5. The publication of Galiani's Della moneta (1750)
was an important event, not because the treatise
abounded in remarks which redistilled systematically
some thoughts of Plato's and Aristotle's or because it
substituted utilità for Saint Antoninus' complacibilitas,
but because it marked a change of temper. The treatise
contains the first sparks of subjectivist ideas, of the
recognition of man as the center of everything social,
which was in line with the reformist ideas of the Age
of Enlightenment. Galiani thus argues that the only
invariable standard of value is man himself, for while
the value of all things changes, “man has been, is, and
will be everywhere the same self.” And in his analysis
of man's behavior we find the thesis that the desire
for “rank, titles, honor, nobility, authority” is stronger
than that for luxuries, and the desire for luxuries
stronger than the desire of the hungry for food—a
thesis germane to a recent idea that man works harder
for that additional income which elevates him on the
social scale (Milton Friedmann and L. J. Savage,
1948).
Most important of all is the fact that Galiani antici-
pates the highest thought advanced on utility, namely,
the modern theory of choice. Value, he says, is “an
idea of the balance between the possession of one thing
and that of another in the mind of an individual.” No
wonder then, that Galiani himself did not grasp the
full relevance of this thought. Otherwise he would not
have continued to cling to the Aristotelian fallacy that
in a just exchange there can be neither loss nor gain.
The idea of subjective choice is even more sharply
outlined in a little known essay, “Valeurs et monnaies”
by Turgot (1768):
If the same individual has a choice among several objects
useful to him, he may prefer one to another.... He will
judge that one object values more than another; he will
compare them in his mind,... choose those he prefers and
leave the others
(Oeuvres... [1844], I, 80).
Turgot goes on to explain that choice reflects the hier-
archy that exists among the individual wants. He also
is the first writer to admit that in barter each party
values what it gets more than what it gives. But, symp-
tomatically, Turgot still could not free himself from
the Aristotelian tradition completely, for he goes on
to argue that in free barter the gains of both parties
must be equal.
