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Dictionary of the History of Ideas

Studies of Selected Pivotal Ideas
  
  

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1. Egypt. The earliest evidence for our subject is
found in Egypt. There, already by about 2400 B.C. as
the Pyramid Texts (Pyr.) attest, the Egyptians believed
that a person's post-mortem well-being could be jeop-
ardized by accusations of wrongdoing brought against
him after death. Since these Texts are an amorphous
collection of prayers, incantations, hymns, and myths
of diverse origin, which the priests of Heliopolis put
together in the belief that they would assist a dead
pharaoh to secure eternal felicity, the various refer-
ences in them to a post-mortem judgment are difficult
to interpret. The following passage, for example, seems
to be designed to refute all kinds of accusations, even
those that might be brought by animals:

There is no accuser (representing) a living person against
N (the deceased king); there is no accuser (representing)
a dead person against N; there is no accuser (representing)
a goose against N; there is no accuser (representing) a bull
against N

(Pyr. 386 a-b).

The situation implied here is significant; for a tribunal
is envisaged before which the deceased may be ac-
cused, if he had in some way abused a human being
or an animal. Who presided over this post-mortem
tribunal, how its transactions were ordered, and what
penalties might be imposed, are not indicated. The
implication that there was a divine law or order, which
the deceased might have transgressed, is suggested by
another Text (Pyr. 319): “N comes forth to justice
(maat); he brings it, that it may be with him.”

This reference to maat is of basic importance, be-
cause its appearance in the Pyramid Texts constitutes
the earliest evidence of the idea of a transcendental
moral order that recurs, under various names, in many
later cultural traditions, as will be noted. For the
Egyptians maat had several facets of meaning. It could
signify justice, truth, and good order in both a social
and cosmic context. In mythological imagery, maat was
portrayed as a goddess, whose distinguishing symbol
was a feather; she was regarded as the daughter of the
sun-god Rē, and, by a curious transformation of
imagery, as the food upon which Rē lived. Thus, Rē,
who was the chief god of the Egyptian state, was
regarded as embodying maat as the principle of order
in the universe and in human society.

How these intimations in the Pyramid Texts of belief
in a moral order, of which the sun-god Rē was the


225

guardian, affected the lives of individuals is revealed
in certain tomb inscriptions of about the same period.
A notable example is that on the tomb of a noble
named Herkhuf. He claims that he “gave bread to the
hungry, clothing to the naked, and ferried him who
had no boat.” He further declares that he never said
anything evil “to a powerful one against any people,”
for he desired “that it might be well with me in the
Great God's presence.” Despite its rather complacent
assertion of virtue, in the history of ethics and religion
this inscription is the earliest evidence of belief that
positive “good-neighborly” conduct would win divine
approval, particularly after death. The “Great God”
of the inscription was undoubtedly Rē, and Herkhuf's
statement implies that the deity was concerned with
a man's moral behavior, and would punish or reward
accordingly after death.

The inscription on Herkhuf's tomb reveals no con-
sciousness of sin; but the assertion of his virtues surely
implies that contrary behavior would transgress the
code of conduct that the Great God required of men.
Greater moral sensitivity is shown in a somewhat later
(ca. 2000 B.C.) writing known as the Instruction for
King Meri-ka-rē.
Here it is stated that “more accept-
able is the character of one upright of heart than the
ox of the evil doer,” and warning is given that each
man must face judgment after death, with his deeds,
good or bad, set in heaps before him.

Despite this evidence of what James Breasted and
others have aptly called the “dawn of conscience,” it
is significant that the early Egyptian documents reveal
primary concern for a form of salvation that is quite
unconnected with moral issues. This salvation, which
was fervently sought, was from death and its conse-
quences. The means employed was a combination of
ritual magic and practical action. A technique of ritual
embalmment was developed, which was patterned on
that which was believed to have been employed to
revivify the divine hero Osiris after his murder by his
evil brother, Set. The efficacy of this mortuary ritual
depended on the careful enactment, on behalf of a
deceased person, of what had once been done for
Osiris; but no question was asked of the moral fitness
of the deceased to enjoy this resurrection. By the New
Kingdom period (from 1580 B.C.), however, belief in
a post-mortem judgment was incorporated into these
Osirian funerary rites. The so-called Book of the Dead,
which was composed at this time to assist the dead
to attain eternal beatitude, impressively attests to this
development. Two of its chapters (XXX and CXXV)
are especially concerned with the judgment which the
dead had to face. In many of the manuscripts, these
chapters are illustrated with vignettes which graphi-
cally present the Egyptian conception of the awful
ordeal. The importance of this conception for both the
history of soteriology and ethics is such that it requires
a measure of detailed analysis here.

The depictions of the judgment scene invariably
show a large pair of balances standing in the middle
of the Hall of the Two Truths (Maati). In one scale-pan
the feather symbol of maat is set, and in the other
the hieroglyph sign (ib) of the heart of the deceased.
The mortuary-god Anubis supervises the weighing, and
the assessment is recorded by the scribe-god Thoth.
The transaction generally takes place in the presence
of Osiris, the lord of the dead, and it is watched
apprehensively by the deceased. Close by a fantastic
monster, with a crocodile's head awaits an adverse
verdict: it is Am-mut, the Eater of the Dead.

The judgment scene usually accompanies the text
of Chapter XXX of the Book of the Dead, which is
a prayer addressed by the deceased to his heart not
to witness against him at this critical juncture. The
hypostatization of the heart implied here is a unique
feature of ancient Egyptian thought. In texts, the heart
is sometimes referred to as the “God in man,” and it
was evidently regarded as a conscious censor of the
individual's behavior throughout life and ready to tes-
tify against him in the judgment after death.

The weighing of the heart was evidently related to
another transaction with which Chapter CXXV is
concerned. This Chapter is prefaced by a descriptive
rubric: “Words spoken when one enters the Hall of the
Two Truths. To separate N (the deceased) from his sins
(ḫww), and to see the face of all the gods.” Then follow
two Declarations of Innocence, sometimes misleadingly
called Negative Confessions. The first Declaration is
addressed to Osiris; the second to forty-two demonic
beings. Each Declaration consists of a number of
asseverations of innocence of certain specified crimes.
The following are representative examples from both
lists, and include both moral and ritual offenses:

I have not killed... caused pain to anyone... diminished
the food offerings in the temples... had sexual relations
with a boy... stolen the loaves of the glorified (dead)...
diminished the corn-measure.

How these Declarations of Innocence were related
to the weighing of the heart is not formally stated in
the relevant texts: but a logical nexus can be reasonably
made out. It would seem that the Declarations were
first made by the deceased on arrival at the Hall of
the Two Truths. But these solemn protestations of
innocence were not deemed enough until the moral
integrity of the person making them had been proved.
This was done by weighing his heart against maat. If
the assessment was favorable, he was significantly
proclaimed maa kheru (“true of voice”) and thus justi-
fied in his protestations of innocence.


226

Considerable attention has been given here to this
ancient Egyptian evidence because it is not only the
earliest we have of the “dawn of conscience,” but it
also concerns the most elaborate conception of a post-
mortem judgment until the evolution of Christian
eschatology. The Declarations of Innocence also pro-
vide our earliest known categories of what was con-
sidered to be sin, in that the act concerned a trans-
gressed divine law. It is significant, too, that the ancient
Egyptians, while they sought salvation from death by
ritual means, believed that the individual's eternal
destiny was finally determined by his own character.