Epistle XXIX. To Quadratus.
by
the Same. [Mr. Henley.]
[_]
Advice to him as an Advocate.
AVIDIUS Quietus, who had a particular Kindness for me, and (which is an equal Pleasure) approv'd all that came from
Thraseas, our common Friend; often repeated a familiar Expression of that great Man,
that a Man ought to undertake three sorts of Causes, Those of his Friends,
of such as were destitute, or those that were Exemplary. But why ought we to undertake the Causes of our Friends?
This demands no Explanation. Why those of the Destitute? Because the Bravery and Humanity of the Speaker is the most visible in them.
Why such as relate to Example? Because the letting in of a good or an evil Precedent is of great Consequence.
To these I will add, tho' perhaps with some Spirit of Ambition, the great and famous Causes.
For it is reasonable to plead sometimes for Glory and Reputation, that is,
one's own Cause; since you have desired my Opinion, these are the Bounds I presume to set to a Person of your Rank and Modesty.
Nor am I ignorant, that Use both
really is, and is reckon'd the best Master of Eloquence: For I observe many Persons of a low Genius,
and no Literature, have acquir'd a Faculty of Pleading well, by Pleading often.
But at the same time, that Saying of
Pollio's, or that is ascrib'd to
Pollio, is, to my own Experience, very true.
Pleading well has made me Plead often,
Pleading often has made me Plead worse: Because, for the purpose,
too much Assiduity gives rather a Facility, than a Faculty, and not so much a proper Assurance,
as an indiscreet Rashness. Nor was the Weakness of Voice, or the Natural Fear of
Isocrates, when he spoke in Publick, any Bar to his Reputation of being a very great Orator.
Therefore read, write, think a great deal, that you may be capable of speaking what you please;
and you will speak, when you ought to have the Inclination. This is a Rule that I have commonly follow'd;
sometimes I have submitted to Necessity, which has a Place among the best Reasons: For I have, at the Order of the
Senate, appear'd in some Causes of the same kind with that of
Thraseas,
that is, such as were important for the Example of them. I defended the
Bætici against
Bæbius Massa; The Question was, Whether an Information was to be granted?
It was granted. I was again retain'd by the same People, in a Complaint lodg'd against
Cæcilius Classicus; the Query was, Whether the Provincial Officers ought to be punish'd,
as the Accomplices and
Agents of the Proconsul? They were punish'd. I accused
Marius Priscus,
who, having been Condemn'd by the Law against Embezzling the Publick Money,
made use of the Clemency of the Law to his own Advantage, when he had exceed the Severity of it,
by the Enormity of his Crimes. He was sent into Banishment. I was Advocate for
Julius Bassus, as too unguarded and imprudent, and therefore not so Criminal.
They made a Civil Cause of it by appointing Judges, and he kept his Place in the Senate.
I pleaded very lately for
Varenus, he insisted on a reciprocal Right,
of calling in his own Evidence; this was allow'd. Hereafter, it is my Wish,
to be chiefly retain'd in such Causes, which it would become me to maintain voluntarily.
Farewell.
