2. A feature of ancient skepticism throughout its
history was a fondness for catchwords. The most widely
current was epochē, “suspension of judgment,” used by
both Pyrrhonists and Academics (see Ac. II.59;
Plutarch, Moralia 1122A; PH I.8, 10, 196; DL IX.61,
62). There is some question, however, whether it goes
back to Pyrrho himself, and it does not appear in the
fragments of Timon. Often coupled with epochē is
akatalepsia, i.e., “nonapprehension,” which probably
derives from the Academic attack on the Stoic theory
of apprehension (katalepsis; cf. Ac. II.17-18, 31). Sextus
(PH I.1-3) assigns it to the Academy rather than to
his own school (see also Photius, III, 119-20). Diogenes
Laërtius, however (IX.61), uses it along with epochē
to characterize Pyrrho's teaching. More certainly
Pyrrhonic is the phrase ou mallon (“no more this than
that”), which appears in the fragments of Timon (cf.
DL IX.76; PE XIV.18.3), in Aenesidemus (Photius, III,
119), and in Sextus (cf. PH I.187-91). It also had a place
in pre-Pyrrhonic philosophy; see De Lacy, Phronesis,
3 (1958), 59-71. The refusal to incline this way or that
was expressed by arrhepsia (PH I.190; DL IX.74), the
refusal to make assertions by aphasia (Timon in PE
XIV.18.4, 19; PH I.192-93; cf. Plutarch, Moralia
1123C), the avoidance of distinctions by ouden horizein
(Timon in DL IX.76; cf. 71 and 74; PH I.197), the
avoidance of rashness in assent by aproptosia (DL
IX.74; cf. PH I.20, 177, 186; II.21; Ac. I.45), the equal
balance of arguments for and against any thesis by
isostheneia (DL IX.73, 76, 101; PH I.8; AM IX.207;
cf. Ac. I.45: paria momenta).
Such terms as these gave the skeptics a kind of
identity and served as substitutes for positive doctrine.
The same may be said of their many schematisms, some
of which have already been mentioned. Among the
most important in later skepticism were Aenesidemus'
ten tropes in support of the view that although it is
possible for me to describe each thing as it appears
to me, I must suspend judgment as to what sort of thing
it is in itself.
The tropes are listed, with minor differences, by both
Sextus (PH I.36-163) and Diogenes (IX.79-88). As
Sextus presents them, the same thing appears different
(1) to different species of animals; (2) to different in-
dividuals, by virtue of their differences in mind and
body; (3) to different senses, as a painting appears flat
to the touch but to the eyes seems to have depth; (4) to
the same sense in different states, e.g., in sickness or
health, in youth or old age; (5) because of differences
in position, distance, or place, as the square tower
appears round at a distance, and the oar appears bent
where it enters the water; (6) by virtue of differences
in the things in whose company it appears, as an object
heavy in air appears light in water; (7) because of
differences in quantity and situation, as grains of sand
when scattered appear rough but in a heap appear soft;
(8) in different relations, everything being in some
sense relative; (9) insofar as it is encountered continu-
ously or rarely, as an earthquake is more frightening
to those who experience it for the first time than to
persons accustomed to earthquakes; (10) according to
different ways of life, customs, and beliefs, as the
Taurians sacrifice strangers to Artemis, but the Greeks
forbid human sacrifice. Diogenes gives to the list a less
arbitrary sequence; his order is 1-4, 10, 6, 5, 7, 9, 8.
Aristocles (
PE XIV.18.11) gives the number of tropes
as nine; no satisfactory explanation of the discrepancy
has yet been found.
The five tropes of Agrippa are broader in scope,
dealing not only with appearances but also with proof.
They are given at some length by Sextus (PH I.164-77)
and summarized by Diogenes (IX.88-89). The first is
that as we are not able to resolve the disagreements
and conflicts in life and in philosophy, we end up by
suspending judgment. The second is that as anything
submitted in support of a proposition must itself be
supported, an infinite regress results. The third is that
a perceived object appears to be of such and such a
description relative to that which makes the judgment
and to the things perceived along with it, but we
suspend judgment about its true nature. The fourth is
that dogmatists, in order to escape infinite regress, take
unproved assumptions as their starting point. The fifth
is that when that which ought to establish some con-
clusion can only be proved from the conclusion, since
we can use neither for the proof of the other, we
suspend judgment.
Finally Sextus (PH I.178-79) assigns to certain
unnamed skeptics two tropes that aim at a formula
of universal application. Certainty about a thing is got
either (1) from the thing itself, or (2) from some other
thing. The first alternative is refuted by the unresolved
disputes of the natural philosophers; the second leads
to infinite regress.
