1. Greek Theodicy. The first philosophical resolution
of the problem of evil is found in the dualism of the
early cosmologists, which separated the good from the
bad—a separation which was retained by Plato and
Aristotle, however much these may have shifted the
reference of the two poles. In each case, whether in
Anaximander's separation of bounded order from
unbounded matter (apeiron), or the Pythagoreans'
dualism of even and odd, or Plato's and Aristotle's
distinction between form and matter, the two are
assigned distinct metaphysical statuses, even though the
latter, the evil, is in some way subordinate or subject
to the former, the good. In Heraclitus, on the other
hand, and the Stoics, who appropriated his theory of
the eternal logos-fire, the two poles are absorbed into
a unity which transcends both but is in some higher
way good, requiring submission by the individual to
this ultimate order which determines his destiny. To
oversimplify somewhat, the philosophic tendency is to
resolve the problem of evil, either through a dualism
in which the good is free of evil yet controls it, or
through a pantheism in which evil is somehow less real
and existent than the “truly” good, though inseparable
from the apparent good. The two movements are fully
synthesized by Plotinus and those who follow him;
following both the Stoic doctrine of the One and the
logic of a hierarchical scale of being, Plotinus makes
matter the source of evil, but places it also at the outer
extreme of nonbeing, removed from the One, the
ineffable source of all goodness and harmony. In every
case, evil is either reducible to some source other than
the good (dualism), or it is merely a limitation of the
good (negation), and the problem of a theodicy (which
involves culpability of the good) is avoided.
In the Hellenistic period, however, there were two
distinct approaches to a theodicy, which established
precedents for later discussions. One was the challenge
which Epicurus directed at God's power or goodness.
According to Lactantius (A Treatise on the Anger of
God, Ch. 13) he reasoned as follows:
God either wishes to take away evils and is unable; or he
is able and is unwilling; or he is neither willing nor able;
or he is both willing and able. If he is willing but unable
he is feeble, which is not in accordance with the character
of God. If he is able and unwilling, he is envious, which
is equally at variance with God. If he is neither willing
nor able, he is both envious and feeble, and therefore not
God. If he is both willing and able, which alone is suitable
for God, from what source then are evils? Or why does he
not remove them?
The argument has been repeated by skeptics until
today and various consequences drawn from it; one
possibility, of course, is Epicurean deism or atheism.
The second contribution to a theodicy in late classi-
cism is Plutarch's criticism of the Stoic ethics of obedi-
ence to the universal reason governing the world, on
the charge that Stoicism makes God the source of all
evils (De Stoicarum repugnantiis, Secs. 32-37; the
criticism is levelled against Chrysippus, Treatise on the
Gods). Plutarch's own solution is Plato's; God cannot
be identified with nature as the Stoics hold; God can
only be good, and evil must have some other source,
whether in lesser powers or in matter.
