to heart:
"Women are wise when they act unconsciously; fools when they
reflect."
It is a familiar fact that women, committing crimes, go to extremes.
It may be correct to adduce, as modern writers do, the
weakness of feminine intelligence to social conditions, and it may,
perhaps, be for this reason that the future of woman lies in changing
the feminine milieu. But also with regard to environment she is
an extremist. The most pious woman, as Richelieu says, will not
hesitate to kill a troublesome witness. The most complicated
crimes are characteristically planned by women, and are frequently
swelled with a number of absolutely purposeless criminal deeds.
In this circumstance we sometimes find the explanation for an
otherwise unintelligible crime which, perhaps, indicates also, that
the first crime was committed by woman. It is as if she has in turpitude
a certain pleasure to which she abandons herself as soon as
she has passed the limit in her first crime.
