V
In the seventeenth century in Germany Geschmack
(“taste”) is used occasionally in the modern sense
(Harsdörffer, 1651), but as late as 1687 Christian
Thomasius prefers the term bon goût for a quality he
requires of gentlemen. Aesthetic interest in the subject
is not yet aroused: Leibniz, in 1712, is satisfied with
a short personal interpretation of Shaftesbury's doc-
trine (Leibniz, 1887). Only with Bodmer (1727) taste
becomes a basic subject in aesthetics, but it is conceived
as a purely intellectual judgment which generates a
subsequent feeling (von Stein, 1886). Gottsched (1730),
referring to Leibniz, defines good taste as a correct
judgment of the senses on beauty (i.e., sensitive per-
fection) which is known clearly but not distinctly; this
judgment is confirmed by reason, applying the rational
rules of perfection (Gottsched, 1751; Tonelli, 1955a).
Similar ideas are expounded in 1734 by J. U. König
(Tonelli, 1955a; Baeumler, 1923), by A. G. Baumgarten
in Metaphysica (Baumgarten, 1739) and by G. F. Meier
(Tonelli, 1955a; Baeumler, 1923). Lessing about 1758
still sponsors a rationalist view (Tonelli, 1955a); the
same is true for what R. Mengs calls “the best taste”
(Mengs, 1762). Th. Abbt in 1762 considers taste as re-
quired not only for appreciating art but also for science
(Abbt, 1780). But Crusius' “moral taste” is conceived
as an individually variable capacity to enjoy goodness
and beauty (Crusius, 1744)—and even philosophy, ac-
cording to G. H. Schramm, a pupil of Crusius
(Schramm, 1772). With Moses Mendelssohn, the
rationalist view is questioned: taste is independent of
intellect, and it is considered as relative; it is related
also to the sublime, and in this respect it seems to be
universal (Braitmaier, 1888; Tonelli, 1855a).
For Kant in 1764, taste is independent of intellect
and of considerations of utility, and it is different from
the moral sense; it is related to the sublime also. Kant
develops an extensive national typology of taste
(Tonelli, 1955a). For Riedel (1767) taste is irrational
and almost completely relative (Tonelli, 1955a). After
1768, Kant develops in a very original way his notion
of taste in the framework of his new philosophy. Taste
is considered as universal, but a posteriori and subjec-
tive, as a sensible judgment on the form of intuition
(Tonelli, 1955a). Sulzer's position is eclectic (1771):
taste is a special power, distinct from reason and
moral feeling, and nevertheless it is the internal feeling
for truth and goodness; beauty, perceived by taste, is
neither perfection nor goodness, but the highest beauty
is connected with both. Taste is universal, and its judg-
ment can be rationally tested (Sulzer, 1792). In 1755,
Herder was awarded a prize in a competition an-
nounced by the Berlin Academy on the “causes of the
corruption of taste.” For Herder, on Hamann's sugges-
tion (Grappin, 1952), taste is a product of genius, as
it corresponds to the orderly use of the genius's powers;
it acts through reason and judgment, but it is not the
same as virtue (Ursachen des gesunknen Geschmacks
... [1775], sec. 1).
