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24.30

Marcellus advanced with his whole force against Leontini and summoned Appius to attack it on the opposite side. The men were so furious at the butchery of the outpost while negotiations were actually going on that they carried the place at the first assault. When Hippocrates and Epicydes saw that the enemy were getting possession of the walls and bursting in the gates, they retreated with a small following to the citadel, and during the night made their escape secretly to Herbesus. The Syracusans had already started with an army of 8000 men, and were met at the river Myla with the news that the city was captured. The rest of the message was mostly false: their informant told them that there had been an indiscriminate massacre of soldiers and civilians, and he thought that not a single adult was left alive; the city had been looted and the property of the wealthy citizens given to the troops. On receiving this shocking intelligence the army halted; there was great excitement in all ranks, and the generals, Sosis and Dinomenes, consulted as to what was to be done. What lent a certain plausibility to the story and afforded apparent grounds for alarm was the scourging and beheading of as many as two thousand deserters, but otherwise not one of the Leontines or the regular troops had been injured after the city was taken and every man's property was restored to him beyond what had been destroyed in the first confusion of the assault. The men could not be induced to continue their march to Leontini, though they loudly protested that their comrades had been given up to massacre, nor would they consent to remain where they were and wait for more definite intelligence. The praetors saw that they were inclined to mutiny, but they did not believe that the excitement would last long if those who were leading them in their folly were put out of the way. They conducted the army to Megara and rode on with a small body of cavalry to Herbesus, hoping in the general panic to secure the betrayal of the place. As this attempt failed, they resolved to resort to force, and the following day marched from Megara with the intention of attacking Herbesus with their full strength. Now that all hope was cut off, Hippocrates and Epicydes thought that their only course, and that not at first sight a very safe one, was to give themselves up to the soldiers, who knew them well, and were highly incensed at the story of the massacre. So they went to meet the army. It so happened that the front ranks consisted of a body of 600 Cretans who had served under these very men in Hieronymus's army and had had experience of Hannibal's kindness, having been taken prisoners with other auxiliary troops at Trasumennus and afterwards released. When Hippocrates and Epicydes recognised them by their standards and the fashion of their arms they held out olive branches and other suppliant emblems and begged them to receive and protect them and not give them up to the Syracusans, who would surrender them to the Romans to be butchered.