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 26.1. 
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26.7

Finding that his enemy could not be drawn into an engagement and that it was impossible to break through their lines and relieve Capua, Hannibal decided to abandon his attempt and march away from the place, for he was afraid of being cut off from his supplies by the new consuls. He was anxiously turning over in his mind the question of his future movements when the idea occurred to him of marching upon Rome, the head and guiding spirit of the whole war. He had always set his heart upon this, and men blamed him for letting the opportunity slip, immediately after the battle of Cannae; he himself admitted that he had made a mistake in not doing so. He was not without hope of seizing some part of the City in the confusion caused by his unexpected appearance, and if Rome were in danger, he expected that both the consuls -or at all events, one of them -would at once quit their hold on Capua. Then, as they would be weakened by their forces being divided, they would give either him or the Capuans the opportunity of fighting a successful action. One thing made him anxious, the possibility of the Capuans surrendering as soon as he had withdrawn. Amongst his men there was a Numidian who was ready for any desperate enterprise, and he induced this man, by the offer of a reward, to carry a despatch and enter the Roman lines in the guise of a deserter, then steal away on the opposite side and enter Capua. He wrote in a very encouraging strain, and pointed out that his departure would be the means of saving them, as it would draw off the Roman generals from their attack on Capua to defend Rome. They were not to be despondent, a few days' patience would completely break up the siege. He then ordered the boats which were on the Volturnus to be seized and brought up to a fort which he had previously constructed to secure the passage of the river. He was informed that there was a sufficient number of them to admit of his entire army being taken across in one night. Ten days' rations were supplied to the men; they marched down to the river, and all his legions were across before day-break.