University of Virginia Library

Ch 15: The American Cultural Revolution: The Next Step

"The most important political idea of the mid-1980s is cultural conservatism. Republican or Democrat, the first 1988 presidential candidate to genuinely grasp the timeliness of this idea-not just make some pro forma utterances about school prayer and abortion-could very quickly find himself with a powerful national constituency."

--Paul Weynch

It is Ronald Reagan's crowning achievement that he made his conservative agenda America's agenda. What in the 1960s liberal era would have been seen as a right-wing extremist agenda became, under two Reagan administrations, mainline issues for public-policy consideration.

Ronald Reagan took issues such as military preparedness, runaway government spending, income tax reform, Communist influence in the Caribbean and Central America, traditional family values, old-fashioned religious values, and patriotism, and he moved them onto center stage. His stubborn refusal to raise taxes while increasing military spending resulted in record budget deficits. Nevertheless, until his covert dealings with Iran and secret funding of the contras sent his approval rating plunging in late 1986, Reagan enjoyed unprecedented popularity. His simple, down-to-earth affirmation of America,

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free enterprise, and traditional values struck a responsive chord with a significant majority of Americans.

Liberals remain reluctant to admit that Reagan's agenda has become the nation's agenda. The restoration of the Senate to Democratic control in 1986 brought cries of jubilation that the Reagan Revolution was over. Even as the votes were still being tallied on election evening, NBC's John Chancellor denied that there had ever been a Reagan Revolution. And he cited public opinion polls to support his claims.

For all the gloating about the end of the Reagan Era, liberal political pundits ignored an important and indisputable reality-the Democrats did well in the 1986 elections because they coopted the issues that Reagan had defined as important. Conspicuously absent were politicians campaigning on promises to go to Washington and spend more money. Nor were local politicians suggesting that state and local governments ought to be picking up the slack in funding social programs cut by mean-spirited politicians in Washington. Easy spending was out. Fiscal restraint was in. Americans may not be ready to give up all the government services to which they have become accustomed, but they want a lean government. And that's what they believe they have under the Reagan administration. For a candidate to propose anything else would be to court disaster at the polls.

Careful examination of the 1986 election results shows mixed feelings. On the so-called personal morality issues, voters went both ways, and sometimes in contradiction to traditional patterns. In usually conservative Kansas, for example, voters finally repealed the last vestige of Prohibition in America by voting to allow liquor to be sold by the drink. And in often-liberal Oregon, it was the liberal Protestant Ecumenical Ministries that led a successful fight against a referendum to legalize the possession or cultivation of marijuana for personal use.

The most frequently cited evidence of the repudiation of Reagan and the conservative Republican philosophy was, of course, the Democrats' recapture of the Senate. Eight seats passed from Republicans to Democrats, a shift that clearly affected Reagan's ability to get his programs through the legislative body of government. But to interpret the outcome of the Senate races as a barometer of future American voting patterns may be very misleading.

Almost totally overlooked by the election analysts was the fact that the Republicans lost a mere six seats in the House. This is unprece-

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dented in modern political history. Since 1946, the party occupying the White House has lost an average of thirty seats in nonpresidential election years. In the off-year elections of a president's second term, the average number of seats his party lost was forty-eight. [1]

Republicans also did very well in the gubernatorial races, scoring a net gain of eight seats. Furthermore, they won in two traditionally Democratic states, Texas and Florida, which could be important in the 1988 presidential elections.

Perhaps the greatest shortcoming in the 1986 election analyses was the failure to examine the outcome in light of the campaign itself. Most of the Senate races were issueless campaigns without any national theme. Local races tended to produce either slick but bland television commercials or vicious personal attacks. When Ronald Reagan finally jumped in with a late campaign blitz, he, too, pursued an issueless trek across the country. Americans were willing to "stay the course" in 1984, but "win one for the Gipper" just didn't have any zing in 1986.

Republicans were hurt particularly badly in the South, where registered Democrats outnumber Republicans by margins of up to 2.5 to 1 in some states. In the absence of issues, people tend to stay home or return to their "regular" party. A lot of both happened in the South. After a brutal Republican primary campaign in North Carolina, 25 percent of those who voted for Ronald Reagan in 1984 voted for Democrat Terry Sanford, a popular former governor.

The Republicans seemed to be trying to run on the perceived momentum of the 1976, 1980, and 1984 elections. But voters, unable to differentiate the candidates in terms of issues, returned to their "usual" voting patterns.

Yet another element generally ignored in the post-election analysis was the margin of victory in the Senate races. Several incumbents from both parties won by very large margins. Wendell Ford, Democrat from Kentucky, received 74 percent of the votes, and in Kansas, Republican Robert Dole received 70 percent of the votes. But many of the races were quite close. In nine of the thirty-four Senate races, the winner received no more than 52 percent of the votes cast. Republicans were successful in only two of these nine close races (Idaho and Wisconsin). The margin of Democratic victory ranged from 2,979 votes for Kent Conrad in North Dakota to 112,689 for incumbent Alan

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Cranston in California, where more than 6 million votes were cast. In five of the seven states, the margin was under 24,000 votes. A strategic realignment of only 32,000 votes would have brought Republican victories in five states. To have won all nine of those close races, and thus retained control of the Senate, the Republicans would have needed a realignment of merely 117,000 out of more than 12.6 million votes cast, less than one percent. A small additional fraction of voter turnout for the Republican candidates would have netted the same result.

The conservative movement clearly lost ground in the 1986 elections. But the big loss of Senate seats was the result of small margins of victories in several states. It is possible that history will mark 1986 as the end of America's late-twentieth-century encounter with conservatism, but it is unlikely. The only real conclusion to be drawn from the elections of 1986 is that there are no firm conclusions. Only in the context of future elections will we be able to determine whether 1986 was the beginning of a decline in conservatism or, like a stock market on a major bull or bear trend, merely a correction or resting point along the way. Furthermore, when we do analyze future elections, we will need to look carefully at the behavior of the winners and the losers. It is quite possible that we will see Democrats winning because they espouse a philosophy and vote in a pattern consistent with the conservatism that Reagan brought to Washington.

This book is grounded in social-movement theory, a theoretical orientation that cannot answer the question of the duration or the ultimate intensity of the conservative movement in America, but does provide a conceptual perspective for wrestling with the evidence.

Social movements do not necessarily give way to countermove meets, but it is not unusual for new problems to be identified as a consequence of addressing others. The programs initiated to deal with inequality and civil rights during the 1960s and 1970s are now seen as a source of some of the problems of the 1980s. The conservative mood in America today seems almost certainly a reaction to the liberal mood of previous decades. But it is more.

Social movements are not easily sustained for long periods. Maintaining momentum requires more and more resources. The capacity of social structures (public and private) to respond is not without limits. Movements tend to become bureaucratized, and with this they develop survival imperatives independent of the movements. In brief,

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movements have cycles. Over time, they lose momentum and must either be regenerated or fade.

These natural tendencies have important implications for understanding (and misunderstanding) the present conservative movement in America. First, a variety of liberal social-movement activities dominated American politics for more than two decades. Whatever the empirical links between the liberal agenda and the current array of intolerable social conditions, there is an appearance of causal relationship-an appearance that the New Christian Right has not hesitated to exploit.

There are two problems with viewing the New Christian Right merely as backlash, however. First, it discourages further analysis, and thus is likely to miss other characteristics of a movement that has great potential for mobilizing a broader following.

The second problem is that this fails to recognize the value of old themes as an instrument for mobilizing passive adherents. The civil rights movement and the feminist movement both played heavily on old themes and unfulfilled dreams and promises. The underlying theme of the conservative movement is a covenant broken and promises similarly unfulfilled.

For liberals, as well as a lot of moderates, it is hard to escape the conclusion that conservative Christians are swimming against the mainstream of American culture. The movement seems out of step with emerging values regarding relations between the sexes. And the New Christian Right's long list of personal "vices" include a number of issues that both liberals and moderates feel ought to be left to personal choice.

For conservative Christians, it is a matter of reestablishing the public importance of private virtue. The issue is not only other people behaving in ways that run counter to their values. They object to a liberal culture that flaunts and calls virtuous the behavior they believe to be sinful. And it bothers them all the more that their personal piety is a matter of scorn and the butt of jokes.

It is difficult to measure the size of the hard core of conservative Christians in America who are fighting mad, but social-movement victories do not depend on a zealous minority becoming a zealous majority. Rather, social movements succeed when they are able to put enough pressure on the political system to address their griev-

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ances. They have a greater chance when they can present their concerns in ways that are not perceived as a threat to the values of others. And if the general public believes that a movement's cause is just and legitimate, the chances of success are further enhanced.

Over the present decade, the New Christian Right has built a solid foundation for pursuing their agenda. It will gain momentum regardless of Pat Robertson's pursuit of the presidency. Consider three observations about the growth of the New Christian Right movement during the 1980s.

First, the decade has been characterized by a broadening of the base of support among conservative Christians, large numbers of whom have not heretofore been involved in the political process.

Second, the number of New Christian Right organizations has mushroomed. While there are many national organizations, the real movement is occurring at the local, community level.

Third, and equally impressive, is the extent to which the New Christian Right has been building coalitions with groups that share common concerns on both broad and specific social agendas.

It is a measure of the developing maturity and strength of the movement that it is able to put aside ideological differences to work for common goals. Abortion is probably the most significant cause drawing together groups that as recently as the 1970s could not even have imagined sitting down in the same room, much less working together. As late as 1980, it would have been hard to predict that by 1985 fundamentalists, charismatics, Mormons, Catholics, and conservative Jews would be working together.

In time, the conservative Christian movement has the potential to become solidified enough to "take over the country." If the Robertson campaign does not succeed in pulling them together, it will at least demonstrate to conservative Christians the real potential of their movement.

As has been enumerated, the resources of the New Christian Right can be enlisted in the cause of electing Pat Robertson president. These same resources will remain to be harnessed by other conservative Christians, regardless of what happens to Robertson's bid.

In conclusion, let's examine five underlying factors that have lent, and will continue to lend, muscle to the New Christian Right social

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movement. Together, these factors add up to enough strength to create a cultural revolution in America.

Loss of Confidence in the Liberal Philosophy. The past quarter-century in America has seen assassination, military defeat, failed leadership, and the persistence of poverty, crime, and drug use.

Other peoples, in other times and places, have faced prolonged frustrations and humiliations and learned to live with them. But the events of the past quarter-century have not gone down well with Americans because we have always thought of ourselves as good, Godfearing people who, with His hand, have the ability to control destiny. As individuals, most of us are doing well. But as we look around us, all the upheaval seems to testify to a deep and fundamental cultural malady.

Sociologically speaking, even if it were possible to step outside our world and objectively assess our cultural condition, it would not matter. People act upon what they perceive to be real. Whether or not our problems seriously threaten our destiny as a people, we think they do. Before Ronald Reagan, Americans had lost confidence in the future. He has stoked the flames of hope for a brighter future.

After fifty years of experimenting with the liberal Democratic philosophy, America has entered a period of reassessment. To be sure, the liberal philosophy is not dead. Its contributions to the concepts of human rights and personal liberty are firmly institutionalized, and America is unlikely to retreat very far from these principles. At the same time, it is unable to completely eliminate poverty or uproot the structural causes of social inequality.

Of paramount concern in the years just ahead will be the struggle to define the proper role of government in our lives-what it may and may not do, what it should and should not do, and what it must and must not do. As we struggle for a new consensus on these issues, we will learn that the old labels of liberal and conservative no longer fit very well. But if the issues don't easily fit our current understanding of liberal and conservative categories, it seems fairly obvious that many of the issues will be resolved in terms more compatible with a conservative rather than a liberal philosophy.

Legitimization of the Conservative Cultural Revolution. The conservative revolution in America has been a long time in coming. Former

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Senator Barry Goldwater was out in front, but in retrospect, it is clear that he was not alone. Otherwise, how could he have captured the Republican nomination in 1964? About the same time, Ronald Reagan pulled America's most populous state to the right. Eventually he would move the whole nation in that direction.

People have jumped aboard the conservative bandwagon for different reasons. There were the economic conservatives, the libertarian conservatives, the anti-big-government conservatives, and the anticommunist conservatives. The religious conservatives came late. When Ronald Reagan encountered them, he intuitively understood their role in shaping a cultural conservatism that would broaden the conservative coalition in America.

Ronald Reagan's dilemma was legitimizing a political philosophy that contends government should deliver less, not more. His answer was to delineate a new concept of the moral state. "Getting government off our backs" has been Ronald Reagan's favorite political slogan and his personal moral crusade. A society free of government entanglement in the lives of its citizens is a good society- a morally good society. And the symbol of that achievement during Reagan's years in office would be tax reform without raising taxes.

The concept of less government as moral government is easily linked to religious imagery. Theologians themselves, running the gamut from charismatic televangelist Kenneth Copeland to neo-conservative Catholic lay theologian Michael Novak, have identified free enterprise as the economic system most compatible with Christianity. Ronald Reagan has borrowed from this rhetoric. But he has made a more direct, less philosophical, and down-to-earth connection Big government places heavy tax burdens on individuals and thereby strains the American family's ability to take care of itself. Free from government interference, individuals and families can find their way back to basic values.

Ever so skillfully, Ronald Reagan has equated his policies with morality. Military buildup is justified not in terms of strategic interests, but as the morally correct move in the face of an "evil empire." "The people want a constitutional amendment making it unequivocally clear our children can hold voluntary prayer in every school across this land," Ronald Reagan told the National Religious Broadcasters in 1984. [2] "And if we could get God and discipline back in our schools," he continued, "maybe we could get drugs and violence out." [3]

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Perhaps Reagan's strongest equation of religion and morality with his political agenda came in Dallas in 1984, on the eve of his renomination. With the whole world looking on at a prayer breakfast for 17,000 in the Reunion Arena, he offered his immortal counsel on the inseparability of religion and politics: Reagan's comments came in the context of a broader exegesis of the role of religion in American history. But unwilling merely to offer a history lesson, the president went on to define his position on school prayer as moral while labeling those who oppose school prayer as intolerant (i.e.,immoral):

Sometimes subtly, other times not so subtly, Ronald Reagan has used religion to legitimize his new agenda for America. In doing so, he helped legitimize the New Christian Right's social movement. His repeated appearances before evangelical and fundamentalist forums, to the exclusion of mainline groups, underscored this.

The social movement that is being spearheaded by the New Christian Right has provided America with a plausible story line of how we got into the troubles we face, why they are perpetuated, and how we might get out.

To the fundamentalists of the early twentieth century, the enemy was modernism. When the New Christian Right came on the scene and identified the enemy as secular humanism, their cry had a familiar ring. Secular humanism, it seemed, was a mere repackaging of the old modernism. Secular Humanists are responsible for the weakening of traditional values and the family. They targeted education and basic learning-proselytizing that values are relative rather than absolute, insisting that there is no place in the classroom for God, nor for mention of the role of religion in history.

At first, secular humanism appeared to be the shrill battle cry of a few latter-day, know-nothing hicks. But, in time, secular humanism would establish itself as a plausible explanation for what had gone wrong. There are two reasons why this is so. First, while there are

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some important parallels between the 1920s and 198Os, there are also some dramatic differences in the social milieu. Second, there are similarly dramatic differences between the messages of the fundamentalists of the 1920s and of the fundamentalists and evangelicals of the 1980s.

In both the 1920s and the 1980s, the nation was trying to rebound from war. They are also two periods shaped by revolutions in social behavior. The "Roaring Twenties" are analogous to the experimentation with alternative lifestyles and drugs in the late 1960s and 1970s. But the responses have been dramatically different.

In the 1920s, Americans were jubilant over victory in Europe, in the "war to end all wars." Modernism meant a new era of confidence, prosperity, and personal freedom. It was not to be feared, but welcomed with gusto. The future was bright, as least for the broader, secular culture. The fundamentalists-with their stuffy lifestyles, untenable biblical literalism, and movement to abolish alcohol-were viewed more as a nuisance than a threat to progress.

In the minds of 1980s liberals, the fundamentalists are cut from the same cloth as their 1920s counterparts. The main difference, liberals perceive, is that they are not quite so laughable because their agenda is much larger and they appear to have the potential to flex more political muscle.

But the differences are actually profound. Whereas America in the 1920s was optimistic about the future, America in the 1980s is not quite so confident. By the end of World War I, Americans were largely persuaded that our engagement was noble. But America never felt very good about fighting in Vietnam, and that sentiment deepened in time. .\Iost believed it was a war that we never should have become involved in. Vietnam was also a staggering blow to our sense of national righteousness and political invincibility.

Now, our inability to deal with terrorism adds to our sense of vulnerability. And Americans of the 1980s worry about the possibility of a nuclear holocaust. In a word, we Americans entered the 1980s much less optimistic or confident of our power to shape the world, or even our own destiny. No one liked it when Jimmy Carter talked about malaise. But deep in our hearts, we knew that everything was not in order; that something had gone terril~ly wrong.

The message of the fundamentalists of the 1920s ran against the

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grain of public sentiment. They saw the future of this world as bleak; salvation was in the world yet to come. The message of the fundamentalists and evangelicals of the 1980s also runs against the grain. But now, they are the optimists. Theologically, they still believe that Jesus is coming soon. But, as a matter of doctrine, they confess that they don't know how soon is soon. In the meantime, prosperity and personal happiness will come to those who profess and follow the Christian path.

That is their personal message of salvation. The new political message is that Christians united can restore America to its former position of greatness and righteousness. It is apromise to restore America's covenant destiny.

While this call is aimed at the fundamentalist and evangelical communities, it is a message with a strong civil religious appeal. One does not have to be an evangelical Christian to believe in the desirability of returning to traditional values, restoring a sense of right and wrong, and reclaiming America's rightful place as a special land in God's scheme of things. Ronald Reagan has gone far in legitimizing these goals and dreams as the goals and dreams of all Americans.

To succeed with their broader political agenda, to assume the undisputed role as leaders in the emerging cultural revolution, the New Christian Right must build upon the legitimacy that Ronald Reagan has bequeathed them. They need to persuade millions of Americans that their cause is America's cause, that their values are America's values, that their dreams for the restoration of a good and decent nation are truly the dreams of all decent Americans.

Monopoly of Religious Broadcasting. The New Christian Right social movement emerged because a small group of religious broadcasters were able to use the airwaves to persuade large audiences that there was a cause that demanded their attention. They sent out the call that brought a quarter- to a half-million conservative Christians to Washington in 1980. They put out the word that brought thousands of pastors to Dallas in August 1980 for two days of hoopla, rallying Christian support for Ronald Reagan. In 1980 and again in 1984, televangelists helped create groups that motivated Christians to register and then to go to the polls to vote.

There can be no question about the centrality of religious broadcasting in making possible Pat Robertson's candidacy. Television was

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his instrument for learning and perfecting communications skills; for becoming knowledgeable about social, economic, and foreign-policy issues; for attracting a loyal following; for encouraging and organizing Christians to become involved in the political process; and, finally, for launching his campaign.

No other interest group has ever possessed as much media access for promoting an ideological perspective as the religious broadcasters. The latest figures reported by the National Religious Broadcasters show that there are 1,370 religious radio stations and more than 221 religious television stations in this country. There are currently three Christian networks broadcasting twenty-four hours a day that can be picked up via satellite nationwide, two more scheduled to achieve this coverage, and several other networks with more limited schedules. There are 414 organizations engaged in the production of religious television programs and 596 organizations producing religious radio programs.s Arbitron and Nielsen ratings, as mentioned earlier, indicate a sizable audience that will become even larger with greater proportions of American homes wired to receive cable television.

Clearly, religious broadcasters occupy a position of even lower esteem in the eyes of the general public than they did before the Roberts and Bakker scandals. But the balance of power between the liberal and the conservative evangelical traditions is unlikely to be altered in the foreseeable future. The liberal churches have neither the resources nor the inclination to compete successfully. The scandals may result in pressure on the Federal Communications Commission to monitor religious broadcasters more aggressively. But barring even deeper scandals in other major ministries, there seems to be nothing on the horizon that would challenge current FCC policies.

Thus, the instrument evangelicals and fundamentalists have used to mobilize conservative Christians on the New Christian Right agenda is likely to remain intact. And it will continue to direct its audiences toward social engagement. Religious broadcasting will remain a medium for the intellectual growth and development of communications skills for others who follow in the steps of Robertson and Falwell.

Mastery of Fund-raising Skills. No social movement can be sustained for long without access to significant financial resources. Tragedy, violence, heroism, or media events can bring a cause to public attention. And investigative journalism may keep the issue before the public

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for a while. But in the absence of social-movement organizations, public visibility and chances to effect change are soon lost. Without money, social-movement organizations fold.

As we have seen, the New Christian Right, with its direct ties to televangelism, has a distinct advantage when it comes to raising money. Without broad- based financial support from their audiences, the television ministries soon would be off the air. So televangelists have developed state-of-the-art fund-raising technology, and their fundraising know-how is transferable to the social- movement organizations they have created. And to some measure at least, their mailing lists can be used to seed social-movement organizations. Jerry Falwell used "Old Time Gospel Hour" mailing lists to promote the Moral Majority. Pat Robertson supported The Freedom Council with direct gifts from the Christian Broadcasting Network. The American Coalition for Traditional Values is partially supported by gifts from the ministries of the several televangelists who helped found the organization and sit on its board of directors.

Another key source of support for the social-movement organizations of the New Christian Right are a few very wealthy Americans who are committed to conservative causes. It is no secret that there is mutual respect between several of the televangelists and oil-rich Texans. And insurance magnate A. L. Williams has been an enthusiastic supporter of Robertson's political interests for a long time.

Even without adequate data on the extent to which conservative wealth in America is supporting the televangelists' political agenda, it should be evident that this group is capable of providing significant support for a long time. Even temporarily deflated oil prices and collapsed silver markets cannot dry up the discretionary funds of the very wealthy for supporting causes they believe in and causes they believe to be in their own best interests.

In short, the fund-raising base of the New Christian Right is solid. It may suffer periodic setbacks and have cash-flow problems, as occurred in the wake of the Bakker and Roberts scandals, but its sources of revenue are unlikely to disappear.

The Demographic Revolution. There's a fifth and decisive reason why the social movement now being forged by the New Christian Right will continue unabated until a genuine cultural revolution is realized. America is on the threshold of a demographic revolution. The nation

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is growing older. The revolutionary impact of this aging process is not easily grasped. But it will be profound and widespread, affecting nearly every aspect of our collective life. And, what's more, the process is inevitable and irreversible.

One way to grasp what is happening is to look at the growing number of Americans who are reaching age sixty-five. As we began the twentieth century, there were only 3.1 million Americans over the age of sixty-five. By 1930, just a little more than a generation, that number increased to 6.7 million. Today there are 29 million Americans over sixty-five, and the Bureau of the Census projects that the number will grow to approximately 65 million by the year 2030.

The size of the U. S. population has also grown significantly, but the number of elderly has grown faster, so they represent an everincreasing proportion of the population. Whereas the 3.1 million citizens over sixty-five in 1900 represented only 4.1 percent of the U. S. population, the percentage over sixty-five increased to 5.4 in 1930 and then jumped to 11.2 in 1980. In 2030, the percentage over age sixty-five will be 20. That figure represents one in five, compared to one in eight today and fewer than one in twenty at the turn of the century. [5]

Medical advances have made this aging process inevitable. It is also happening in Western Europe and will gradually become a global phenomenon. But the American experience of aging will be accelerated by the post-World War II "baby boom." The "baby boom" was substantially, though not exclusively, a result of deferred fertility during the years of the war. Between 1946 and 1965, there were 76 million births in America. These "boomers" are now twenty to forty years of age. As they begin to move into the ranks of the elderly in the early twenty-first century, there will be a demographic tidal wave.

Never before has a nation had such a large proportion of its population over age sixty-five. An inevitable consequence of the expanding aging population is a shrinking proportion of younger people. The implications of this are staggering. Younger populations will almost certainly be taxed more heavily to support Social Security and healthcare benefits for the elderly. While Congress has taken measures to try to keep the Social Security Administration solvent for the next several decades, the technological revolution in medicine is being accompanied by astronomical rises in health-care costs.

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To add to this growing health-care burden, the years ahead portend a rapid growth in the number of people who live to advanced ages. According to Bureau of the Census estimates, the number of citizens eighty-five and over will grow from 3 million today to 16 million midway through the next century. The startling implications of these figures are evident in data from the Social Security Administration and a study of Massachusetts citizens conducted at Brown University. [6] According to the Social Security Administration, those who reach age sixty- five today can expect to live an average of sixteen more years. The Brown study indicates, however, that, on average, these same people can expect to be self-sufficient only about ten years; those who reach age eighty-five can expect to live an average of seven additional years but function independently for only three.

One consequence of the demographic revolution will be the conflict of interest between younger generations looking to preserve their own resources and older generations who feel they are entitled to retirement and health-care benefits through government-funded programs. As a result of their large numbers, accumulated resources, and experience, the elderly will wield significant clout in the political process.

While the aging can be expected to vote and lobby for their own interests-which certainly will include social- welfare programs-the major impact of their political engagement will be to support conservative economic and social policies.

Social-science research conducted over the past several decades has demonstrated that older populations tend to hold more conservative political and economic worldviews. For some time it was believed that this relationship could be attributed to the effects of the Depression on those older adults who lived through it. More recent research challenges this connection. Norman Nie and his colleagues have shown that even as many segments of the society have become more liberal, the older segment has generally become more conservative. [7]

Furthermore, the elderly do not "slow down" or withdraw from participation in public life, particularly voting, as was once believed. Earlier studies had shown lower levels of public participation among the elderly. We now know that the lower levels of participation observed stemmed from the lower educational and socioeconomic status of many elderly citizens. Among better-educated and better- off el-

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derly, there is hardly any discernible decrease in political participation. Increasingly, the aging will mirror the general population in terms of education levels and socioeconomic status [8]

In a word, the future will see the elderly playing an increasingly important role in the political process. And their voice will be politically conservative.

Just as people become more conservative over time, there is a strong tendency for people to become more religious as they grow older. Data compiled by the Gallup Organization and its affiliate, the Princeton Religious Research Center, demonstrate a powerful relationship between aging and holding a religious worldview. Gallup's fifty-year survey, Religion in America, reveals that people over fifty are more likely than younger age groups to believe religion can answer all or most of today's problems. Those over fifty also report that they have a great deal of confidence in organized religion, and they are more likely to report religious affiliation and participation in a local church or synagogue. And, as noted earlier, the elderly are more likely to be viewers and contributors to one or more of the televangelism ministries. [9]

Social-science research also supports the conclusion that conservative religious worldviews and conservative political ideology go hand in hand. This is not an inevitable correlation but rather a strong tendency.

Ronald Reagan was sixty-nine years old when he became president of the United States. He will be just a few days short of seventy-eight when his successor is inaugurated in January of 1989. Reagan's presidency both personifies and symbolizes the rise to power of an aging America-confident of the validity of their conservative values. And their conservative religion is the foundation of their conviction and determination.

Another potentially significant barometer of the shift toward political and religious conservatism in America is found in a recent analysis of the values and behavior of the "baby boomers." Examining extensive social survey data gathered by the National Opinion Research Center, David Roozen and his colleagues found a decided shift away from liberalism and toward conservatism on social and political issues, particularly among the "baby boomers." [10] They also found higher levels of participation in religion among older "boomers" than younger ones.

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This is the rebellious generation of the late 1960s. They rejected the authority, values, and lifestyles of their parents and older generations. They scoffed at tradition and experimented with alternative lifestyles to an unprecedented degree. If the data analyzed by Roozen and his colleagues accurately reflect what is happening, the cultural revolution pulling America back to religion and traditional values may be even more profound and swift than we have suggested in this analysis.

Whatever the fate of Pat Robertson's quest for the presidency, the social movement that made it possible will not soon recede.

There is a cause. The New Christian Right is locked in a struggle against the "dark forces" of secular humanism. As they see it, theirs is a battle of right and wrong, of good and evil.

A closing scene from The Empire Strikes Back, the second of George Lucas's celebrated Star Wars trilogy, offers a powerful metaphor for the Robertson candidacy. The evil lord Darth Vader has captured young Luke Skywalker's friends and thereby set a trap for him. Luke has not completed his training to be a Jedi knight but insists on attempting a rescue. Yoda and Obi-Wan Kenobi are afraid that Luke will be captured and try to dissuade him from the risky mission. Failing, Obi-Wan sighs, "That boy was our last hope." To which the Jedi master Yoda sagely replies, "No. There is another."

Pat Robertson's bid for the presidency may be premature, but there will be other evangelical candidates, perhaps even better qualified, to do battle with the secular political establishment in America. And, in the meantime, Pat Robertson, like Luke Skywalker, can be counted on to put up a helluva fight.

Notes