25.21
Fulvius and his legions were in the
neighbourhood of Heraclea. When they heard that the enemy were
approaching they were almost on the point of dragging up the standards and
going into battle without waiting for orders. In fact the one thing that
restrained them more than anything else was the confidence they felt of being
able to choose their own time for fighting. The following night, when
Hannibal became aware that the camp was in a state of tumult and that most
of the men were defying their commander and insisting that he should give
the signal, and that there was a general cry, "To arms!" he was quite certain
that the opportunity was presented of a successful battle. He quietly
disposed some three thousand of his light infantry in the surrounding
homesteads and in the woods and copses. They were all to spring from their
concealment at the same moment when the signal was given, and Mago had
orders to place about two thousand cavalry along all the roads which he
thought the direction of the flight might take. After making these
dispositions during the night, he marched out to battle at dawn. Fulvius did
not hesitate, though he was not drawn on so much by any hopes of success
on his own part as by the blind impetuosity of his men. The same
recklessness which sent them on to the field appeared in the formation of
their line. They went forward in a haphazard way and took their places in the
ranks just where they chose, and left them again as their caprices or fears
dictated. The first legion and the left wing of the allies were drawn up in
front and the line was extended far beyond its proper length. The officers
called out that it possessed neither strength nor depth and wherever the
enemy made their attack they would break through, but the men would not
even listen to, much less attend to anything that was for their good. And
now Hannibal was upon them; a general so different from their own, with an
army so different and in such different order! As might be expected, the
Romans were unable to withstand the very first attack; their general, quite as
foolish and reckless as Centenius, though not to be compared with him in
courage, no sooner saw the day going against him and his men in confusion
than he seized a horse and made his escape with about two hundred of his
cavalry. The rest of the army, repulsed in front and then surrounded in rear
and flanks, was so completely cut up that out of 12,000 men not more than
2000 escaped. The camp was taken.
